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Aesthetic  Perception,  Attention  and  Aesthetic  Psychology  
Alan  Mark  Christopher  Bowden  
Abstract  
What  are  the  psychological  foundations  of  aesthetic  experience?  Disagreements  about  
how   to   answer   this  question  underlie   tensions  between   the   experiences  described  by  
those  in  the  developing  field  of  everyday  aesthetics  and  many  art-­‐‑centred  accounts  of  
aesthetic  experience.  I  argue  that  neither  has  provided  the  psychological  framework  to  
support   their   arguments   in   favour  of  or   against   the   extension  of   aesthetic   experience  
into  everyday   life.   Such  a   framework   is   required   in  order   to   reconcile   the   two   fields.  
This   thesis   aims   to   develop   an   empirically   informed   aesthetic   psychology   which  
accommodates   both   everyday   and   paradigmatic   aesthetic   experience   without  
compromising  what  is  distinctive  about  each.    
  In   order   to   understand   the   oft-­‐‑unacknowledged   assumptions   in   everyday   and  
mainstream   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   I   distinguish   between   “broad”   and  
“narrow”  aesthetic  psychology.   I  argue  that  each  approach  differs  with  respect   to  the  
necessity   of   attention   for   aesthetic   experience.   The   narrow   approach   to   aesthetic  
psychology   underlies   many   contemporary   accounts   and   places   an   “attention  
condition”   on   aesthetic   experience;   the   broad   approach   underlies   many   accounts   of  
everyday  aesthetic  experience  and  involves  no  such  condition.  
I   develop   a   broad  psychological   account   of   aesthetic   perception   as   the   perceptual  
representation  of  bound  qualities  and  suggest  that  its  minimal  or  “bare”  form  goes  on  
in   the   absence   of   attention,   whilst   its   “rich”   form   requires   attention   and   supports  
characteristically   appreciative   activities   of   mind.   Using   contemporary   empirical   and  
philosophical  work  on  attention  and  its  relation  to  consciousness  and  cognition  I  argue  
that   there   is   an   attention   condition   on   rich   aesthetic   perception   (and   aesthetic  
appreciation),   but   not   on   bare   aesthetic   perception:   this   establishes   a   broad   aesthetic  
psychology.   In  this  way  I  reconcile  everyday  and  mainstream  aesthetic  experience  by  
creating   a   continuum   of   aesthetic   engagement   which   runs   from   the   fleeting   and  
unattended  experiences  of  broad  aesthetic  psychology  to  the  complex  and  appreciative  
experiences  of  narrow  aesthetic  psychology.  
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How  can  everyday  life  be  defined?  It  surrounds  us,  it  besieges  us,  on  all  sides  
and  from  all  directions.  We  are  inside  it  and  outside  of  it.  No  so-­‐‑called  
“elevated”  activity  can  be  reduced  to  it,  nor  can  it  be  separated  from  it.  Its  
activities  are  born,  they  grow  and  emerge;  once  they  have  left  the  nourishing  
earth  of  their  native  land,  not  one  of  them  can  be  formed  and  fulfilled  on  its  
own  account.    
Clearing  the  Ground  
Henri  Lefebvre1  
  
Venice  is  not  so  much  a  town  as  a  representation  of  a  town.  In  the  Italian  theatre  
the  whole  arrangement  is  pivoted  not  on  the  stage  or  the  auditorium  but  on  the  
footlights  that  separate  them,  for  if  they  were  on  the  same  level  there  would  be  
no   spectacle.   Similarly,   what   defines   Venice   is   not   Venice   but   the   lagoon  
separating  it   from  the  profane,  utilitarian,   interested  outside  world,  a  patch  of  




[The]  task  is  to  restore  continuity  between  the  refined  and  intensified  forms  of  
experience  that  are  works  of  art  and  the  everyday  events,  doings,  and  sufferings  
that  are  universally  recognized  to  constitute  experience.  Mountain  peaks  do  not  
float  unsupported;  they  do  not  even  just  rest  upon  the  earth.  They  are  the  earth  
in  one  of  its  manifest  operations.    
Art  as  Experience  
John  Dewey3    
                                                                                                 
1  (Lefebvre,  1961/2008,  p.  29).  
2  (Debray,  2012,  pp.  16-­‐‑17).  
3  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  2).  
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Introduction  
There   would   seem   to   be   nothing   more   obvious,   more   tangible   and  
palpable  than  the  present  moment.  And  yet  it  eludes  us  completely.  All  
the  sadness  of   life   lies   in   that   fact.   In   the  course  of  a  single  second,  our  
senses  of  sight,  of  hearing,  of  smell,  register  (knowingly  or  not)  a  swarm  
of  events  and  a  parade  of  sensations  and  ideas  passes  through  our  head.  
Each  instant  represents  a  little  universe,  irrevocably  forgotten  in  the  next  
instant.  
The  Art  of  the  Novel  
Milan  Kundera4    
Here  is  a  plausible  experience  of  art:  Whilst  gazing  in  rapt  contemplation  at  
Titian'ʹs  Diana  and  Actaeon  the  minutes  seem  to  fly  by.  The  gallery  dissolves  and  
the   other   visitors   seem   to   drop   away.   We   are   immediately   struck   by   the  
painting'ʹs   balance;   by   the   remarkable   handling   of   colour   to   evoke   light   and  
shade  and   form;  by  what  must  once  have  been  an  astonishing  yet  now   faded  
blue  in  the  distance  and  its  echo  in  a  nymph'ʹs  drapery;  by  the  strong  red  tones  
balancing  one  another  across  the  canvas;  and  by  the  solid  verticals  of  a  column  
and   a   male   figure   framing   the   scene:   above   all   the   poise,   the   moment   of  
suspension   supported   by   the   triangular   compositional   structure   which  
integrates  the  whole.    
Perhaps  our  experience  of  the  work  is  informed  by  knowledge  of  its  subject  
matter   and   art-­‐‑historical   background.   Capturing   the   moment   between  
discovery  and  transformation  that  precedes  the  hunter'ʹs  flight  and  death,  Titian  
presages  Actaeon'ʹs  fate  in  the  scarlet  hanging  cloth,  the  hunting  dog  by  his  side,  
and  the  lapdog  with  its  hackles  raised  opposite;  but  most  of  all  in  the  skull  of  a  
deer   hanging   on   the   column  which   balances   Actaeon   across   the   canvas.   The  
                                                                                                 
4  (Kundera,  2005,  pp.  24-­‐‑25).  
   12  
calm   stream   will   momentarily   be   disturbed   as   Diana   effects   Actaeon'ʹs  
transformation   by   splashing   him   with   water.   Perhaps   we   are   aware   of   the  
work'ʹs   commissioning   by   Phillip   II   of   Spain;   of   Titian'ʹs   belief   that   he   was  
creating  in  his  'ʹpoesie'ʹ  series  the  visual  equivalent  of  epic  poetry;  of  the  work'ʹs  
place  in  that  series  of  six  based  on  Ovid'ʹs  Metamorphoses;  of  the  recent  campaign  
to  keep  the  painting  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Perhaps  our  knowledge  is  limited  
to  its  being  a  work  of  oil  on  canvas.  Perhaps  not  even  that.  
Thus,   the  sheer  expressive  power  of   the   individuals  and  ensemble  depicted  
seem   to   reward   close   attention   and   repeated   viewing,   for   somehow   the  
experience   cannot   be   captured  or   recollected   as   fully   as  we  might  wish.  As   a  
result   we   set   aside   time   and   mental   space   to   consider,   appreciate,   and   take  
pleasure  in  Titian'ʹs  achievement  in  terms  of  its  product,  the  process  itself,  and  
its  effect  on  us  and  the  nature  of  that  experience'ʹs  development.  This  experience  
might  well   involve   or   produce   a   judgement   of   the   value   of   the  work.   Such   a  
judgement   might   be   as   straightforward   as   the   belief   that   the   painting   is  
beautiful,   without   necessarily   involving   any   explicit   reasoning   in   aid   of   the  
judgment;  or  it  might  be  a  more  nuanced  collection  of  appraisals  of  the  work'ʹs  
formal  and  expressive  qualities  combined  with  the  dovetailing  of  such  qualities  
with  its  subject  matter  and  art-­‐‑historical  significance.  Perhaps  this  reflective  and  
complex   experience   of   the   painting   and   its   qualities   is   what   we   find   so  
peculiarly  valuable.  Perhaps  that  is  why  we  return.    
This  is  a  picture  of  the  aesthetic  appreciation  of  art  which  should  be  familiar  
in  philosophical  aesthetics.  It   involves  an  absorbed,  attentive  contemplation  of  
appearances   and   the   qualities   which   interrelate   to   produce   the   particular  
character   of   the  work.   This   aesthetic   experience  may   be   pleasurable;   and   the  
value  of   such  experience  as  well   as   that  of   its  objects  might  be  understood   in  
terms   of   such   pleasure.   As   an   experience   of   art   we   might   also   include  
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judgements  of  originality  and  the  satisfaction  of  the  artist’s  aesthetic  and  artistic  
aims:  however  we  think  those  are  related.5  
So  goes  a  generic  account  of  aesthetic  experience  in  what  we  might  call  “art-­‐‑
centred   aesthetics”   (Saito,   2007).   It   links   a   form   of   experience  with   a   kind   of  
value   and  evaluation,  with   the   relations  between  qualities,   and   the   context   in  
which   such   an   experience   occurs.  We   can   imagine  modified   versions   for   the  
other  arts.  Yet,  we  might  ask,  does  this  exhaust  the  forms  of  experience  we  can  
call   “aesthetic”?   Discussions   of   the   aesthetic   experience   of   nature   are   now  
familiar   and   fairly   uncontroversial,   although,   of   course,   as   Ronald   Hepburn  
wrote,  “we  are  in  nature  and  a  part  of  nature,  we  do  not  stand  over  against  it  as  
over  against  a  painting  on  a  wall”  (Hepburn,  1966,  p.  523).6  Can  we  go  further?  
Are   there  other  aspects  of  our   lives   into  which  aesthetic  experience  or   similar  
forms  of  aesthetic  engagement  might  extend?  
This  is  a  thesis  about  aesthetic  experience  and  the  ways  our  minds  shape  the  
nature  and  extent  of  such  experience.  This   issue  has  become  pressing  because  
many  contemporary  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience  seem  ill-­‐‑suited  to  explain  
the   kind   of   everyday   experiences  which   it   has   recently   been   suggested   have   a  
claim  to  be  regarded  as  aesthetic.  In  contrast  to  the  characteristically  attentive,  
absorbed,  and  contemplative  experiences  of  the  qualities  of  objects  which  many  
philosophers   of   art   consider  paradigmatically   aesthetic,   “everyday   aesthetics”  
emphasises  forms  of  experience  characterised  by  inattention,  distraction,  and  a  
vague  awareness  of  sensory  qualities  (e.g.  (Irvin,  2008a;  Saito,  2007)).  
                                                                                                 
5   This   characterisation   draws   on   a  wide   variety   of   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience.   For   a  
small   sample,   see   (Beardsley,   1981,   1982a;   Budd,   1995;   Carroll,   2006a;   Goldman,   1995;  
Iseminger,  2006;  Levinson,  1996b,  forthcoming;  Saito,  2007;  Sibley,  2001b,  2001d;  Stecker,  2006a;  
Stolnitz,  1969;  Walton,  1993).  
6   For   overviews   of   environmental   aesthetics   which   pay   particular   attention   to   the  
relationship   between   art   and   environment   see   (Carlson,   2011),   (Carlson,   2007),   and   (Brady,  
2003).  See  Carlson  for  a  much-­‐‑debated  cognitive  theory  of  the  aesthetic  appreciation  of  natural  
environments.  Carlson’s  original  statement  of   the  view   is   (Carlson,  1979),  but  he  develops  his  
“scientific  cognitivism”  at  greater  length  in  (Carlson,  2000).  
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These  putatively  aesthetic  experiences  are  very  different  from  the  art-­‐‑centred  
form   of   experience   described   by,   for   example,  Monroe   Beardsley,  who  wrote  
that  “the  painting  and  the  music  invite  us  to  do  what  we  would  seldom  do  in  
ordinary  life—pay  attention  only  to  what  we  are  seeing  or  hearing,  and  ignore  
everything  else.  They  summon  up  our  energies  for  an  unusually  narrow  field  of  
concern”  (Beardsley,  1981,  p.  528).  On  the  art-­‐‑centred  view,  aesthetic  experience  
is  distinguished   in  part  by   its  difference   from  everyday   life.  How,   then,  should  
we   understand   the   relationship   between   experiences  which   seem   so   different  
whilst  both  claiming  to  be  in  some  sense  aesthetic?  What,  if  anything,  could  the  
experience   of   hanging   laundry   (Rautio,   2009)   or   cleaning   the   house   (Leddy,  
1995)  have  in  common  with  the  attentive  and  detached  contemplation  of  music  
or  painting?    
The   aesthetic   experiences   discussed   by   everyday   and   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics  
can  seem  different  not  merely  in  degree  but  in  kind.  Are  everyday  experiences  
legitimately   aesthetic?   If   they   are,   then   we   need   some   way   to   go   about  
reconciling  these  diverse  forms  of  aesthetic  experience.  One  way  to  do  that  is  to  
think   about   the   psychological   foundations   of   everyday   and   art-­‐‑centred   or  
contemplative  aesthetic  experience.    
In   attempting   to   understand   the   operations   of   the   mind   in   an   aesthetic  
context   we   are   engaging   in   what   we   might   call   “aesthetic   psychology”.  
Questions   in  aesthetic  psychology   include   the   following:  Which  psychological  
processes   and   capacities   are   required   for   distinctively   aesthetic   forms   of  
experience?  Can  we  distinguish  between  different  forms  of  aesthetic  experience  
on  the  basis  of  the  psychological  capacities  they  involve?  Attempting  to  answer  
these  questions  should  help  us  with  the  problem  of  the  status  and  relationship  
of  everyday  and  paradigmatic  forms  of  aesthetic  experience.    
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This  consequence  becomes  clearer  if  we  consider  some  of  the  ramifications  of  
aesthetic  psychology   for  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience   (and  vice  versa).  For  
example,  if,  along  with  many  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience,  we  think  having  
such   an   experience   requires   that   certain   epistemic   or   cognitive   conditions   are  
satisfied  in  or  by  experience,  then  aesthetic  experience  will  be  restricted  to  the  
occasions   on   which   our   psychology   can   meet   those   conditions.  
Correspondingly,  if  aesthetic  experience  requires  a  particular  form  of  awareness  
of  appearances  (perhaps  in  order  to  satisfy  those  epistemic  conditions)  then  that  
form   of   awareness   needs   to   be   possible   in   any   context   in   which   aesthetic  
experience  is  to  be  possible.  If,  for  whatever  reason,  our  psychology  is  such  that  
conditions  for  aesthetic  experience  cannot  be  met  in  a  particular  circumstance,  
then  we  can  safely  say  that  aesthetic  experience  is  ruled  out  in  that  instance.    
So   aesthetic   psychology   and   aesthetic   experience   stand   in   a   reciprocal  
relationship:   what   we   think   aesthetic   experience   is   affects   the   kinds   of  
psychological  capacities  required  for  its  occurrence;  and  the  presence  or  absence  
of   those   capacities   in   different   contexts   affects   the   possibility   of   aesthetic  
experience.   One   way   to   go   about   understanding   the   nature   of   aesthetic  
experience  in  everyday  life,  then,  is  to  think  about  the  psychology  involved  in  
accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   and   the   capacity   for   everyday   experience   to  
meet  the  psychological  demands  of  such  accounts.  It  might  be  the  case  that  we  
end   up   adjusting   both   our   account   of   aesthetic   experience   and   our  
understanding   of   the   psychological   capacities   required   to   instantiate   such  
experience.    
One   of   the   aims   of   this   thesis   is   thus   to   analyse   the   assumptions   about  
aesthetic  psychology  and  its  relationship  to  aesthetic  experience  which  operate  
in  contemporary  aesthetics.  If  our  aesthetic  psychology  is  so  significant  for  the  
forms  of  aesthetic  experience  of  which  we  are  capable  in  different  circumstances  
then   we   need   to   be   very   clear,   firstly,   about   the   psychological   demands   our  
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accounts   of   the  varieties   of   such   experience   involve;   and,   secondly,   about   the  
contexts  in  which  such  demands  are  satisfied.    
We   can   understand   contemporary   aesthetic   psychology   in   terms   of  what   I  
will   call   the   “broad”   and   “narrow”   approaches.   Each   approach   can   be  
understood  as  a  set  of  views  about  what  renders  an  experience  aesthetic  and  the  
psychological  capacities  and  mental  states  required  to  instantiate  or  possess  that  
character.   In   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   only   a   fairly   limited   range   of  
experiences   qualify   as   aesthetic   because   the   psychological   requirements   for  
aesthetic  experience  serve  to  restrict  the  contexts  in  which  such  experiences  are  
possible.   This   serves   to   exclude  many   forms   of   everyday   experience   because  
they  don’t  satisfy  those  psychological  requirements.    
In   contrast,   broad   aesthetic   psychology   considers   a   wider   range   of  
experiences   to   be   aesthetic,   either   because   broad   theorists   consider   these  
psychological  requirements  to  be  met  more  often  than  narrow  theorists  believe,  
or   because   they   hold   a   different   view   about   the   capacities   and  mental   states  
required   for   aesthetic   experience.   In   other  words,   broad  and  narrow   theorists  
can   disagree   both   about   what   renders   experience   aesthetic   and   about   the  
psychology  involved  in  doing  so.  
Much  of  contemporary  philosophical  aesthetics,  I  will  suggest,  has  inherited  
the  narrow  approach  to  aesthetic  psychology.  I  will  argue  that  narrow  accounts  
effect   the   exclusion   of   the   everyday   by   adopting   or   assuming   a   problematic  
aesthetic  psychology.  Whether  or  not  we  ultimately  consider  everyday  aesthetic  
experience   plausible,   this   conclusion   should   be   premised   upon   a   clear  
understanding   of   the   psychological   framework   underpinning   aesthetic  
experience.   I   will   argue,   however,   that   our   aesthetic   psychology   has   been  
under-­‐‑theorised.  
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In   particular,  my   analysis  will   show   that   assumptions   about   attention   and  
the   forms   of   awareness   required   for   aesthetic   experience   lie   at   the   heart   of   a  
conflict   between   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic   psychology.   Narrow   theorists  
consider   forms   of   epistemic,   cognitive,   or   evaluative   interest   in   appearances  
characteristic   of   aesthetic   experience,   and   (implicitly   or   explicitly)   hold   that  
attention  is  necessary  to  secure  the  right  kind  of  awareness  for  this  interest.  In  
contrast,  broad  theorists  do  not  consider  such  interest  exhaustive  of  all  forms  of  
aesthetic   experience   and   so   do   not   require   attention   to   secure   a   form   of  
awareness  which   can   support   it.   In   other  words,   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology   disagree   over   the   significance   of   attention   in   determining   the  
possibility  and  extent  of   aesthetic   experience.  Each  comes   to  a  different   set  of  
conclusions  about  the  aesthetic  character  of  everyday  experience  as  a  result.  
Most   of   those   who   adopt   an   implicitly   or   explicitly   broader   approach   to  
aesthetic  psychology  work  in  the  field  of  everyday  aesthetics.  As  we  have  seen,  
in   contrast   to   the   characteristic   target   of   narrow   approaches—art,   nature,  
contemplative  experience,  and  appreciation—everyday  aesthetics  addresses  the  
kinds   of   experience   mentioned   above:   inattentive   and   distinctly   un-­‐‑
contemplative   experiences   of   daily   life.   This   difference   between,   for   example,  
inattentive   sensory   experience   (Irvin,   2008a),   on   the   one   hand,   and   focused  
reflection   on   the   relations   between   nonaesthetic   and   aesthetic   qualities  
(Levinson,   forthcoming),   on   the   other   hand,   has   led   at   least   one   everyday  
aesthetician   to   propose   two   separate   domains:   everyday   aesthetics   and   art-­‐‑
centred  aesthetics  (Saito,  2007).  One  of  the  aims  of  this  thesis  is  to  analyse  and  
resist   this   separation  and  begin   to  solve   the  apparent  clash  between  everyday  
and   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics   by   framing   it   in   terms   of   the   role   of   attention   in  
aesthetic  psychology.  
I   will   argue   that   we   should   reject   the   narrow   approach   to   aesthetic  
psychology   in   favour   of   a   broad   approach  which   can   do   justice   to   everyday  
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aesthetic   experience   as   well   as   the   aesthetic   experiences   which   are   the  
characteristic   target   for   aesthetic   theory.   However,   my   aim   is   not   simply   to  
argue  in  favour  of  the  broad  approach  in  one  of  its  current  manifestations.  My  
analysis   will   show   that   both   approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   are  
problematic  as  they  stand.  In  particular,  what  we  find  when  we  undertake  the  
analysis  of  contemporary  broad  and  narrow  approaches  is  that  attention  and  its  
relation   to   awareness   are   under-­‐‑acknowledged   and   under-­‐‑theorised   in  
aesthetics.   We   will   need   to   delve   into   the   foundations   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology  in  order  to  rebuild  a  stronger  broad  approach.  
My   approach   enlists   the   resources   of   empirical   as   well   as   philosophical  
psychology.   I   use   work   on   perceptual   organisation   and   the   constitution   of  
objects  in  experience  to  argue  for  a  foundational  concept  of  aesthetic  perception  
as  the  perceptual  representation  of  individual  objects  possessing  (or  constituted  
by)   qualities   of   appearance.   I   then   use   this   model   and   contemporary  
philosophical  and  empirical  work  on  attention,  consciousness,  and  cognition  to  
argue   that   aesthetic  perception   is  possible   in   the   absence   of   attention,   but   that  
richer   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement—including   the   appreciative   activities  
targeted  by  the  narrow  approach—do  require  attention.  This  dual  philosophical  
and   psychological   methodology   allows   us   to   begin   to   remedy   the   under-­‐‑
theorisation   of   attention   in   aesthetics   and   to   reconcile   the   broad   and   narrow  
approaches  by  establishing  a   continuum  of  aesthetic  perception   running   from  
the   unattended   to   the   attended:   and   thus   to   find   a   place   for   everyday  
experiences  in  aesthetic  psychology.  
The   first   task   is   to   understand   why   an   interest   in   everyday   aesthetic  
experience  and  its  relationship  to  accounts  of  paradigmatic  aesthetic  experience  
should   lead   us   to   questions   about   aesthetic   psychology   and,   specifically,   the  
role  of  attention  in  that  psychology.  I  argue  in  the  first  chapter  that  one  of  the  
central  conflicts  between  everyday  and  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetic  experience  can  be  
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understood   as   a   disagreement   about   the   range   of   experiences  which  may   be  
qualified   as   aesthetic,  which   can   itself   be   traced   to   differing   views   about   the  
psychological   capacities   required   for   experiences   with   aesthetic   character.   I  
introduce   the   distinction   between   broad   and   narrow   approaches   to   aesthetic  
psychology   in   order   to   analyse   the   oft-­‐‑unacknowledged   differences   in  
contemporary  accounts  about  the  psychological  capacities  required  for  aesthetic  
experience   and   the   consequences   of   such   views   for   the   range   of   experiences  
which  qualify  as  aesthetic.  
In  establishing   the  distinction   I   examine   the   foundations  and  motivation  of  
the  narrow  approach  in  Kant’s  account  of  the  judgement  of  taste  (Kant,  2000).  I  
argue   that   Kant   placed   conditions   on   our   aesthetic   psychology   because   he  
wanted  to  ground  the  subjective  universality  of  the  judgement  of  taste  and  that  
this  serves  to  narrow  the  range  of  aesthetic  experience.  I  contrast  this  with  the  
broader   aesthetic   psychology   of   John   Dewey   (Dewey,   2005),   who   rejected  
Kantian   contemplation   in   favour   of   an   experience   which   is   continuous   with  
everyday  life  and,  in  doing  so,  planted  the  seeds  of  everyday  aesthetics.  
Having  established  the  origins  of  broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  psychology,  we  
are  well  placed   to  understand  their  contemporary  manifestations.   I  argue   that  
in   contemporary  aesthetics   the  central   conflict  between   the  narrow  and  broad  
approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   lies   in   a   disagreement   about   the   role   of  
attention  and  the  forms  of  awareness  required  for  aesthetic  experience.  Indeed,  
time  and  again  attention  emerges  as  the  fault  line  running  between  broad  and  
narrow  aesthetic  psychology.  Whereas  narrow  accounts  focus  on  absorbed  and  
attentive   experiences   leading   to   aesthetic   judgements,   broad   aesthetic  
psychology   (exemplified   here   by   everyday   aesthetics)   frequently   emphasises  
both  a  lack  of  (or  divided)  attention  to  the  objects  and  contents  of  experience  as  
well   as   a   vagueness   in   our   awareness   of   them.   I   conclude  by   considering   the  
significance   of   the   aestheticisation   of   perception   for   the   relationship   between  
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everyday   and   so-­‐‑called   “art-­‐‑centred”   aesthetics,   the   forms   of   aesthetic  
experience  each  discusses;  and   the   implications  of  broad  aesthetic  psychology  
and  the  role  of  attention  for  our  understanding  of  the  aesthetic  experience  of  art  
and  criticism.  
Once   it  has  been  suggested   that  attention  and   its   relationship   to  awareness  
lie   at   the   heart   of   the   disagreement   between   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology,  we  need  to  analyse  the  role  attention  plays  in  these  approaches.  In  
chapter  two  I  introduce  a  tool  for  analysis  which  I  call  “the  attention  condition”  
that   we   can   use   to   understand   the   ways   in   which   contemporary   accounts  
consider  attention  significant.  After   introducing  a  “common-­‐‑sense”  concept  of  
attention  with  which   to  analyse  some  examples  of  each  approach   I  argue   that  
narrow   approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   involve   an   attention   condition   on  
aesthetic   experience.  That   is,   narrow  accounts  make   the   aesthetic   character   of  
perception,  experience,  or  appreciation  conditional  on  the  presence  of  attention.  
I   argue   that   this   requirement   is   based   on   the   assumption   that   attention   is  
required  in  order  that  we  are  aware  of  the  right  kind  of  content  in  the  right  kind  
of   way.   I   conclude   that   nothing   in   our   analysis   thus   far   merits   making   all  
aesthetic   character   dependent   on   attention,   even   if   the   kinds   of   cognitive   or  
epistemic   interest   characteristic   of   narrow   accounts—and   rejected   by   broad  
accounts—might  require  attention.    
My   analysis   of   the   role   of   attention   in   contemporary   accounts   emphasised  
the  under-­‐‑theorisation  of  the  relationship  between  attention  and  awareness  and  
their   significance   for   aesthetics.   We   need   a   better   understanding   of   the  
relationship  between  the  different  elements  of  our  aesthetic  psychology  as  well  
as   of   attention   itself.   In   chapter   three   I   argue   for   a   model   of   aesthetic  
psychology   founded  on  aesthetic  perception:  we  must  place  at   the  centre  of  our  
aesthetic   psychology   an   account   of   the   manner   in   which   we   perceive   and  
organise  the  material  of  sense.  Via  a  discussion  of  perceptual  organisation  and  
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the  problem  of  how  we  achieve   coherent  perceptual   experience  of   a  world  of  
objects—the   “binding   problem”—I   argue   for   a   minimal   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception   as   the   perceptual   representation   of   individual   objects   possessing  
sensible  properties.  I  call  this  minimal  concept  “bare  aesthetic  perception.”    
Through   a   discussion   of   Baumgarten   and,   especially,   Kant’s   concept   of  
purposive  organisation  and  aesthetic  response,  I  argue  that  we  can  understand  
the   constitution   of   bound   perceptual   representations   as   the   purposive  
organisation  of  sense  by  a  subject  receptive  to  and  in  expectation  of  an  ordered  
world.   I   then  sketch   the  structure  of  aesthetic  perception   in   terms  of  bare  and  
rich   aesthetic   perception:   the   latter   requires   attention   and   involves   more  
complex   and   determinate   representations   than   bare   aesthetic   perception.   I  
suggest   that   aesthetic   appreciation—the   characteristically   narrow   form   of  
aesthetic   engagement—depends   on   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   thus   on  
attention.  
At   this   point   we   need   to   deploy   contemporary   philosophical   and  
psychological   work   on   attention   in   order   to   understand   firstly,   whether   bare  
aesthetic  perception  goes  on  in  the  absence  of  attention  and,  secondly,  why  the  
appreciative   activities   which   depend   on   rich   aesthetic   perception   require  
attention   and   the   kinds   of   consciousness   and   cognition   it   supports.   Chapter  
four  begins  by  exploring  the  complexities  of  contemporary  work  on  attention.  I  
argue   that   the   question   of   what   is   possible   in   the   presence   and   absence   of  
attention  is  anything  but  straightforward  given  the  great  diversity  of  definitions  
and   approaches   to   attention   in   empirical   psychology   and   the   philosophy   of  
mind.   Nonetheless,   if   used   carefully   this   work   can   help   us   understand   the  
relationship  between  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception.    
I   set   about   this   by   examining   the   relationship   between   several   different  
concepts   of   consciousness,   focusing   on   the   dissociation   between   phenomenal  
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consciousness   (the   “what-­‐‑it-­‐‑is-­‐‑like-­‐‑ness”   of   experience)   and   cognitive  
consciousness   (the   access   and   use   of   phenomenal   content   in   reasoning   and  
report).   I   argue   that   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   conflates   phenomenal   and  
cognitive   consciousness;   and,   moreover,   that   the   aesthetic   character   of  
perception  depends  on  phenomenal   rather   than   cognitive   consciousness.  Using  
empirical  work  on  attention  and   consciousness   I   then  argue   that  we  have   the  
right   kind   of   phenomenal   consciousness   in   the   absence   of   attention   for   bare  
aesthetic   perception,   whilst   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   cognitive   access  
require  attention.  
In  the  second  half  of  chapter  four  I  turn  to  the  relationship  between  attention  
and   cognition.   Narrow   aesthetic   psychology   is   characterised   by   epistemic   or  
cognitive   conditions   on   aesthetic   experience:   aesthetic   experience   is  
characterised   as   a   way   of   knowing   the   world.   I   discuss   two   accounts   which  
understand   attention   in   terms   of   rational   and   epistemic   access   to   and  
engagement   with   perceptual   experience.   I   suggest   that   the   ability   to   think  
demonstratively   is   required   for   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
appreciation  and  consider  two  approaches  which  make  demonstrative  thought  
dependent  on  attention.    
Finally,   I  address   the  question  of  whether   feature  binding—which   I  argued  
in  chapter   three   is   the  core  of  aesthetic  perception—goes  on   in   the  absence  of  
attention.  I  argue  that  problems  of  feature  binding  exist  and  may  be  solved  on  
at   least   three   levels:   computational   information   processing,   perceptual  
experience,  and  conceptual  thought.  Bare  aesthetic  perception  requires  solving  
the   binding   problem   at   the   level   of   perceptual   experience,   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception  at  both  this  level  and  that  of  conceptual  thought.  I  argue  that  solving  
the   binding   problem—and   thus   perceiving   aesthetically—at   the   level   of  
perceptual   experience   does   not   require   attention:   thus   establishing   a   broad  
aesthetic   psychology.   There   is   thus   no   attention   condition   on   bare   aesthetic  
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perception,   but   there   is   one   on   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
appreciation.  
In   chapter   five   I   consider   some   of   the   most   significant   challenges,  
advantages,   and   implications   of   my   account   of   aesthetic   perception   and  
attention.   I   focus  on  two  sets  of  related  challenges:   firstly,   the   identification  of  
the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  and  my  distinction  between  bare  and  rich  
aesthetic  perception;  and,  secondly,  some  potential  challenges  to  my  account  of  
aesthetic   perception   which   focus   on   the   aestheticisation   of   perception   and  
consequent   apparent   demotion   of   aesthetic   value.   I   argue   that  my   account   of  
aesthetic   perception   identifies   the   philosophical   core   of   aesthetic   experience,  
and  emphasise   that  bare  aesthetic  perception   is   to  be  understood  as  a  minimal  
form   of   such   perception   rather   than   as   an   attempt   to   capture   all   forms   of  
aesthetic  engagement.  This  approach  has  the  benefit  of  creating  a  continuum  of  
aesthetic  perception  which  runs   from  bound  perceptual  experience   to   the  rich  
and   sophisticated   forms   of   appreciation   targeted   by   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology.    
I  respond  to  the  challenge  that  the  consequent  pervasiveness  of  the  aesthetic  
in   perception   trivialises   the   aesthetic   and   threatens   the   normative   core   of  
aesthetic   judgement  by  arguing  that  we  should  separate  questions  of  aesthetic  
perception   from   those   of   aesthetic   value:   my   account   separates   appreciative  
activities   concerned   with   normativity   and   value   from   the   question   of   the  
aesthetic  character  of  experience  whilst  retaining  the  concern  with  appreciation  
at   the   level  of  rich  aesthetic  perception.  Nonetheless,  we  can  connect  aesthetic  
perception  and  aesthetic  value  on  my  account.  I  return  to  the  everyday  concerns  
with  which  we  began  via  a  consideration  of  the  relationship  between  attention,  
qualities  of  appearance  and  certain  fundamental  human  values.  I  argue  that  far  
from   banishing   aesthetic   value   to   the   sidelines,   my   account   places   it   at   the  
centre  of  our  lives.  
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In  the  final  section  of  chapter  five  I  consider  the  implications  of  my  account  
of  aesthetic  perception  for  our  attentive  and  inattentive  experiences  in  daily  life,  
emphasising   the   shifting   relationship   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception  in  the  experience  of  home.  Next,  I  consider  the  relationship  between  
everyday   and   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics.   I   argue   that  my   account  undercuts   those  
who   consider   either   that   the   two   domains   are   separate,   or   that   art-­‐‑centred  
aesthetics   should   simply   be   extended   to   account   for   the   everyday.   Finally,   I  
explore  one  way   in  which  my  account  of   aesthetic  perception  affects  how  we  
understand   an   aesthetic   theory   of   the   creation   of   artworks.   I   suggest   that  
reading   an   aesthetic   theory   of   art   in   the   light   of   my   account   also   has  
consequences   for   our   understanding   of   the   aesthetic   appreciation   of   art   and  
criticism.    
This   thesis   aims   to   understand   the   way   our   minds   work   in   an   aesthetic  
context.   I   will   argue   that   aesthetic   perception   is   pervasive   and   that   attention  
plays  a  significant  role  in  shaping  our  aesthetic  psychology.  We  live  in  a  world  
of   appearances   and   in   the  perceptual   representation  of   these   appearances   lies  
the  foundation  of  our  aesthetic  engagement  with  the  world:  on  this  foundation  
we   can   build   complex   forms   of   aesthetic   thought,   communication,   and  
appreciation.   To   that   extent   mine   is   both   a   clarificatory   and   a   revisionary  
argument:  We  must  better  understand  our  aesthetic  psychology  and  the  project  
of   doing   so—via   the   resources   of   contemporary   philosophy   of   mind   and  
empirical  psychology—leads   to  a   revision  of   the   limits  of  aesthetic  perception  
and  the  role  of  the  aesthetic  in  everyday  life.  
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Chapter  One  
Aesthetic  Experience  and  Aesthetic  Psychology  
There  is  a  widespread  assumption  that  if  one  is  interested  in  the  visual,  
one’s   interest  must   be   limited   to   a   technique   of   somehow   treating   the  
visual.   Thus   the   visual   is   divided   into   categories   of   special   interest:  
painting,  photography,  real  appearances,  dreams  and  so  on.  And  what  is  
forgotten—like   all   essential   questions   in   a   positivist   culture—is   the  




The   aims   of   this   opening   chapter   are   firstly,   to   explain  why   an   interest   in  
everyday   aesthetics   should   lead   us   to   questions   about   the   psychological  
foundations  of   aesthetic   experience—i.e.   aesthetic  psychology—and,   secondly,  
to  argue  that  one  of  the  central  and  unacknowledged  points  of  tension  between  
the   aesthetic   psychology   of   art-­‐‑centred   and   everyday   aesthetics   lies   in  
assumptions  about  attention.  I  will  begin  by  tracing  the  origins  of  the  project  in  
this   thesis   to   questions   about   the   kinds   of   aesthetic   experience   possible   in  
everyday   life   and   their   apparent   incompatibility  with   art-­‐‑centred   accounts   of  
aesthetic  experience.  I  argue  that  this  can  be  understood  as  an  unacknowledged  
disagreement  about  the  psychological  capacities  and  mental  states  required  for  
or   involved   in   experiences  with   aesthetic   character.   I   call   the   different   views  
about   the   psychology   required   for   aesthetic   experience   the   “broad”   and  
“narrow”   approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   and   begin   to   show   that  
disagreements  about  the  role  of  attention  in  aesthetic  experience  lie  at  the  heart  
of  the  tensions  between  them.  The  guiding  thought  of  this  chapter—and  of  this  
thesis—is   that   neither   everyday   aesthetics   nor   contemporary   art-­‐‑centred  
                                                                                                 
7  (Berger,  2009,  p.  45).  
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aesthetics  has  done  a  good  job  of  addressing  the  psychological  foundations  for  
their  respective  extension  and  limitation  of  aesthetic  experience.  It  is  the  aim  of  
this  thesis  to  begin  to  solve  this  problem.  
1.2  Everyday  aesthetics  and  aesthetic  experience  
The  origins  of  this  thesis  lie  in  an  interest  in  the  kinds  of  aesthetic  experience  
possible  in  everyday  life  and  the  way  that  those  experiences  relate  to  the  forms  
of   experience   theorised   by   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics.   In   recent   years   aestheticians  
have   turned   their   attention   to   aspects   of   our   lives   often   neglected   by  
philosophical   aesthetics.   As   the   name   implies,   everyday   aesthetics   or   “the  
aesthetics  of  daily  life”  seeks  to  understand  the  aesthetic  character  or  aesthetic  
value   involved   in   everyday   life.8   This   might   be   understood   negatively   as  
concerning  the  aesthetic  character  of  things  outside  the  established  domains  of  
the   fine   arts   or   natural   environments.   As   Thomas   Leddy  writes,   in   everyday  
aesthetics  “We  are   thinking…of   the  home,   the  daily   commute,   the  workplace,  
the   shopping   center,   and   places   of   amusement”   (Leddy,   2005,   p.   3).   He  
continues,  
The  issues  that  generally  come  up  have  to  do  with  personal  appearance,  
ordinary   housing   design,   interior   decoration,   workplace   aesthetics,  
sexual   experience,   appliance  design,   cooking,   gardening,  hobbies,  play,  
appreciation  of  children’s  art  projects,  and  other  similar  matters.  (Leddy,  
2005,  p.  3)  
So   everyday   aesthetics   can   be   understood   in   relation   to   its   characteristic  
subject  matter.  The  “everyday”  is  the  ordinary,  the  routine,  and  the  habitual:  it  
concerns  the  kinds  of  objects,  environments  and  activities  found  outside  the  art  
                                                                                                 
8   For   the  main   trends,   positions,   and   historical   background   in   everyday   aesthetics   or   the  
“aesthetics   of   daily   life”   see   (Berleant,   2010);   (Brady,   2005);   (Carlson,   2011);   (D.   Davies,  
forthcoming);   (Dowling,   2010);   (Irvin,   2008a,   2008b,   2009);   (Korsmeyer,   1999);   (Leddy,   1995,  
2005,   2012b);   (Light   &   Smith,   2005);   (Melchionne,   2013);   (Naukkarinen,   2013);   (Novitz,   2001  
[1992]);  (Rautio,  2009);  (Saito,  2005,  2007);  (Sartwell,  2003);  (Scruton,  1979,  2007,  2009,  2011).  
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gallery,  theatre,  concert  hall  and  nature  reserve.9  However,  everyday  aesthetics  
can  also  be  understood  as   concerned  with   forms  of   aesthetic   experience  quite  
unlike   the   “standout”   experiences   of   art   and   nature   found   in   art-­‐‑centred  
aesthetics.  For  example,  in  a  paper  titled  “The  Pervasiveness  of  the  Aesthetic  in  
Ordinary  Experience”  Sherri  Irvin  argues  that,  
…particular   moments   and   local   experiences   have   an   aesthetic   quality  
about   them.  Being   in   the   room  you  are   in   right  now  with   its  particular  
visual   features   and   sounds;   sitting   in   the   way   that   you   are   sitting,  
perhaps  crookedly  in  an  uncomfortable  chair  feeling  the  air  currents  on  
your   skin—all   of   these   things   impart   a   texture   to   your   experience  
that…should  be  regarded  as  aesthetic.  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  30)  
Irvin  suggests  that  a  great  deal  of  our  ordinary  experience  possesses  aesthetic  
character   or   “texture”   rather   than   just   those   special   or   standout   experiences  
associated  with  the  appreciation  of  art  or  nature.  Similarly,  Yuriko  Saito  writes  
that   “In   the   realm   of   "ʺthe   aesthetic,"ʺ   I   am   including   any   reactions   we   form  
toward   the   sensuous   and/or   design   qualities   of   any   object,   phenomenon,   or  
activity…[Responses]   that   propel   us   toward   everyday   decision   and   actions,  
without   any   accompanying   contemplative   appreciation”   (Saito,   2007,   pp.   9,11,   my  
emphasis).   Irvin   and   Saito,   along   with   a   number   of   others   (e.g.   (Lee,   2010)),  
discuss  diverse  experiences  but  what  they  have  in  common  is  a  rejection  of  the  
                                                                                                 
9  However,  the  danger  of  treating  “everyday  aesthetics  as  something  of  a  catch-­‐‑all,  a  default  
third  basket  for  what  is  not  comfortably  characterized  as  fine  art  or  natural  beauty”  is  a  real  one  
(Melchionne,   2013).   Kevin   Melchionne   suggests   that,   “Instead   of   an   expansive   catch-­‐‑all,  
everyday   aesthetics   is   restricted   to   the   aspects   of   our   lives   marked   by   widely   shared,   daily  
routines  or  patterns  to  which  we  tend  to  impart  an  aesthetic  character”  (Melchionne,  2013).  He  
thus   resists   the   breadth   implicit   in   Leddy’s   non-­‐‑art   and   non-­‐‑natural   specification.   (See   also  
Dowling,   2010;  Melchionne,   2011;   Naukkarinen,   2013).   Thus,   for  Melchionne,   not   everything  
that   is   everyday   is   aesthetic,   and   not   everything   that   is   aesthetic   outside   of   the   gallery   and  
nature   reserve   is   everyday.   This   “dual   character”   is   special   and   limited,   in   general,   to   “food,  
wardrobe,  dwelling,  conviviality,  and  going  out.  Nearly  all  of  us  eat,  dress,  dwell  somewhere,  
socialize,  and  go  out  into  the  world  for  work  or  errands  on  a  nearly  daily  basis”  (Melchionne,  
2013).  
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attentive  and  contemplative  models  of  aesthetic  experience  found  in  art-­‐‑centred  
aesthetics.10  
Art-­‐‑centred  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience  differ   in   their   characterisations  
of   the  aesthetic   element  of   experience  and   the   requirements   they   lay  down   in  
order   that   our   experience   be   called   “aesthetic”.  Nonetheless,   as  we   shall   see,  
what  these  accounts  have  in  common  is  a  focus  on  attention  to  objects  and  their  
qualities  and  the  responses  we  have  to  them,  often  accompanied  by  a  particular  
attitude   or   motivation   for   attending   that   serves   precisely   to   exclude   the  
everyday.   For   example   Robert   Stecker   describes   aesthetic   experience   as   “the  
experience   of   attending   in   a   discriminating   manner   to   forms,   qualities   or  
meaningful   features  of   things,  attending  to   these   for   their  own  sake  or   for   the  
sake   of   this   very   experience”.   (Stecker,   2006a,   pp.   4,  my   emphasis)   Similarly,  
Noël   Carroll   (Carroll,   2006a,   2012),   Jerrold   Levinson   (Levinson,   1996b,  
forthcoming),   David   Davies   (D.   Davies,   forthcoming),   Gary   Iseminger  
(Iseminger,  2006),  and  others,  emphasise   the  attentive,   focused,  often  reflexive  
nature   of   aesthetic   experience.   Many,   like   Stecker,   also   emphasise   the  
importance   of   experience   or   attention   “for   its   own   sake”,   detached   from   the  
everyday,  the  practical,  or  the  self-­‐‑interested.  
So,   even   at   this   relatively   early   stage   it   seems   that   one   very  useful  way   of  
understanding   the   difference   between   paradigmatic   experiences   of   art   and  
nature,   on   the   one  hand,   and   the   everyday,   on   the   other,   is   by   appeal   to   our  
habits  of  attention  and  inattention.  The  everyday  is  perhaps  best  understood  as  
involving   a   regular   inattentive   interaction   with   objects,   practices,   and  
environments.   As   Ben   Highmore   points   out   “Beds,   chairs   and   clothes  
accommodate   us:   most   of   the   time   they   receive   our   “daily   inattention”.   We  
don'ʹt   notice   them,   but   we   do   interact   with   them”   (Highmore,   2011,   p.   58).  
                                                                                                 
10   See   (Saito,   2007)   chapter   one   for   discussion   of   the   special   or   standout   experiences  
characteristic  of  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetics.  
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Compare   Carroll’s   characterisation   of   aesthetic   experience   in   an   introductory  
textbook   as   “attention   with   a   certain   dedicated   focus   or   delimited   content—
aesthetic  properties  and  forms”  (Carroll,  1999,  p.  201).  
This  stark  contrast  between  the  inattentive,  un-­‐‑contemplative  experiences  or  
responses   of   everyday   aesthetics   and   the   attentive   and   contemplative  
experiences  of  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetics  might  lead  one  to  think  that  we  are  dealing  
here  with  experiences  which  are  different  not  simply  in  degree  but  in  kind.  The  
forms  of  awareness  involved  both  of  the  objects  of  aesthetic  experience  and  the  
subject’s   response   to   them,   seem  sufficiently  different   in  each  case  as   to   resist  
accommodation  within   the   same   framework.   Indeed,   the   differences   between  
everyday   and   so-­‐‑called   “art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics”  have   led   Saito   to   suggest   that  
the   two   should   be   separated   into   different   domains   (Saito,   2007).   More  
problematically,  the  everyday  aestheticians’s  commitment  to  a  more  pervasive  
form   of   aesthetic   experience   makes   it   relatively   straightforward   for   the   art-­‐‑
centred  aesthetician  to  simply  reject   it:  everyday  aesthetic  experience,   it  might  
be   argued,   is   so   radically   different   a   form   of   experience   as   to   be   simply  
changing   the   subject   from   appreciative,   reflective,   and   valuable   experience   of  
perceptual  forms  and  qualities  to  some  vague  sensory  experience  of  the  world  
around  us.  (E.g.  (Dowling,  2010).)  
Nonetheless,   the   case   for   exploring   the   nature   and   value   of   aesthetic  
experience   in   everyday   life   is   compelling.  A   great   deal   of   our   lives   has   been  
neglected   by   the   focus   of   philosophical   aesthetics   on   so-­‐‑called   “standout”  
experiences   of   art   and   nature.   As   Saito   argues,   “whether   regarding   history,  
landscape,   objects,   or   experiences,   the   ordinary   and   mundane   that   are   often  
overlooked  need  to  receive  equal  attention  as  the  dramatic  and  extraordinary”  
(Saito,   2007,   p.   49).   Similarly,   Irvin   writes   that   “unless   art   and   nature   are  
construed  quite  broadly,  they  play  a  comparatively  small  role  in  our  everyday  
lives”   (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  29).  Addressing   this  oversight   is   the  central  motivation  
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behind  work  in  everyday  aesthetics.   Indeed,  Saito,  Irvin,  and  Arnold  Berleant,  
amongst  many   others,   argue   that   the   cultivation   of   such   aesthetic   awareness  
would  result   in  more  satisfying   lives  and  greater  understanding  of   the  moral,  
social,  and  ecological  value  of  such  phenomena.11  Whether  or  not  those  further  
ambitions   may   be   fulfilled,   it   is   desirable   to   understand   how   far   into   our  
everyday  life  and  thought  the  aesthetic  penetrates.  
How   are   we   to   understand   the   relationship   between   everyday   and   art-­‐‑
centred   approaches   to   aesthetic   experience?   This   thesis   had   its   genesis   in   the  
realisation   that   one  way   in  which   to   begin   to   reconcile   the   two   fields   and   to  
provide  a  framework  for  everyday  aesthetics  was  to  consider  the  psychological  
foundations   of   the   experiences   each   considers   so   important.   Everyday  
aesthetics   has   failed   to   provide   a   clear   psychological   framework   in  which   to  
situate   the   extension   of   aesthetic   experience.   Similarly,   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics  
has   failed   to   adequately   articulate   the   psychology   underpinning   the   forms   of  
awareness   involved   in   aesthetic   experience.   This  means   philosophers   in   each  
field  operate  with  differing  assumptions  and  end  up  talking  past  one  another:  
each  seems  to  mean  a  different   thing  by  “aesthetic”  and  by  “experience”.12  As  
we  will  see,   this  has   led  to  accusations  that  everyday  aesthetics  has  trivialised  
the  aesthetic  by  compromising  the  appreciative  core  of  art-­‐‑centred  accounts  of  
aesthetic   experience.  Conversely,   those  working   in   everyday  aesthetics   accuse  
art-­‐‑centred  theorists  of  exclusivity  and  elitism.  An  assessment  of  the  psychology  
operative  in  both  fields  is  required  in  order  to  understand  what’s  really  going  
on  here.  In  short,  what  kinds  of  experiences  can  we  have  and  what  makes  them  
aesthetic?   In   answering   that   question  we   can   begin   to   reconcile   the   everyday  
and  mainstream  aesthetics.  
                                                                                                 
11  See  chapters   two  and  five  of   (Saito,  2007);   (Irvin,  2008a,  2008b);  and   (Berleant,  2010).  See  
also  (Melchionne,  2014).  
12   See,   for   example,   the   debate   between   Christopher   Dowling   (Dowling,   2010)   and   Kevin  
Melchionne   (Melchionne,   2011)   in   which   each   seems   to   possess   a   markedly   different  
understanding  of  the  aesthetic  and  the  constitution  of  aesthetic  value  in  everyday  life.  
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1.3  The  psychological  foundations  of  aesthetic  experience  
What   do  we  mean  when  we   talk   about   “the   psychological   foundations   of  
aesthetic   experience”   or,   more   broadly,   “aesthetic   psychology”?   When  
philosophers   discuss   psychology   we   are   often   thinking   about   the   kinds   of  
mental   states,   mental   events,   or   dispositions   involved   in   the   area   under  
discussion.  For  example,  moral  psychology  is  characteristically  concerned  with  
the  nature  of  human  agency  and   the   relationship  between   reason,   judgement,  
desire,   evaluation,  and  motivation   in   the  moral   sphere.  Hume’s  question   in  A  
Treatise   of   Human   Nature   about   the   grounds   of   moral   motivation   and   the  
relationship   between   the  passions,   reason,   and   action   is   a   question   about   our  
moral   psychology;   and   his   answer   “that   reason   has   no   influence   on   our  
passions  and  actions”  (Hume,  1985,  p.  509)  is  a  psychological  one,  having  to  do  
with  what  he  understood  to  be  the  faculties  and  dispositions  of  the  mind.  From  
his   moral   psychology   Hume   reaches   broader   ethical   conclusions   about   the  
nature  of  duty,  merit,  virtue,  and  vice.  Likewise,  Kant’s  resistance  to  the  role  of  
desire   or   inclination,   and   his   privileging   of   rational   cognition   in   his   moral  
psychology   is   part   of   his   account   of   human   nature   and   leads   to   conclusions  
about  the  nature  of  duty,  agency,  and  goodness  (Kant,  1993).13  
In   a   similar   manner   to   the   way   in   which   moral   psychology   aims   to  
understand  the  operations  of  the  mind  in  a  moral  context,  aesthetic  psychology  
seeks  to  understand  the  mental  states  and  events  involved  in  aesthetic  thought  
and  activity.  Part  of  Kant’s  project  in  the  Critique  of  the  Power  of  Judgment  (Kant,  
2000)  is  to  delineate  the  faculties  of  the  mind  involved  in  aesthetic  judgment  in  
a  manner  compatible  with  his  understanding  of  sensory  perception,  reason,  and  
                                                                                                 
13   Each   approach   remains   viable   in   contemporary   ethics   and   draws   on   and   produces  
different   accounts   of   human   nature   and   the   place   of  morality  within   such   a   picture.   See,   for  
example,  (Blackburn,  1998)  and  (Korsgaard,  2008).  
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the  laws  of  nature.  In  order  to  do  this  he  began  with  the  kinds  of  experiences  we  
have  in  nonaesthetic  and  aesthetic  contexts:  more  specifically,  with  the  kinds  of  
pleasures  we  gain  from  the  senses  and  from  the  good.  How  can  we  differentiate  
pleasure   in   the   beautiful   from   pleasure   in   “the   agreeable”—sensory  
gratification  from  wine,  say?  For,  Kant  thinks,  pleasure  in  the  beautiful  seems  to  
us   to  have   some   significance  beyond   the   individual,   beyond  mere  preference.  
From   this   question—and   from   the   resources   of   his   critical   philosophy—Kant  
develops  his  aesthetic  psychology  and  a  theory  of  aesthetic  judgement.  
More   recently,  philosophers  have   turned   to   empirical  work   to   inform   their  
philosophical   psychology   and   in   relation   to   broader   questions   in   their  
respective   domains.  As   John  Doris   and   Stephen   Stich  write   in   relation   to   the  
empirical   turn   in   moral   psychology,   “Questions   about   the   psychological  
contours   of   actual   human   lives   demand   empirically   substantiated   answers”  
(Doris  &  Stich,   2014).14  Or,   at   least,   answers  which   are  not   clearly   contrary   to  
empirical   psychology.   One   of   the   most   extreme   examples   of   this   turn   is   the  
Quinean   exhortation   to   naturalise   or   replace   epistemology   with   psychology  
(Quine,  1969).  The  Churchlands’   eliminative  project  provides  another  extreme  
example  (Churchland,  1981),  but,  as  we  shall  see,  attention  to  empirical  work  is  
now  entrenched  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  and  perception.15  
Despite   arguably   originating   in   the   late   Nineteenth   Century   with   Gustav  
Fechner  (Seeley,  2014),  the  idea  of  an  empirical  or  naturalised  aesthetics  gained  
traction   in   the   early   years   of   the  Twenty-­‐‑First.   (See   (Schellekens,   2012)   for   an  
overview.)   This   trend   can   be   understood,   firstly,   from   the   perspective   of   the  
empirical  sciences  targeting  art  and  aesthetic  experience   in  experimental  work  
(so-­‐‑called   “empirical   aesthetics”)   for   whom,   as   Elisabeth   Schellekens   writes,  
“the   role,   purpose,   and   importance   of   art   and  beauty   are   to   be   accounted   for  
                                                                                                 
14  See  (Doris  &  Stich,  2014)  for  an  overview  of  empirical  approaches  to  moral  psychology.  
15  See,  for  example,  (Mole,  Smithies,  &  Wu,  2011a),  (Prinz,  2010),  and  (Dennett,  1991).  
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within  a  framework  of  psychological  evolution  and  neurological  development”  
(Schellekens,   2011,   p.   225);   and,   secondly,   as   philosophers   seeking   empirical  
guidance   and   substantiation   for   traditionally   “armchair”   problems.   In   the  
former   camp   lie   the   neuroscientific   or   “neuroaesthetic”   approaches   of   Semir  
Zeki  (Zeki,  1999),  V.  S.  Ramachandran  and  William  Hirstein  (Ramachandran  &  
Hirstein,   1999);   the   more   explanatorily   modest   empirical   psychology   of   I.   C.  
McManus   (McManus,   2011);   and   the   evolutionary   psychology   of   Geoffrey  
Miller  (Miller,  2001).  
In   the   latter   camp,   the  philosopher   Jesse  Prinz  explicitly   frames  his   inquiry  
into  aesthetic  psychology  as  “an  exercise   in  naturalised  aesthetics”,  seeking   to  
understand  “what  kind  of  mental  state  [aesthetic]  appreciation  is”  (Prinz,  2011a,  
p.  72)  with  reference  to  neuroimaging  studies  and  the  neurobiology  of  emotion;  
Aaron  Meskin  and  his  colleagues  avail  themselves  of  the  methods  of  empirical  
psychology   in   order   to   understand   the   effect   of   exposure   to   artworks   on  
aesthetic   judgements   of   them   (Meskin,   Phelan,   Moore,   &   Kieran,   2013);   and  
Noël  Carroll   and  Margaret  Moore   study   the   relationship   between  movement,  
music,  and  dance  with  reference  to  cognitive  science  (Carroll  &  Moore,  2011).      
Now,   which   questions   (if   any)   admit   of   empirical   investigation   and  
substantiation   and   at  what   level   of   explanation   they  may   do   so   is   a   difficult  
question   in  aesthetic  psychology  and  the  empirical  approach  to  aesthetics  and  
the  philosophy  of  art   in  general   (Currie,  2003;  Zangwill,  2009a).  Not  everyone  
welcomes   the   influence   of   the   empirical,   arguing   that   the   normative   or  
evaluative   nature   of   many   questions   in   aesthetics   does   not   suit   it   to   the  
reductionist  methodologies  of  the  sciences.  For  example,  Peter  Lamarque  writes  
that   “empirical   facts   about   the   psychological   states   of   actual   people   and  
empirical   theories   about   such   states   will   not   illuminate   what   is   of   value   in  
individual  works  of  literature”  (Lamarque,  2011,  pp.  298,  my  emphasis).    
   34  
Yet,  even  if  we  are  happy  to  admit  the  significance  of  empirical  work  on  and  
for   traditionally   philosophical   questions,   undertheorised   and   simplistic  
concepts  of  art,  aesthetic  experience,  aesthetic  pleasure,  aesthetic  value  and  the  
relation   between   them   frequently   undermine   the   methodologies   and  
conclusions   of   empirical   aesthetics;   although,   as   Schellekens   points   out,  
philosophers   have   hardly   reached   agreement   on   these   issues   themselves  
(Schellekens,   2011).   John  Hyman  warns   of   “extravagant   generalisations   about  
art”   in   the   work   of   Ramachandran   and   Zeki   (Hyman,   2010,   p.   260)   and  
McManus  of  the  “utter  failure  of  grand  theories  of  evolutionary  psychology  or  
neuroaesthetics”  to  explain  the  variety  of  aesthetic  preferences  for,   in  his  case,  
Mondrian  paintings  and  the  cropping  of  photographs  (McManus,  2011,  p.  186).  
All   of   this  must   be   kept   in  mind  when  we   reach   the   empirical  work—and  
empirically  informed  philosophy  of  perception  and  mind—I  wish  to  make  use  
of   in   chapters   three  and   four.   I  will  not  be   considering  empirical  work  which  
specifically   targets   aesthetic   value   or   experience:   that   is,   empirical   aesthetics.  
Instead  I  will  focus  on  work  on  attention  and  consciousness  which  we  may  then  
relate   to   the   account   of   aesthetic   perception   I   propose.   This   is   a   thesis   firmly  
situated  in  philosophical  aesthetics,  but  which  nonetheless  seeks  to  develop  an  
empirically   informed   aesthetic   psychology   in   the   light   of   the   concerns  many  
have  about  the  relationship  between  philosophical  and  scientific  explanation.16  
                                                                                                 
16  Aesthetic  psychology   is   thus  much  broader   in   range   than   the  questions   I   focus  on.  As   I  
mentioned,   I   will   not   be   addressing   empirical   work   which   specifically   targets   aesthetic  
experience   or   the   experience   of   art.   I   have   reservations   about   a   lot   of   empirical  work  which  
purports   to   examine   or   illuminate   the   experience   of   beauty,   aesthetic   value,   or   to   reveal   the  
foundations  and  purpose  of  artistic  endeavour.  However,   that   is   too   large  an   issue  to  address  
here.  See  (Turner,  2006)  and  (Schellekens  &  Goldie,  2011)  for  two  collections  which  examine  the  
question  of   the  relationship  between  empirical  and  philosophical  approaches  to   the  mind  and  
its  aesthetic  and  artistic  modes.  
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1.4  Broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  
How  are  we  to  begin  developing  this  aesthetic  psychology?  I  have  suggested  
that  we   can  understand   the   clash  between   everyday  and  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetic  
experience   as   a   manifestation   of   underlying   but   unacknowledged  
disagreements  about  our  aesthetic  psychology.  So  a  good  place  to  start  is  with  
the   kinds   of   assumptions   about   our   aesthetic   psychology   operative   in  
contemporary   accounts   of   aesthetic   perception,   aesthetic   experience,   and  
aesthetic   appreciation.   Analysing   these   assumptions   with   recourse   to  
contemporary   empirical   and   philosophical   work   on   attention   can   help   us  
toward  a  better  account  of  our  aesthetic  psychology,  and  thus  toward  a  better  
understanding  of  aesthetic  experience.  
To  this  end,  I  suggest  that  we  should  understand  approaches  to  the  operation  
of  the  mind  in  an  aesthetic  context  as  either  broad  or  narrow.  Put  simply,  broad  
aesthetic  psychology  considers  a  wide  range  of  our  mental   life   to  be   involved  
with   or   to   have   aesthetic   character.   In   contrast,   narrow   aesthetic   psychology  
considers   a   narrower   range   of   our   mental   life   to   be   involved   with   or   have  
aesthetic  character.  Each  approach  has  this  consequence  as  a  result  of  implicit  or  
explicit   views   about   the   psychological   capacities,  mental   states,   and   forms   of  
awareness  required  for  aesthetic  experience.  I  will  argue  that  the  majority  of  art-­‐‑
centred   aestheticians   hold   implicitly   narrow   theories   of   aesthetic   psychology  
whilst  everyday  aestheticians  hold  implicitly  broad  theories.  
Each   approach   can   be   understood   as   a   set   of   views   about   what  makes   an  
experience  aesthetic  and  the  psychological  capacities  and  mental  states  required  
to   instantiate  or  possess   that   character.  We  can  understand   the   clash  between  
the   broad   and   narrow   approaches   as   a   disagreement   about   the   psychological  
threshold   of   aesthetic   experience:   when   have   we   reached   the   tipping   point  
where   nonaesthetic   experience   becomes   aesthetic?   A   narrow   approach   to  
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aesthetic  psychology  is  one  which  considers  (i)  that  the  requisite  psychological  
processes   or   capacities   for   aesthetic   experience   (or   some   similar   concept)   are  
such   that   specific   conditions   must   be   satisfied   in   order   that   (the)   experience  
qualify  as  aesthetic  and  (ii)  that  these  conditions  are  not  commonly  satisfied  in  
daily   life   and   thus   that   a   narrow   range   of   experiences   possess   aesthetic  
character.    
In   other   words,   in   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   a   fairly   limited   range   of  
experiences   qualify   as   aesthetic   because   the   psychological   requirements   for  
aesthetic  experience  are  only  met  in  particular  circumstances.  For  example,  we  
will   see   that   attention   is   frequently   a   necessary   condition   for   aesthetic  
experience   in   narrow   aesthetic   psychology.   In   the   absence   of   attention   our  
experience  or  perception  cannot  be  aesthetic:  this  and  other  conditions  serve  to  
narrow  our  aesthetic  psychology.  
A   broad   approach   to   aesthetic   psychology   is   one  which   considers   either   (i)  
that  the  requisite  psychological  processes  or  capacities  for  aesthetic  experience  
(or   similar)   are   such   that   specific   conditions   must   be   satisfied   in   order   that  
experience   qualify   as   aesthetic   and   (ii)   that   these   conditions   are   frequently  
satisfied  in  daily  life  and  thus  that  aesthetic  experience  (or  similar)  is  common;  
or   that   the   requisite   psychological   processes   or   capacities   for   aesthetic  
experience   (or   similar)   are   such   that   the   aesthetic   is   always   involved   in  
experience  to  some  extent.    
So,  broad  aesthetic  psychology  can  be  understood  either  as  denying  that  the  
conditions  of  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  truly  constrain  aesthetic  experience  
or   that   these   conditions   are   satisfied   more   often   than   might   be   thought.  
Alternatively,   a   broad   approach   might   reconstrue   aesthetic   perception   or  
experience   in   such   a  way   as   to   involve   it   in   the   psychological   processes   and  
capacities   which   underlie   or   constitute   perceptual   experience   in   general.   The  
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first  form  of  the  broad  approach  might  agree  with  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  
on   the   kind   of   capacities   required   for   aesthetic   experience   and   disagree   on  
when  such  capacities  are  involved  or  instantiated.  The  second  form  involves  a  
different   account   of   aesthetic   perception   or   aesthetic   experience   as   well.   My  
account   takes   this   latter   approach.   It   is   open   to   both   forms   of   the   broad  
approach   to   deny   the   necessity   of   attention   for   aesthetic   experience,   but   they  
may  do  so  for  different  reasons.  
1.5  The  foundations  of  broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  psychology    
To   begin   to   understand   how   contemporary   philosophical   aesthetics   is  
shaped  by  the  broad  and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology  we  should  
investigate  the  foundations  of  each.  We’ll  begin  with  the  narrow  approach  and  
focus   on   the   way   in   which   Kant’s   aesthetic   psychology   places   conditions   on  
aesthetic  experience.  The  origins  of  the  broad  approach  are  more  recent  and  lie  
in  the  work  of  John  Dewey,  whose  Art  as  Experience  (Dewey,  2005)  can  be  seen  
as  a  reaction  to  the  aesthetic  psychology  of  Kant  and  his  Nineteenth  and  early  
Twentieth   Century   successors.17   This   should   equip   us   to   tackle   the   modern  
forms  of  each  approach.  
1.5.1  Kant  and  the  narrowing  of  aesthetic  psychology  
Rather   than  engage   in  a  piece  of  Kant  scholarship  or  exegesis,   I’m  going   to  
highlight  one  aspect  of  the  Kantian  approach  which  both  demonstrates  the  way  
that  extra-­‐‑psychological  aims  can  effect  aesthetic  psychology  and,  in  particular,  
lays   the   foundation   for   contemporary   narrow   approaches.   I’ll   focus   on  
disinterest,  a  concept  which  did  not  strictly  originate  in  Kant’s  work,  but  which  
he   gives   a   distinctly   psychological   reading:   by   which   I   mean   that,   in   Kant,  
                                                                                                 
17   I   have   in   mind   here   Arthur   Schopenhauer   in   the   Nineteenth   Century   and   Edward  
Bullough  (Bullough,  2008)  and  Clive  Bell  (Bell,  2011)  in  the  Twentieth.  
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disinterest   is   treated   as   a  particular   operation  of   the   faculties   of   the  mind;   an  
aspect  that,  I  suggest,  serves  to  narrow  the  range  of  aesthetic  experience.  
Prior   to   Kant,   to   take   disinterested   pleasure   in   beauty   meant   roughly  
something  like  making  sure  that  pleasure  in  an  object  was  not  self-­‐‑interested  or  
associated  with   one’s  well-­‐‑being;   or,   perhaps,   that   the   object  was   not   judged  
according  to  its  fittingness  for  use.  Pleasure  in  beauty  should  be,  in  some  sense,  
contemplative  rather  than  practical.  As  it  developed  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  
“Taste”  is  the  sense  or  faculty  which  discerns  beauty.18  As  George  Dickie  puts  it,  
“the   theory   of   taste   was   eighteenth-­‐‑century   philosophy’s   attempt   to   give   an  
account  of   [beautiful,  sublime,  delicate,  and  so  on]  objects  and  of   the  pleasure  
and   displeasure   taken   in   them”   (Dickie,   1996,   p.   3).   By   setting   out   certain  
conditions   for   the   “judgement   of   taste”,   Kant   and   his   predecessors   began   to  
articulate   a   distinct   experience:   an   aesthetic   experience.   One   of   the   first   to  
theorise  taste,  Francis  Hutcheson,  summarises  the  features  of  the  aesthetic  and  
aesthetic  experience  which  began  to  develop  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  and  to  
which  Kant  responded.  
This  superior  power  of  perception  is   justly  called  a  sense,  because  of  its  
affinity  to  the  other  senses  in  this,  that  the  pleasure  does  not  arise  from  
any   knowledge   of   principles,   proportions,   causes,   or   the   usefulness   of  
the  object;  but  strikes  us  at  first  with  the  idea  of  beauty  ….  And  further,  
the   ideas   of   beauty   and   harmony,   like   other   sensible   ideas,   are  
necessarily   pleasant   to   us,   as   well   as   immediately   so;   neither   can   any  
resolution  of  our  own,  nor  any  prospect  of  advantage  or  disadvantage,  
vary  the  beauty  or  deformity  of  an  object.  (Hutcheson,  2008,  pp.  91-­‐‑92)  
Hutcheson  isolates   the   feeling  of  beauty  from  knowledge  of  use,  origin,  and  
principle,  highlighting  the  immediacy  and  necessity  of  pleasure  in  the  beautiful.  
                                                                                                 
18  Taste   is   also  a   central   feature  of  Frank  Sibley’s  mid-­‐‑twentieth   century  work.  Quite  what  
Sibley   means   by   taste   is   part   of   his   interest,   but   he   means   roughly   the   ability,   capacity,   or  
sensitivity  required  to  perceive  certain  qualities  and  to  apply  aesthetic   terms  to  them.  Taste   is  
some  capacity  to  judge  or  discriminate  aesthetically.  See  (Sibley,  2001b).  
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This   noncognitive   state—pleasure—is   central   to   the   development   of   aesthetic  
experience   and   the   question   of   how   we   approach   and   grasp   the   world  
aesthetically.   In   this   thesis   I  will  move   the  aesthetic  away   from   its  association  
with  pleasure  whilst  retaining  its  subjectivity:  that  is,  the  central  concept  of  the  
aesthetic   will   be   an   activity   of   mind,   but   not   one   I   approach   as   a   form   of  
pleasure,  disinterested  or  otherwise.  Before  we  get  to  that  point,  however,  let’s  
look   more   closely   at   the   way   in   which   Kant’s   distinctive   development   of  
disinterest   serves   to  narrow  our  aesthetic  psychology  and  place  conditions  on  
aesthetic  experience.19  
1.5.1.1  Psychological  conditions  on  aesthetic  experience:  Disinterest  
Kant  wanted  to  understand  the  judgement  of  beauty:  the  judgement  of  taste.  
In   particular,   and   in   response   to   the  perceived   failure   of  Hume’s   standard   of  
taste,  in  order  to  secure  something  like  an  intersubjectively  valid  judgement  of  
taste,   Kant   sought   to   articulate   the   conditions   under   which   a   judgement   of  
beauty  may   be   properly  made   and   asserted.   So,   one   way   to   construe   Kant’s  
programme   is   as   the   project   to   understand   the   operation   of   the   mind   in   an  
aesthetic   context   and   to   connect   that   psychological   account  with   the   claim   to  
intersubjective   or   universal   validity   of   the   judgement   of   taste.20   For  Kant,   the  
way  to  do   this  was   to  distinguish  a  particular   form  of  disinterested  pleasure   in  
the  representation  of  the  form  of  an  object  by  the  subject.  “Taste”,  he  wrote,  “is  
the   faculty   for   judging   an   object   or   a   kind   of   representation   through   a  
                                                                                                 
19  On  Eighteenth  Century   aesthetics   and  disinterestedness   see   (Stolnitz,   1961),   (Townsend,  
1987),  and  (Guyer,  2005a).  (Dickie,  1996)  contains  detailed—and  sometimes  scathing—analyses  
of  Eighteenth  Century  theories  of  taste,  beginning  with  Hutcheson.  
20  Interestingly,  Malcolm  Budd  identifies  one  of  Hume’s  failings  as  precisely  the  absence  of  a  
theory  of  aesthetic  psychology  in  which  to  ground  his  claims  about  the  supposed  uniformity  of  
human  responses  to  qualities  “naturally  fitted”  to  give  us  pleasure.  (Budd,  1995,  p.  20)  But  see  
Dickie’s  determined  defence  of  Hume  in  chapter  five  of  (Dickie,  1996).  
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satisfaction   or   dissatisfaction   without   any   interest.   The   object   of   such  
satisfaction  is  called  beautiful”  (5:  211).21  
Why  does  Kant   identify  a   certain  kind  of  pleasure  and  why  must   it   satisfy  
this   condition   of   “disinterest”?   Kant   is   starting   from  what   he   takes   to   be   the  
phenomenology   of   the   judgement   of   taste   or   the   experience   of   beauty.   Such   an  
experience  is  pleasurable:   the  experience  satisfies   the  subject   in  some  way;  and  
this  pleasure  is  part  of  what  it  means  to  judge  something  beautiful.  Hume  had  
got  this  far  (Hume,  2008),  but  Kant  did  not  think  that  Hume  had  succeeded  in  
freeing  aesthetic   judgement   from  the   idiosyncrasies  of   the   individual.22  This   is  
despite  Hume  and  Kant  agreeing  that  the  distinctiveness  of  aesthetic  judgement  
lies  in  its  subjectivity—in  the  role  of  feeling—and  in  our  expectation  in  making  
such  a  judgement  that  others  should  (rather  than  will)  agree  with  it.    
When  we  call  something  beautiful,  the  pleasure  that  we  feel  is  expected  
of  everyone  else  in  the  judgment  of  taste  as  necessary,  just  as  if  it  were  to  
be   regarded   as   a   property   of   the   object   that   is   determined   in   it   in  
accordance   with   concepts;   but   beauty   is   nothing   by   itself,   without  
relation  to  the  feeling  of  the  subject.  (5:  218)  
  The   judgement   of   taste   is   therefore   not   a   cognitive   judgement…but   is  
rather  aesthetic,  by  which  is  understood  one  whose  determining  ground  
cannot  be  other  than  subjective.  (5:  203)  
Kant’s   task,   then,   is   to   reconcile   the   subjective   grounding   of   aesthetic  
judgement  with  its  putative  universality.  In  other  words,  Kant  needs  to  connect  
his   aesthetic   psychology   with   his   theory   of   the   subjective   universality   of  
aesthetic   judgement.   (See   (Guyer,   1997),   chapter   three.)   He   does   this   by  
                                                                                                 
21  All   quotations   from   the  Critique   of   the   Power   of   Judgement   are   from  Paul  Guyer   and  Eric  
Matthews’s  translation  (Kant,  2000).  
22  On  Hume  see  (Budd,  1995),  (Levinson,  2006b),  and  (Guyer,  2005b)  amongst  many  others.  
Levinson’s  paper  has  an  extensive  list  of  useful  references.  
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appealing  to  disinterested  pleasure.  This  appeal  serves  to  narrow  our  aesthetic  
psychology  and  aesthetic  experience.  Let’s  see  why.  
The   first   thing   to  point  out   is   that  Kant  doesn’t   really   individuate  kinds  of  
pleasure  except  with  reference  to  their  grounding  or  source.  As  Budd  points  out,  
pleasure   “is   a   reaction   to   how   the  world   is   represented   to   the   subject,   rather  
than   a   representation   of   a   possible   state   of   affairs”   (Budd,   1995,   p.   17).  
Therefore,  it  is  not  the  pleasure  which  must  be  assessed,  but  its  ground.  This  is  
important  for  Kant,  because  we  take  pleasure  in  many  things  and  most  of  them  
are  unsuitable   either   as   grounds   for   a   judgement   of   beauty   or   the   suggestion  
that  others  should  take  pleasure  in  them  too  if  they  approach  them  in  the  right  
way.   This   is   because   pleasures   can   arise   as   the   result   of   the   satisfaction   of   a  
desire   or   preference,   which   is   something   idiosyncratic:   such   pleasures   arise  
from  the  inclinations  of  the  individual  rather  than  the  form  of  the  represented  
object.  Kant  calls  this  “satisfaction  in  the  agreeable”  or  “gratification”  and  it   is  
the  kind  of  pleasure  we  take  in  our  favourite  wine  or  colour  (§3).23    
In   contrast   to   pleasures   in   the   agreeable   and   in   the   good   (which   pleases  
through  reason,  see  §4),  which  “are  always  combined  with  an   interest   in   their  
object”  as  a  result  of  their  “relation  to  the  faculty  of  desire”,  “the  judgement  of  
taste   is  merely  contemplative,   i.e.,  a   judgment   that,   indifferent  with   regard   to  
the   existence   of   an   object,   merely   connects   its   constitution   together   with   the  
feeling  of  pleasure  and  displeasure”  (5:  209).  The  point  is  that  for  Kant,  as  Savile  
points   out,   beauty   is   “a   concept   that   is   essentially   tied   to   human   responses”  
(Savile,   1993,   p.   3)   and   so   Kant   needs   to   be   able   to   distinguish   the   response  
which  grounds  the  judgement  of  taste  from  others:  he  turns  to  disinterest.    
                                                                                                 
23  To  this  extent,  Kant’s  rejection  of  inclination  in  the  deduction  of  the  intersubjectivity  of  the  
judgement  of  taste  is  analogous  to  that  found  in  his  grounding  for  duty.  
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As  Nick  Zangwill  puts  it,  for  Kant,  “pleasure  is  disinterested  when  the  route  
from   the   representation   of   the   object   to   the   response   of   pleasure   entirely  
bypasses  desire.  Pleasure  in  the  beautiful  is  a  response  to  the  representation  and  
to   the   representation   alone”   (Zangwill,   1992,   pp.   149-­‐‑150).   That   response   is  
understood  as  the  free,  harmonious  play  of  the  cognitive  powers  of  imagination  
and  understanding:  a  harmony  which  arises   from  the   lack  of  a  concept  under  
which   to   subsume   the   representation   of   the   object.   Which   freedom   from  
determinate  concepts  also  distinguishes   the   representation  of   the  object   in   the  
judgement   of   beauty   from   nonaesthetic   judgements   which   seek   to   bring  
representations  under  particular  rules  or  concepts  of  the  understanding.24  
In   order   to   decide   whether   or   not   something   is   beautiful,   we   do   not  
relate   the   representation   by   means   of   understanding   to   the   object   for  
cognition,  but  rather  relate  it  by  means  of  the  imagination…to  the  subject  
and  its  feeling  of  pleasure  or  displeasure.  (5:  203)  
The  combination  of   the   free  play  of   the   faculties  and  disinterested  pleasure  
serves   to   narrow   Kant’s   aesthetic   psychology   because   the   contexts   in   which  
those  conditions  are  satisfied  are  fairly  limited.  As  Zangwill  emphasises,  Kant  is  
identifying   a   particular   route   from   the   representation   of   the   object   to   the  
response   of   pleasure.   That   route   must   not   involve   desire   or   any   personal  
connection   to   the   object.   (Such   a   connection  might   exist,   but   it   cannot   be   the  
determining   ground   of   the   judgement.)   It   is   also   worth   emphasising   that  
aesthetic   experience   is   restricted   by   Kant’s   insistence   on   the   relation   of   the  
representation   of   an   object   to   the   subject   via   a   feeling:   a   noncognitive,  
nonrepresentational   mental   state.   It   is   not   enough,   in   other   words,   to   attend  
disinterestedly  to  the  appearance  of  an  object:  we  do  not  come  to  the  judgement  
of   taste   via   disinterested   attention.   (Although,   as   we   shall   see,   later   thinkers  
                                                                                                 
24   I   am   focusing   here   on   disinterest   rather   than   the   nonconceptual   representation   of   the  
object   in   the   judgement  of   taste.  Suffice   it   to  say,   this  emphasis  on   freedom  from  determinate  
concepts  is  also  a  narrowing  factor  in  Kant’s  aesthetic  psychology.  
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appeal   to   something   like   this).  Rather,   aesthetic   judgement,   for  Kant,   requires  
representation  via  disinterested   feeling.  Affectless  aesthetic   judgement  doesn’t  
make  sense  on  Kant’s  account.  
So,  Kant  provides  a  framework  for  aesthetic  experience  (or  the  judgement  of  
taste)   with  which   to   satisfy   the   extra-­‐‑psychological   interest   in   grounding   the  
universality  of  the  judgement  of  taste.  This  is  by  no  means  a  complete  account  
of  the  judgement  of  taste,  but  I  hope  it  has  highlighted  the  connection  between  
Kant’s   understanding   of   the   nature   of   aesthetic   judgement   and   his   aesthetic  
psychology.  It  is  the  attempt  to  balance  the  origin  of  the  judgement  of  taste—or  
aesthetic   experience—in   feeling   with   its   universal   validity   which   leads   to   a  
narrow  aesthetic  psychology  because  the  conditions  in  which  such  a  subjective  
response   could   even   begin   to  make   a   claim  on   others   are   few.  Kant   needs   to  
retain   the   apparatus   of   feeling   in   the   individual  whilst   isolating   such   feeling  
from  the  distinctive  aspects  of  any  particular  individual.  Disinterest  is  one  way  
in   which   he   does   this.25   However,   a   corollary   of   specifying   so   particular   a  
mental  operation  is  the  narrowing  of  the  range  of  aesthetic  experience.  
1.5.2  Dewey  and  the  origins  of  broad  aesthetic  psychology  
John   Dewey   wrote   about   aesthetic   experience   in   the   early   Twentieth  
Century,  by  which  time  the  idea  that  some  form  of  disinterestedness  or  distance  
is   required   for   aesthetic   experience   and   aesthetic   appreciation   had   become  
fairly   standard.   We   can   see   its   influence   in   theories   of   “psychical   distance”  
(Bullough,   2008),   the   aesthetic   attitude   (Stolnitz,   1969),   and   significant   form  
(Bell,  2011).  Dewey   traced   this   separation  of   the  aesthetic   from  other   forms  of  
experience   to   Kant’s   aesthetic   psychology   and   the   isolation   of   aesthetic  
pleasure.  “Thus”,  he  writes,  “the  psychological  road  was  opened  leading  to  the  
                                                                                                 
25   An   assumption   about   the   uniformity   of   human   response   to   appearances  when   isolated  
from  the  faculty  of  desire  is  another.  See  (Allison,  2001)  chapter  seven.  
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ivory   tower   of   “Beauty”   remote   from   all   desire,   action,   and   stir   of   emotion”  
(Dewey,   2005,   p.   263).   Now,   whether   or   not   this   is   a   fair   reading   of   Kant’s  
aesthetic   psychology,   Dewey   considers   this   remoteness   of   the   aesthetic  
something  of  a  disaster.  
[We]  have,  as  the  record  of  this  chasm,  accepted  as  if  it  were  normal,  the  
philosophies   of   art   that   locate   it   in   a   region   inhabited   by   no   other  
creature,  and  that  emphasize  beyond  all  reason  the  merely  contemplative  
character   of   the   esthetic…There   is   much   applause   for   the   wonders   of  
appreciation  and  the  glories  of  the  transcendent  beauty  of  art  indulged  in  
without   much   regard   to   capacity   for   esthetic   perception   in   the  
concrete….[This]   deeply   affects   the   practice   of   living,   driving   away  
esthetic   perceptions   that   are   necessary   ingredients   of   happiness,   or  
reducing   them   to   the   level   of   compensating   transient   pleasurable  
excitations.  (Dewey,  2005,  pp.  8-­‐‑9)  
Dewey’s   aim   is   to   rebalance   the   relationship   between   the   individual   and  
their   environment   in   aesthetic   experience.   He   considers   the   distance   and  
disinterest   implicit   in   a   contemplative   model   of   aesthetic   experience  
problematic   both   in   terms  of   the   aesthetic  psychology   it   presupposes   and   the  
forms   of   life   it   devalues.   On   my   terms,   Dewey   objects   to   the   narrowness   of  
Kant’s   aesthetic   psychology.   Dewey   is   particularly   significant   for   this  
discussion   because   he   has   some   claim   to   be   the   “grandfather   of   everyday  
aesthetics”  (Leddy,  2012b,  p.  44).   Indeed,  despite  his  writing  eighty  years  ago,  
Irvin  considers  Dewey’s  “the  most  general  and  well-­‐‑developed  existing  account  
of   the   possibility   of   aesthetic   experience   in   everyday   life”   (Irvin,   2008a).  
Dewey’s   is   not   straightforwardly   a   broad   aesthetic   psychology,   but   his  
significance   lies   in   the   attempt   to  undermine   the  narrowing   conditions   of   the  
Kantian   model.   Let’s   begin   by   considering   Dewey’s   understanding   of   how  
aesthetic  experience  develops.  
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1.5.2.1  From  experience  to  aesthetic  experience  
Dewey’s   starting   point   is   very   different   from   Kant’s.   In   Art   as   Experience  
(Dewey,   2005)   Dewey   begins  with   the   experience   of   everyday   life.26   Only   by  
understanding  “the  ordinary  focus  and  conditions  of  experience  that  we  do  not  
usually  regard  as  esthetic”  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  2)  can  we  understand  the  nature  of  
the  production  and  appreciation  of  art.  “In  order  to  understand  the  esthetic  in  its  
ultimate  and  approved  forms,  one  must  begin  with  it  in  the  raw;  in  the  events  
and  scenes  that  hold  the  attentive  eye  and  ear  of  man,  arousing  his  interest  and  
affording  him  enjoyment  as  he  looks  and  listens”  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  3).  Art  and  
its  experience  begin  in  ordinary  human  experience.  We  can  already  see  a  clear  
difference   here   between  Kant’s   isolation   of   aesthetic   experience   and  Dewey’s  
insistence   that   art   and   the   aesthetic   begin   in   daily   life   and   experience.   This  
doesn’t   mean   that   aesthetic   experience   isn’t   differentiated   from   everyday  
experience   for   Dewey,   but   the   manner   of   its   differentiation   is   very   different  
from  the  Kantian  isolation  of  pleasure  in  the  beautiful.  Dewey  never  identifies  
any   particular   faculties   or  mental   states   required   for   or   involved   in   aesthetic  
experience.  
The   watchword   of   Dewey’s   aesthetics   might   be   “continuity”:   he   doesn’t  
accept   the   kinds   of   compartmentalisation   found   in   Kant’s   psychology.  
Experience  ebbs  and  flows,  it  “consists  of  phases  in  which  the  organism  falls  [in  
and]  out  of  step”  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  12)  with  the  environment.  Our   interactions  
with  our   surroundings  are  driven  by  our   animal   and  higher  needs,   involving  
adjustments   and   adaptations   to   hostile   environments,   building   rhythms,  
balance,  harmony  and  order.  It  is  precisely  because  we  live  in  such  a  world  of  
“movement  and  culmination,  of  breaks  and  re-­‐‑unions”  (16)  that  our  experience  
is   capable   of   possessing   what   Dewey   calls   “esthetic   quality”.   It   is   the  
                                                                                                 
26  For  an  overview  of  Dewey’s  aesthetics  focusing  on  Art  as  Experience  see  (Leddy,  2013)  and  
(Leddy,  2012b,  p.  77ff).  
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achievement   of   harmony,   of   equilibrium   which   provides   the   most   intense  
experiences   of   which   we   are   capable.   This   “heightened   vitality…is   the  
fulfilment   of   an   organism   in   its   struggles   and   achievements   in   a   world   of  
things”  (18)  and  contains  the  promise  of  aesthetic  experience.  By  its  very  nature,  
then,  Dewey’s  concept  of  experience  is  a  dynamic  continuous  relation  between  
the  individual  and  their  environment.  
What  gives  an  experience  “aesthetic  quality”?  Dewey  begins  by  introducing  
the   idea   of   “an   experience”.   Often   experience   is   inchoate   and   disordered,  
interrupted   and   at   odds   with   itself.   However,   within   the   continuous  
interchange   between   a   subject   and   their   surroundings   there   are   occasions   on  
which   the   material   of   experience   “runs   its   course   to   fulfillment”   (36).   “An  
experience”  is  “integrated  and  demarcated  in  the  general  stream  of  experience”  
(37)   by   virtue   of   a   sense   of   consummation   or   closure:   the   kind   of   experience  
arising   from   the   solving   of   a   problem   or   the   completion   of   a   game.   Such  
experiences   don’t   simply   end,   they   come   to   a  well-­‐‑rounded   close.  As  Dewey  
writes,   “Such   an   experience   is   a   whole   and   carries   with   it   its   own  
individualizing  quality  and  self-­‐‑sufficiency”  (37).  This  concept  of  the  integrated,  
self-­‐‑contained,  complete  and  internally  consistent  experience  is  not  coextensive  
with   aesthetic   experience—intellectual   enquiry   can   involve   this   kind   of  
consummation—but   is  necessary  for   it.  Such  experience   is  diverse  yet  unified,  
involving   distinct   yet   free   flowing   elements  which   form   a   unified  whole.  All  
experience   contains   the   possibility   of   becoming   an   experience   and   achieving  
unity  by  virtue  of  a  single  pervasive  quality:  “the  institution  of  a  felt  harmony”  
(45).  
So   an   aesthetic   experience   is   an   experience.   More   than   this,   however,   an  
aesthetic  experience  must  involve  a  felt  harmony  which  serves  to  individualise  
it  in  addition  to  its  consummation  or  sense  of  closure.  The  aesthetic  in  experience  
refers,   for   Dewey,   “to   experience   as   appreciative,   perceiving,   and   enjoying”  
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(49).   It   is   not   the   objects   experienced   but   the  manner   of   experience   in  which  
they   figure   which   mark   aesthetic   experience.   Indeed,   “any   practical   activity  
will,   provided   that   it   is   integrated   and  moves   by   its   own   urge   to   fulfilment,  
have   esthetic   quality”   (41).   However,   whilst   all   experience   contains   such  
promise,   the   “esthetic   experience”   is   still   a   distinctive   form   of   experience:   an  
experience.   Its   subject   matter   and   occasion   might   be   various   but   its  
phenomenology  is  specific  and  individuating.  
1.5.2.2  Dewey’s  aesthetic  psychology  
Aesthetic  experience  is  a  form  of  heightened,  intensified  feeling  or  experience  
for   Dewey.   He   shares   this   much   with   Kant   and   many   others.   However,   by  
placing   desire,   action,   and   emotion   at   the   core   of   a   concept   of   aesthetic  
experience  which  emerges  from  ordinary  experience  Dewey  effectively  argues  
for   something   like   a   broad   aesthetic   psychology.   He   argues   that   “The   very  
dominance   of   intense   sensuous   qualities   in   esthetic   objects   is   itself   proof,  
psychologically  speaking,  that  appetition  is  there”  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  266).  This  is  
quite  different  from  Kant’s  insistence  that  the  pleasure  in  the  representation  of  
an   object   must   bypass   the   faculty   of   desire   in   order   to   ground   an   aesthetic  
judgement.  
We  can  see  here  Dewey’s  critique  of  an  approach  to  aesthetic  experience  and  
aesthetic   perception   that   develops   from   the   Kantian   distinction   between   the  
judgement   of   taste   and   the   agreeable.   As   we   have   seen,   for   Kant   “[the]  
agreeable  is  that  which  pleases  in  sensation”  and  is  a  question  of  the  gratification  
of  the  subject  and  their  interests.  The  agreeable  is  grounded  on  a  private  feeling  
restricted   to   the   individual,   and   is   thus   distinguished   from   the   beautiful,   our  
satisfaction   in  which   arises  without   interest   and,   so   it   is   argued,   thus   carries  
with   it   an   intersubjective   weight—a   “subjective   universality”—that   the  
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agreeable  cannot  claim.  Dewey  rejects  Kant’s  understanding  of  pleasure  and  his  
isolation  of  the  aesthetic  from  action  and  desire.  
One   trouble   with   the   Kantian   psychology   is   that   it   supposes   all  
“pleasure,”   save   that   of   “contemplation,”   to   consist  wholly   of  personal  
and  private  gratification.  Every  experience,  including  the  most  generous  
and  idealistic,  contains  an  element  of  seeking,  of  pressing  forward.  Only  
when  we  are  dulled  by  routine  and  sunk   in  apathy  does   this  eagerness  
forsake  us.  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  265)  
Now,  Dewey  does  endorse  something  like  the  view  that  aesthetic  perception  
excludes   the   practical,   but   only   insofar   as   “by   “practical”   is  meant   an   action  
undertaken   for   a   particular   and   specialized   end   outside   of   perception,   or   for  
some  external  consequence”  (Dewey,  2005,  p.  267).  The   idea  here   is   that  some  
“ulterior”  motive  may  disrupt   the  otherwise  unified  experience  by   interfering  
with   the   institution   of   a   single   individualising   quality.  However,   despite   this,  
Dewey   firmly   rejects   a   view   of   “contemplation”   founded   on   disinterested  
pleasure.  
  One   of   the   central   characteristics   of  modern  manifestations   of   the   narrow  
approach   to   aesthetic   psychology   which   will   emerge   below   is   the   pairing   of  
attention  and  concepts  descended  from  Kantian  disinterestedness  as  conditions  
for  aesthetic  experience.  Whilst  Kant’s  concept  of  disinterest  qualifies  pleasure  
rather   than   attention,  many   later   views  develop   accounts   of   attention   “for   its  
own   sake”   as   the   prerequisite   for   aesthetic   experience.  My   argument  will   be  
that  such  accounts  utilise  an  undertheorised  concept  of  attention,  but  this  is  not  
exclusive   to   narrow   approaches.   Dewey  writes   that   “Attentive   observation   is  
certainly  one   essential   factor   in   all   genuine  perception   including   the   esthetic”  
(Dewey,   2005,   p.   263).   His   aesthetic   psychology,   broad   as   it   may   be   when  
compared   to  Kant’s,   is  nonetheless  narrowed  by   the   identification  of  attentive  
observation  as  a  necessary  condition  on  aesthetic  perception  and   the   forms  of  
awareness  characteristic  of  an  experience  with  aesthetic  quality.    
   49  
Nonetheless,  what  Dewey  emphasises   is   the  way   in  which  the  potential   for  
aesthetic   experience   or   aesthetic   perception   is   ever-­‐‑present.   He   considers   the  
psychological   capacities   operative   in   daily   life   and   ordinary   experience   to   be  
those  involved  in  aesthetic  experience;  and  his  conditions  serve  to  differentiate  
aesthetic   experience   from   ordinary   experience   only   insofar   as   the   pervasive  
quality  of   the  experience   individuates   it.   It  doesn’t  make  sense,   for  Dewey,   to  
separate  the  agreeable  and  the  beautiful,  because  he  doesn’t  accept  the  way  in  
which   Kant   isolates   one   form   of   representation   via   feeling   from   another.   In  
resisting   the   compartmentalisation   of   experience   Dewey   opens   the   way   for  
broad  aesthetic  psychology  and  everyday  aesthetics.  
1.6  Contemporary  broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  psychology:  Attention  
One   of   the   main   aims   of   this   thesis   is   to   demonstrate   how   a   proper  
understanding  of  the  role  of  attention  in  aesthetic  life  facilitates  the  resolution  of  
the  tensions  between  the  broad  and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology.  
We  will  have  much  more  to  say  about  attention  in  the  next  chapter,  where  I  will  
analyse   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   in   terms   of   an   “attention  
condition”  for  aesthetic  experience  and  aesthetic  perception.  Understanding  the  
nature   of   the   attention   condition—the   manner   in   which   the   absence   and  
presence  of  attention  constrains  aesthetic  experience—will  allow  us  to  construct  
a  map  of   our   aesthetic  psychology  which   explains  how   the  kinds  of   aesthetic  
engagement   characteristic   of   the   broad   approach   and   everyday   aesthetics   can  
lie  on  a  continuum  with  the  more  complex  appreciative  elements  of  the  narrow  
approach.   In   what   remains   of   this   chapter   I   will   briefly   show   how  
contemporary   approaches   differ  with   respect   to   the   role   of   attention   and   the  
forms  of  awareness  they  consider  characteristic  of  aesthetic  experience.  
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1.6.1  Narrow  approaches  in  contemporary  aesthetic  psychology  
We  will  begin  by  considering  some  examples  of  narrow  accounts  of  aesthetic  
experience   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   Two   things   in   particular   will   emerge:  
firstly,   taking   a   narrow   approach   to   aesthetic   psychology   does   not   entail   a  
particular   account   of   the   nature   of   the   aesthetic   or   what   makes   experience  
aesthetic;   and,   secondly,   that   the   necessity   of   some   kind   of   attention   for  
awareness  or  perception  of  the  aesthetic  features  of  objects  and  our  experience  
of   them   is   a   common   condition   for   aesthetic   experience   on   the   narrow  
approach.   Similarly,   the   broad   approach   contains   no   single   account   of   the  
nature  of  the  aesthetic  or  our  experience  of  it.  Yet,  the  role  of  attention  and  the  
conditions   for   our   awareness   or   perception   of   the   aesthetic   are   markedly  
different  from  the  narrow  approach.  
Recall   that   a   narrow   approach   to   aesthetic   psychology   is   one   which   lays  
down  psychological  conditions  on  experience  which  serve  to  restrict  the  range  
of  experiences  which  qualify  as  aesthetic.  I  highlighted  that  this  involves  a  view  
about  what  renders  an  experience  aesthetic  and  the  psychological  capacities  and  
mental  states  required  to  instantiate  or  possess  that  character.  Narrow  theorists  
can   occupy   fairly   different   positions   about   such   matters:   what   makes   them  
narrow  theorists  is  the  view  that  both  the  aesthetic  and  psychological  elements  
contrive   to   restrict   the   range   of   experiences   we   may   call   aesthetic.   Narrow  
aesthetic   psychology   is   often   implicit   in   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience,  
aesthetic  perception,  or  aesthetic  appreciation.  We  need  to  excavate  it.  
1.6.1.1  Narrow  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience  
A  complete  account  of  aesthetic  experience  will   tell  us  something  about  the  
subject  and  their  experience  in  combination  with  what  that  experience  is  of.   It  
may  be  that  it  is  something  about  the  subject  which  makes  experience  aesthetic,  
or   it   might   be   that   something   about   the   object(s)   of   their   experience   is  
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responsible.   Most   likely   some   combination   of   subject   and   object   serves   to  
characterise   aesthetic   experience.   How   do   accounts   cash   out   the   aesthetic  
element  of  experience?  Broadly,  a   theory  of  aesthetic  experience  might  appeal  
to  any  of  the  following  either  individually  or  in  combination  as  the  distinctively  
and/or  necessarily  aesthetic  aspect  of  any  given  experience  or  state  of  mind:  
• The  phenomenology  or  “what-­‐‑it-­‐‑is-­‐‑likeness”  of  experience.  
• The  structure  of  experience.  
• The  object(s)  of  experience.  
• The  content  of  experience.  
• The  value  or  evaluative  stance  of  experience.  
Any   given   theory   is   likely   to   rely   on   a   combination   of   these   and   to   place  
them  in  differing  relations,  with  one  proving  to  constrain  or  underpin  another.  
A  phenomenological  account,   for  example,   is  often   less   likely   to  be  concerned  
with   the   correctness   or   appropriateness   of   aesthetic   experience   than   it   is   in  
characterising  the  quality  or  “feeling”  of  the  experience  itself.  Such  an  account  
is   often   coupled  with   a   structural   element  detailing  how  experience  develops  
and  is  demarcated  from  non-­‐‑aesthetic  experience.  Dewey’s  aesthetic  experience  
can   be   understood   as   a   phenomenological   and   structural   account   on   these  
terms.   Moreover,   for   Dewey,   it   is   the   phenomenology   and   structure   of   such  
experience,  in  combination  with  the  objects  and  practices  which  arise  from  and  
elicit   such   experiences,   which   help   us   to   explain   the   value   of   art   and   our  
experience  of  it.  
In   contrast,   a   different   account   might   emphasise   the   representation   or  
scrutiny  of  particular  properties  or  qualities  of  appearance,  perhaps  on  the  basis  
of   a   certain   kind   of   attention.   Such   views   certainly   do   not   ignore   the  
phenomenology  or  structure  of  aesthetic  experience,  but  are  more   likely   to  be  
concerned  with   the   correctness  or  appropriateness  of   experience  because   they  
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are   orientated   towards   features   of   the   world   that   we   can,   in   theory,   all  
experience  or  know.    
For  example,  Jerrold  Levinson  writes  that  “pleasure  in  an  object   is  aesthetic  
when  it  derives  from  apprehension  of  and  reflection  on  the  object'ʹs   individual  
character   and   content,   both   for   itself   and   in   relation   to   the   structural   base   on  
which  it  rests”  (Levinson,  1996a,  p.  6).  We  can  see  in  Levinson’s  characterisation  
of   aesthetic   pleasure   a   combination   of   a   particular   phenomenology   and   the  
demand   that   it   derive   from   the   right   kind   of   content:   content   which   is  
apprehended   “for   itself”.   Levinson   specifies   a   certain   kind   of   awareness   of   a  
particular  form  of  content  grounded  in  the  right  type  of  approach  to  objects  and  
their   qualities.   He   identifies   attention   as   central   to   the   form   of   awareness  
characteristic  of  aesthetic  experience:  
By  aesthetic  attention   is  meant  attention  focused  on  an  object'ʹs  character,  
or   otherwise   put,   its   perceivable   forms   and   properties,   for   their   own  
sake,  in  their  full  individuality,  apart  from  the  utility  of  so  attending,  on  
whatever   content   emerges   from   such   forms   and   properties,   and   on  
relationships   among   such   forms,   properties   and   contents.   (Levinson,  
forthcoming)  
  Attention  to  an  object’s  appearance  “for  its  own  sake”  is  central  to  aesthetic  
experience  on  many  narrow  accounts.  Such  attention  is  a  descendant  of  Kant’s  
notion   of   disinterest   and   is   meant   to   ensure   that   the   subject’s   awareness   is  
focused  on   the  properties   of   the   object   such   that   any  pleasurable   response   or  
any   judgement   of   the  merit   or   value  of   the   object   refers   only   to   it   and  not   to  
idiosyncrasies  of  the  subject.  We  will  go  into  this  further  in  the  next  chapter,  but  
we   can   see   that,   for   Levinson,   attention   is   enlisted   to   provide   the   content   of  
experience  by  virtue  of   focusing  on  “perceivable  forms  and  properties”  and   to  
play   a   role   in   ensuring   the   appropriateness   of   the   subject’s   response   to   such  
properties.  
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In  an  otherwise  fairly  dissimilar  account,  Gary  Iseminger  writes,  “Someone  is  
appreciating  a  state  of  affairs   just   in  case  she  or  he  is  valuing  for   its  own  sake  the  
experiencing  of  that  state  of  affairs”  (Iseminger,  2006,  p.  99).  Iseminger  identifies  as  
aesthetic   a   particular   evaluative   stance   towards   the   content   and   objects   of  
experience,  requiring  not  only  that  experience  involve  a  certain  kind  of  valuing  
of   its   objects,   but   also   a   more   reflexive   valuing   of   one’s   own   experience   of  
value.27  
However,  attention   to  and  awareness  of   the  “right  kind”  of  content  are  not  
indissolubly   linked   to   non-­‐‑instrumental   or   “for   itself”-­‐‑type   conditions   in  
narrow  accounts.  Noël  Carroll  has  argued  that  “an  aesthetic  experience  can  be  
identified   in   terms   of   its   content,   without   referring   to   affective   states   like  
pleasure,  disinterested  or  otherwise,  or  to  evaluative  postures,  such  as  finding  
the   experience   of   such  properties   to   be   valuable   for   their   own   sake”   (Carroll,  
2006a,   pp.   91,   my   emphasis).   This   content   includes   “the   formal   structures,  
aesthetic   and/or   expressive   properties   of   the   work   and/or   of   the   manner   in  
which   those   features   interact   with   each   other   and/or   address   the   cognitive  
perceptual,  emotive,  and/or  imaginative  powers  of  the  subject  (Carroll,  2006a,  p.  
89).  This  list  should  remind  us  of  Levinson’s  account  of  aesthetic  pleasure  and  
aesthetic   attention   in   its   content,   but   diverges   from   it   in   insisting   on   the  
irrelevance  of  a  particular  phenomenology,  evaluative  orientation,  or  structure  
beyond  the  appropriate  representation  of  aesthetic  content.  
1.6.1.2  Narrow  psychological  conditions  on  aesthetic  experience  
Central  to  the  examples  of  narrow  accounts  above  are  conditions  which  must  
be   satisfied   in   order   for   particular   properties   or   qualities   of   objects   to   be  
perceived  and  represented  by  the  subject;   for   those  properties  and  qualities   to  
be   responded   to   appropriately;   and   for   the   subject’s   response   to   their   own  
                                                                                                 
27  See  (Walton,  1993)  for  a  similar  account  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  
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experience   to   be   appropriate.   In   particular,   we   have   seen   the   importance   of  
attention   to   the   qualities   of   objects,   another   example   of   which   is   Robert  
Stecker’s   “minimal   conception”   of   aesthetic   experience:   “the   experience   of  
attending  in  a  discriminating  manner  to  forms,  qualities  or  meaningful  features  of  
things,   attending   to   these   for   their   own   sake   or   for   the   sake   of   this   very  
experience”  (Stecker,  2006a,  pp.  4,  my  emphasis).  Stecker  agrees  with  Carroll  in  
the  demand  for  discriminating  attention,  but  disagrees  with  him  (and  others)  in  
his  emphasis  on  attending  to  or  valuing  the  experience  and  its  objects  “for  their  
own  sake”.28    
So   the   importance   of   attention   on   the   narrow   approach   is   not   limited   to   a  
particular   account   of   the   “aesthetic-­‐‑making”   element   of   experience   or  
perception.   Attention   plays   a   role   in   providing   the   right   kind   of   content  
whether  or  not  our  awareness  of  or  response  to  that  content  must  then  satisfy  
some  further  “for  its  own  sake”-­‐‑type  condition.  We  will  explore  this  in  detail  in  
the  next  chapter  where  I  will  argue  than  an  “attention  condition”  on  aesthetic  
experience   is   characteristic   of   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   and   that   a  
commitment  to  such  a  role  for  attention  in  securing  the  right  kind  of  awareness  
for   aesthetic   experience   is  one  point  of   conflict  with  many  examples  of  broad  
aesthetic  psychology.  Our  question  must  then  be  whether  attention  is  required  
in   order   to   secure   the   aesthetic   character   of   aesthetic   experience   or   aesthetic  
perception;  or  whether  we  can  envision  a  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  in  the  
absence  of  attention.  We  will  need  to   turn  to  contemporary  psychological  and  
philosophical  work  on  attention  and  consciousness  to  begin  to  resolve  this.  
Broadly,   however,  we   can   at   this   stage   identify   attention   and   the   forms   of  
awareness  which  it  supports  as  one  of  the  requisite  psychological  capacities  in  
                                                                                                 
28   The   debate   between   Carroll   and   Stecker   over   the   sufficiency   of   content   for   aesthetic  
experience  and  the  necessity  of  valuing  “for  its  own  sake”  is  a  lengthy  one.  See  (Carroll,  2001,  
2006a,  2006b,  2012)  and  (Stecker,  2001,  2006a,  2006b).  
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narrow   aesthetic   psychology.   In   several   cases   attention   is   the   foundation   for  
further  and  more  complex   forms  of  engagement,   such  as   the  kind  of   reflexive  
valuing   of   one’s   own   experience   that   Iseminger   identifies   and   calls   aesthetic  
appreciation  (or  the  “aesthetic  state  of  mind”).  This  kind  of  appreciative  mental  
activity   is   distinctively   narrow   and   contrasts   with   the   broader   accounts   in  
contemporary  aesthetic  psychology  to  which  we  now  turn.  
1.6.2  Broad  approaches  in  contemporary  aesthetic  psychology  
It   is   important   to  understand  that   the  disagreement  between  the  broad  and  
narrow   approaches   is   not   simply   about   the   “aesthetic-­‐‑making”   character   of  
experience.   Indeed,   a   broad   and   narrow   theorist   might   agree   on   the  
distinctively   aesthetic   aspect  of   experience:   a   certain   form  of  phenomenology,  
say.   Where   the   approaches   differ   is   in   the   psychological   processes   and  
capacities   experiences   must   involve   for   the   “aesthetic-­‐‑making”   element   they  
consider  necessary.  
For  example,  the  broad  theorist  Yuriko  Saito  explicitly  agrees  with  Carroll’s  
content  view,  arguing  that  the  aesthetic  aspect  of  experience  is  supplied  by  the  
features  and  qualities  of  objects  and  phenomena  perceived  by  the  subject  (Saito,  
2007,   p.   11).   Saito,   however,   whilst   agreeing   with   the   significance   of   content,  
wishes  to  extend  this  beyond  Carroll’s  examples  of   the  aesthetic  experience  of  
art   to  “those  responses   that  propel  us   toward  everyday  decisions  and  actions,  
without  any  accompanying  contemplative  appreciation”  (Saito,  2007,  p.  11).  In  
other  words,  Saito  wishes   to  preserve   the  significance  of  content   in  qualifying  
an  experience  as  aesthetic,  but  also  to  change  the  way  in  which  we  understand  
the  possible  forms  of  engagement  with  that  content.    
This   rejection   of   attentive   and   contemplative   appreciation   as   necessary   for  
aesthetic  experience  or  aesthetic  perception  is  distinctive  of  the  broad  approach  
to   aesthetic   psychology.   It   prompts   the   same   question   we   asked   of   narrow  
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aesthetic   psychology:  what   constitutes   and   is   required   for   the   kinds   of   states  
and   forms   of   awareness   characteristic   of   aesthetic   experience?  What   kinds   of  
responses   to   aesthetic   features   is   Saito   talking   about?  What   level   or   form   of  
attention—if  any—to  such  features  is  required?  What  kind  of  awareness  of  those  
features  or  of  our  own  responses  is  involved  on  Saito’s  view?  It  is  far  from  clear  
that  these  questions  have  been  answered  or  clearly  formulated  by  any  account.  
1.6.2.1  Broad  aesthetic  psychology,  everyday  aesthetics,  and  attention  
It   is   striking   how   consistently   attention   of   some   kind   serves   to   distinguish  
both   everyday   aesthetic   experience   from   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetic   experience   and  
broad  aesthetic  psychology  from  narrow.  For  example,  recall   Irvin’s  argument  
that    
…particular   moments   and   local   experiences   have   an   aesthetic   quality  
about   them.  Being   in   the   room  you  are   in   right  now  with   its  particular  
visual   features   and   sounds;   sitting   in   the   way   that   you   are   sitting,  
perhaps  crookedly  in  an  uncomfortable  chair  feeling  the  air  currents  on  
your   skin—all   of   these   things   impart   a   texture   to   your   experience  
that…should  be  regarded  as  aesthetic.  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  30)  
Irvin  makes  this  argument  on  the  basis  of  an  adaptation  and  attenuation  of  
Dewey’s  scheme  for  an  experience,  arguing  that  each  satisfies  the  conditions  he  
sets   down   for   the   institution   of   “felt   harmony”   and   thus   an   experience  
possessing   aesthetic   character.29   The   idea   of   “aesthetic   texture”   isn’t   entirely  
clear  and  Irvin  discusses  diverse  examples,  but  the  “imparting”  of  such  texture  
to   experience   seems   very   different   from   the   kind   of   appreciative   activity  
characteristic   of   the   narrow   approach.   In   particular,   there   is   no   mention   of  
attention   “for   its   own   sake”.   Irvin—a   broad   theorist—is   discussing   a   quite  
                                                                                                 
29   Elsewhere   Irvin   makes   the   argument   that   itches   and   scratches   are   legitimate   aesthetic  
phenomena.  (Irvin,  2008b).  
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different   form   of   awareness   from,   for   example,   Levinson’s   attentive   aesthetic  
experience.    
This  is  one  of  the  reasons  it  is  useful  to  consider  the  ways  in  which  broad  and  
narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology  intersect  with  the  philosophy  of  art  
and   everyday   aesthetics.   The   connection   between   attending,   noticing,  
interacting,   and   the   aesthetic   is   a   key   aspect   of   the   problematic   relationship  
between  everyday  aesthetics  and  traditional  philosophical  aesthetics.  Clarifying  
those   connections   and   thus   beginning   to   reconcile   everyday   and   traditional  
aesthetics  is  one  of  aims  this  thesis.  Indeed,  I  suggest  that  it  is  with  reference  to  
attention   rather   than   to   the   problematic   domains   of   the   everyday,   art,   and  
nature  that  we  should  seek  to  understand  experiences  of  the  diverse  candidates  
for  aesthetic  engagement.  
Yet,   despite   the   significance   of   attention   for   both   fields,   we   should   not  
overstate   the   similarity   of   the   debate   between   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology,   on   the   one   hand,   and   everyday   aesthetics   and   art-­‐‑centred  
philosophical   aesthetics,   on   the   other.   It   is   important   to   appreciate   that   the  
distinction   between   the   broad   and   narrow   approaches   is   not   that   between  
everyday  aesthetics  and  the  philosophy  of  art  over,  for  example,  paradigmatic  
objects   of   aesthetic   experience.   A   narrow   theorist   might   be   quite   happy,   for  
example,  to  add  Leddy’s  “everyday  surface  aesthetic  qualities”  (Leddy,  1995)  to  
their   ontology   whilst   retaining   their   interest   in   the   “special”   or   “stand-­‐‑out”  
experience  of  them.  Indeed,  a  narrow  theorist  like  Roger  Scruton,  who  wishes  to  
retain   a   contemplative   element   to   aesthetic   experience   is   nonetheless   eager   to  
adequately   theorise   the  aesthetics  of  daily   life.   Scruton  argues   that  “there   is   a  
kind   of   disinterested   contemplation   that   is   involved   even   in   the   most   practical  
matters,  and  which  is  an  integral  part  of  knowing  what  we  are  doing  and  doing  
it  well’  (Scruton,  2007,  pp.  239,  my  emphasis)  and  that  aesthetic  choices  play  a  
central   role   in   the   life   of   rational   beings   as   “part   of   the   attempt   to  match  our  
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surroundings   to  ourselves  and  ourselves   to  our  surroundings”   (Scruton,  2009,  
p.  82).30  In  other  words,  the  two  sets  of  distinctions  may  cut  across  one  another.  
Nonetheless,   the   distinct   accounts   proposed   by   philosophers   of   art   and  
everyday   aesthetics   to   explain   the   kinds   of   experience   involved   in   their  
domains  often  reflect  the  underlying  disagreements  between  narrow  and  broad  
accounts.  This   is  part  of   the  reason   the  question  of   the  nature  of  our  aesthetic  
psychology  is  particularly  pressing.  Whether  broad  or  narrow  in  our  aesthetic  
psychology,  we  should  be  able  to  give  an  account  of  what  we  think  is  involved  
in   having   such   a   psychology,   and   in  which   contexts   the   aesthetic   enters   into  
experience.   If  we  can  do   that,   then  we  can  also  make  some  headway  with   the  
question   of   the   relationship   between   the   philosophy   of   art   and   everyday  
aesthetics.  
1.6.3  Strengths  and  weaknesses  of  broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  
Each  approach   to   the  breadth  of   our   aesthetic  psychology  has   its   strengths  
and  weaknesses.  The  great  strength  of  the  broad  approach  is  its  ability  to  place  
the  aesthetic  at  the  heart  of  our  lives  in  a  manner  which  promises  to  retain  the  
continuity  of  the  kind  of  aesthetic  responses  Dewey  and  everyday  aestheticians  
discuss   with   those   that   narrow   theorists   seek   to   analyse.   As   we   have   seen,  
philosophical  aesthetics  has  focused  on  standout  experiences  of  art  and  nature,  
neglecting   the   everyday,   un-­‐‑contemplative   experiences   of   daily   life.   Broad  
aesthetic  psychology  is  well  placed  to  approach  the  question  of  the  penetration  
of  the  aesthetic  into  daily  experience.  
Nonetheless,   the  narrow  approach   is   correct   in   seeking   to  understand  why  
and   how   it   is   that   we   seek   to   appreciate,   analyse,   and   value   the   aesthetic  
features  of   our   lives:   be   that   art,   nature,   or   the   everyday.  We  do   contemplate  
                                                                                                 
30  See  also  (Scruton,  1979,  2011).  
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objects   and   their   features;   we   talk   about   them,   seeking   to   understand   them,  
their   effects   on   us   and   others;  we   argue   about   them   and   produce   reasons   in  
favour   of   our   judgements.   Such   activities   underpin   everything   from   the  
business  of  criticism  to  the  decoration  of  our  homes.  It  seems  plausible  that  part  
of   the   reason   narrow   accounts   emphasise   a   certain   set   of   prerequisites   for  
aesthetic   experience   is   that   the   satisfaction   of   those  prerequisites  puts  us   in   a  
position   to  make   and   articulate   aesthetic   judgements   or   critical   verdicts  with  
some   claim  on  others.  That,   it   seems,   requires   a   certain   level   of   attention  and  
awareness.  This  seems  to  be  missing  in  many  examples  of  the  broad  approach.  
In   fact,   the   supposed   inability   of   broad   aesthetic   experiences   to   furnish  
descriptions  for  use  in  aesthetic  judgements  has  been  cited  as  a  reason  to  doubt  
their  aesthetic  status  (D.  Davies,  forthcoming).    
A   related   worry,   articulated   by   Christopher   Dowling,   is   that   everyday  
aesthetics—and,  by  extension,  broad  aesthetic  psychology—elides   the  Kantian  
distinction   between   the   agreeable   and   the   beautiful   and   thus   includes   many  
experiences   which,   whilst   significant   in   some   sense,   are   nonetheless  
nonaesthetic   because   they   fail   to   involve   “the   normative   aspect   that   renders  
certain  judgements  of  particular  interest  to  others”  (Dowling,  2010,  p.  240).  The  
worry   here   is   not   that   broad   aesthetic   experiences   fail   to   furnish   aesthetic  
descriptions—although   they  might—but   that   an  account   like  Saito’s  or   Irvin’s  
which   admits   a   wide   variety   of   sensory   experiences   loses   the   fundamental  
distinction  between  idiosyncratic  sensory  experiences  (the  agreeable)  and  those  
which   transcend   the   subject’s   response   (the   beautiful).   Such   an   account,   it   is  
argued,   renders   the  aesthetic   trivial  or   critically  uninteresting.   It   is   the   critical  
aspect,  Dowling  and  others  argue,  that  aesthetics  should  seek  to  understand.    
Indeed,   part   of   what   Kant   sought   to   explain   was   the   way   in   which   we  
communicate   our   experience   of   beauty.   Likewise,   narrow   accounts   seek   to  
understand  and  reflect  the  manner  in  which  we  feel  justified  in  articulating  and  
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urging   upon   others   the   attributions   and   judgements   we   make   in   aesthetic  
experience,  often  by  grounding  our  response  in  disinterest  or  attention  “for  its  
own   sake”.   This   interweaving   of   the   phenomenological,   epistemic,   and  
evaluative  is  a  key  and  attractive  attribute  of  many  narrow  theories  because  it  
attempts  to  explain  the  intuitions  and  behaviour  which  surround  paradigmatic  
aesthetic  experiences.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  whilst   such  narrow  accounts  may  
do  a  good  job  of  capturing  what  is  distinctive  about  a  certain  form  of  aesthetic  
experiences  of  art  or  nature,   they  are  unable   to  address   the  kinds  of   concerns  
highlighted  by  everyday  aestheticians  and  other  broad  theorists.  
Both   approaches   to   aesthetic   experience   and   aesthetic   psychology   capture  
something  important  about  aesthetic  life.  However,  both  approaches  also  seem  
unable  to  deal  with  the  other’s  characterisation  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  For  
the   broad   theorist   the   narrow   approach   renders   aesthetics   rarefied,   removed  
from   the   business   of   living   in   the  world,  whereas   for   the   narrow   theorist   the  
broad  approach   sacrifices   the  distinctive   and  valuable   aspects   of   the   aesthetic  
which   make   it   worth   pursuing   in   the   first   place.   We   thus   find   ourselves   at  
something  of  an  impasse,  seeking  to  accommodate  the  intuitions  of  both  broad  
and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology.    
The  way  out  of   this   impasse   lies   in  a  shared  characteristic  of  contemporary  
approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology.  The  weakness  of  both  approaches  lies  in  the  
failure  to  develop  accounts  of  aesthetic  psychology  which  support  the  limits—
or   lack   thereof—they   place   on   aesthetic   experience.   In   particular,   neither  
approach   adequately   theorises   the   kinds   of   attention   and   awareness   required  
for  the  various  forms  of  aesthetic  engagement  proposed.  Yet  it   is  precisely  the  
role  of  attention   in  aesthetic  experience  which  most   frequently  emerges  as   the  
distinguishing  feature  of  broad  and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology.  
We  need  to  remedy  this.  
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1.8  Conclusion  and  Implications  
We  have  seen  that  one  of  the  motivations  for  broad  approaches  to  aesthetic  
psychology   lies   in   the   suggestion   that   many   everyday   aesthetic   experiences  
apparently  take  place  either  without  our  attending  to  and  reflecting  upon  their  
aesthetic   qualities   or   those   of   their   objects;   or   they   involve   activities   and  
environments  to  which  we  pay  little  if  any  attention  at  all,  which  again  seems  to  
contravene   the  attentive,   contemplative,   reflective,   and   reflexive   tendencies   in  
many  narrow  theories  of  aesthetic  experience.  For  example,  Kevin  Melchionne  
writes  that  “the  aesthetic  virtues  of  the  home  are  usually  background  qualities  
that  affect  our  experience  of  the  space  without  calling  attention  to  themselves”  
(Melchionne,  1998,  p.  199).  Irvin  suggests  that  several  experiences  of  which  we  
are  barely  conscious  have  an  “aesthetic  texture”:  “simply  producing  a  sensation  
without   reflecting   on   it”   (Irvin,   2008a,  pp.   31,  my  emphasis).   In   these   everyday  
accounts  lie  the  hints  of  a  broad  aesthetic  psychology.  We  need  to  understand  
the  nature  of  such  unattended  experience  and  the  forms  of  aesthetic  experience  
of  which  we  might  be  capable  in  the  absence  of  attention.  
Indeed,   the   everyday   aesthetician’s   interest   in   a   pervasive   and   unattended  
aesthetic   aspect   to   life   is   one   that   Saito   articulates   more   clearly   when   she  
suggests   that   “Sometimes   our   aesthetic   interests   and   concerns   generate  
memorable  aesthetic  experiences,  while  other  times  they  simply  lead  to  further  
thoughts,  judgements,  or  actions,  without  inspiring  special  moments  that  stand  
out  from  the  flow  of  our  daily  affairs”  (Saito,  2007,  p.  9).  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  
with   this   lack   of   attention   to   appearances   that   so   many   narrow   accounts   of  
aesthetic   experience,   appreciation,   and   the   perception   of   aesthetic   qualities  
must  take  issue.31    
                                                                                                 
31   There   is   a   clear   split   between   those  who   are  willing   to   expand   the   range  of   objects   and  
environments   which   support   aesthetic   experience,   judgement,   and   value   whilst   maintaining  
that   this  must   involve  attention  to   those  phenomena,  and  those  who  wish  not  only  to  expand  
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We  can  understand  the  role  of  attention  in  this  disagreement  in  terms  of  the  
aspects   of   experience   mentioned   earlier.   Attention,   it   might   be   claimed,   is  
necessary  for  one  or  all  of  the  phenomenology,  structure,  objects,  content,  and  
value   of   experience   to   be   in   place   such   that   it   be   aesthetic.   This   appeal   to  
attention  is  often  underpinned  by  the  belief  that  a  certain  kind  of  discrimination  
of   aesthetic   properties   or   qualities   is   required   in   order   that   our   experience   or  
perception  be  aesthetic;  and  that  such  discrimination  requires  attention.  As  we  
have  seen,  several  theories  require  or  urge  that  aesthetic  responses  be  grounded  
in   the   discrimination   of   aesthetic   qualities   and   the   relations   between   those  
qualities  and  the  nonaesthetic  qualities  from  which  they  arise.  Alternatively,  the  
reflexive   valuing   of   one’s   own   experience   of   certain   features   (“appreciation”)  
implicitly   requires  attention   to   the  aesthetic  qualities  of   the  experience  of   that  
which   we   value.   Others   require   that   the   discrimination   of   the   perceptual  
manifold   must   be   such   that   we   can   deploy   descriptions   of   it   in   aesthetic  
judgement.  The  capacity  for  such  discrimination  and  description,  it  is  claimed,  
requires   attention   (D.   Davies,   forthcoming).   In   other   words:   the   kind   of  
awareness  required  for  aesthetic  experience  and  aesthetic  appreciation  requires  
attention  on  the  narrow  approach  to  aesthetic  psychology.  
I  will   argue   that   one  way   to   resolve   this   disagreement   is   to   adopt   a   broad  
approach  to  our  aesthetic  psychology,  but  to  make  this  approach  sophisticated  
enough   to   support   the  more   complex  phenomenological,   cognitive,   epistemic,  
and   evaluative   elements   that   narrow   theorists   demand.   This   won’t   be   easy  
because  we  will   have   to   deal  with   those   accounts  which  want   to   reserve   the  
aesthetic   for   the  more   complex   or   demanding   forms   of   engagement.  We  will  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
this  range  of  objects  and  environments,  but  also  the  kinds  of  experience  which  we  have  of  them.  
In   the   former   camp   are   narrow   theorists   like   (Budd,   2008;   Dowling,   2010;   Iseminger,   2006;  
Levinson,   1996b,   forthcoming;   Parsons   &   Carlson,   2008;   Scruton,   2011;   Sibley,   2001d).   In   the  
latter,   (Berleant,   2010;  Dewey,  2005;   Irvin,   2008a,   2008b;  Leddy,  2012b;  Lee,   2010;  Melchionne,  
2011;  Novitz,  2001  [1992];  Saito,  2007;  Sartwell,  2003).  
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have   to   show   why   it   is   that   those   complex   forms   are   instances   of   a   broader  
aesthetic   psychology   rather   than   the   fundamental   concepts   in   terms  of  which  
aesthetic  life  should  be  explained.  
Such   a   project   will   involve   formulating   and   answering   some   pressing  
questions  about   the  nature  of  attention,  aesthetic  perception,  and   the  kinds  of  
awareness  and  accessibility  involved  in  different  kinds  of  engagement  with  the  
world.   Thus   we   will   focus   on   our   aesthetic   psychology,   and   do   so   by  
considering  our  aesthetic  perception  and   its   relation   to  attention,   the  kinds  of  
awareness   involved   in   aesthetic   perception,   and   the   manner   in   which   we  
graduate   from   unattended   everyday   aesthetic   life   to   full-­‐‑blown   appreciative  
experiences  of   the  world  and   its  contents.  To   that  end,   in   the  next  chapter  we  
will   focus  on  what   I   call   “the  attention   condition”  and   show  how   it   serves   to  
both  produce  and  solve  problems  for  the  broad  and  narrow  theorist.  
1.8.1  Implications  
Any   discussion   of   aesthetic   experience,   the   concept   of   the   aesthetic,   and  
aesthetic  psychology  will  have  consequences  not  only  for  its  own  subject  matter  
but   for   debates   and   accounts  which   draw   on   them.   In   this   section   I   want   to  
briefly  discuss  some  of  the  implications  my  account  will  have  both  for  its  own  
subject  and  for  wider  debates  in  aesthetics.  
I   will   argue   for   a   broad   aesthetic   psychology   founded   on   a   concept   of  
aesthetic  perception  very  different  from  the  concepts  of  aesthetic  experience  to  
be   found   in   contemporary   literature.   This   concept   of   aesthetic   perception  
locates   the   aesthetic   character   of   perceptual   experience   in   the   assembly   of  
perceptual   representations   of   the   external   world   and   its   contents.   As   a  
consequence   aesthetic   perception—and   aesthetic   character—is   pervasive   in  
perceptual  experience  and,  I  will  argue,  prior  to  the  deployment  of  attention  to  
either   the   objects   of   experience   or   our   responses   to   those   experiences.   This  
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immediately   undermines   those   accounts—some   of   which   we   have   already  
encountered  and  whose  analysis  we  will  undertake  in  the  next  chapter—which  
seek   to   locate   the   aesthetic   character   of   experience   in   a   particular   stance   or  
approach  to  the  world,  such  as  the  experience  of  the  features  of  objects  or  our  
response  to  them  “for  their  own  sake”.    
This   pervasiveness   of   aesthetic   perception   has   as   a   consequence   the  
aestheticisation  of  everyday  experience  whether  or  not  it  is  attended.  Not  only  
does   this   mean   that   our   aesthetic   psychology   is   broad,   but   that   everyday  
aesthetics   should   be   construed   as   studying   one   of   the   foundational   and  most  
significant   forms  of  aesthetic  experience  of  which  we  are  capable.  My  account  
should   thus   serve   to   rebalance   the   dialectic   surrounding   everyday   aesthetics  
and  the  philosophies  of  art  and  nature  by  placing  the  experiences  they  discuss  
on  a  continuum  of  aesthetic  perception  modified  by  attention.  
However,  for  all  that  my  account  places  aesthetic  experiences  of  art,  nature,  
and   the   everyday  on  a   continuum  with  one  another,   it  would  be   strange  and  
implausible  were   there   to   be   no   differences   between   them.   By   distinguishing  
two  different   forms  of   aesthetic  perception  on   the  basis  of   attention   I  make   it  
possible  to  understand  paradigmatic  experiences  of  art  and  nature  as  rich  and  
appreciative   forms   of   aesthetic   perception   capable   of   supporting   aesthetic  
judgement,  criticism,  and  communication.  This  has  a  number  of  consequences  
both  for  aesthetic  experience  and  accounts  which  draw  on  it  or  related  concepts.  
Firstly,   as   I   have   suggested,   the   aesthetic   character   of   experience   can   no  
longer   depend   on   either   psychological   elements   or   evaluative   stances  
subsequent  to  the  deployment  of  attention  or  the  forms  of  thought  and  mental  
activity  which  depend  on  attention.  This  includes  anything  which  approximates  
to   an   “aesthetic   attitude”   (Stolnitz,   1969)   or   the   insistence   of   a   concept   of  
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disinterestedness  or   experience   “for   its   own   sake”   as   conditional   for   aesthetic  
perception  or  experience.  
However,   secondly,   it   might   still   be   the   case   that   such   conditions   have   a  
place  in  an  account  of  aesthetic  judgement.  One  of  the  consequences  of  locating  
the  criterion  of  aesthetic  perception  in  the  assembly  of  perceptual  experience  is  
that   questions   of   aesthetic   character   become   separated   from   questions   of  
aesthetic  evaluation  or   judgement.  We  saw  that  Kant  attempted  to  connect  his  
theory   of   aesthetic   psychology   with   his   account   of   aesthetic   judgement   by  
narrowing  the  former  to  serve  the  needs  of  the  latter.  I  have  resisted  that  move  
and,   consequently,   have   separated   the   question   of   aesthetic   perception   from  
that   of   aesthetic   evaluation.   This   means   that   it   might   still   be   the   case   that,  
should   we   wish   to   preserve   the   normativity   of   aesthetic   judgement,   further  
conditions  may   need   to   be   placed   on   aesthetic   perception   so   as   to   ensure   its  
appropriateness   and   protect   against   idiosyncrasy.   My   argument   is   that   such  
conditions  must  be  understood  to  be  issues  for  aesthetic  judgement  rather  than  
aesthetic   perception.   The   working   out   of   such   conditions   is   a   plausible  
extension  of  the  work  in  this  thesis.  
Thirdly,   if   I   alter   our   concept   of   aesthetic   experience,   how   are   we   to  
understand   the   role   of   such   experience   in   theories   which   attempt   to   use   the  
concept   in   the   definition   or   analysis   of   other   phenomena?   For   example,  
according  to  aesthetic  concepts  of  art  we  are  to  understand  artworks  as  objects  
intended   to   function  as   (amongst  other   things)  sources  of  aesthetic  experience  
where   “aesthetic   experience”   is   frequently   cashed   out   in   terms   of  
contemplation,   absorption,   intense   feeling,   intrinsic   value,   and   detachment  
from   practical   ends.32   Such   views  may   also,   but   not   necessarily,   consider   the  
                                                                                                 
32   See   (Beardsley,   1983),   (Anderson,   2000),   and   (Iseminger,   2004).   For   a   variation   which  
focuses   on   the   intention   to   realise   aesthetic   properties   rather   than   aesthetic   experience   see  
(Zangwill,  2007).  
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value  of  art  to  lie  in  this  function  or  capacity.  Aesthetic  theories  of  art  vary  and  
are  subject  to  a  number  of  objections  which  I  won’t  discuss  here.33  As  this  thesis  
develops,  however,  it  will  become  apparent  that  my  non-­‐‑evaluative  concept  of  
pervasive   aesthetic   perception   complicates   any   attempt   to   understand   art   in  
terms  of  it,  although  it  may  not  rule  out  a  modified  aesthetic  theory  according  
to   which   artworks   aim   at   a   certain   form   of   (suitably   specified)   attentive  
aesthetic  appreciation.    
Fourthly,   the  way   in  which   I  will  develop   the   role   of   attention   in   aesthetic  
perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation   will   affect   the   way   we   understand   the  
relationship   between   aesthetic   perception,   evaluation   and   criticism.   As   will  
become   apparent,   whilst   I   do   not   consider   attention   necessary   for   aesthetic  
perception,   I   do   consider   it   necessary   for   the   form   of   aesthetic   perception  
(which  I  call  “rich  aesthetic  perception”)  which  supports  appreciative  activities  
such   as   the   analysis   and   evaluation   of   formal   features   or   qualities   and  
knowledge  of  the  origins  of  the  emotions  or  feelings  experienced  in  response  to  
the  appearance  of  objects.    
I  offer  no  fully  worked-­‐‑out  theory  of  appreciation  or  criticism,  but  I  think  it  
suggestive  of  the  function  of  criticism  that  aesthetic  perception  as  I  conceive  it  
may   be   the   fundamental   concept   with   reference   to   which   our   aesthetic  
framework  should  be  developed:  it  suggests,  firstly,  that  the  aim  of  the  critic  is  
to   draw   our   attention   to   a   particular   set   of   appearances   so   that   we   perceive  
them  in  a  certain  way;  and,  secondly,  that  this  attention  is  required  in  order  that  
we  understand  both   the   reference   of   the   critic’s   statement   and  have   access   to  
                                                                                                 
33   For   an   overview,   see   (S.   Davies,   1991)   and   (Stecker,   2003).   The   historical   alternative   is  
exemplified  by,  amongst  others,  Jerrold  Levinson  (Levinson,  1979,  1989,  1993).  
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and  knowledge  of  the  grounds  of  our  own  perceptual  experience  of  the  objects  
or  qualities  in  question.34  
                                                                                                 
34  This  brief  characterisation  of  the  aims  of  criticism  draws  on  (Sibley,  2001a,  2001b).  
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Chapter  Two  
The  Attention  Condition  
I  feel  that  art  has  something  to  do  with  the  achievement  of  stillness  in  the  
midst  of  chaos.  A  stillness  which  characterizes  prayer,  too,  and  the  eye  of  
the  storm.  I  think  that  art  has  something  to  do  with  an  arrest  of  attention  
in  the  midst  of  distraction.  
The  Paris  Review:  The  Art  of  Fiction  No.  37  
Saul  Bellow35  
2.1  Introduction  
I   suggested   at   the   end   of   the   last   chapter   that   a   productive   way   to  
understand  the  tension  between  the  broad  and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  
psychology   is   in   terms   of   attention.  Attention   is   a   fundamental   psychological  
capacity  involved  in  perception,  thought,  and  action.  Thinking  about  the  role  of  
attention  in  aesthetics  is  thus  to  engage  in  aesthetic  psychology.  The  aim  of  this  
chapter   is   to  analyse   the   roles  attention  plays   in   some  examples  of  broad  and  
narrow   accounts.   It   is   characteristic   of   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   to   make  
aesthetic   perception,   aesthetic   experience,   and   aesthetic   appreciation  
conditional   on   attention   of   some   kind.   Conversely,   a   broad   approach   is   less  
likely  to  consider  attention  necessary  for  all  aesthetic  engagement.    
I   will   argue   that   some   prominent   narrow   accounts   make   problematic  
assumptions  about  the  necessity  of  attention  for  all  aesthetic  experience,  whilst  
broad  accounts  do  little  better  in  explaining  why  attention  is  not  required  for  all  
aesthetic  experience.  I  will  conclude  that  we  need  to  be  much  clearer  both  about  
the  roles  attention  plays  in  experience—aesthetic  and  otherwise—as  well  as  the  
different  forms  of  aesthetic  engagement  of  which  we  are  capable.  Ultimately,  I  
will   argue   that   attention   is   necessary   for   some   but   not   all   forms   of   aesthetic  
                                                                                                 
35  (Bellow,  1966).  
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engagement.   However,   before   we   get   to   that   we   will   need   a   better  
understanding  of  attention  as  well  as  a  model  of  aesthetic  psychology  in  which  
to  situate  it.  The  latter  task  is  one  for  the  next  chapter.  Here  we  will  focus  on  the  
attention   condition   and   its   role   in   broad   and   narrow   accounts   of   aesthetic  
psychology.  
2.2  A  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention  
Before   we   tackle   the   role   of   attention   in   broad   and   narrow   accounts   of  
aesthetic  psychology  we  need   to   outline   a   concept   of   attention  with  which   to  
approach  them.36  The  following  is  a  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention  which  
will  allow  us  to  analyse  those  accounts.37  
Nearly   every  work   on   attention   begins   with   the   following   quotation   from  
William  James'ʹs  The  Principles  of  Psychology:  
Everyone   knows   what   attention   is.   It   is   the   taking   possession   by   the  
mind,   in   clear   and   vivid   form,   of   one   out   of   what   seem   several  
simultaneously  possible  trains  of  thought.  Focalization,  concentration,  of  
consciousness  are  of  its  essence.  It  implies  withdrawal  from  some  things  
in  order   to  deal   effectively  with  others,   and   is   a   condition  which  has  a  
real   opposite   in   the   confused,  dazed,   and   scatterbrained   state...   (James,  
1980,  pp.  403-­‐‑404)  
More  recently,  Christopher  Mole  has  written  the  following:  
We  can  expand  upon  [James'ʹs]  remark  like  this:  For  minds  like  ours,   in  
environments   like   ours,   more   than   one   sequence   of   mental   states   is  
possible.   We   end   up   with   the   train   of   thought   that   we   actually   have  
partly   by   chance,   but   partly   because   certain   things   catch   our   attention,  
and  partly  because  we  direct  our  attention  onto  certain  things.  A  theory  
of   attention   is   an  attempt   to  give   an  account  of   this  nonrandomness   in  
                                                                                                 
36   For   overviews   of   attention   and   an   introduction   to   these   kinds   of   questions,   see   (Mole,  
2009),  (Watzl,  2011b,  2011c),  and  (Wu,  2014).  
37  Later  chapters  will  show  that  this  concept  needs  much  refinement  and  can  be  challenged  
in  various  ways.  Those  refinements  should  not  affect  the  conclusions  of  this  chapter.  
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our  coming  to  have  the  train  of  thoughts  that  we  in  fact  end  up  with.  It  is  
an  attempt  to  explain  the  selectivity  of  our  mental  engagement  with  the  
world.  That  is  what  psychologists  working  on  attention  seek  to  explain.  
(Mole,  2011a,  pp.  1-­‐‑2)  
Whether   or   not   everyone   really   knows   what   attention   is,   our   use   of   the  
concept  in  everyday  life  seems  to  follow  certain  patterns.38  As  James  and  Mole  
write,   attention   seems   bound   up   with   the   selectiveness   of   perception   and  
thought.   We   listen   to   and   watch   a   presentation,   focus   on   the   speech   and  
argument  of  the  speaker,  choose  the  seat  we  wish  to  take:  each  of  these  shapes  
and   is   shaped   by   shifts   in   attention.   Attention   and   consciousness   seem  
intimately  related:  there  is  a  sense  in  which  our  consciousness  is  shaped  by  our  
attention   and   inattention.   Our   experience   changes   as   our   attention   wanders.  
Attention   can   be   caught   involuntarily   by   a   shout,   a   flashing   light,   an   itch.  
Writing   this   sentence   requires   a   complex   combination   of   attention   to   its  
meaning,  its  place  in  a  series  of  arguments  which  are  themselves  part  of  a  larger  
single  argument,  as  well  as  visual  attention   to   the  words  on   the   screen  of  my  
computer,   and   the   task   of   typing—all  whilst   a   cat   sits   behind   the   screen   and  
does  its  best  to  distract.  
Thus  selectivity,  nonrandomness,  focalisation,  and  a  sense  of  the  shaping  of  
our  mental  lives  seem  to  underlie  the  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention.  More  
than  that,  and  as  the  examples  above  suggested,  attention  apparently  aids  and  
underpins   perceptual   and   mental   discrimination.   As   Wayne   Wu   writes,   the  
phenomenology  of   attention   “to  what   is  perceived   involves  not   just   a  way  of  
perceptually  locking  on  to  a  specific  object.  It  is  a  way  of  cognitively  locking  on  
to   it   as   well”   (Wu,   2011,   p.   93).   The   common-­‐‑sense   notion   thus   has   both  
                                                                                                 
38  Such  patterns  are  open  to  dispute,  but  I  shall  try  not  to  prejudice  the  question  of  the  folk  
psychology   of   attention   or   its   consistency   here.   We   will   address   the   viability   of   folk-­‐‑
psychological   concepts   of   attention   and   its   relation   to   consciousness   in   chapter   four.   On   the  
question   of   whether   there   is   a   substantive   or   unambiguous   folk-­‐‑psychology   of   attention   see  
(Mole,  2008),  (De  Brigard  &  Prinz,  2010),  and  (De  Brigard,  2010).  
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phenomenological  and  epistemic  (or  functional)  senses:   items  within  the  focus  
of   attention   seem   different   for   the   subject   as  well   as  being   somehow   clearer   or  
more   available   for   report,   scrutiny,   and   claims   about   their   nature.   That   is,  
attention  seems  to  bring  an  alteration  in  both  the  nature  of  our  experience  and  
what   we   know   or   can   reason   about.   Whether   the   former   phenomenological  
sense  depends  on  the  latter  epistemic  or  vice  versa  is  a  question  we  will   leave  
open  for  now.  
One   way   in   which   we   might   cash   out   the   effect   of   attention   on  
phenomenology   (and,   for   some,   its   effect   on   perceptual   or   representational  
content)   is   by   saying   that   attention   makes   the   attributed   properties   of   its  
object(s)   more   determinate   (Nanay,   2009).   Being   the   determinate   of   a  
determinable   property   can   be  understood   as   one  way   of   being   that   property;  
and   the  determinate  of  one  property  can  be   the  determinable  of  another:   thus  
being  red  is  determinate  of  being  coloured  but  determinable  of  being  scarlet.  So,  
Nanay  writes,    
If   I   am   attending   to   the   colour   of  my   office   telephone,   I   attribute   very  
determinate,   (arguably   super-­‐‑determinate)   properties   to   it.   If,   as   it   is  
more   often   the   case,   I   am   not   attending   to   the   colour   of   my   office  
telephone,   I   attribute   only   determinable   properties   to   it   (of,   say,   being  
light-­‐‑coloured  or  maybe  just  being  coloured).  (Nanay,  2009,  p.  266)    
So,   one   way   of   understanding   the   effect   of   attention   is   as   aiding  
discrimination  by  making  determinable  properties  more  determinate.39  There  is,  
on   Nanay’s   account,   a   phenomenological   (and   representational)   difference  
between  properties  within  and  outside  the  focus  of  attention.  
The   common-­‐‑sense   concept   is   thus   also   importantly   contrastive:   “whatever  
occupies   one'ʹs   attention   is   in   the   foreground,   rather   than   the   background,   of  
                                                                                                 
39  For  more  on  the  determinate-­‐‑determinable  relation  see  (Funkhouser,  2006).  
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conscious  experience”  (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  249).  To  put  it  another  way,  attention  
renders  the  properties  or  objects  it  focuses  on  more  determinate  whilst  those  it  
does   not   focus   on   remain   determinable.   (Although,   we   should   note   that   we  
might  attribute  more  determinate  properties  non-­‐‑perceptually  via  memory,  for  
example).   This   is   part   of   what   James   means   by   our   withdrawal   from   some  
things  in  order  to  deal  effectively  with  others.  He  writes,  “Interest  alone  gives  
accent  and  emphasis,  light  and  shade,  background  and  foreground—intelligible  
perspective”  (James,  1980,  p.  402).  
Again,   this   has   both   a   phenomenological   and   an   epistemic   sense:   certain  
things   seem   to   occupy   the   centre   of   awareness,   sometimes   quite   literally  
occupying   the   centre   of   our   visual   field   or   seeming   to   be   the   focus   of   one'ʹs  
auditory  experience.  Consider,  for  example,  the  experience  of  listening  to  a  jazz  
trio   and   choosing   to   focus   on   the   bass.  We  don'ʹt   cease   to  hear   the  piano   and  
drums,  but  our  phenomenology  seems   to  alter,   the  bass   seems   to  come   to   the  
fore   as  we   attend   to   it.  We  might  model   this   in  phenomenal   terms  by   saying  
that   the  piano  and  drums  have  become  peripheral   to   the  bass,  which   is  now  at  
the  centre  of  our  consciousness,  whilst  the  other  instruments  are  at  the  fringe  of  
consciousness   (or,  as   is  more   likely,   some  suitably   intermediate  point)   (Watzl,  
2011a).  We  might,   therefore,  be   in  a  different  epistemic  position  regarding  the  
bass  and  its  auditory  and  musical  qualities  than  we  are  in  relation  to  the  piano  
and   drums:   our   consciousness  might,   for   example,   be  more   fine-­‐‑grained   as   a  
result  of  the  centrality  and  selection  of  the  bass.40  
Another  distinction   is   important  here:   that  between   something   catching   our  
attention   and   our   attention   being   intentionally   directed   toward   something.  
                                                                                                 
40  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  example  is  not  about  shifting  visual  attention  toward  
the   bass:   that   would   very   plausibly   supply   more   information   about   the   nature   of   the   bass-­‐‑
player'ʹs  activity;  but  this  would  also  entail  a  very  clear  change  in  the  nature  of  the  experience.  
The  example  above,  in  contrast,  focuses  on  a  phenomenal  shift  as  the  result  of  shift  in  auditory  
or  mental  attention.  
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Salient   stimuli   such   as   a   fast  moving  object,   a   flash   of   bright   colour,   or   some  
personally   significant   stimulus   such   as   our   name   involuntarily   capture   our  
attention,  perhaps  bringing  about  a  bodily  movement,  a  shift   in  our  stream  of  
consciousness,   or   both.  Alternatively,  we  may   choose   to   attend   to   a   computer  
screen  and  to  reflect  on  what  we  are  typing;  or  we  might  look  more  closely  at  
the  left  hand  corner  of  a  painting,  or  the  distribution  of  blue  across  the  canvas.  
This   voluntary-­‐‑involuntary   distinction   is   an   important   one   in   the   common-­‐‑
sense  concept  of  attention  and  is  central  to  attention  research  in  general.  
So,   according   to   the   common-­‐‑sense   conception,   attention   is   involved   in   the  
selectivity  of  engagement  that  characterises  perception,  mental  life,  even  action.  
Contemporary   debates   about   the   role   and   nature   of   attention   have   been  
concerned  with  the  kind  of  rational,  cognitive,  and  behavioural  access  attention  
gives   us   to   perceptual   experiences.   They   have   also   been   concerned   with   the  
kinds  of  consciousness  possible  in  the  presence  and  absence  of  attention.  How  
does  attentiveness  shape  our  phenomenology:  is  consciousness  possible  outside  
of   attention?   What   kind   of   access   do   we   have   to   perceptual   and   other  
phenomena  outside  of   the  focus  of  attention?  We  will  address   these  questions  
in  detail   later.  For  now  we  will  use   the  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention   to  
analyse   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic   psychology.   Let’s   begin   by   formulating  
what  I  call  “the  attention  condition”.  
2.3  The  attention  condition  
The   idea  underlying   the  attention  condition   is   that  attention  constrains  and  
underpins   the  elements  and  operations  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  Particular  
forms   of   the   condition   go   a   long   way   toward   modelling   the   breadth   or  
narrowness  of  any  given  account.  The  accompanying  justification  for  that  form  
of  the  condition  should  approach  a  complete  account  of  that  particular  mental  
state:  why  it  is  the  mental  state  that  it  is,  what  that  involves,  and  why  it  is  or  is  
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not   necessary   for   attention   to   be   deployed   in   the   instantiation   of   that  mental  
state.  The  divisive  issue  between  broad  and  narrow  accounts  is  usually  whether  
attention  is  necessary  for  our  possession  of  aesthetic  mental  states.41  Two  typical  
examples  of  the  attention  condition  might  be  the  following:  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  experience  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  aesthetic  experience  that  we  attend  
to  the  object(s)  or  content(s)  of  that  experience  and/or  to  the  experience  itself.  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  aesthetic  perception  that  we  attend  
to   the  object(s),  properties,  qualities,  or   features  perceived.   (Alternatively,   that  
the  perception  of  the  object  and/or  its  qualities  themselves  requires  attention.)  
Notice   that   these  conditions  do  not  specify  whether   it   is   the  aesthetic  aspect  
which  requires  attention  or  the  particular  state,  process,  or  experience  it  seeks  to  
analyse:  aesthetic  experience  or  aesthetic  perception.  (It  might,  of  course,  be  both.)  
We  could  frame  similar  statements  for  almost  any  term  a  theorist  might  choose:  
aesthetic  appreciation,  the  aesthetic  state  of  mind,  aesthetic  judgement,  aesthetic  
response,  aesthetic  pleasure,  and  so  on.  
2.3.1  Forms  of  the  attention  condition  
With   this   distinction   between   attention   securing   aesthetic   character   and   its  
supporting  particular  mental   states   or   experiences   in  mind  we  might   reframe  
                                                                                                 
41  There  might  be  an  attention  condition  of  one  sort  or  another  on  a  great  many  mental  states  
unconnected   to   aesthetic   psychology.   Its   intuition   and   form   is   such   that   elements   of   the  
philosophy  of  mind,  moral  psychology,  and  epistemology  might  all  be  analysed  in  terms  of  the  
attention   they   involve   or   demand   and,   crucially,   the   cognitive,   rational,   and   communicative  
processes   thereby   implicated.   In   chapter   four  we  will   see   how   this   is   the   case  with,   amongst  
other  things,  demonstrative  thought.  
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the  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  experience  and  perception  in  terms  of  what  
attention  is  thought  to  secure:  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  experience1  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  an  experience  to  be  distinctively  or  
characteristically   aesthetic,   that  we   attend   to   the   object(s)   or   content(s)   of   that  
experience  and/or  to  the  experience  itself.  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  experience2  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  a  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  to  
be   an   aesthetic   experience,   that  we   attend   to   the   object(s)   or   content(s)   of   that  
experience  and/or  to  the  experience  itself.  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception1  
It   is   necessary,   although   not   sufficient,   for   an   episode   of   perception   to   be  
distinctively   or   characteristically   aesthetic,   that   we   attend   to   the   object(s),  
properties,  qualities,  or  features  perceived.  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception2  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  a  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  to  
be  an  episode  of  aesthetic  perception,  that  we  attend  to  the  object(s),  properties,  
qualities,  or  features  perceived.  
It  will  be  my  contention  that  the  forms  of  the  attention  condition  implicit  in  
most   narrow   accounts   are   mistakenly   framed   as   the   first   formulation   rather  
than   the   second:   that   is,   such   accounts   mistakenly   claim   that   attention   is  
necessary  for  any  instance  of  aesthetic  engagement  and,  thus,  that  our  aesthetic  
psychology  is  beholden  to  attention  in  a  strong  sense,  rather  than  holding  that  
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attention   is  necessary   for  some  but  not  all  aesthetic  mental  states.   I  will  argue  
that   we   must   be   more   sophisticated   in   our   understanding   of   the   place   of  
attention   in  our  aesthetic  psychology.  The   role  of   the  variants  of   the  attention  
condition   will   be   to   help   us   to   understand   which   elements   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology   and   the   practices  which   emerge   from   them   require   attention   and  
which  do  not.    
In  the  next  chapter  I  will  argue  that  the  aesthetic  enters  our  psychology  much  
earlier  than  is  often  thought.  I  will  outline  an  account  of  aesthetic  perception  in  
which  the  core  concept  of  the  aesthetic  is  bound  up  with  the  representation  of  
individual  objects  possessing   integrated  properties  of  appearance.   I  will  argue  
that  this  goes  on  in  the  absence  of  attention  and  that  attention  serves  to  modify  
aesthetic  perception  and  make  aesthetic  appreciation  possible.  In  other  words,  I  
will   argue   that   there   is   no   attention   condition  on   aesthetic  perception   (of   one  
sort),  but  that  there  is  such  a  condition  on  aesthetic  appreciation.  
The   more   nuanced   forms   of   the   attention   condition   allow   for   complex  
relationships   between   different   mental   states   and   aesthetic   character.   For  
example,   if  some  form  of  attention   is  required  for  aesthetic  experience,   then   it  
might   be   thought   likely   that   attention   is   required   for   aesthetic   perception   as  
well.  However,  whether  or  not  the  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  experience  
entails  the  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception  is  not  a  generalisation  we  
can   make   unless   we   hold   one   of   the   following:   a)   all   aesthetic   experience  
involves  perceiving  aesthetically  rather  that  some  nonaesthetic  perception  which  
we   then   respond   to   in   a   manner   which   constitutes   aesthetic   experience;   b)  
aesthetic  experience  just  is  aesthetic  perception  and  vice  versa;  and  c)  aesthetic  
experience  is  always  straightforwardly  perceptual.  
Similarly,   if  what   it   is   for   an   experience   to   be   aesthetic   is   that  we  perceive  
aesthetically   during   that   experience;   and   what   it   is   to   perceive   aesthetically  
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ineliminably   involves   attention,   then   aesthetic   experience   will   inherit   the  
attention  condition  as  it  applies  to  aesthetic  perception.  What  this  shows  is  that  
we  need   to  be  clear  about   the   relationships  between   these   respective  states  as  
elements   within   our   aesthetic   psychology   because   each   variant   implies  
something  different  about  the  role  of  attention.  
2.4  The  attention  condition  and  aesthetic  psychology  
The  great  strengths  of  approaching  the  division  between  broad  and  narrow  
approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   in   terms   of   an   attention   condition   are,  
firstly,   that   the   emphasis   on   attention   and   inattention   reflects   the   differences  
between   the   examples   and  analyses  of   each   approach;   and,   secondly,   that  we  
can  then  use  the  condition(s)  to  explore  the  elements  of  any  proposed  aesthetic  
psychology   and   dig   out   its   aesthetic   and   attentional   presuppositions.   In   this  
chapter  we  will  do  this  using  the  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention.  Later  we  
will  bring   the  battery  of   contemporary  approaches   to  attention   to  bear  on   the  
question  of  its  role  in  aesthetic  psychology.    
The   key   distinction   between   the   broad   and   narrow   forms   of   the   attention  
condition   is   in  where   they  consider   the  aesthetic   to  enter  our  psychology.  For  
narrow   accounts,   attention   is   necessary   in   order   for   our   mental   states   or  
experiences   to  deserve   the  qualification  “aesthetic”:   this  might  be  because   the  
aesthetic  is  understood  as  involving  a  particular  form  of  scrutiny  of  perceptual  
qualities,  a  particular  evaluative  stance  toward  such  scrutiny,  or  an  affective  or  
emotional   response   toward   those  qualities   and  our   scrutiny  of   them.   In  other  
words,   on   the   narrow   approach,   something   about   the   aesthetic   engagement  
with  and  response  to  appearances  requires  attention.    
For   broad   accounts,   attention   constrains   which   aesthetic   mental   states   are  
instantiated,  but  there  are  experiences  or  mental  states  with  aesthetic  character  
in  the  absence  of  attention.  So,  if  mental  states  or  experiences  require  a  form  of  
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perceptual  discrimination  or  response  in  order  that  they  be  aesthetic,  the  broad  
approach  does  not  consider  that  discrimination  or  response  to  require  attention.  
In   terms   of   the   common-­‐‑sense   concept   of   attention,   broad   approaches  do  not  
require  the  selection  and/or  foregrounding  of  the  objects  of  aesthetic  experience.  
In   short,   in   broad   aesthetic   psychology   the   aesthetic   overflows   attention;   in  
narrow  aesthetic  psychology  it  does  not.    
2.4.1  Narrow  aesthetic  psychology  and  the  attention  condition  
We’ll  begin  by  looking  at  the  role  of  attention  in  narrow  approaches,  firstly,  
because  these  are  the  dominant  forms  of  account  in  contemporary  philosophical  
aesthetics  and,  secondly,  because  it  will  be  useful  to  see  how  broad  approaches  
resist   narrow   constraints   on   aesthetic   engagement.   Narrow   forms   of   the  
attention   condition   characteristically  make  attention  necessary   for   any  and  all  
forms  of  aesthetic  perception,  aesthetic  appreciation,  and  aesthetic  experience.  
Where   they   differ   is   in   which   terms   or   concepts   they   use   to   characterise  
aesthetic   engagement   and   in   what   they   consider   to   be   the   aesthetic   aspect   of  
such  engagement.  In  other  words,  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  always  requires  
attention,   but   does   so   for   different   reasons.   Sometimes   those   reasons   derive  
from   the   belief   that   the   aesthetic   aspect   of   a   state   requires   attention   and  
sometimes  from  the  belief   that   the  state  or  experience   itself  requires  attention.  
Sometimes,  of  course,  it  is  both.  
The   common-­‐‑sense   concept   of   attention   plays   a   significant   role   in   some  
central  narrow  accounts  of   aesthetic  perception  and  experience.   Some  kind  of  
focusing  or  concentration  of  consciousness  accompanied  by  a  (perhaps  willed)  
withdrawal  from  other  elements  of  one’s  surroundings  and  one’s  consciousness  
are  highly  characteristic  of  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  experience.  That   is,  
in   many   theories   of   aesthetic   experience   one   is   simultaneously   open   and  
receptive   to   some   elements   of   experience   whilst   suppressing   others.   For  
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example,  Monroe  Beardsley  argues  that  “the  painting  and  the  music  invite  us  to  
do  what  we  would  seldom  do  in  ordinary  life—pay  attention  only   to  what  we  
are   seeing   or   hearing,   and   ignore   everything   else.   They   summon   up   our  
energies   for   an   unusually   narrow   field   of   concern”   (Beardsley,   1981,   p.   528).  
Later,   he   wrote   that,   “a   person   is   having   an   aesthetic   experience   during   a  
particular   stretch   of   time   if   and  only   if   the   greater  part   of   his  mental   activity  
during  that  time  is  united  and  made  pleasurable  by  being  tied  to  the  form  and  
qualities  of  a  sensuously  presented  or   imaginatively   intended  object  on  which  
his  primary  attention  is  concentrated”  (Beardsley,  1982a,  pp.  81,  my  emphasis).  In  
what  can  be  understood  as  a  development  of  Beardsley'ʹs  view,  Jerrold  Levinson  
writes  that    
to  appreciate  something  aesthetically  is  to  attend  to  its  forms,  qualities,  and  
meanings  for  their  own  sakes,  and  to  their  interrelations,  but  also  to  attend  
to  the  way  in  which  all  such  things  emerge  from  the  particular  set  of  low-­‐‑
level  perceptual   features   that  define   the  object  on  a  nonaesthetic  plane.  
(Levinson,  1996b,  pp.  6,  my  emphasis)    
What   we   find   in   Beardsley   and   Levinson   is   an   association   between   the  
presentation  in  experience  of  objects,  an  apparent  focalisation  or  narrowing  of  
consciousness   both   in   itself   and   in   regard   to   the   presented   qualities   of   the  
objects,   their   pleasurable   appreciation,   and   the   deployment   of   attention   as  
somehow  central  to  (or  in  some  sense  identical  with)  this  perceptual  and  mental  
operation.  This  is  characteristic  of  the  role  of  attention  in  the  narrow  approach  
and  reflects  both  the  Kantian  background  to  contemporary  aesthetics  as  well  as  
Twentieth  Century  developments  of  the  “aesthetic  attitude”.42    
                                                                                                 
42  Jerome  Stolnitz  famously  (yet  more  cautiously  than  is  often  allowed)  defined  the  aesthetic  
attitude  as  “disinterested  and  sympathetic  attention  to  any  object  of  awareness  whatever  for  its  
own  sake  alone”  (Stolnitz,  1969,  p.  19).  By  “disinterested”  Stolnitz  means  “that  we  do  not  look  
at  the  object  out  of  concern  for  any  ulterior  purpose  which  it  may  serve”  (20).  In  a  fairly  familiar  
manner,  then,  Stolnitz  excludes  utilitarian,  cognitive,  acquisitive,  causal,  or  sociological  interest.  
Rather,  “the  aesthetic  attitude  “isolates”  the  object  and  focuses  upon  it—the  “look”  of  the  rocks,  
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The  common-­‐‑sense  understanding  of  attention  is  used  to  point  toward  some  
crucial  aspect  of  an  experience  or  object;  be  that  a  certain  family  of  properties,  
our   engagement   with   them,   or   the   development   of   mental   states   involving  
some   reciprocal   relationship  between   the   two.  That   is,   attention   is   invoked   in  
narrow  aesthetic  psychology  to  secure  one  or  both  of   the  right  kind  of  content  
and   awareness   for   aesthetic   experience.  Attention   also   seems   to   be   the  way   in  
which   content   and  awareness   are   approached   in   the   right  kind  of  way:   recall  
Beardsley’s   specification   of  mental   activity   “united   and  made   pleasurable   by  
being  tied  to  the  form  and  qualities  of  a  sensuously  presented  or  imaginatively  
intended  object”.  Attention,  here,  is  implicated  in  appropriately  grounding  the  
pleasure  as  well  as  the  content  of  aesthetic  experience.    
This  is  enough  to  demonstrate  why  broad  approaches  encounter  opposition  
from   narrow   ones.   For   the   narrow   approach   attention   is   key   in   somehow  
causing   experience   to   focus   or   narrow   in   the   appropriate   phenomenological,  
epistemic,   or   evaluative   sense.   Attention   underpins   contemplation,   the  
awareness  of  interrelations,  and  their  being  valued  “for  their  own  sake”:  all  of  
which   might   be   thought   necessary   for   aesthetic   experience.   On   such   a   view  
unattended   experiences   and   objects   cannot   qualify   as   aesthetic   even   if,   for  
example,  they  involve  aesthetic  properties  or  qualities.  
That   is,   even   if   we   allow   that   there   are   aesthetic   properties,   qualities,  
features,  or  descriptions  in  everyday  life,  or  that  such  features  affect  experience  
in  some  way,  their  being  perceived  or  experienced  as  aesthetic  requires  attention:  
which  serves  to  narrow  our  aesthetic  psychology.  Attention  is  required  in  order  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
the   sound   of   the   ocean,   the   colors   in   the   painting”   (20).   In   another  marked   similarity   to   the  
commonsense   concept   of   attention   he  writes   that   “the   object   is   not   seen   in   a   fragmentary   or  
passing  manner,  as  it  is  in  practical  perception,  e.g.,  in  using  a  pen  for  writing.  Its  whole  nature  
and   character   are   dwelt   upon”   (20).   By   “sympathetic”   attention   Stolnitz   means   that   we  must  
“accept  the  object  “on  its  own  terms”,”  we  must  appreciate  its  individual  quality  (21).  
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that  we  be  aware  of  such  qualities  in  the  right  kind  of  way.  Indeed,  if  we  recall  
the   list  of  ways   in  which  a  state  of  mind  might  be  distinctively  aesthetic,   then  
we   can   see   that,   regardless   of   which   option   we   choose—phenomenology,  
structure,  object(s),  content,  value—construing  attention  as   the  gate-­‐‑keeper  for  
aesthetic   perception,   experience,   or   appreciation   rules   out   a   broad   aesthetic  
psychology.  
However,  that  narrow  accounts  use  the  term  “attention”  and  its  cognates  by  
no  means  implies  that  each  draws  on  a  theory  of  attention  or  its  role  in  aesthetic  
experience.   It   is   precisely   because   attention   seems   to   admit   of   common-­‐‑sense  
readings  that  we  find  it  deployed  in  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience.  So  when  
we  speak  of  “X’s  account  of  attention”  or  something  similar,  we  must  be  clear  
that   this   is   often—although   not   always—something   implicit   and   based   on  
assumptions   or   intuitions   about   the   relationship   between   attention   and  
awareness.   That   this   is   a   problem  was   part   of   the   argument   of   the   previous  
chapter.   With   this   in   mind,   let’s   look   a   bit   more   carefully   at   contemporary  
narrow  views.  
2.4.1.1  Attention  and  content  
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  narrow  accounts   involving  an  attention  condition  
differ  in  what  they  consider  attention  to  secure  such  that  their  particular  choice  
of  mental  state  is  aesthetic.  The  key  issue  is  what  they  consider  the  “aesthetic-­‐‑
making”  element(s)  of  our  mental  lives  to  be.  Is  it  a  question  of  the  content  or  
objects  of   such  states,  of  our  affective  and  evaluative  response   to   them,  of   the  
experience   we   have   whilst   so   responding,   some   combination?   Is   attention  
required  for  any  or  all  of  these?    
A  narrow  content-­‐‑orientated  attention  condition  can  be  seen   in   the  work  of  
Noël  Carroll.  He  argues  that  “an  aesthetic  experience  can  be  identified  in  terms  
of  its  content,  without  referring  to  affective  states  like  pleasure,  disinterested  or  
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otherwise,   or   to   evaluative   postures,   such   as   finding   the   experience   of   such  
properties   to   be   valuable   for   their   own   sake”   (Carroll,   2006a,   p.   91).  His   is   a  
deflationary   account   because   he   rejects   any   single   unifying   criterion   for  
aesthetic   experience;   but   he   remains   a   narrow   theorist   about   aesthetic  
psychology   because   he   demands   attention   for   the   perception   of   aesthetic  
content.   In   his   consideration   of   the   ways   in   which   we   perceive   aesthetic  
properties  he  writes,  
We  may  attend  to  these  properties  either  directly  or  apperceptively.  That  
is,  we  may  either  attend  to  the  sadness  in  the  dance  or  we  may  attend,  at  
one  remove,  to  the  way  in  which  the  organization  of  the  elements  of  the  
choreography   elicits   the   impression   of   sadness   from  us.  Either  way,   the  
experience   is   an   aesthetic   experience   in   virtue   of   the   objects   upon   which   our  
attention  is  focused.  (Carroll,  2012,  pp.  173,  my  emphasis)  
Carroll   is   using   attention   in   different   senses   here.43   We   can   attend   to   the  
qualities  of  the  artwork  either  as  appearing  (in  some  suitable  sense)  in  the  work;  
or  we   can   attend   to   our   responses   as   they   are   elicited   by   the   qualities   of   the  
work.   Our   experience   is   aesthetic   in   virtue   of   its   content   and   that   content   is  
secured  via  direct  or  indirect  attention  to  the  aesthetic  properties  of  its  objects.  
The   reflexivity   involved   in   Carroll’s   apperceptive   aesthetic   experience   is   one  
which   he   could   not   secure   in   the   absence   of   focused   attention   to   our   own  
mental   states   and   affective   responses.   Carroll’s   account,   whilst   it   rejects   the  
necessity  of  disinterest  or  valuing  “for   its  own  sake”,   requires  a   sophisticated  
and   attentive   engagement  with   the   objects   of   perception   and   the   experiences  
they  elicit.  
                                                                                                 
43  Carroll  also  thinks  attention  is  involved  in  other  art-­‐‑appropriate  responses  which  may  well  
operate  alongside  aesthetic  experiences.  He  writes  that  “by  characterizing  aesthetic  experiences  
of   artworks   in   this   way   I   am   not   saying   that   these   are   the   only   kinds   of   experiences   that  
artworks   qua   art   do   afford.   Artworks,   on  my   view,  may   legitimately   invite   a  wide   range   of  
other  kinds  of  experiences,  including  moral,  cognitive,  religious,  political,  and  sexual  ones.  My  
point   is   rather   that…Aesthetic   experience   concerns   how   those   points   and   purposes   are  
embodied  or  advanced.  The  moral,  cognitive,  religious,  and  so  on  content  of  the  work  is  more  of  
the  nature  of  what  is  embodied”  (Carroll,  2012,  p.  174).  
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Yet  we  should  ask  whether  Carroll’s  view  is  more  plausible  not  as  an  account  
of   aesthetic   experience   but   as   an   one   of   aesthetic   perception   understood   as   the  
perceptual   (or   apperceptual)   attribution   of   one   or  more   of   a   disjunctive   list   of  
aesthetic  and  expressive  properties.  This  is  important,  because  we  are  aiming  to  
understand   the   role   of   attention   in   the   different   elements   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology;   and   it   seems   plausible   that   we   might   want   to   distinguish   the  
perceptual   attribution   (or   representation)   of   qualities—i.e.   aesthetic  
perception—from  aesthetic  experience  or  aesthetic  appreciation.    
Why   distinguish   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   experience   in  
this   way?   To   perceive   something   is,   it   is   usually   thought,   to   experience   that  
thing.  But  what  do  aestheticians  tend  to  mean  by  “experience”?  Something  more,  
I   suggest,   than   just   perceptual   experience.  As  we  will   see,   to   suggest   that   an  
experience   involves   the   aesthetic   in   some   way   is   not   the   same,   for   many  
aestheticians,   as   saying   that   this   experience   is   an   “aesthetic   experience”.   On  
many   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   to   characterise   an   experience   as  
“aesthetic”   is   to   suggest   that   its   dominant   character   is   aesthetic.   Indeed,  most  
accounts  demand  precisely  this  of  an  experience  in  order  that  it  merit  the  term  
“aesthetic  experience”.  This  is  part  of  what  attention  is  meant  to  be  securing  in  
narrow  aesthetic  psychology.  
One   of   the   benefits   of   distinguishing   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
experience   lies   in   the  way   it   allows   us   to   resist   the   need   to   qualify   an   entire  
experience   as   aesthetic—through   some   “for   its   own   sake”-­‐‑type   condition,   for  
example—before,  say,  aesthetic  qualities  may  play  a  role  in  experience.  We  may  
then  ask  whether  aesthetic  perception  may  occur  in  conditions  which  preclude  
or  do  not  amount  to  aesthetic  experience.    
So,   one  way   of   thinking   about  Carroll’s   account  might   be   as   a   view   about  
aesthetic  perception   rather   than  aesthetic  experience.  His  view   is   that   it   is   the  
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perception   or   discrimination   of   aesthetic   properties   that   makes   for   aesthetic  
experience.   This,   he   says,   is   all   we   can   ever  mean   by   “aesthetic   experience”.  
Carroll’s   most   plausible   response   to   the   suggestion   that   he   is   describing  
something  else—something  we  might  more  properly  call  aesthetic  perception—
would  be  to  point  out  that  experiences  are  characterised  by  their  contents  and,  
thus,  an  experience  with  aesthetic  content  is  characterised  by  that  content,  and  
hence  should  be  called  an  aesthetic  experience.  
However,  such  a  response  is  only  plausible  because  Carroll  is  presuming  that  
the   content   in   question   is   already   the   focus   of   our   attention:   we   are   already  
looking  at  the  painting,  listening  to  the  concert,  reading  the  poem.  As  such,  it  is  
unproblematic   to   suggest   that   our   experience   should   be   characterised   by   the  
aesthetic  content  Carroll  identifies.  His  assumption  is  that  this  content  serves  to  
characterise   experience   precisely   because   we   are   attending   to   it   and   its  
nonaesthetic  bases.    
So,  what  we   actually   need   to   identify   in   the   content-­‐‑orientated   account   is,  
firstly,  a  question  about  the  way  in  which  we  characterise  experience:  how  do  
we   decide   when   an   experience   doesn’t   simply   involve   the   aesthetic,   perhaps  
through   the   perception   of   aesthetic   content,   but   should   be   characterised   as  
“aesthetic  experience”;  secondly,  what  role  does  attention  play  in  mediating  that  
transition,   if   transition   it   be,   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
experience?  Is  Carroll  really  talking  about  aesthetic  perception,  but  doing  so  with  
the  assumption  that  such  perception  always  involves  attention  and  should  thus  
be   characterised   as   aesthetic   experience   by   virtue   of   attention’s   focusing   of  
perceptual  experience?  
Is   the   view   that   aesthetic   perception   requires   attention   plausible?   In   the  
reflexive  case  of  perceiving  the  aesthetic  properties  of  an  artwork  via  attention  
to  our  own  responses   this  seems  plausible.  However,   the  question  of  whether  
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all   aesthetic   content   requires   attention   to   be   perceived   remains   open.   (As,   of  
course,  does  the  question  of  the  correct  characterisation  of  aesthetic  perception.)  
If   this   is  correct   then  we  must   resist  Carroll’s  equation  of  aesthetic  perception  
with  aesthetic   experience  even  before  we  have  decided  whether  he   is   right   to  
eliminate  the  phenomenological,  affective,  and  evaluative  conditions  that  others  
have  placed  on  aesthetic  experience.  
Why   is   this   significant?  Well,   firstly,   because   the   relationship   between   key  
elements   in   our   aesthetic   psychology   is   one   of   the   concerns   of   this   thesis:  
Carroll   appears   to   suggest   that   aesthetic   perception   amounts   to   aesthetic  
experience.   I  will   suggest   that   things  are  more  complex.  Secondly,   if  we  resist  
the   equation   of   aesthetic   perception   with   aesthetic   experience   or   aesthetic  
appreciation,  and  can  establish  that  the  former  might  take  place  in  the  absence  
of  attention,  then  we  will  have  made  a  substantial  step  toward  a  broad  aesthetic  
psychology.   The   key   question,   of   course,   is   whether   a   content-­‐‑orientated  
account   must   involve   an   attention   condition   on   aesthetic   perception.   I   will  
suggest   that   we   can   frame   a   different   account   of   aesthetic   perception   which  
does   not   involve   an   attention   condition   in   either   its   aesthetic   or   perceptual  
guises.    
2.4.1.2  A  non-­‐‑minimalist  account  of  aesthetic  experience  
Carroll’s   narrow   account   centres   on   his   content   criterion   for   aesthetic  
experience.   The   apprehension   of   this   content,   he   suggests,   requires   attention.  
Other   narrow   accounts   make   similar   demands   but   do   so   on   the   basis   of  
additional  criteria.  Let’s  look  now  at  a  narrow  view  which  demands  more  than  
content  and  thus  makes  a  stronger  claim  on  attention.  
Jerrold   Levinson   is   committed   to   both   a   substantive   or   “non-­‐‑minimalist”  
account  of  aesthetic  experience  and  an  attention  condition  on  such  experience.  
Indeed,  on  his  account,  it  is  aesthetic  attention  which  provides  the  material  for  
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aesthetic   perception,   which   may   then   develop   into   aesthetic   experience.  
Levinson   characterises   a   “minimalist”   conception   of   aesthetic   experience   like  
Carroll’s  as  “one  according   to  which  aesthetic   experience   is   just   experience   in  
which  there   is  perception  or  cognition  of  aesthetic  and/or  formal  properties  of  
some  object”  (Levinson,  forthcoming).  He  suggests  that  such  a  view  is  unable  to  
explain  why  aesthetic   experience   is  normally   considered   rewarding,  valuable,  
or   worthwhile.   Indeed,   in   his   discussion   of   the   shortcomings   of   minimalist  
accounts  Levinson  nicely  pinpoints  the  concern  we  have  been  addressing:    
[When]  artworks  are  mediocre,  or  landscapes  are  ordinary,  it  is  not  clear  
that  we  are  having  aesthetic  experience  of  them  when  we  register  some  of  
their  formal  and/or  aesthetic  properties…That  is  to  say,  their  mediocrity  
or   ordinariness   may   be   enough   to   preclude   the   aesthetic   mode   of  
experience,   understood   as   one   normally   comporting   some   measure   of  
absorption   and   satisfaction.   But   even   when   artworks   are   outstanding  
and  landscapes  are  impressive,  it  is  implausible  to  maintain  that  we  have  
aesthetic   experience   of   them   every   time  we   adequately   register   any   of  
their  formal  or  aesthetic  features.  Aesthetic  experience  is  not  as  common  
as  all  that!  (Levinson,  forthcoming)  
Levinson  requires  more   than  the  perception  of  aesthetic  properties   in  order  
to   speak   of   aesthetic   experience:   more   than   content.   Aesthetic   experience   is  
special.  Mediocre  objects  do  not  engage  us  in  the  right  way;  and  nor,  necessarily,  
do  masterpieces.  Mere  registration—or  mere  perception—of  certain  properties  
does   not   suffice:   for   aesthetic   experiences   are   uncommon   and   valuable,   and  
those   properties   are   fairly   common.   Simply   noting   the   formal   structure   of   a  
poem   or   the   composition   of   a   painting   is   not   sufficient,   for   Levinson,   to  
engender   or   merit   the   term   “aesthetic   experience”.   To   call   this   aesthetic  
experience   debases   the   concept:   “Wouldn’t   it   be  more   honest   to   just   call   such  
noting  a  perceptual  experience,  or  even  more  simply,  a  perception,  in  which  some  
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property,   formal   or   aesthetic,   is   being   apprehended?”   (Levinson,  
forthcoming).44  
We  are  starting  to  see   the  kind  of  structure  a  narrow  theorist   like  Levinson  
may   build.   Some   form   of   perception   sits   at   the   foundation   of   aesthetic  
experience,  but  more  is  required  before  we  start  characterising  or  qualifying  our  
experience  as  aesthetic  even  if  we  have  apprehended  or  represented  qualities  or  
features  which  might  form  the  appropriate  content  of  such  experience.  We  now  
have   two  questions:  Why   shouldn’t   such  perception  be   regarded  as   aesthetic;  
and  what  kinds  of  conditions  does  a  narrow  theorist  like  Levinson  place  on  our  
experience   in   order   that   such   perception   turns   into   aesthetic   experience?  We  
will  start  by  considering  the  second  question,  which  should  lead  us  naturally  to  
the  first.  
2.4.1.3  Aesthetic  attention  and  aesthetic  perception  
Levinson’s   narrow   account   of   aesthetic   experience   is   built   on   two   other  
concepts  of  aesthetic  engagement:  aesthetic  attention  and  aesthetic  perception.  
He  writes  that,  
Aesthetic  experience  is  experience  involving  aesthetic  perception  of  some  
object,  grounded  in  aesthetic  attention  to  the  object,  and  in  which  there  is  
                                                                                                 
44   The   commitment   to   either   the   inherent   worth   or   the   neutrality   of   aesthetic   experience  
represents  a  real  divide  between  many  aestheticians:  one  which  cuts  across  the  domains  of  art,  
nature,   and   the   everyday.   It   also   tends   to   go   hand   in   hand   with   a   commitment   to   either   a  
substantial/non-­‐‑minimal   or   a   minimal   account   of   aesthetic   experience   (or   more   specific  
concept).   Levinson   insists   on   retaining   a   concept   of   aesthetic   experience   that   involves   such  
experiences  being  “inherently  worthwhile”,  although  he  is  careful  to  emphasise  that  this  value  
is  not  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  pleasure,  even  as  he  insists  on  the  centrality  of  “responding  
hedonically,   affectively,   or   evaluatively,   in   a   positive   manner”   in   aesthetic   experience  
(Levinson,   forthcoming).   In   this   he   agrees  with   an   everyday   aesthetician   like   Thomas   Leddy  
(Leddy,  2012b)  but  disagrees  with  Yuriko  Saito.   Indeed,  Saito  explicitly  endorses  an  approach  
analogous  to  Carroll’s  (Saito,  2007,  pp.  10-­‐‑11).  Once  again  the  question  of  the  value  and  valuing  
involved  in  aesthetic  experience  and  the  category  of  the  aesthetic  in  general  comes  to  the  fore.  
This   is   something  we  will   have   to   address   in  order   to  understand   the   role  of   the   aesthetic   in  
everyday   life,   but   for   now,   let  me   say   that   I   am   not   committed   to   an   inherently   positive   or  
honorific  conception  of  the  aesthetic  or  aesthetic  experience  in  general.  
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a   positive   hedonic,   affective,   or   evaluative   response   to   the   perception  
itself  or  the  content  of  that  perception.  (Levinson,  forthcoming)  
Aesthetic  experience,   for  Levinson,   requires  aesthetic  attention   to  an  object,  
which   grounds   the   aesthetic   perception   of   it,   which   in   turn   supplies   the  
appropriate   content  when   suitably   related   to   our   response;   a   response  which  
must   be   positive   in   the   right   kind   of  way  with   respect   to   the   object   and   our  
experience  of  it.  He  divides  these  elements  in  two:  “the  right  sort  of  attention  or  
perception   at   the   core   of   the   experience”   and   “a   positive   response   or   reaction  
toward   that   core   attending   or   perceiving,   one   of   a   hedonic,   affective   or  
evaluative  nature”  (Levinson,  forthcoming).    
It   seems   that   Levinson’s   “aesthetic   perception”   is   different   from   the  
perception   of   formal   qualities   in   the   way   we   have   be   discussing.   He   thinks  
something  further  is  required  to  merit  the  term:  something  which  narrows  his  
account  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  Likewise,  by  “aesthetic  attention”  is  meant  
something   more   than   that   we   attend   to   something.   Let’s   consider   what  
Levinson   means   by   aesthetic   attention   and   aesthetic   perception   and   the  
relations  in  which  he  places  them  in  his  aesthetic  psychology.  
By  aesthetic  attention   is  meant  attention  focused  on  an  object’s  character,  
or   otherwise   put,   its   perceivable   forms   and   properties,   for   their   own  
sake,  in  their  full  individuality,  apart  from  the  utility  of  so  attending,  on  
whatever   content   emerges   from   such   forms   and   properties,   and   on  
relationships   among   such   forms,   properties   and   contents.   Aesthetic  
perception  can  then  be  understood  as  the  upshot  of  aesthetic  attending,  a  
perceptual   engagement   with   an   object   in   which   both   the   imaginative  
capacity  and  the  embodied  corporeality  of  the  perceiving  subject  should  
be  understood  to  play  a  role…  (Levinson,  forthcoming)  
Levinson  makes  aesthetic  attention  (and  hence  attention  in  general)  prior  to  
aesthetic   perception   and,   consequently,   prior   to   aesthetic   experience.   In   other  
words,  Levinson  subscribes  to  an  attention  condition  on  aesthetic  attention  (by  
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definition),   aesthetic   perception,   and   aesthetic   experience.   However,   the  
relationship   between   attention,   aesthetic   attention,   and   aesthetic   perception   is  
not  entirely  transparent.  His  position  seems  to  be  that  aesthetic  attention  is  both  
the  perceptual  and  reflective  orientation  to  a  particular  family  of  properties  or  
qualities   as   well   as   the   intention   or   disposition   to   exclude   concerns   such   as  
function.  He   thus   builds   in   a   “for   its   own   sake”-­‐‑type   consideration   from   the  
very   beginning,   which   means   that   the   subsequent   hedonic,   affective,   or  
evaluative   response   inherits   the   same   exclusion   of   the   functional   and  
instrumental.   This   distinguishes   his   view   from   Carroll’s   because   the   content  
account   firmly  rejects   the  need   for  a  “for   its  own  sake”-­‐‑type  condition  on  our  
attention  to  aesthetic  qualities.  
Now,   Levinson’s   “aesthetic   attention”   is   a   fairly   broad   sense   of   attention  
amounting   to   both   perceptual   and   mental   selectivity   and   something   very  
similar   to   an   aesthetic   attitude,   something   which   conduces   to   aesthetic  
experience   without   amounting   to   it.   Attention   itself   is   not   sufficient:   “For”,  
Levinson   writes,   “attentiveness,   in   whatever   degree,   is   not   all   there   is   to  
regarding  or  approaching   something  aesthetically.  There   is   also   the  manner   in  
which   one’s   attention   is   directed,   in   turn   partly   a   function   of   what  motivates  
such  attention,  as  well  as  one’s  willingness  to  be  affected  by  what  such  attention  
discloses.   In   addition,   there  may   be   differences   in   the   quality   of   the   attention  
itself”   (Levinson,   forthcoming).   Thus   Levinson   modifies   attention   by  
demanding  a  suitable  mental  orientation  or  disposition,  which  should  remind  
us  once  again  of  the  aesthetic  attitude  and  the  suppression  of  concerns  such  as  
the  functional  or  personal  significance  of  the  objects  of  experience.  
This  receptivity  or  attitude  is  a  key  element  and  needs  to  be  separated  from  
straightforward   attention.   Levinson’s   aesthetic   attention   is   a   combination   of  
attention  and  attitude:  it  is  a  question  of  disposition  and  perceptual  orientation.  
Whilst  it  makes  little  sense  to  speak  of  attention  as  the  kind  of  thing  which  can  
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be  aesthetic,  we  might,  it  seems,  consider  the  grounds  for  our  attending  (and  for  
our  maintaining  that  attention)  as  being  so.  Indeed,  this  seems  to  be  the  case  on  
Levinson’s   own   terms:   “The   aesthetic   attitude   is   a  matter   of   being  disposed   to  
attend,   perceive,   respond   or   experience   in   a   certain  manner;   it   is   not   itself   as  
such   a   kind   of   attending   or   perceiving   or   responding   or   experiencing”  
(Levinson,   forthcoming).   Hence   the   modification   of   attention   such   that   we  
attend  to  the  right  sort  of  thing  in  the  right  kind  of  way.  
So,  if  aesthetic  attention  is  the  combination  of  orientation  (i.e.  attention)  and  
attitude,  what  is  aesthetic  perception,  which  seems  to  stand  halfway  between  the  
initial   selective   engagement   with   the   world   and   the   full-­‐‑blown   aesthetic  
experience?  It  seems  that  Levinson  must  be  construing  aesthetic  perception  as  a  
success   term.  Aesthetic  attention   sets  us  up   for  “perceptual   engagement”  of  a  
fairly   sophisticated   sort:   one   which   involves   our   imaginative   capacity   and  
“embodied   corporeality”;   and   if   that   engagement   takes   place,   then   we   have  
perceived  aesthetically.   (Although  we  have  not  had  an  aesthetic  experience  as  
yet).  So  far  this  is  similar  to  Carroll’s  content-­‐‑orientated  view,  in  which  aesthetic  
experience   is   the   appropriate   perception   of   aesthetic   properties.   The   key  
difference,  of  course,  is  Levinson’s  insistence  that  aesthetic  attention  be  “for  its  
own  sake”.  
Whilst   Levinson   make   it   clear   that   aesthetic   attention   is   necessary   for  
aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   experience,   he   certainly   does   not   think  
aesthetic  attention  sufficient  for  aesthetic  experience.  
For  aesthetic  attention   is  one  thing,  and  aesthetic  experience  another,  and  
bigger,   thing.   That   attention   is   directed   to   certain   aspects   of   an   object,  
namely,  formal  and/or  aesthetic  ones,  and  to  relations  among  them,  may  
perhaps   be   enough   to   justify   categorizing   such   attention   as   aesthetic  
attention.   But   that   aesthetic   attention   is   occurring   is   not   enough,   I  
submit,   to   justify   categorizing   the   experience   of   which   it   is   part   as   an  
aesthetic  experience.  (Levinson,  forthcoming)  
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Levinson,   on   our   terms,   places   another   attention-­‐‑involving   condition   on  
aesthetic   experience:   the   second   response-­‐‑orientated   element.   Aesthetic  
experience,   then,   involves   an   attention   condition  on  aesthetic  perception   such  
that  we   are   provided  with   appropriate   content;   but   it   also   involves   a   further  
affective,   hedonic,   or   evaluative   response   which  must   also   involve   attention.  
This  condition  is  aimed  at  securing  the  right  kind  of  awareness  of  that  content:  
attention  must  be  directed  both  inward  toward  our  response  and  to  facilitate  the  
narrowing  of  awareness  or  the  exclusion  of  nonaesthetic  concerns;  and  outward  
to  the  object  and  its  qualities.  
By   a   positive   hedonic,   affective   or   evaluative   response   or   reaction   to   the  
perceptual  experience  being  had  is  meant  responses  or  reactions  such  as  
the   following:   enjoying   or   savoring   such   perceiving,   being   moved   by  
what  one  is  perceiving,  registering  an  emotion  in  relation  to  what  one  is  
perceiving,  valuing  the  perceptual  activity,  admiring  what  is  revealed  in  
the   perceptual   experience   being   had,   and   so   on.   These   instances  
hopefully   suffice   to   give   an   adequate   idea   of   the   sort   of   response   or  
reaction   required   to   turn   an   occasion   of   aesthetic   perception   into   an  
occasion  of  aesthetic  experience.  (Levinson,  forthcoming)  
This   is   a   fairly   diverse   list   unified   by   the   constancy   of   our   response’s  
reference  to  perceptual  experience  and  the  positive  nature  of  this  response.  The  
role  of  this  range  of  responses  seems  to  be  to  secure  the  overall  characterisation  
of  our  experience  as  aesthetic  and,  once  again,  builds  in  the  inherently  positive  
nature  of   the   aesthetic   to  which  Levinson   is   committed.  The  aesthetic   content  
seems   to  be  provided,   for  Levinson,  by   the   first   element  of  aesthetic  attention  
and   aesthetic   perception.   This   provides,   as   it   were,   the   aesthetic,   whereas   the  
second  element  provides  the  experience.  This  is  a  vital  point  in  our  consideration  
of   aesthetic   psychology:  we   are   interested   in  what  makes   experience   aesthetic  
and   the   psychological   capacities   or   mental   states   required   to   instantiate   or  
possess  that  character.    
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The   key   requirement   for   Levinson   appears   to   be   the   “for   its   own   sake”  
criterion  on  all  stages  of  our  aesthetic  psychology:  if  attention,  perception,  and  
experience  are  not  focused  on  aesthetic  qualities  and  our  responses  to  them  for  
their   own   sake—if   other   considerations   and   ends   impinge—then  we   lose   the  
right  to  qualify  the  entire  state  as  aesthetic.  Carroll  rejected  this,  arguing  that  we  
need  only  characterise  our  mental  states  by  their  content,  not  by  the  manner  in  
which  we  entertain   that  content.  Our  question   then  became  whether  attention  
should   be   construed   as   necessary   for   that   content   to   be   perceived.   That   is,   is  
there   an   attention   condition  on   aesthetic  perception   in   either   the   aesthetic-­‐‑   or  
perception-­‐‑qualifying  forms  of  the  condition?  Might  it  be  that  case  that  aesthetic  
perception   does   not   require   attention  whilst   other,  more   developed,   or  more  
psychologically  complex  states  and  experiences  do?  
We   should   consider   the   possibility   that   a   narrow   account   like   Levinson’s  
characterises  a  “non-­‐‑minimal”  concept  of  aesthetic  experience  whilst   failing  to  
do   justice   to   other   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement   like   aesthetic   perception   or  
aesthetic   response.   Levinson   allows   that  we   perceive   aesthetically   prior   to   or  
separately  from  aesthetic  experience:  it  is  his  second  element  of  response  rather  
than   some   further   perception   which   renders   experience   characteristically  
aesthetic.45  Why,   then,   should   aesthetic   perception   require   attention?   I   suggest  
that   Levinson   demands   attention   because   he   does   not   distinguish   aesthetic  
perception   from   aesthetic   appreciation   in   the   right   way,   and   thus   places   an  
attention  condition  on  aesthetic  perception  where  none  is  required.  
                                                                                                 
45   In   this   Levinson  may   be   revealing   his   debt   to,   amongst   others,  Monroe   Beardsley  who,  
despite  acknowledging   the  kinds  of  concerns  Levinson  does   in  his  understanding  of  aesthetic  
perception   also   maintained   a   commitment   to   a   phenomenological   criterion   of   aesthetic  
experience.   (See   (Beardsley,   1981)   and   the   developments   in   (Beardsley,   1982b).)   Beardsley,   in  
turn,  was  one  of  the  few  prominent  Twentieth  Century  aestheticians  to  be  influenced  by  Dewey.  
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2.4.2   Towards   a   broad   aesthetic   psychology:   Distinguishing   aesthetic  
perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation  
In  the  next  chapter  I  will  develop  a  map  of  our  aesthetic  psychology  in  which  
one   of   the   key   divisions   is   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
appreciation.  I  will  argue  that  there  is  no  attention  condition  on  the  former,  but  
that  there  is  one  on  the  latter.  In  order  to  lay  the  groundwork  for  that  account  I  
will  argue  here  that  Levinson’s  narrow  account  fails  to  adequately  distinguish  
aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   In   particular,   this   account  
makes  linked  epistemic  and  awareness  demands  of  aesthetic  perception  which  
are  too  strong:  by  which  I  mean  that  Levinson  specifies  ways  of  knowing  and  
being  aware  of  objects  and  their  properties  which  are  unnecessary  for  aesthetic  
perception,  but  which  are  quite  plausibly  required  for  aesthetic  appreciation.  
Levinson’s  account  of  aesthetic  perception  is   fairly  demanding.  As  we  have  
seen,  he  specifies  that  aesthetic  perception  is  grounded  in  a  complex  notion  of  
aesthetic   attention  which   involves   focus   not   simply   on   the   perceivable   forms  
and  properties  of  an  object  and  the  content  which  emerges  from  them,  but  also  
“on   relationships   among   such   forms,   properties   and   contents”.   This   becomes  
clearer  if  we  analyse  a  different  formulation  of  Levinson’s  view.    
Elsewhere,   Levinson   seeks   to   analyse   distinctively   aesthetic   pleasure   rather  
than  “aesthetic  experience”  as  such.  In  a  foreshadowing  of  his  characterisation  
of  aesthetic  experience,  he  writes  that  “pleasure  in  an  object  is  aesthetic  when  it  
derives  from  apprehension  of  and  reflection  on  the  object'ʹs  individual  character  
and   content,   both   for   itself   and   in   relation   to   the   structural   base   on  which   it  
rests”   (Levinson,   1996b,  p.   6).  This  pleasure,   it   seems,   is  part  of   the   response-­‐‑
element  of  his  later  characterisation  of  aesthetic  experience.  
We  can  understand  Levinson'ʹs  model  of  aesthetic  appreciation  as  being  one  
of   bringing   certain   concerns   to   the   foreground   of   awareness.   We   direct   our  
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“attention   to   the   relation   between   content   and   form—between   what   a   work  
represents  or  expresses  or  suggests,  and  the  means  it  uses  to  do  so”  (Levinson,  
1996b,  p.  10).  This  phenomenal  contrast  amounts  also  to  a  cognitive  one  as  we  
focus  mental   resources   on   detecting   and  understanding   the   formal,   semantic,  
and   expressive   dependency   relations   that   hold   between   the   object'ʹs   non-­‐‑
aesthetic  and  aesthetic  properties.  After  all,  Levinson'ʹs  is  an  epistemic  theory  of  
aesthetic   experience.   He   describes   a   kind   of   non-­‐‑inferential   recognition:  
apprehending  and  reflecting  on  the  individual  character  and  content  of  both  the  
object  and  the  experience.46  
So,   for   Levinson,   it   is   not   sufficient   for   aesthetic   pleasure   that   a   positive  
hedonic   tone   or   feeling   which   accompanies   the   perception   of   an   object   is  
grounded   in   the   perception   of   the   natural   or   nonaesthetic   properties   of   the  
object.   Rather,   in   addition   to   this   grounding,   Levinson   requires,   firstly,   the  
perception   of   the   aesthetic   features   or   properties   which   depend   on   those  
nonaesthetic  properties,  and,  secondly,  the  subject'ʹs  understanding  of  the  fact  of  
that   relation   and   reflection   on   that   relationship   between   base   and   structure.  
Aesthetic  pleasure  cannot  simply  accompany  our  apprehension  and  reflection:  
it   must   derive   from   it   somehow,   it   must   be   pleasure   in   that   relation   and   its  
effect.   This   grounding   is   meant   to   militate   against   mere   or   purely   sensory  
pleasure:   not   pleasure   from   perception,   but   pleasure   in   perception,   thus  
ensuring  the  appropriateness  of  our  response.  
In   other   words,   in   order   for   their   pleasure   to   be   qualified   as   aesthetic,  
Levinson’s   subject   must   be   aware   of   the   relationship   between   an   object’s  
nonaesthetic   and   aesthetic   properties   and   reflect   on   the   character   which  
emerges   from   that   relationship.   It   seems   plausible   to   suggest,   too,   that   this  
awareness  gives  the  subject  access  to  the  grounds  of  their  pleasure:  they  should  
                                                                                                 
46  See  (Carroll,  2006a)  for  an  analysis  of  Levinson’s  account  as  an  epistemic  one.  
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be  able  to  say  what  caused  their  pleasure.  More  than  this,  they  must  know  that  
the  grounds  for  their  pleasure  are  appropriate:  their  attention  to  and  perception  
of   the   object   and   their   response   to   it  were   grounded   in   its   appearance   for   its  
own  sake.  
  It   is   the  demand   for   this  kind  of  awareness  and   the  epistemic  or   cognitive  
access   it  brings  to  the  grounds  of  our  pleasure  which  explains  the  presence  of  
an  attention  condition  in  Levinson’s  work.  The  relationship  between  attention,  
awareness   or   consciousness,   and   cognition   is   one  we  will   explore   thoroughly  
later,  but  the  significance  of  that  relationship  for  aesthetic  psychology  should  be  
emerging   as   we   analyse   Levinson’s   narrow   account.   Attention   provides   the  
right  kind  of  content  and,   in  concert  with  an  aesthetic  attitude,  guarantees  the  
right  kind  of  awareness.  Recalling  the  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention,  then,  
focusing   attention   on   an   object   and   its   qualities   underpins   the   right   kind   of  
phenomenology  and  the  right  kind  of  cognition:  we  know  and  take  pleasure  in  
the  appearance  of  the  object  for  itself.  
But   is   this   knowledge   of   or   reflection   on   the   grounds   of   our   pleasure   a  
necessary  condition  for  all  aesthetic  experience?  We  should  note  that  Levinson  
has   a   tendency   to   elide   aesthetic   pleasure   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   As  
Malcolm  Budd  points  out,  Levinson  demands  too  much  in  his  requirement  that  
aesthetic   pleasure—and,   we   should   add,   aesthetic   perception—requires  
reflection   on   the   relationship   between   the   character   of   an   object   and   its   base.  
Even   if   aesthetic   appreciation   involves   such   a   level   of   understanding   of   the  
relations  between  an  object'ʹs  aesthetic  and  non-­‐‑aesthetic  properties  it  seems  too  
demanding   that   their   apprehension   or   their   having   an   effect   in   experience  
should  not  be  sufficient  to  secure  aesthetic  pleasure  or,  more  broadly,  aesthetic  
perception  (Budd,  2008,  pp.  40-­‐‑41).  
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For  example,  our  taking  pleasure  in  the  delicacy  of  a  cup,  the  grace  of  a  vase,  
the   rolling   or   craggy,   textured   landscape   before   us   need   not   arise   from  
reflection   on   the  way   that   those   qualities   arise   from   the   relationship   between  
the   properties   of   the   object.   Our   pleasure   in   those   effects   precedes   our  
understanding   of   the  ways   in  which   they  manifest.  We   have   perceived   those  
qualities  of  delicacy  and  grace,   they  have  played  a   role   in   experience;  but  we  
need   not   say   that  we   are   aware   of   or   have   reflected   on   the   structures  which  
support   them.   Those   qualities   caused   our   pleasure,   but   we   may   not   yet  
understand  them  or  have  even  tried  to.  Perhaps  we  never  will.  
Indeed,  we  don'ʹt  usually  suggest  that  pleasure  in  or  arising  from  something  
needs  to  be  founded  in  reflection  on  or  understanding  of  that  thing.  It  is  often  
the   case   that   taking   pleasure   in   an   object   or   experience   is   what   spurs   us   to  
reflect  on  its  nature  and  perhaps  to  deepen  our  pleasure  or  to  see  that  our  initial  
delight  was  ill-­‐‑founded.  As  Budd  writes,  “it   is   important  to  recognize  that  the  
relation   of   substructure   to   superstructure   may   be   an   essential   determinant   of  
one'ʹs   pleasure   in   a   work,   and   one'ʹs   pleasure   may   be   pleasure   in   the  
superstructure  as  embodied  in  the  substructure,  in  the  absence  of  any  reflection  on  
that   relation”   (Budd,   2008,   pp.   42,   my   emphasis).   That   is,   it   is   important   to  
separate  the  response  from  the  grounding  of  the  response,  even  if,  epistemically  
speaking,  we  are  better  off  with  the  more  demanding  account  because  it  allows  
and  accounts  for  our  appreciative  activities  of  analysis  and  evaluation.  
This   reflects   a   general   concern   we   might   have   with   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology:  that  the  privileging  of  the  epistemic    interest  in  the  grounding  of  a  
response   comes   at   the   cost   of   other   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement.   That   this  
epistemic  demand  requires  attention  is  plausible,  but  we  should  not  think  that  
the   characteristically   appreciative   activities   involved   in   understanding   the  
grounds   of   our   response   characterise   all   aesthetic   engagement.   It   is  
understandable,   given   the   widespread   concern   with   appropriate   and  
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intersubjective   aesthetic   judgement,   that   attention   is   valued   as   a   means   to  
secure  appropriate  and  reliable  discrimination:  but  we  might  construe  that  as  a  
constraint   on   judgement   and   intersubjectivity   rather   than   on   the   aesthetic  
character   of   experience   or   perception.47   Those   judgements   might   require  
knowledge  of  the  grounds  of  our  aesthetic  response,  but  such  judgements  may  
not   exhaust   what   it   is   to   have   an   aesthetic   experience:   and   the   epistemic  
constraints   on   aesthetic   experience—and   aesthetic   psychology—which   arise  
from   trying   to   theorise   such   judgements   need   not   extend   to   all   forms   of  
aesthetic  engagement.  
That   is,   we   might   adopt   a   model   of   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
appreciation   in   which   it   is   only   the   latter   which   is   involved   in   making  
judgements   of   aesthetic   value   (or  merit)   with   some   claim   to   intersubjectivity.  
Whilst  many   narrow   accounts   target   this   kind   of   critical   activity—and   argue  
that  broad  aesthetic  psychology  risks   trivialising   the  aesthetic  by   its   loss—one  
way  to  establish  a  continuum  of  aesthetic  engagement  is  to  develop  a  model  of  
aesthetic   psychology   in   which   aesthetic   appreciation   occupies   one   end   and  
aesthetic   perception   the   other.  Different   points   on   the   continuum  might   have  
different  relationships  to  attention  as  a  result  of  their  differing  relationships  to  
our  awareness  of  and  cognitive  or  epistemic  access  to  the  objects  and  responses  
we  perceive.  This  would  mean  that  we  can  preserve  the  substantive  and  critical  
                                                                                                 
47  What  we  mean  by  “apprehension”  may  also  be  a  source  of  confusion.  “To  apprehend”  can  
mean   a   variety   of   significantly   different   things.   On   the   one   hand,   we   might   simply   mean  
perception  “of  an  object'ʹs   individual  character  and  content”,  but  on  the  other  hand,  we  might  
mean  an  understanding  or  mental  grasping  of   this  character  and  content.  Yet,  perception  and  
understanding  are  not  the  same  thing  even  if  we  hold  that  a  certain  level  of  understanding  of  
some   object   or   phenomenon   is   required   in   order   that   we   perceive   some   of   its   properties.   It  
might  well  be  the  case  that  certain  of  an  object'ʹs  properties  require  understanding  before  they  
can  be  perceived,  but  this  is  far  from  always  being  the  case;  and  until  we  have  a  clear  view  of  
what  we  mean  by  understanding—knowledge  of  art  historical  tradition,  iconography,  author'ʹs  
biography,  historical  context,  scientific  knowledge,  state  of  human  interference,  and  so  on—the  
relationship  between  perception  and  understanding  will  remain  unclear.  
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concept   of   aesthetic   appreciation   narrow   accounts   prefer:   but   it   need   not  
exhaust  our  aesthetic  psychology.  
2.4.2.1  A  place  for  aesthetic  appreciation  
So,  the  suggestion  that  his  understanding  of  aesthetic  pleasure  and  aesthetic  
perception   is   too   demanding   need   not   immediately   undermine   Levinson'ʹs  
account   as   a   plausible   view   of   aesthetic   appreciation   or   the   substantive   and  
non-­‐‑minimal  conception  of  aesthetic  experience.  These,  we  might  allow,  involve  
cognitive   processes   and   phenomenology   that   require   attention.   For   example,  
the  following  characterisation  is  presented  by  Levinson  as  an  elaboration  of  his  
view  of  aesthetic  pleasure,  but  need  not  be  taken  as  such:  
…to  appreciate  something  aesthetically  is  to  attend  to  its  forms,  qualities,  
and  meanings  for  their  own  sakes,  and  to  their  interrelations,  but  also  to  
attend  to  the  way  in  which  all  such  things  emerge  from  the  particular  set  
of   low-­‐‑level  perceptual   features   that  define  the  object  on  a  nonaesthetic  
plane.   We   apprehend   the   character   and   content   of   an   artwork—
including   formal,   aesthetic,   expressive,   representational,   semantic,   or  
symbolic  properties—not  as   free-­‐‑floating  but   rather  as  anchored   in  and  
arising   from   the   specific   structure   that   constitutes   it   on   a   primary  
perceptual   (or   cognitive)   level.  Content   and   character   are   supervenient   on  
structure,  and  appreciation  of  them,  if  properly  aesthetic,  involves  awareness  of  
that  dependency.  To  appreciate  an  object'ʹs  inherent  properties  aesthetically  
is   to   experience   them,   minimally,   as   properties   of   the   individual   in  
question,   but   also   as   bound   up   with   and   inseparable   from   its   basic  
perceptual  configuration.  Features  aesthetically  appreciated  are  features  
understood   as   qualified   by   or   even   internally   connected   with   their  
underlying  bases.    (Levinson,  1996b,  pp.  6,  my  emphasis)48  
As   an   account   of   (one   sort   of)   aesthetic   appreciation   this   seems   plausible.  
Aesthetic  appreciation  plausibly  requires  a  greater  level  of  understanding  of  the  
object   experienced   than  aesthetic  pleasure  or  aesthetic  perception.   In  aesthetic  
                                                                                                 
48   The   parenthetical   “cognitive”   is   added   so   as   not   to   exclude   literature   from   Levinson'ʹs  
account   which,   whilst   being   grounded   in   perceptual   experience   of   the   words   on   a   page   is  
plausibly  not  best  understood  as  having  its  aesthetic  properties  constituted  by  the  arrangement  
of  the  text:  at  least,  not  in  standard  cases.  
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appreciation  we   need   at   least   a  minimal   grasp   of   the   structures   that   emerge  
from   the   low-­‐‑level   features   of   the   object   in   question,   both   in   terms   of   the  
interrelations  of  those  structures  and  their  relations  with  the  features  on  which  
they   depend.   In   this   we   seem   to   be   well   on   the   way   toward   the   kind   of  
experience   that   either   amounts   to   or   underpins   an   aesthetic   judgement:   an  
assessment  of  the  aesthetic  value  of  the  work  or  object,  often  with  reference  to  a  
description   of   its   features   and   the   relations   between   them  which   function   as  
reasons  for  that  judgement.  The  expectation  here  is  that  we  can,  if  asked,  point  
toward  the  features  of  the  object  that  we  find  valuable  (or  not).  That,  as  we  shall  
see,  plausibly  requires  attention.  
Levinson  emphasises  the  manner  in  which  we  come  to  know  the  object  and,  
more   specifically,   a   particular   way   of   attending   to   its   properties.   Those  
properties  must  be  perceived  both  as  belonging  to  the  object  and  as  inextricably  
involved   with   “its   basic   perceptual   configuration”:   that   is,   with   the  
arrangement   of   its   nonaesthetic   perceptual   features.   Once   again,   Levinson  
demands  that  we  are  aware  of  and  reflect  upon  the  dependency  of   the  object'ʹs  
aesthetic   properties/structure   on   the   underlying   features   of   the   object.   Budd'ʹs  
objection  to  this  as  a  demand  on  aesthetic  pleasure  was  that  we  need  only  take  
pleasure  in  the  object'ʹs  character  as  realised  rather  than  in  an  awareness  of  the  
manner  of  that  realisation.  If  we  keep  this  in  mind  and  take  Levinson’s  account  
as  characteristic  of  one  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  then  we  can  allow  that  the  
requirement   for   reflection  on   the   relations  between  aesthetic  and  nonaesthetic  
qualities   is   a   plausible   distinction   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
appreciation.    
Does  this  epistemic  concern  merit  the  extension  of  an  attention  condition  to  
all  of  our  aesthetic  engagement?  Perhaps.  As  we  shall  see,  on  certain  theories  of  
the   relationship   between   attention   and   consciousness   attention   is   necessary   for  
phenomenal  consciousness  and  cognitive  and  epistemic  access  to  the  content  of  
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consciousness.  For  these  theories  it  is  the  selection  of  an  object  or  space  for  our  
attention  which  renders  our  consciousness  of  them  accessible  to  higher  mental  
operations.  To   the  extent   that   these  higher  mental  operations  are   required   for  
the  kind  of  reflection  and  evaluation  that  Levinson  and  others  require,  they  will  
demand   the   attention   that   renders   them   available   for   aesthetic   scrutiny.  
Without  them  the  complex  and  reciprocal  perceptual,  cognitive,  and  evaluative  
criteria  he  lays  out  could  never  be  satisfied.  As  a  result,  it  seems  likely  that  the  
rational  demands  of  aesthetic  appreciation  and  judgement—the  availability  and  
deployment  of   reasons  which  make   reference   to  aspects  of   the  object   and  our  
experience   of   it—will   be   undermined.   This   is   something   we   will   address   in  
chapter  four  when  we  consider  contemporary  approaches  to  attention.  
Levinson’s   view   is   complex,   but   comes   down   to   the   question   of   what   is  
required   in  order   to  perceive  aesthetic   features  and   then  engage  with   them  in  
the   correct   way.   I   suggested   that   his   view   is   best   understood   as   one   about  
aesthetic   appreciation   rather   than   aesthetic   perception;   although   this   is  
complicated   by   the   demanding   model   of   aesthetic   attention   he   claims   is  
necessary   for   aesthetic   perception.   The   issue   we   need   to   address   is   the  
assumption   that   attention   (or   aesthetic   attention)   is   required   for   aesthetic  
perception.   By  making   aesthetic   attention   the   ground   for   aesthetic   perception  
Levinson   cuts   out   the   possibility   of   aesthetic   perception   of   any   sort   in   the  
absence  of  suitably  orientated  attention.  Yet  this  seems  premature.  It  might  be  
argued   that   this   is   the   only  manner   in  which   to   appropriately   experience   such  
qualities,  but  the  appropriateness  of  our  perception  is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  
manner  and  content  of   the  perception   itself.  Why,  we   should  ask,   can  we  not  
perceive  aesthetically  in  circumstances  where  the  appropriateness  or  evaluative  
significance  of  that  perception  is  not  an  issue  or  simply  not  assessable  until  we  
attend  in  a  particular  way?  This,  I  will  argue,  is  a  feature  of  unattended  aesthetic  
perception.    
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2.5  Broad  aesthetic  psychology  and  the  attention  condition  
The  possibility  that  attention  might  not  be  required  for  all  forms  of  aesthetic  
engagement  opens  the  way  for  a  broader  approach  to  aesthetic  psychology.  In  
general,   the   broad   forms   of   the   attention   condition   reject   the   necessity   of  
attention  for  aesthetic  character  but  may  well  endorse  its  necessity  for  particular  
forms   of   aesthetic   engagement   like   aesthetic   appreciation.   Recall   Saito’s   view  
that  we  should  consider  aesthetic  “any  reactions  we  form  toward  the  sensuous  
and/or   design   qualities   of   any   object,   phenomenon,   or   activity…[Responses]  
that   propel   us   toward   everyday   decision   and   actions,   without   any  
accompanying   contemplative   appreciation”   (Saito,   2007,   pp.   9,11).   Saito  
considers  her   approach  analogous   to  Carroll’s   content  view,   except   insofar   as  
she   has   little   interest   in   an   attention   condition   on   aesthetic   response.   (She   is  
happy,  I  think,  to  allow  that  traditional  “standout”  or  appreciative  experiences  
might  require  attention).    
Saito’s  account  of   everyday  aesthetic   experience   is  one  which   suggests   that  
aesthetic   features  affect  our  experience   in  a  variety  of  ways  without   requiring  
awareness   of   the   aesthetic   relations   involved,   nor   of   their   effect   on   our  
experience   qua   aesthetic.   The   explicit   analogy  with   the   content   view   suggests  
that   Saito’s   criterion   for   aesthetic   engagement   is   the   undemanding   one   of  
sensory  perception  of  aesthetic  qualities,  thus  placing  neither  a  cognitive  nor  an  
evaluative  condition  on  aesthetic  perception.  There  is  certainly  no  equivalent  of  
Levinson’s   knowledge   of   the   grounds   of   aesthetic   response   in   Saito’s   broad  
account.  
2.5.1   Inattention   and   the   pervasiveness   of   aesthetic   character   in   ordinary  
experience  
Many   broad   theorists   have   a   complex   relationship   with   the   attention  
condition   and   attention   in   general.   It’s   not   always   clear   either   what   broad  
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theorists  refer   to  when  they  discuss  attention  or   the  role   they  think  it  plays   in  
their   account   of   aesthetic   experience.49   Sherri   Irvin,   for   example,   writes   that  
“our   everyday   lives   have   an   aesthetic   character   that   is   thoroughgoing   and  
available  at  every  moment,   should  we  choose   to  attend   to   it”   (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  
30);   and,   then,   “Being   in   the   room   you   are   in   right   now,   with   its   particular  
visual   features   and   sounds;   sitting   in   the   way   that   you   are   sitting,   perhaps  
crookedly  in  an  uncomfortable  chair;  feeling  the  air  currents  on  your  skin—all  
of  these  things  impart  a  texture  to  your  experience  that…should  be  regarded  as  
aesthetic”   (Irvin,   2008a,   p.   30).   It   seems   unclear  whether   Irvin   is   endorsing   a  
broad   aesthetic   psychology   or   not.   Is   the   availability   of   aesthetic   character   “at  
every  moment”  the  suggestion  that  aesthetic  character  or  “aesthetic  texture”  is  
present   in   the   absence   of   attention   and   that  we  may   choose   to   attend   to   that  
character;  or  is  Irvin’s  suggestion  that  in  conditions  of  inattention  there  is  only  
the   potential   for   aesthetic   character   which   is   realised   when   we   (choose   to)  
attend?   This   matters   because   each   reflects   a   different   formulation   of   the  
attention  condition  with  differing  implications  for  our  aesthetic  psychology.50  
At   the   very   least,   it   seems   that   Irvin   is   not   invoking   the   full   sense   of   the  
common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention:  her   interest   is  not   (in   this   instance)   in   the  
experiences  we  select  and  focus  on,  although  she  does  think  that  we  have  a  role  
in   shaping   such   experiences.   Many   of   Irvin’s   examples   have   something  
                                                                                                 
49  See,  for  example,  (Rautio,  2009)  and  (Lee,  2010).  
50  This  also  touches  on  a  problem  that  permeates  the  discussion  of  broad  approaches—and  
everyday   aesthetics   in   particular—the   problem   that   in   studying   such   moments   of   what   we  
might  call  integrated  or  unattended  aesthetic  experience—when  the  aesthetic  aspect  of  experience  
is  not  something  that  is  attended,  contemplated,  reflected  upon,  or  even  remembered—we  strip  
them  of   their   distinctively   everyday   or   ordinary   character.  As  Leddy  writes:   “any   attempt   to  
increase  the  aesthetic  intensity  of  our  ordinary  everyday  life-­‐‑experiences  will  tend  to  push  those  
experiences  in  the  direction  of  the  extraordinary.  One  can  only  conclude  that  there  is  a  tension  
within  the  very  concept  of  the  aesthetics  of  everyday  life”  (Leddy,  2005,  p.  18).  Thus  we  arrive  
at   the   (somewhat  cacophonous)  distinction  between   the  ordinary   extraordinarily   experienced   and  
the  ordinary  ordinarily  experienced.  Our  question  must  always  be  whether  it   is  the  former  or  the  
latter  which   involves   aesthetic   character,   because   that   it   is   the   distinction   between   the   broad  
and  narrow  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology.  
   103  
absentminded   about   them:   they   go   on   alongside   other   activities,   almost   as  
forms  of  punctuation  or  inflection,  helping  to  shape  our  broader  experiences.  It  
is  worth  quoting  Irvin  at  length  to  illustrate  this:  
[Let]  me  describe  a   few  things   I  have  discovered   I   sometimes  do.   I   run  
my  tongue  back  and  forth  on  the  insides  of  my  closed  teeth,  feeling  the  
smoothness  of  their  central  surfaces  and  the  roughness  of  the  separations  
between   them.   In   the  middle  of   typing  a   sentence,  when   I  am  not   sure  
what  to  say  next,  I   turn  to  look  out  the  window  next  to  my  desk,  and  I  
rest  my  right  cheek  on  my  cool  knuckles  while  I  watch  the  ducks  that  are  
swimming   around   in   the   small   patch   of   lake   that   has   already   thawed  
near   the   shore.  While  walking  down  my  dirt   road,   I   study   the  various  
colours   of   the   dirt   and   the   tyre   tracks   that   weave   along   it,   and   I  
contemplate   how   nice   it  would   be   to   have   a   suit  made   out   of   a   fabric  
with   these   gradations,  with   a   subtle   pattern   that   varies   in   texture   and  
does  not  run  too  straight.  I  drink  tea  out  of  a  large  mug  that  is  roughly  
egg-­‐‑shaped,  and  I  clasp   it  with  both  hands  to  warm  my  palms.  When  I  
am   petting  my   cat,   I   crouch   over   his   body   so   that   I   can   smell   his   fur,  
which  at  different  places  smells  like  trapped  sunshine  or  roasted  nuts,  a  
bit   like   almonds   but   not   quite.   I   scratch   my   head   with   a   mechanical  
pencil  that  allows  me  to  part  my  hair  and  reach  exactly  the  right  spot  on  
my  scalp.  I  move  my  wedding  ring  back  and  forth  over  the  knuckle  that  
offers  it  slight  resistance,  and  I  jiggle  it  around  in  my  right  palm  to  enjoy  
its  weight  before  sliding  it  back  on.  (Irvin,  2008a,  pp.  30-­‐‑31)  
This  is  an  extremely  diverse  list.  Studying  the  colours  and  textures  of  a  dirt  
road,   and   reflecting   on   their   appropriateness   for   fabric   is   a   clear   example   of  
attentive   experience;   as   is   smelling   the   fur   of   a   cat   (construed   as   intentional  
rather   than   passive).   Other   examples   seem  more   accidental,   accompaniments  
isolated  only  after  the  fact  of  their  being  experienced:  resting  a  cheek  on  a  hand;  
feeling  the  texture,  shape,  and  weight  of  a  warm  mug;  fiddling  with  a  wedding  
ring.    
Irvin  argues  that  each  “involves  my  imparting  a  certain  shape  or  texture  to  a  
small  part  of  my  life,  over  and  above  any  other  goal  I  might  be  aiming  to  fulfil”  
(Irvin,  2008a,  p.  31).  This  should  remind  us  of  Dewey’s  phenomenological  and  
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structural   account   of   aesthetic   experience.   (Although,   other   examples   seem   to  
emphasise  the  features  of  experienced  objects  as  well.)  Indeed,  it  is  on  the  basis  
of   an   adaptation   of   the   Deweyan   “an   experience”   that   Irvin   argues   such  
experiences   are   bounded   and   unified   in   such   a   way   as   to   satisfy   the  
phenomenological   and   structural   criteria   for   aesthetic   experience.   What   is  
unclear  here—as  it  was  in  Dewey—is  the  extent  of  our  awareness  of  the  “doing  
and   undergoing”   relation   with   the   environment   which   underpins   this  
experience.  Moreover,  Irvin’s  attenuation  of  Dewey’s  criteria  for  the  unity  and  
boundedness   in  an  experience  should   leave  us  wondering  at   the  extent  of  our  
awareness  of  having  an  experience  with  aesthetic  quality.  
Indeed,   Irvin  writes   that   “the   reciprocal   sensing   and   adjusting   to   alter   the  
quality   of   perceptual   experience   is   often   done   automatically,   even  
unconsciously”   (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  34).  That   is,   Irvin  seems   to  be  suggesting   that  
the   phenomenological   or   structural   elements   of   our   aesthetic   psychology  
involved  in  its  being  aesthetic  can  occur  in  the  absence  of  attention;  or,  at  least,  
in  the  presence  of  a  very  diminished  or  divided  attention:  certainly  nothing  like  
the  focused  and  absorbed  state  of  mind  demanded  by  the  Levinsonian  narrow  
theorist.   This   lack   of   clarity   about   the   role   of   attention   and   nature   of   our  
awareness  of  aesthetic  character  is  part  of  the  problem  we  face  when  trying  to  
analyse  the  relationship  between  narrow  and  broad  aesthetic  psychology.    
Furthermore,   it   seems   that   Irvin   is,   at   some  points,   interested   in   the  agency  
involved   in   the   shaping   of   our   perceptual   experience,   and   at   others   more  
concerned   with   the   way   the   shape   of   the   experience   emerges   from   or   is   an  
aspect   of   some   other   activity   on   which   our   attention   is   focused.   In   general,  
Irvin,  in  common  with  many  broad  theorists,  seems  less  interested  in  properties  
or  qualities   than  she  is   in  the  structure  or  phenomenology  of  experience:  being  
aesthetic   is   some   manner   of   relation   with   the   environment   and   our   own  
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experience.51   Irvin’s   view   is   distinctively   broad   in   that   her   focus   is   not   the  
epistemic  or  analytical  one  of  discriminating  and  appreciating  the  relationships  
between  aesthetic  features  in  experience.  The  broad  approach  tends  to  be  more  
interested   in   effects   on   experience   whether   or   not   we   are   in   a   position   to  
analyse,   evaluate,   or   communicate   the   elements   of   that   experience   or   the  
features   on  which   they  might   depend.   As   a   result,   her   criterion   for   aesthetic  
character   in  experience   is  not   subject   to   the  kind  of  attention  condition  which  
arises   from   the   linked   concerns   with   awareness   and   epistemic   and   cognitive  
accessibility  that  we  saw  in  Levinson’s  appeal  to  attention.  
This   implicit   rejection   of   an   attention   condition   founded   on   the   kind   of  
awareness   or   accessibility   involved   in   aesthetic   appreciation   can   be   see   in  
Irvin’s   response   to   the   thought   that   the   phenomenologically   vague   and  
fragmented   nature   of   many   of   her   examples   might   detract   from   their   being  
aesthetic:  
This  lack  of  vividness  might  be  thought  to  disqualify  the  experience  from  
having   an   aesthetic   character.   I   submit,   though,   that   there   is   no   such  
disqualifying   effect;   indeed,   the   position   of   an   aspect   of   experience   on  
the  spectrum  between  full  attention  and  vague  awareness  may  be  a  part  
of  the  experience’s  aesthetic  character.  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  36)  
There   is  a  sense  that   the  aesthetic  character  of  our  experience   is  continuous  
with  ordinary  experience  and,  critically,  that  such  aesthetic  character  might  be  
partially  constituted  by  the  absence  of  or  vagueness  of  attention:  “The  very  fact  
of  my  vague  awareness  of  a  tantalizing  smell  in  my  environment  may  be  part  of  
the  aesthetic  texture  of  this  moment;  and  that  aesthetic  texture  would  be  quite  
different  if  I  were  fully  and  vividly  aware  of  the  smell”  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  36).  This  
is  a  crucial  point  at  which  the  broad  and  narrow  approaches  part  company,  and  
they  do  so  on  the  basis  of  the  role  of  attention  in  our  aesthetic  psychology.    
                                                                                                 
51  See  (Novitz,  2001  [1992]),  (Melchionne,  2011),  and,  to  some  extent,  Saito  (Saito,  2007).  
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2.5.2  Is  “cognitive  interest”  required  for  aesthetic  experience?  
We   have   seen   that   on   the   narrow   approach   it   is   the   epistemological   and  
phenomenological  aspects  of  aesthetic   experiences   that  attention   is   thought   to  
secure:   attention   underpins   the   discrimination   of   properties,   facilitates   our  
reflection   on   such   properties,   and   brings   them   to   the   foreground   of   our  
experience.   Attention   also   supports   our   knowledge   of   this   process:   our  
knowledge  or  awareness  of  the  grounding  of  our  response  in  the  object  and  its  
qualities.  The  broad  approach  is  less  interested  in  this  epistemic  and  evaluative  
element  of  experience.  
The   lack   of   a   cognitive   or   epistemic   interest   is   the   root   of   David   Davies’s  
objections   to   Irvin’s   broad   approach   (and   to   broad   approaches   in   general).  
Davies  appeals  to  Frank  Sibley’s  analysis  of  aesthetic  experience.  For  Sibley,  not  
only   is   “a   necessary   element   in   any   viable   notion   of   aesthetic   interest,  
contemplation,   etc…some   dwelling   of   thought   on   whatever   is   the   object   of  
attention”  but  “an  explanation  of  why  one  is  interested  and  in  what,  involves  or  
consists  in  some  kind  of  description  of  its  qualities  or  character”  (Sibley,  2001d,  
p.   230).   That   is,   not   only   does   Sibley   assume   the   necessity   of   attention   for  
aesthetic  experience,  but  he  also  emphasises,  firstly,  reflection  on  the  object  and  
its   qualities,   and,   secondly,   the   capacity   to   explain   or   describe   the   qualities   or  
character  of  that  object  (Sibley,  2001b).    
Again,   we   see   the   linked   concern   with   a   certain   kind   of   awareness   and  
epistemic  or  cognitive  accessibility   in  aesthetic  experience.  We  have  to  be  able  
to  reflect  on  and  describe  the  objects  of  our  experience.  This  is  the  heart  of  the  
disagreement   about   our   aesthetic   psychology   that   this   thesis   addresses:  what  
form  of  awareness  and  what  form  of  cognition  is  required  in  order  that  we  may  
describe  our  perception,  appreciation,  experience  as  aesthetic?  
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For   Sibley   the   cognitive   dimension   is   crucial.   As   Davies   writes,   “Sibley  
insists…that  we   need   to   distinguish   an   aesthetic   interest   from   other   forms   of  
sustained  heightened  attention  to  a  perceptual  manifold  motivated  by  a  desire  
to  experience  more  fully  the  qualities  of  that  manifold  with  no  further  ulterior  
motive”  (D.  Davies,  forthcoming).  As  Davies  reads  him  at  least,  Sibley  requires  
attention  to  the  object’s  perceptual  character  and  our  experience  of  it,  motivated  
only  by  the  desire  to  experience  that  character  as  fully  as  possible.    
Yet,  not  only  does  Irvin  seem  to  reject  these  cognitive  or  epistemic  aspects  as  
necessary  for  aesthetic  experience,  she  also  suggests   that   it  can  be  constitutive  
of   the   nature   of   an   experience’s   aesthetic   character   that   it   not   be   in   the  
foreground:   that   it   should   be   continuous   with   other   aspects   of   experience.  
Indeed,   it   seems   for   Irvin   that   only   certain   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement  
require   attention.   These   are   the   forms   of   engagement   we   have   been   calling  
aesthetic  appreciation.52    
Davies   takes   issue  with   the   suggestion   that   only   certain   forms   of   aesthetic  
engagement   require   attention,   and   in   doing   so   pinpoints   the   central  
disagreement  between  broad  and  narrow  approaches  to  attention  and  aesthetic  
character:  
Sibley’s   insistence   on   the   need   for   cognitive   involvement   in   genuinely  
aesthetic   attention   to   qualitative   features   of   the   object   of   experience  
seems   incompatible   with   Irvin’s   suggestion   that   our   everyday  
experiences   can   have   an   aesthetic   character   even   when   we   are   barely  
aware  of  those  particular  perceptual  features  of  the  manifold  that  please  
us.  Tasteful  discernment  of  features  of  a  perceptual  manifold,  issuing  in  
direct  descriptions  of  the  aesthetically  relevant  features  of  that  manifold,  
seems  to  require  active  attention.  It  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  whether,  in  
                                                                                                 
52  Irvin  argues  that  the  kind  of  closure  and  unity  in  an  experience  that  Dewey  demands  for  
his  “esthetic  experience”  is  misguided,  but  that  such  a  demand  can  be  understood  as  “framing  
and  securing   the  objectivity  of  aesthetic   judgment”   (Irvin,   2008a,  p.   37),   something  which  her  
weaker   sense   of   boundedness   and   closure   can   provide   but  which,   presumably,   still   requires  
attention  in  the  course  of  any  particular  aesthetic  evaluation  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  39).  
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line  with   Dewey’s   analysis   of   ‘an   experience’,   we   are   conscious   of   the  
connection  between  what  we  do  and  what  we  undergo.  It  is  also,  as  just  
noted,   that   without   conscious   attention   to   the   manifold   we   cannot  
tastefully  discern  the  aesthetic  features  that  give  it  its  aesthetic  character,  
thereby  furnishing  ourselves  with  the  rich  direct  descriptions  that  might  
enter  into  our  aesthetic  judgments.  (D.  Davies,  forthcoming)  
This  is  a  crucial  point:  must  we  have  “rich  direct  descriptions”  available  for  
use  in  aesthetic  judgements  as  a  result  of  conscious  attention  to  the  perceptual  
manifold?   Is   this   cognitive   requirement   a   condition   on   all   aesthetic  
engagement?  Does  such  a  condition  require  attention?    
The  cognitive   involvement  required   is  a   form  of  discriminating  attention  to  
the   “perceptual   manifold”,   thus   making   it   the   case   by   definition   that   this  
involvement   requires   attention.   However,   whether   or   not   this   cognitive  
involvement   or   scrutiny   is   necessary   for   aesthetic   character   of   any   sort   is  
precisely   what   is   at   issue.   Davies’s   and   Sibley’s   view   is   that   the   cognitive  
requirement   must   be   satisfied   in   order   that   we   be   able   to   deploy   aesthetic  
descriptions  in  aesthetic  judgements  and  know  the  grounds  of  our  pleasure.  Yet  
it   was   precisely   on   this   basis   that   we   distinguished   between   aesthetic  
perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation   in   our   analysis   of   Levinson’s   narrow  
account:   the   cognitive  or   epistemic  demand  does  not,   at   least  without   further  
argument,  seem  to  extend  to  all  aesthetic  engagement.  
For  Irvin,  there  is  no  attention  condition  on  aesthetic  character  in  experience,  
but   there   is   one   on   the   more   complex   and   demanding   state   or   process   of  
aesthetic  appreciation.  This  is  because  she  considers  the  phenomenal  character  
of   experience   to   be   the   distinctively   aesthetic   aspect   and   is   thus   fairly  
undemanding   about   the   complexity,   boundedness,   or   vividness   of   such  
experience.   The   cognitive   and   evaluative   sophistication   Irvin   considers  
characteristic   of   aesthetic   appreciation   is   only   one   element   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology;  and  one  which  does  seem  to   require  attention.  This  distinguishes  
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her  broad  approach  from  that  of  narrow  theorists.  She  doesn’t  require  anything  
resembling   Levinson’s   aesthetic   attention,   Carroll’s   attention   to   aesthetic  
properties,  or  Davies’s  aesthetic-­‐‑description-­‐‑grounding  attention.53    
However,   one   of   the   problematic   elements   of   Irvin’s   approach   is   exactly  
which   aspect   of   our   experience   supplies   or   instantiates   “aesthetic   character”.  
She   goes   into   quite   some   depth   about   what   is   not   required   for   aesthetic  
character,   but   it   is   never   quite   clear   what   is   required   for   the   positive   claim.  
Establishing  a  criterion  for  aesthetic  character  without  attenuating  it  to  the  point  
of  trivialisation  is  a  key  challenge  for  any  broad  approach.  In  the  next  chapter  I  
will   suggest   one   way   in   which   we   might   go   about   securing   the   aesthetic  
character   of   experience   in   the   absence   of   attention   by   introducing   a   broad  
concept   of   aesthetic   perception   within   which   narrower   attention-­‐‑requiring  
states  and  stances  can  be  positioned.    
2.6  Conclusion  
In  this  chapter  I  analysed  some  key  examples  of  broad  and  narrow  aesthetic  
psychology  in  terms  of  attention.  Narrow  accounts  make  aesthetic  engagement  
conditional   on   the   presence   of   attention   because   of   the   kinds   of   awareness,  
reflection,   and   cognitive   and   epistemic   accessibility   they   require.   Attention  
supports   characteristically   appreciative   activities   like   the   scrutiny   of   a  
perceptual   manifold,   reflection   on   the   relations   between   nonaesthetic   and  
aesthetic  properties,   valuing  and  experiencing  objects   for   their   own   sake,   and  
the  capacity  to  give  reasons  for   judgements.  The  question  that  emerged  in  the  
course   of   the   chapter  was  whether   such   appreciative   activity   is   necessary   for  
                                                                                                 
53  This  also  distinguishes  Irvin  from  other  narrow  theorists  like  Gary  Iseminger,  who  require  
a  highly  reflexive  approach  to  one’s  own  experience:  “Someone  is  appreciating  a  state  of  affairs  
just   in   case   she   or   he   is   valuing   for   its   own   sake   the   experiencing   of   that   state   of   affairs”  
(Iseminger,   2006,   pp.   99,   emphasis   in   original).   Likewise,   Kendall   Walton   requires   that  
““aesthetic”  pleasures  include  the  pleasure  of  finding  something  valuable,  of  admiring  it.  One  
appreciates  the  work.  One  does  not  merely  enjoy  it;  one  takes  pleasure  or  delight  in  judging  it  to  
be  good”  (Walton,  1993,  p.  504).  
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aesthetic   character   or   only   necessary   for   particular   forms   of   aesthetic  
engagement:  in  this  case,  appreciation.  
A   broad   approach   is   likely   to   opt   for   the   latter   option:   the   kinds   of  
appreciative   activity   supported   by   attention   and   the   forms   of   awareness   and  
cognition   it   enables   are   only   one   aspect   of   a   broader   spectrum   of   aesthetic  
engagement.54  I  argued  that  this  issue  remains  open  and  is  made  more  difficult  
by   the   lack   of   clarity—especially   in   broad   accounts—regarding   the   kinds   of  
attention  and  awareness  involved  in  aesthetic  experience.    
We  need  a  better  understanding  both  of   the  relations  between  the  elements  
of   our   aesthetic   psychology   and  of   attention   itself.   The   rest   of   this   thesis  will  
focus   on   the   structure   of   our   aesthetic   psychology   and   the   way   in   which  
contemporary  work  aids  us   in  understanding  the  role  of  attention   in  aesthetic  
perception,   appreciation,   and   experience.   In   the   next   chapter   I   will   focus   on  
developing  an  account  of  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation  with  
which   to   approach   contemporary   work   on   attention,   consciousness,   and  
cognition.  
                                                                                                 
54  One  possibility  we  haven’t  much  mentioned  is  that  of  divided  attention  or  a  spectrum  of  
attention   from   full,   engrossed   attentiveness   to   fleeting   attention   distributed   amongst   a   large  
number   of   objects   or   tasks.   It   is   likely   that   such   distinctions   within   the   broad   and   narrow  
approaches   would   serve   to   further   divide   accounts,   with   some   proving   to   require   full   and  
focused   attention,   others   a   momentary   foregrounding   of   aesthetic   concerns,   and   still   others  
nothing  but  a  fleeting  glance  or  sensory  encounter.  
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Chapter  Three  
An  Outline  of  Aesthetic  Perception  
White.  A  blank  page  or  canvas.  The  challenge:  bring  order  to  the  whole.  
(As  he  continues  to  speak,  the  white  stage  is  transformed  into  a  park  on  
the   island   of   La   Grande   Jatte.   Trees   descend   onto   the   grass;   a   bottle  
glides   into   view;   a   cut   out   couple   appear   in   the   distance.   The   lighting  
gives   the   impression  of   early  morning.)  Through:  design.  Composition.  
Tension.  Balance.  Light.  And  harmony.  
Sunday  in  the  Park  With  George,  Act  I,  Scene  One  
Stephen  Sondheim  
3.1  Introduction  
Our   discussion   of   the   broad   and   narrow   approaches   and   their   relations   to  
various  attention  conditions  has  reinforced  the  need  for  a  map  of  our  aesthetic  
psychology   within   which   to   situate   attention   and   the   variety   of   forms   of  
aesthetic  engagement  of  which  we  are  capable.   In   this  chapter   I  will  outline  a  
broad  model  of  aesthetic  psychology  with  which  we  may  work  to  understand  
the  role  of  attention,  refining  each  as  our  understanding  improves.  I  will  argue  
that  a  broad  notion  of  aesthetic  perception  is  the  fundamental  concept  in  terms  of  
which  we  should  understand  our  aesthetic  psychology.  That  is,  if  our  question  
concerns  the  kinds  of  psychological  states  and  processes  which  characterise  the  
aesthetic   activities   of   mind,   then   my   answer   will   be   that   we   must   place   an  
account  of  the  manner  in  which  we  perceive  and  organise  the  material  of  sense  
at   the   heart   of   our   aesthetic   psychology.   From   that   central   account   we   may  
build   a  model  which   encompasses   both   broad   and   narrow   forms   of   aesthetic  
perception  and  appreciation:  a  model  in  which  attention  will  play  a  vital  role.  
3.2  What  is  aesthetic  in  aesthetic  perception?  
  Our  task  is,  firstly,  to  understand  what  aesthetic  perception’s  being  aesthetic  
involves   and,   secondly,  what  we  mean   by  perception;   particularly   that   variety  
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which  amounts  to  aesthetic  perception.  Presumably  not  all  perception,  sensory  
or   otherwise,   is   aesthetic   even   if   aesthetic   perception   is   pervasive   in   the  way  
that   broad   accounts—and   this   account—argue.   We   need   to   find   a   criterion  
which,   once   satisfied,   renders   our   perception   aesthetic.   With   that   account   in  
hand   we   will   be   better   placed   to   assess   the   role   of   attention   in   aesthetic  
perception;   in   particular,   whether   and   how   attention   might   be   necessary   for  
particular   forms  of  aesthetic  perception  and   thus  how  broad  or  narrow   is  our  
aesthetic  psychology.  
3.2.1  Representing  the  individual  
In   this   thesis  we  have  encountered  a  number  of  proposals   for   the  aesthetic  
aspect   of   perception,   appreciation,   judgement,   and   pleasure.   Many   of   them  
focus  on  some  form  of  discrimination,  apprehension,  or  valuing  of  a  particular  
collection  of  properties  or  qualities;  an  activity  or  set  of  activities  which  we  saw  
required  attention  both  to  such  properties  as  well  as  to  our  response(s)  to  them.  
Thus,   Jerrold   Levinson   seeks   more   than   the   “registration”   of   aesthetic  
properties   for   their   own   sake   in   aesthetic   experience,   but   nonetheless  
emphasises  the  importance  of  the  apprehension  of  the  web  of  relations  between  
formal   qualities   and   their   dependence   on   nonaesthetic   perceptual   features  
(Levinson,  1996b,  forthcoming).  David  Davies,  drawing  on  Frank  Sibley’s  work  
(Sibley,   2001d),   also   emphasises   the   importance   of  discriminating   attention   to  
the  perceptual  manifold,  arguing   that  only   this  kind  of  attention   is   capable  of  
supplying   the   descriptions   involved   in   aesthetic   judgements   (D.   Davies,  
forthcoming).   Similarly,   Robert   Stecker   outlined   a   “minimal   conception”   of  
aesthetic  experience  involving  “attending  in  a  discriminating  manner  to  forms,  
qualities  or  meaningful  features  of  things,  attending  to  these  for  their  own  sake  
or  for  the  sake  of  this  very  experience”  (Stecker,  2006a,  p.  4).  And  again,  Noël  
Carroll,   whilst   rejecting   any   unifying   concept   of   the   aesthetic,   nonetheless  
requires   attention   to   (historically   or   traditionally   formulated)   aesthetic   and  
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expressive  properties,  understood  as,  amongst  other  things,  the  web  of  relations  
between   perceptual   features   of   the   object   in   question   (Carroll,   2006a,   2012).  
Finally,   Roger   Scruton,   a   little   more   broadly,   identifies   a   concern   with   “the  
ways  things  present  themselves”  as  central  to  aesthetic  interest  (Scruton,  2007,  
p.  246).  
My   aim   in   this   chapter   is   to   isolate   the   “aesthetic-­‐‑making”   element   of   our  
engagement  with   the  world   that   lies   at   the   heart   of   such  views,   but  which   is  
rarely  developed  in  as  helpful  a  way  as  it  might  be.  This  element  has  something  
to  do  with  the  constitution  of  objects  in  perceptual  experience.  More  than  this,  it  
is  bound  up  with  the  constitution  of  appearances.  It  is  my  suggestion  that  the  key  
criterion   for  aesthetic  perception   is   that  we  perceptually   represent  an  object  or  
set   of   objects   as   an   individual   (or   individuals)   possessing   particular   sensible  
properties.   The   central   concept   in   aesthetics   should   be   the   representation   (or  
apprehension)   of   an   object,   phenomenon,   or   environment   as   a   particular  
instance   or   event   (or   set   of   such   instances   and   events)   in   the   external   world  
which   possesses   or   manifests   qualities   of   appearance:   size,   shape,   colour,  
texture,   pattern,   structure,   composition,   and   so   on   in   varying   degrees   of  
complexity.  
This  is  not  the  Levinsonian  position  according  to  which  we  must  be  aware  of  
the   dependency   of   and   relations   between   particular   qualities   and   their  
nonaesthetic  bases;  nor  is  it  the  suggestion  that  we  need  to  be  able  to  draw  on  
the   representation   of   the   object   as   an   individual   in   possession   of   particular  
properties   in   order   that   we   may   deploy   descriptions   of   them   in   aesthetic  
judgements;  nor,  again,   is   this   the  suggestion   that  we  value  such  a  perceptual  
representation  either  instrumentally  or  for  its  own  sake.  Indeed,  this  suggestion  
has   far   more   in   common   with   Scruton’s   core   idea   that   the   aesthetic   is  
fundamentally   concerned  with   a   subject’s   interest   in   “the  way   things   present  
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themselves”,  which  strikes  me  as  being  the  core  of  an  aesthetic  approach  to  the  
world.  
Beneath  disagreements  about  the  kinds  of  evaluative  response,  awareness,  or  
discrimination  involved  in  aesthetic  perception,  experience,  or  appreciation  lies  
this   fundamental  concern  with  the  perception  of  organisation  and  structure   in  
the   appearance   of   objects,   persons,   and   phenomena;   whether   that   involves  
artworks,   performances,   food,   drink,   the   built   environment,   or   the   natural  
landscape.   Indeed,   one  way   to   construe   the  disagreement  between  broad  and  
narrow  theorists  is  as  a  debate  about  when  and  how  our  engagement  with  these  
qualities  of  appearance  and  the  objects  which  possess  them  becomes  aesthetic.  
In   order   for   an   interest   in   the  manner   of   an   object’s   presentation   to  make  
sense,   we   require   that   the   object   be   perceived   as   a   particular   instance—
although,  and  we  will  expand  on   this,  we  need  not  understand  an  object  as  a  
particular   instance   of   some   broader   category.   This   automatically   involves  
representing   the   object   and   its   qualities      as   the   particular   collection   of  
interrelating   qualities   of   appearance   that   it   is.   I   emphasise   the   perceptual  
representation  of  individual  or  particular  instances  of  sensible  qualities  because  
we  seem  to  be  consistently  concerned  in  aesthetics  with  the  manner  in  which  a  
particular   collection   of   properties   or   qualities   appear   and   interrelate.   (By  
“particular”  I  mean  not  a  specific  class  of  properties—“aesthetic  properties,”  for  
example—but   a   unique   instance   of   a   quality   or   feature.)   It   is   this   perceptual  
activity  of  the  representation  of  object(s)  and  their  qualities  as  individual  which  
makes  perception  aesthetic   rather   than  any  evaluative  stance,  reflection  on   this  
representation,   or   attentive   scrutiny   of   the   object   itself,   although   these   latter  
states   are   derivative   of   and   depend   upon   the   central   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception.  
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A  particular  vase  is  beautiful  or  ugly  because  of  the  way  in  which  its  shape,  
colour(s),  pattern,  glaze,  texture,  translucency  or  opacity,  and  apparent  weight  
interact.  If  asked  to  justify  our  judgement  that  a  vase  is  beautiful,  we  will  point  
to  these  qualities  and  their   interrelations  (Sibley,  2001b).  Such  a  vase  need  not  
be  unique—we  can  imagine  two  identical  and  equally  beautiful  vases:   indeed,  
they  often  come  as  pairs—but  it  will  be  an  individual,  a  particular  vase,  which  
we   must   represent   as   that   vase   which   possesses   a   particular   collection   of  
properties   or   qualities   of   appearance   organised   and   related   in   this   particular  
way.  
What   I   contend   is   that   it   is   this   core   concept   of   representation—the  
perceptual  representation  of  objects  possessing  qualities  of  appearance—which  
we   should  use   to  pinpoint   the  aesthetic   element  of  perception  underlying   the  
more  complex  and  developed  forms  of  engagement  on  which  narrow  theorists  
like   Levinson   and  Carroll   focus.   The   broad   approach   to   aesthetic   psychology  
helps   push   us   toward   this   realisation   by   questioning   the   narrow   focus   on  
cognitive   or   epistemic   engagement   with   appearances.   However,   one   of   the  
problems  with  broad  accounts  of  everyday  experience  is  that  their  specification  
of  the  aesthetic  element  becomes  vague  and  merely  sensory:  they  tend  to  brush  
off   the  question  of  why   experience   is   aesthetic   in   favour  of   a  discussion  of   its  
power  or  value   in  daily   life.   I   aim   to   combat   this  vagueness  whilst  keeping  a  
foot   in   both   the   broad   and   narrow   camps   by   specifying   a   particular  
understanding  of  aesthetic  perception  as  the  representation  of  an  individual  in  
possession  of  particular  qualities  of   appearance;   an  account  which  aims   to  do  
justice  to  the  intuition  of  the  pervasiveness  of  the  aesthetic  whilst  retaining  its  
power   to   develop   into   the   paradigmatic   experiences   of   art   and   nature  
addressed  by  narrow  accounts.    
I  propose  to  divide  aesthetic  perception  into  what  I  will  call  “bare  aesthetic  
perception”   and   “rich   aesthetic   perception”,   each   of   which   will   be   partially  
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defined  by  its  relationship  to  attention.  Bare  aesthetic  perception  is  characterised  
by  a  minimal   satisfaction  of   the  criterion   for  aesthetic  perception  outlined.  As  
will  become  apparent,  bare  aesthetic  perception  both  precedes  and  provides  the  
foundation   for   rich   aesthetic   perception.   Bare   aesthetic   perception   is  
undoubtedly  more  controversial  in  this  account  of  a  broad  aesthetic  psychology  
as   it   includes   elements   which   might   be   thought   to   undermine   narrow  
characterisations  of  the  phenomenology,  evaluative  stance,  and  cognitive  states  
involved  in  aesthetic  appreciation.  Rich  aesthetic  perception,  however,  supports  
many  of  the  paradigmatic  mental  states  of  aesthetic  experience  such  as  aesthetic  
evaluation,   analysis,   judgement,   and   the   capacity   for   criticism   and  
communication,  which  we  might  broadly  label  aesthetic  appreciation.  
It   is   not   my   aim   to   present   an   account   of   beauty   or   aesthetic   value:   I   am  
concerned   with   what   makes   perception   aesthetic,   rather   than   aesthetically  
valuable   or   positive.   I   am   clearly   separating   my   account   and   criterion   of  
aesthetic   perception   from   the   recognition   of   aesthetic   value   or   the   activity   of  
aesthetic   appreciation.   The   apprehension   of   or   experiential   constitution   of  
aesthetic  value  (via  some  form  of  appropriately  grounded  aesthetic  pleasure  or  
reflexive   valuing   of   experience)   is   not   what   makes   perception   or   experience  
aesthetic  on  my  account.55  Instead,  aesthetic  perception,  at  its  most  minimal,  is  
the   perceptual   representation   of   individual   objects   possessing   sensible  
properties.   This   involves   (at   least!)   two   separate   questions:   how   we  
(perceptually)   represent   objects,   and   how   we   represent   them   as   individual  
objects   possessing   particular   sensible   properties   such   that   perception   is  
aesthetic.  My  suggestion  will  be  that  we  represent  perceptually  “bound”  objects  
at   a   particular   stage   of   visual   processing   and   that   this   drive   to   represent   the  
world   around   us   as   ordered   is   a   reflection   of   the   kind   of   creatures   we   are.  
                                                                                                 
55  Although  see  chapter  five  for  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  aesthetic  perception  
and  aesthetic  value.  
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However,  in  order  to  understand  what  this  notion  of  bound  objects  amounts  to  
we  must  be  clearer  about  what  we  mean  by  “perception”  and  how  it  relates  to  
our  questions  about  the  nature  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  
3.3  Perception:  Aesthetic  and  otherwise  
What  we  mean  by  “perception”  varies  widely  and  we  will  make  use  of   the  
full  range  of  its  meanings  in  what  follows.  The  senses  of  perception  in  which  we  
are  most   interested  can  be  usefully  understood   in   terms  of  discrimination.  This  
discrimination  has  narrowly  sensory  and  more  broadly  cognitive  senses:  firstly,  
the  narrower  sense  in  which  we  detect  incoming  stimuli  via  our  sensory  organs,  
process   those   stimuli,   and—in   several   complex   ways—produce   organised  
representations   of   the   environment   and   its   contents.   Secondly,   the   broader,  
sense   of   discrimination   in   which   these   representations   become   consciously  
accessible,  memorable,   and   rationally  manipulable;   or,   to   put   it   another  way,  
the  sense  of  perception  which  brings  insight,  understanding,  and  deliberation.56  
The  empirical  and  philosophical  study  of  perception  is  thus  incredibly  broad,  
running  from  experimental  work  on  the  biology  of  the  sensory  organs  and  the  
processes   subserving  and   involving  attention  and  awareness,   to  philosophical  
debates   about   the   nature   of   our   connection   to   the   external   world   and   the  
relationship   between   the   intentionality   and   consciousness   of   perceptual  
experiences.  We  will   draw   on  work  which   addresses   the   relationships   of   the  
different   senses   of   perception   and   cognition,   particularly   that  which   seeks   to  
understand  the  role  of  attention  and  attentional  processes  in  the  move  from  the  
                                                                                                 
56  On  the  first  sense  see,  for  example  (Brooks,  In  Press),  (Palmer,  1999;  Pomerantz  &  Cragin,  
In  Press;  Pomerantz  &  Portillo,  2010),  (Schirillo,  2010).    
The  different  senses  of  perception  are  emphasised  by  the  related  point,  formulated  here  by  
Robert  Stecker,  but  credited  to  Peter  Lamarque  (2010),  that  “the  expression  'ʹperceptual  features'ʹ  
is  ambiguous...It  can  mean  a  feature  accessible  to  the  senses  with  no  background  knowledge.  Or  
it   can   mean   any   feature   we   can   discern   from   perception   no   matter   how   much   background  
information  is  required  before  we  can  do  so”  (Stecker,  2012,  p.  356).  
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organisation   and   interpretation   of   sensory   stimuli   to   phenomenological   and  
cognitive  consciousness  and  access  to  the  upshot  of  such  organisation.  
This  involves  thinking  about  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  sensation  
or   sensory   experience   and   perceptual   experiences  or   perceptual   states.  How  do  we  
move  from  sensation  to  perception;  from  the  stimulation  of  the  sensory  organs  
to  a  sensory  experience  with,  amongst  others,  visual,  auditory,  taste,  touch,  and  
smell  characteristics?  How  does  this  sensation  become  a  perceptual  experience  
with  an  accompanying  (or  constitutive)  phenomenology:  an  experience  which  is  
apparently   about   the   world   and   our   relationship   to   it?   (See,   for   example,  
(Chalmers,  2004b).)   In  other  words,  how  do  we  move   from   the  stimulation  of  
sensory  receptors  to  an  organised  apprehension  or  representation  of  the  world  
with  both  phenomenal  character  and  intentional  content;  and  what  is  the  nature  
of  the  relation  between  that  apprehension  and  the  external  world?  I  will  suggest  
that  aesthetic  perception  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the  process.  Indeed,  I  will  
argue   that   the   heart   of   aesthetic   perception   lies   not   in   the   scrutiny   of   the  
products   of   perception   in   the   way   that   narrow   theorists   argue;   but   in   the  
process  of  producing  representations  of  the  external  world.  
3.3.1  Problems  of  perception  
The   questions   we   ask   about   the   relationship   between   sensation   and  
perceptual  experience  are  complicated  by  the  so-­‐‑called  “problem  of  perception”  
posed   by   perceptual   illusion   and   hallucination.   How,   we   might   ask,   can   we  
think   that  we  have  reliable  or  direct  access   to   the  external  world  by  means  of  
sense  perception   if  we  can  be  undermined  by  a  phenomenon   like   the  Müller-­‐‑
Lyer  illusion?  This  illusion  leads  us  to  experience  two  lines  of  equal  length  as  if  
unequal:   that   is,   we   are   subject   to   a   perceptual   illusion   which   leads   us   to  
mistake  the  qualities  of  objects  before  us.  Moreover,  in  cases  of  hallucination  we  
do  not  merely  mistake  the  nature  of  an  object,  but  are  subject  to  a  perception-­‐‑
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like  experience   in   the  absence  of  any  corresponding  mind-­‐‑independent  object.  
This   has   led   many   to   reject   the   notion   of   “direct   perception”   in   favour   of  
various   forms   of   “indirect   perception”   in  which   our   perceptual   experience   of  
the  external  world  is  mediated  by  some  form  of  representation  or  sense-­‐‑data.57    
However,  we  will  not  focus  on  the  arguments  from  illusion  and  hallucination  
and   the   theories   concerned  with   the   nature   of   our   perceptual   relation   to   the  
world  which   arise   from   them.   Rather,   when   in   the   next   chapter   we   come   to  
consider  possible   empirical   challenges   to   the  account  of   aesthetic  perception   I  
propose,  we  will  discuss  a  different  family  of  perceptual—specifically  visual—
phenomena.   These   challenges   take   as   their   focus   experimental   work   which  
seems   to   indicate   both   pervasive   failures   of   perception   in   the   absence   of  
attention  and  the  related  view  that  our  inattentional  phenomenal  consciousness,  
rather  than  being  rich  and  detailed  despite  our  inattention,  is  in  fact  sparse  and  
lacking  in  detail  when  unattended.  This  sparseness  threatens  to  undermine  my  
attempt   to   broaden   our   aesthetic   psychology   by   appeal   to   the   nature   of   the  
relationship   between   attention   and   perceptual   organisation.   Before  we   get   to  
that,   however,  we  will   develop  my   account   of   aesthetic   perception   in   greater  
detail.  
3.3.2  Perceptual  organisation  and  the  binding  problem  
One  of  my  key  claims  is  that  aesthetic  perception  is  intimately  involved  with  
the   processes   by   which   we   produce   ordered   representations   of   the   external  
world.   This   production   of   “assembled   experience”—of   apparently   integrated,  
coherent  experiences  of  the  world  around  us—as  Ronald  Rensink  calls  it  is  not  
conventionally   understood   as   an   aesthetic   matter   although   it   would   be  
considered  a  necessary   foundation   for   aesthetic   interest   in   the  world  by  most  
                                                                                                 
57  See  (Crane,  2011)  for  an  overview  of  the  problem  of  perception  and  a  variety  of  possible  
responses.  For  a  collection  of  essays  concerned  with  the  nature  of  our  perceptual  relation  to  the  
external  world  see  (Noë  &  Thompson,  2002).  
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(Rensink,   2013).   A   key   task   in   the   development   of   my   account   will   be   to  
adequately   distinguish   the   aesthetic   and   non-­‐‑aesthetic   elements   of   such  
assembling.  However,  before  that,  we  can  begin  to  think  about  this  assembling  
of  experience  by  considering  the  significance  of  perceptual  organisation.      
[Perceptual  organisation]  is  necessary  because  many  objects  in  real  world  
scenes  do  not  project   to  a   continuous   region  of  uniform  colour,   texture  
and  lightness.  Instead,  due  to  occlusion,  variations  in  lighting  conditions  
and  surface  features,  and  other   factors,  different  parts  of  a  single  object  
often   result   in   a   mosaic   of   non-­‐‑contiguous   regions   with   varying  
characteristics   and   intervening   regions   associated   with   other,  
overlapping  objects.  These  diverse  and  disparate  image  regions  must  be  
united   (and   segregated   from   those   arising   from   other   objects   and  
surfaces)  to  form  meaningful  objects  which  one  can  recognize  and  direct  
actions   toward.   Also,   meaning   may   appear   not   only   in   the   shape   of  
individual  objects  but  in  the  spatial  and  temporal  relationships  between  
them.   For   instance,   the   arrangement   of   individual   objects   may   form   a  
higher-­‐‑order   structure   which   carries   an   important   meaning   such   as  
pebbles  on  a  beach  to  form  a  word.  Perceptual  grouping  is  one  process  
by   which   disparate   parts   of   an   image   can   be   brought   together   into  
higher-­‐‑order  structures  and  objects.  (Brooks,  In  Press)  
In   other  words,  we   need   the   ability   to   organise   diverse   stimuli   so   that  we  
may  perceive  objects  and  scenes  in  the  world:  objects  and  scenes  which  do  not  
strike  the  surface  of  the  retina  in  complete  or  integrated  images.  The  ability  to  
organise   these   scenes   provides   the   foundation   for   the   perception   of   higher-­‐‑
order   forms   of   meaning   (meanings   which   may   then   affect   earlier   forms   of  
organisation).58   The   challenge   arising   from   the   diversity   of   the   processes   and  
pathways   by   which   such   organisation   occurs   can   be   expressed   as   what  
empirical  psychologist  Anne  Treisman  calls  “the  binding  problem”. ⁠  
                                                                                                 
58   Work   on   the   emergence   of   structure   in   perception   and   its   relation   to   our   phenomenal  
consciousness  of  organisation  and  meaning  has   roots   in  Gestalt  psychology  which,  whilst  not  
inaugurating  the  study  of  perceptual  organisation,  was  a  key  influence  on  developments  in  the  
Twentieth  Century.  See  (Wagemans,  In  Press).  
For  an  overview  of  vision  science   from,  as   the   title  says,  “photons   to  phenomenology”  see  
(Palmer,  1999).  
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The  binding  problem   in  perception  deals  with   the  question  of  how  we  
achieve   the   experience   of   a   coherent   world   of   integrated   objects,   and  
avoid   seeing   a   world   of   disembodied   or   wrongly   combined   shapes,  
colours,  motions,  sizes  and  distances.   In  brief,  how  do  we  specify  what  
goes  with  what  and  where?  (Treisman,  1998,  p.  1295)  
Sensory  information  arrives  in  parallel  as  a  variety  of  heterogenous  hints,  
(shapes,  colors,  motions,  smells  and  sounds)  encoded  in  partly  modular  
systems.  Typically  many  objects  present  at  once.  The  result  is  an  urgent  
case  of…the  binding  problem.  We  must  collect  the  hints,  bind  them  into  
the   right   spatial   and   temporal   bundles,   and   then   interpret   them   to  
specify  their  real  world  origins.  (Treisman,  2003,  p.  97)  
How   do   we   assemble   the   properties   we   detect   in   diverse   and   specialised  
detection  centres  such  that  we  represent  and  experience  multifeatured  objects?  
How  are  discrete   features  and   locations  bound   and   integrated   to   form  coherent  
and  enduring  representations  of  visual  scenes  and  the  objects  they  contain?  In  
other  words,   if  we  detect   colours,   shapes,  motions,   smells,   sounds,   separately  
how  do  we  organise  them  into,  say,  a  blue  mug  full  of  coffee  moving  toward  us  
on  a  tray  against  a  background?  
This   issue   of   binding   or   “feature   integration”   forms   the   first   of   two   broad  
questions   in   the   study   of   perception   with   which   we   will   be   concerned.   The  
second  question  will  be  that  of  the  role  of  attention  and  attentional  processes  in  
our   awareness   of   and   ability   to   cognitively   and   rationally   access   such  
perceptual  representations.  
3.3.3  Organisation  and  aesthetic  perception  
I   contend   that   we   should   construe   aesthetic   perception   and   the   binding  
problem   as   intimately   linked.   Both   are   concerned   with   perceptual  
discrimination  and  organisation,  but  beyond  that  I  suggested  above  that  the  key  
characteristic  of  aesthetic  perception  is  that  we  perceptually  represent  an  object  
or  set  of  objects  as  an  individual  (or  individuals)  possessing  particular  instances  
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of   sensible   qualities.   Thus   not   just   any   sensory   state   or   representation   of   a  
colour,   outline,   texture,   shape,   size,   and   so   on,  will   do:  we   need   to   represent  
features  as  belonging  to,  as  bound  to  objects  in  time  and  space,  as  appearing  in  a  
certain  way.  Aesthetic  perception  is  concerned  with  particular  appearances  and  
the   binding   problem   is   concerned   with   how   we   achieve   that   organised,  
assembled,  experience  of  the  world  and  its  contents.    
In  other  words,  once  we  solve  the  binding  problem  we  perceive  aesthetically.  
Once   the   coffee   mug   is   bound   temporally   and   spatially,   possessing   colour,  
shape,   size,   and  other   sensible   qualities—once   its   features   are   integrated—we  
have   perceptually   represented   it   as   an   individual   in   possession   of   particular  
sensible  qualities  of  appearance.  
However,   we  must   be   careful   to   distinguish   this   from   the  more   primitive  
organisational   processes   which   precede   feature   binding.   These   processes  
include  the  following:  
• Grouping   and   part-­‐‑whole   relationships:   determining   which   regions   of   an  
image  go  with  which  others  to  form  unitary  objects.  
• Figure-­‐‑ground   segregation:   determining   which   regions   represent   opaque  
objects   blocking   our   view   of   (“occluding”)   other,  more   distant   objects;  
and  which   side   of   an   edge   is   the   figure   side   and  which  belongs   to   the  
ground  continuing  behind.  
• Perceptual   coupling:   determining   the   appropriate   relationship   between  
two  linked  dimensions  in  the  image.  As  an  object  moves  away  from  us,  
the   image   it   projects   to   our   eye   shrinks   until   it   has   vanished.   If   a  
medium-­‐‑sized  image  strikes  our  retinas,  did  it  come  from  a  large  object  
at  a  great  distance,  a  small  object  at  a  short  distance,  or  an  intermediate-­‐‑
sized  object  at  a  moderate  distance?  
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• Multistability  (bistable  perception):  some  stimuli  may  be  perceived  equally  
correctly   in   two   different   ways.   Interestingly,   our   visual   system   often  
alternates  spontaneously,  between  possible  interpretations,  abruptly  and  
unrelentingly  flipping  as  though  the  stimulus  were  changing.  
(Pomerantz  &  Portillo,  2010,  p.  787)  
The  first  of  these  pre-­‐‑binding  (and  thus,  on  my  account,  pre-­‐‑aesthetic)  issues  
is   tackled   by   the   visual   system   according   to   certain   principles   of   perceptual  
grouping.   The   relationship   between   these   principles   is   debated:  which   comes  
first,   how   they   constrain   one   another,   and   so   on.   The   classical   principles   of  
grouping  include  the  following:  
• Proximity:  the  closer  together  any  two  elements  are  in  an  image,  the  more  
likely  they  belong  to  the  same  object.  
• Similarity:   the  more   alike   any   two   elements   are   (more   similar   in   color,  
size,  orientation,  distance,  etc.),  the  more  likely  they  belong  to  the  same  
object.  
• Common  fate:  the  more  similarly  any  two  elements  change  over  time  (e.g.,  
in  their  pattern  of  motion)  the  more  likely  they  belong  together.  
• Good   continuation:   the  more   smoothly   one   edge   or   contour   blends   into  
another  one,  the  more  likely  they  are  parts  of  a  single  contour.  
• Closure/convexity:  when  connecting  contours  into  objects,  curves  that  can  
be   assembled   into   closed   or   convex   objects   are   more   likely   to   belong  
together  than  ones  that  cannot.  
• Common   region:   any   two   elements   that   are   contained  within   a   common  
region   (e.g.,   encircled  by  a   single   contour)   are  more   likely   to  belong   to  
the  same  object.  
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• Connectedness:   any   two   elements   that   are   physically   connected   to   one  
another  are  more  likely  to  be  parts  of  the  same  object  than  two  that  are  
not.  
   (Pomerantz  &  Portillo,  2010,  p.  787)  
Now,  these  are  vital  processes  and  principles,  but  they  are  not,  on  their  own,  
sufficient  to  constitute  either  a  solution  to  the  binding  problem  or  an  outline  of  
aesthetic   perception.   We   must   distinguish   perceptual   grouping   and   the  
principles   which   guide   it   from   binding—the   assembling   of   the   features   we  
discern   through   such   processes   into   objects   with   locations—and   thus   from  
aesthetic  perception,  which  I  have  argued  is  the  representation  of  individuals  in  
possession   of   particular   sensible   properties.   This   distinction   between   the  
perception   of   features   and   the   binding   of   features   (“feature   integration”)   is  
important   and   the   root   of   much   debate   and   empirical   work,   especially   in  
relation  to  attention.   (E.g.   (Gillebert  &  Humphreys,   In  Press;  Treisman,  1998).)  
We  will  focus  on  the  relationship  between  feature  binding  and  attention  in  the  
next  chapter.  
My  suggestion  is  not  that  all  perceptual  organisation  is  aesthetic,  but  that  the  
stage  where  we  bind  features   to  objects   is.   In  other  words,  when  we  can  bind  
features,  we  can  perceive  aesthetically  even  if,  as  we  shall  see  below,  this  is  not  
a   very   rich   sense   of   aesthetic   perception.   This   is   what   I   call   bare   aesthetic  
perception  and  one  of  our  key  questions  will  be  whether  and  how  this  goes  on  
in  the  absence  of  attention.  
  In   short,   the   binding   problem   and   the   question   of   when   and   how   we  
perceive   aesthetically   are   aspects   of   the   same   phenomenon.   If   aesthetics   is  
concerned   with   the   manner   in   which   things   appear,   with   representing   the  
individual  and  its  sensory  qualities,  and  the  binding  problem  is  concerned  with  
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the   representation   of   a   coherent   or   “assembled”   world   of   bound   objects—
multifeatured   objects   with   locations   and   properties   which   belong   to   them—
then   the   two   are   intimately   linked.   Our   question   becomes   one   about   the  
prerequisites   for   bound   perceptual   experience   and,   crucially,   whether  
perceptually   representing   individual   objects   possessing   sensible   properties  
requires  attention.  This  will  be  the  concern  of  the  next  chapter.  
For   now,   however,   I   want   to   flesh   out   the   reasons   for   thinking   about  
aesthetic  perception  and  perceptual  organisation  as  connected  in  this  way  and  
to   suggest,   with   reference   to   an   interpretation   of   Kant’s   principle   of  
purposiveness,   how   we   might   understand   the   organisational   and  
representational  processes  at  play  in  such  perception.  
3.4  Perceptual  discrimination  in  aesthetics  
The   centrality   of   perception   in   this   model   is   in   part   a   reflection   of   its  
significance  in  the  history  of  aesthetics.  The  manner  in  which  we  represent  and  
respond  to  the  world  in  perceptual  experience  was  the  underlying  concern  of,  
for  example,  Baumgarten  and  Kant,  each  of  whom  we  will  consider  below.  The  
aesthetic  has  a  role  in  our  orientation  toward  the  world  through  sense.  That  the  
world   presents   itself   in   certain  ways   to   the   subject,   that   objects   and   features  
appear   in   and   affect   experience   has   interlinked   phenomenological   and  
epistemological   manifestations.   To   put   it   another   way,   aesthetics   and  
perception   are   involved   in   our   discriminating   approach   to   the   world:   an  
approach  which  has  both  phenomenological  and  epistemological  consequences.    
Firstly,  there  is  something  it   is   like   to  experience  the  world  and  its  contents.  
We   describe   the   world   in   qualitative   terms   which   aspire   to   characterise   the  
texture  of  our  experience:  hence  Sibley’s  “It  is  with  an  ability  to  notice  or  see  or  
tell  that  things  have  certain  qualities  that  I  am  concerned”  (Sibley,  2001b,  p.  3).  
This  ranges  from  descriptions  of  texture,  colour,  shape,  smell,  taste,  timbre,  and  
   126  
pitch  to  the  more  complex  and  evaluatively  weighted  qualities  of  grace,  unity,  
dynamism,   and   order   exhibited   and   possessed   by   objects,   environments,   and  
individuals.  Secondly,  and  relatedly,  perception  is  a  key  way  in  which  we  find  
out   about   the   world:   it   is   a   source   of   knowledge   and   belief,   the   origin   and  
fulfilment  of  desire,  the  objects  of  emotion.  The  field  appears  to  me  to  be  green,  
rectangular  (with  perspective),  flat,  roughly  textured  by  grass  and  thus,  all  else  
being   equal,   I   consider   myself   to   know   or   be   justified   in   believing   that   it   is  
green,  rectangular,  flat,  and  grassy.  Perception  situates  me  in  the  world.  
Thinking  of  our  concern  with  perception   in   terms  of  discrimination   is  useful  
because   it   is   in  precisely   such   terms   that  our  aesthetic   interest  or  approach   to  
the  world  and  our  perceptual  representation  of  it  is  often  framed.  This  was  one  
of  the  things  we  learnt  in  chapter  two.  Indeed,  it  is  in  terms  of  perceptual  and  
rational   or   cognitive   discrimination   that   “aesthetics”   was   first   defined   by  
Alexander  Gottlieb  Baumgarten  in  1735,  although  what  writers  have  meant  by  
both   “aesthetics”   and   “perception”   has   shifted   over   the   centuries.   What   has  
remained   central   in   some   form   is   the   association   between   discrimination   in  
aesthetic   experience   and   sensory   or   sensible   perception   even   as   the   emphasis  
placed  on  the  role  of  the  objects  of  experience,  our  representation  of  them,  and  
the  response  which  mediates  or  supplies  that  representation  has  altered.  
3.4.1  Baumgarten  and  the  analogue  of  reason  
Baumgarten’s   aims   were   broader   than   those   we   tend   to   associate   with  
contemporary  aesthetics.   In  circumscribing  a   field  or  discipline  of  “aesthetics”  
(derived  from  the  Greek  “aisthesis”:  sensory  perception)  Baumgarten  sought  to  
emphasise  the  cognitive  value  of  sensory  perception  and  to  develop  “a  science  
of  how  things  are  to  be  known  by  means  of  the  senses”  (Meditations  §cxv-­‐‑cvvi.  
Quoted   in   (Guyer,   2005a,   p.   3))   to   complement   a   system   of   logic,   describing  
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aesthetics  as  “the  analogue  of  rational  cognition”.59  Hence  his  fuller  description:  
“Aesthetics  (the  theory  of  the  liberal  arts,  lower  gnoseology,  the  art  of  beautiful  
thinking,  the  art  of  the  analogue  of  reason)  is  the  science  of  sensitive  cognition”.  
(Aesthetica  §1.  Quoted  in  (Guyer,  2005a,  p.  3).)  
Following   Christian   Wolff   (who   followed   Leibniz),   Baumgarten   held   that  
sensory   perception   delivers   clear   (that   is,   recognisable   or   categorisable)   but  
confused   (not   necessarily   analysable   or   fully   understood)   representations   of  
things  which  it  lies  in  the  capacity  of  the  reason  to  know  clearly  and  distinctly.  
This   led   Leibniz   and  Wolff   to   privilege   reason   and   denigrate   the   sensory   as  
routes  to  knowledge.  Baumgarten  also  inherits  the  understanding  of  pleasure  as  
the  sensory  (and  therefore  clear  but  confused)  perception  of  perfection  in  objects,  
as   well   as   the   perfectionism   inherent   in   such   a   conception   of   the   objects   of  
aesthetic  experience.  However,  Baumgarten  departs  from  his  predecessors  in  an  
important  way:  
I   cognize   the   interconnection   of   some   things   distinctly,   and   of   others  
indistinctly,   consequently   I   have   the   faculty   for   both.   Consequently   I  
have   an   understanding,   for   insight   into   the   connections   of   things,   that  
is,  reason  (ratio);  and  a  faculty  for  indistinct  insight  into  the  connections  of  
things,  which  consists  of  the  following:  1)  the  sensible  faculty  for  insight  
into   the   concordances   among   things,   thus   sensible   wit;   2)   the   sensible  
faculty   for   cognizing   the   differences   among   things,   thus   sensible  
acumen;  3)  sensible  memory;  4)  the  faculty  of  invention;  5)  the  faculty  of  
sensible  judgment  and  taste  together  with  the  judgment  of  the  senses;  6)  
the   expectation   of   similar   cases;   and   7)   the   faculty   of   sensible  
designation.   All   of   these   lower   faculties   of   cognition,   in   so   far   as   they  
represent  the  connections  among  things,  and  in  this  respect  are  similar  to  
reason,   comprise  that   which   is   similar   to   reason  (analogon   rationis),   or   the  
sum  of   all   the   cognitive   faculties   that   represent   the   connections   among  
things  indistinctly.  (Metaphysik,  §468  Quoted  in  (Guyer,  2008).)  
Paul  Guyer  explains  Baumgarten’s  innovation  in  the  following  way:    
                                                                                                 
59  See  (Shusterman,  1999)  and  (Shusterman,  2000,  pp.  263-­‐‑267)  especially.  
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[His]   idea   is   that   the  use   of   a   broad   range  of   our  mental   capacities   for  
dealing  with  sensory  representations  and  imagery  is  not  an  inferior  and  
provisional  substitute  for  reason  and  its  logical  and  scientific  analysis,  but  
something  parallel  to   reason.   Moreover,   this   complex   of   human   mental  
powers  is  productive  of  pleasure,  through  the  sensible  representation  of  
perfection,  in  its  own  right.  (Guyer,  2008)  
The  key  aspects  of  Baumgarten’s  approach  to  note  for  our  purposes  are  the  
identification   of   the   aesthetic   with   sensory   perception,   the   binding   of   the  
sensory   to   the   cognitive   faculties   in   a   parallel   position   to   reason,   and   the  
concern  of  the  aesthetic  activity  of  mind  with  representations  of  the  connections  
between   things.   This   sense   in   which   aesthetics   is   analogous   to   reason   in   its  
interest   in   and   cognition   of   “the   connections   of   things”   is   suggestive   of   later  
developments   in  which   aesthetic   judgement   or   understanding   is   given   a   key  
role  in  the  development  and  understanding  of  reason  itself.  For  example,  Roger  
Scruton  accords  aesthetic   taste  a   central  place   in  practical   reason  because   it   is  
vital   in   our   understanding   of,   amongst   other   things,   appropriateness   and   the  
transformation  of  “the  confusion  of  utilitarian  reasoning”   into  an  aesthetically  
guided  manifestation  of  our  chosen  life-­‐‑style  (Scruton,  1979,  pp.  241-­‐‑243).60      
It   should   be   kept   in  mind   that   Baumgarten,   his   predecessors,   and  most   of  
those   who   followed   him   had   in   mind   visual   and,   perhaps,   auditory   sensory  
perception  rather  than  what  have  been  called  the  “lower  senses”  of  touch,  taste,  
and  smell.  The  former  “distal”  senses  are  suited  to  the  detachment  and  distance  
characteristic  of  contemplation  and  the  supposedly  unprejudiced  perception  of  
the   objects   of   thought,  whilst   the   latter   “proximal”   senses   are   condemned   as  
(merely)  bodily,   the   suppliers  of   sensual  pleasures.61  This   cognitively   inspired  
                                                                                                 
60  See  (Scruton,  1979),  especially  chapter  ten,  and  (Scruton,  2007,  2011).  
61   The   unfortunate   distinction   between   “the   sensuous”   and   “the   sensual”  was   highlighted  
and   rejected   by   (Berleant,   1964).   The   distinction   is   still   operative   in   much   of   contemporary  
philosophical   aesthetics.   A   recent   restatement   can   be   found   in   chapter   seven   of   (Parsons   &  
Carlson,  2008),  whilst  slightly  older  forms  can  be  found  in  (Osborne,  1977)  and  chapter  five  of  
(Scruton,  1979).  For   recent   rejections  of   the  so-­‐‑called  “sense-­‐‑hierarchy”  see   (Korsmeyer,  1999),  
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focus  on   the  distal   senses   recurs   in   the  narrow  approach   although   it  must   be  
acknowledged—as   we   saw   in   Carroll’s   content-­‐‑orientated   account   and  
Levinson’s  non-­‐‑minimal  account  of  aesthetic  experience—that  affect  and  bodily  
feeling   is   now   allowed   a   greater   role   in   aesthetic   experience,   although   the  
restriction  on  the  senses  remains.  
What   we   should   take   from   Baumgarten   is   the   association   of   the   aesthetic  
with   representation   and   insight   into   or   cognisance   of   the   interconnections,  
ordering,  and  structures  of  the  deliverances  of  perception.  In  the  narrow  sense  
of  perception   this   is  a  question  of   the  representation  of   such   interconnections,  
but   on   the   broader   sense   of   perception   this   extends   to   our   awareness,  
understanding,   and   grasping   of   the   world.   (Hence   the   analogue   of   reason.)  
Baumgarten   can   thus   be   seen   to   gesture   toward   the   different   senses   of  
perception   that  my  model   of   aesthetic  perception   seeks   to   accommodate   and  
explain.    
3.4.2  Kant  and  purposiveness  
For   Baumgarten   the   aesthetic,   understood   as   the   sensible   element   of  
cognition,   is   a   central   aspect   of   perception   in   both   the   narrow   sense   of  
perceptual   representation   and   the   broadest   sense   of   the   grasping   of   the  
connections   between   elements   of   the   world,   of   memory,   and   images.   This  
preoccupation   with   the   aesthetic   as   central   to   making   sense   of   sense,   so   to  
speak,  emerges  in  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  of  Kant’s  first  Critique,  although  
his  views  on   the  significance  and  nature  of   the  aesthetic   in   the  constitution  of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(Brady,   2005),   and   much   of   Richard   Shusterman’s   development   of   “somaesthetics”  
(Shusterman,  1999,  2000).  
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the   representation   of   the   external   world   evolved   by   the   time   of   the   third  
Critique.62  
As  I  have  presented  it,  the  question  of  how  we  go  about  constituting  such  a  
representation   is   one   of   the   key  ways   in  which   our   aesthetic   and   perceptual  
concerns  coincide.  My  suggestion  was  that  the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  
lies   in   the   perceptual   representation   of   an   individual   possessing   particular  
qualities   of   appearance;   and   that   this   should   be   understood   as   an   aesthetic  
characterisation   of   the   binding   problem   in   the   study   of   visual   perception.   I  
emphasised   that   the  concept  of  aesthetic  perception  should  be  separated  from  
the   apprehension   of   value   or   activity   of   valuing.   Instead,   I   argued   that  when  
features  are  bound  to  objects  such  that  those  objects  or  phenomena  can  be  said  
to  appear  in  a  certain  way  we  perceive  aesthetically  and  that  this  lies  at  the  core  
of  myriad  accounts  of  aesthetic  experience,  perception,  and  appreciation.  This  
takes   us   beyond   Baumgarten,   who   was   interested   in   the   sensible   operations  
which   lead   us   to   a   representation   of   perfection,   toward   a   form   of   perception  
which  is  concerned  with  particular  appearances  and  their  interrelations.  But,  if  
we  are  not  concerned  with  the  sensible  representation  of  perfection—and  thus  
lack   this   regulative   end   or   ideal   of   perception   when   organising   sensory  
stimuli—we  must  ask  how  and  why  it  is  that  we  go  about  organising  the  “stuff”  
of   sense   into   the   representations   of   perception,   such   that  we   bind   features   to  
objects  and  perceive  aesthetically.    
We  have  seen  one  way  in  which  we  can  begin  answering  this  question.  The  
processes  and  principles  of  perceptual  organisation  underpin  the  production  of  
bound   features,   but   that   is   only   part   of   the   answer   we   need   to   understand  
                                                                                                 
62   Sebastian  Gardner  describes   this  as  “what   the  mind  makes  of   its  manifold  of   sensation”  
(Gardner,   1999,  p.   67).   See   (Guyer,   1997),  particularly   chapter   six  on   the   relationship  between  
Kant’s  account  of  sensory  perception  in  the  first  Critique  and  his  theory  of  aesthetic  judgment  in  
the  third.  
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aesthetic  perception.  How  are  we  to  understand  the  mind’s  drive  to  organise,  to  
find  and  represent  form  and  structure  in  the  external  world  in  the  first  place?    
My   answer   draws   on,   amongst   others,   Rachel   Zuckert’s   interpretation   of  
Kant’s  project  in  the  Critique  of  the  Power  of  Judgment.  Zuckert  argues  that  Kant  is  
concerned  to  answer  the  problem  of  “the  unity  of  diversity”:  the  problem  of  the  
great  variation  in  nature  and  the  way  in  which  we  are  to  render  such  diversity  
intelligible  without  simply  homogenising  and  thus  undermining  that  diversity.  
She   argues   that   Kant   sought   to   identify   a   principle   of   judgement   that  would  
counter  this  “threat  of  diversity”  and  establish  the  unity  of  the  diverse  and  thus  
make   empirical   knowledge   possible.   This,   Zuckert   argues,   is   the   principle   of  
purposiveness  without  a  purpose  (Zuckert,  2007).  
Purposiveness  without  a  purpose   is  a  structure  or  principle  of  ordering  
by   which   we   can   judge,   i.e.,   discriminate   among,   and   “lawfully”  
combine   or   synthesize,   the   contingent,   diverse   aspects   of   empirically  
given  nature,  objects,  or  qualities.  Purposiveness  is,  first,  a  unifying  form  
of  relations—of  means  to  ends—that  holds  among  parts  to  form  a  whole.  
These  parts   are,  moreover,  unified  with  one   another   and   the  whole,   as  
diverse  and  contingent….  
Purposiveness   without   a   purpose   is   an   order   of   means-­‐‑end   relations  
without   an   external   purpose;   it   comprises   reciprocal   means-­‐‑ends  
relations,  in  which  each  part  is  both  means  and  end,  in  relation  to  other  
parts.   Thus   purposiveness   without   a   purpose   is   the   form   of   fully  
systematic,   internal   relations.   Because   this   principle   constitutes   a   unity  
among  heterogeneous,   contingent  parts,  without   a   separate  purpose   or  
concept   (the   means-­‐‑ends   relations   are   reciprocal,   not   directed   to   a  
particular  end),  it  is  also  that  by  which  we  can  judge  (discern  and  unify)  
the  particular,  unconceptualized  characteristics  of  nature.  For  in  judging  
according  to  this  principle,  we  do  not  need  to  know  what  the  purpose  of  
the  whole  is  supposed  to  be,  do  not  need  to  employ  a  concept  of  such  a  
purpose,  in  order  to  find  this  whole  intelligible,  and  its  parts  unified  with  
one  another.  (Zuckert,  2007,  pp.  14-­‐‑15)  
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Recall  that  we  are  interested  in  the  activity  of  perceptual  organisation  in  the  
narrow  and  broad  sense—perception  as   the  organisation  of  perceptual  stimuli  
and  perception  as  understanding—and  that  we  are  trying  to  find  a  way  to  think  
about  the  ordering  and  relating  of  sensation  and  representation.  Purposiveness  
without  a  purpose  can  help  us  do  this  because  it  provides  a  way  to  understand  
the  organisational  activity  of  the  subject.  
  It   is   Zuckert’s   understanding   of   Kant   that   we   are   subjects   who   judge  
according   to   this   principle   of   purposiveness  without   a   purpose   and  who   are  
always  in  anticipation  of  the  resolution  of  the  relation  of  parts  to  a  whole.  For  
Kant,   Zuckert   argues,   this   is   our   fundamental   activity   of   judging,   of  
representing   the   world   in   experience.   In   aesthetic   experience   we   judge  
purposively  without   a  purpose   through  our  organisational   anticipation  of   the  
future,  representing  the  unity  of  a  beautiful  object’s  diverse  properties  formally  
rather  than  materially:  that  is,  these  are  not  causal  but  “reciprocal”  relations  of  
contrast  and  complementarity  (Zuckert,  2007,  p.  181).  What  matters  here  is  that  
the  perceptual  representation  of  and  search  for  an  organised  or  ordered  world  
need  not  require  a  prior  concept  or  notion  of  what  the  purpose  of  the  contents  
of  such  a  world  might  be.   (Although  we  will  often  have  such  a  concept  based  
on  memory  and  inference.)    
On  Kant’s  view,  our  appreciation  of  beauty  is  the  sole,  pure,  isolated  case  
of  our  ability   to   represent  unity   in  empirical  diversity  as   such,  without  
prior,   empirical-­‐‑conceptual   distinction.   Thus   aesthetic   experience   is  
uniquely  revelatory  of  this  subjective  judgmental  activity,  of  the  subject’s  
self-­‐‑legislated   openness   to   the   empirically   given   world   and   of   the  
subject’s  irreducibly  purposive  character.  (Zuckert,  2007,  p.  11)  
Now,   Kant   is   interested   in   our   actual   judgements   of   beauty,   in   the   “sole,  
pure,   isolated   case”   of   the   representation   of   unity   and   the   ensuing—or  
underpinning—harmony  of   the   faculties   thus  undergone.   Because   of  what   he  
thinks—on  Zuckert’s  reading—the  appreciation  of  beauty  reveals,  Kant  focuses  
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on  “successful”  instances  of  it.  This  need  not,  I  suggest,  be  taken  to  entail  that  
unsuccessful   instances   of   aesthetic   judgement,   wherein   we   do   not   judge   an  
object   beautiful,   are   somehow   “unaesthetic”   or   unpurposive:   it   would   make  
little  sense  for  Kant  or  Zuckert  to  occupy  such  a  position,  given  their  interest  in  
delineating   the   principles   and   faculties   of   mind   involved   in   judgement   in  
general.   Those   principles   and   faculties   do   not   disappear   in   the   absence   of  
beauty;   they   are   peculiarly   revealed   in   its   presence.   This   means   that   we   can  
think   about   the   organisational   activity   of   the  mind   involved   in  what  Zuckert  
calls   “the   subject’s   self-­‐‑legislated   openness”   to   the   world   even   when   that  
activity  doesn’t  manifest  in  a  judgement  of  beauty.  Purposive  organisation  and  
the  anticipation  of  the  resolution  of  the  relationship  of  parts  to  a  whole  are  not  
limited   to   instances   in   which   the   representation   of   the   form   on   an   object  
prompts  the  harmony  of  the  faculties.  They  are  constant  activities  of  mind.  
3.4.3  Purposiveness  and  the  representation  of  the  individual  
Rather  than  becoming  caught  up  with  beauty  we  should  focus  on  the  drive  
or  principle  which  underpins  Kant’s   approach:  purposiveness   and   the  mind’s  
search   for  organisation   in  what  William  James  called   the  “buzzing  confusion”  
of  sensory  stimuli.  This  is  the  capacity  for  perceiving  a  heterogenous  world  as  
ordered   and,   as  we  have   seen,   can   be   construed   as   the   foundation   for  Kant’s  
entire   critical  project.  We  need  not  go  so   far.  What  we  are   interested   in   is   the  
way  in  which  we  actively  seek  to  organise  sensory  stimuli   in  purposive  ways.  
This   will   tend   to   implicate   particular   families   of   properties   in   aesthetic  
perception  and   involve  us   in   long-­‐‑running  debates   surrounding   the  nature  of  
such  properties.63  What  I  want  to  emphasise  here  is  that,  in  Zuckert’s  words,  
                                                                                                 
63  On  the  metaphysics  and  response-­‐‑dependence  of  aesthetic  qualities  see  (Levinson,  2006a,  
2006c),   (Matravers,   2005),   (Zangwill,   2000,   2003),   (Bender,   1996,   2001,   2003),   as  well   as   earlier  
discussions  in  (Goldman,  1993,  1995).  
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What   is   crucial   for  Kant’s  account  of  purposive   form   is   that   it   involves  
our   (imaginative)   grasp   of   diverse,   empirical   properties   of   an   object   as  
interrelated,   reciprocally   complementing   and   contrasting   with   one  
another,   not   which   sorts   of   such   properties   are   to   be   so   grasped.  
(Zuckert,  2006,  p.  613)  
That  is,   the  key  idea  for  Kant  is  of  the  mind’s  activity  of  organising  diverse  
stimuli,   placing   them   in   ordered   and   intelligible   relations   whilst   nonetheless  
retaining   their   diversity   and,   crucially,   the   individuality   of   the   object   which  
possesses   and  presents   them.   In   focusing  on   this  purposiveness  of  perceptual  
organisation  and  the  ordering  of  subsequent  perceptual  representations  we  are  
also   identifying   the   manner   in   which   aesthetic   perception   consists   in  
representing   individuals   with   particular   sensible   qualities   as   well   as  
understanding   why   that   might   be   so.   For   purposive   representation   requires  
particular   qualities   and   individual   possessors   of   such   qualities   to   organise:  
these  are  Kant’s  diverse,  empirical,  and  contingent  properties.    
However,   firstly,   we   need   not   adopt   Kant’s   account   of   purposive   form  
insofar   as   it   demands   unity;   but   only   insofar   as   the   principle   of   the   active  
organisation   of   sensory   stimuli   or   the   perceptual   manifold   identifies   a  
characteristic  of  perception   itself:   the  process  of   the  ordering  of   sense.  We  are  
taking   a   step   back   from   the   nature   of   the   judgement   of   beauty   to   the  
characterisation  of  aesthetic  perception  in  general,  and  its  relation  to  perceptual  
organisation  and  the  binding  problem  in  particular.  
Secondly,   this   representation   of   a   unified   or   organised   manifold   is   a  
“judgment”  only   in   the   thin  sense  of  a  perceptual   representation  of   the  world  
produced   by   an   active   operation   of   mind,   however   unconsciously.   This   is  
because,  for  Kant,  any  representation  is  an  upshot  of  some  form  of  judgement,  
some  activity  of  mind,  rather  than  something  which  simply  pops  into  our  head,  
mysteriously  delivered  from  the  external  world  (Zuckert,  2007,  p.  290).  
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In  other  words,  what  I  want  to  preserve  in  Zuckert’s  reading  of  Kant   is   the  
way   in   which   our   engagement   with   the   world   cannot   but   be   organised   as  
containing   individual   and   interrelated   objects   whose   parts   or   properties   we  
bind   together   (to   attempt)   to   form   ordered   or   organised   wholes.   Zuckert’s  
suggestion   is   that   “[In]   aesthetic   experience   we   appreciate   the   object   as   an  
individual,   as   comprising   all   (or   indeterminately   many)   of   its   sensible  
properties  as  inextricably  interrelated  or  unified  to  make  the  object  what  it  is:  in  
other  words,  we   appreciate  what   has   be   called   an   object’s   ‘individual   form’”  
(Zuckert,   2006,   pp.   599-­‐‑600).   I   think   that   this   is   true,   insofar   as   it   secures   our  
representation   of   an   individual   object   characterised   by   its   interrelated   and  
individualising   sensible   properties;   but   we   need   not   then   follow   Kant—as  
Zuckert   analyses   him—toward   an   analysis   of   what   being   a   beautiful   object  
consists  in  or  of  the  putative  necessity  of  such  judgements.64  This  is  because  we  
are   interested   in   the   processes   and   imperatives   that   constitute   aesthetic  
response   or   aesthetic   perception,   and   the   relation   of   discrete   stimuli   to   one  
another,   rather   than   the   evaluative   judgement   which   may   or   may   not   be  
                                                                                                 
64  For  a  more  sceptical  approach  to  purposiveness  and  its  relation  to  formalism  see  (Guyer,  
1997)   chapters   three   and   six.   Guyer   comes   closest   to   the   approach   outlined   above   when   he  
writes  that,  in  order  to  understand  Kant’s  argument  in  §10  of  the  third  Critique,    
  
we   must   attribute   to   Kant   the   view   that   knowledge   requires   not   only   the   synthesis   of  
representations   of   objects   according   to   rules   [as   outlined   in   the   first   Critique],   but   also   the  
production   of   objects   themselves   according   to   rules,   and   that   where   we   cannot   see   a  
comprehensible  object  as  due  to  our  own  action  according  to  rules,  we  must  postulate—though  
we  cannot  actually  know—some  other  rule-­‐‑governed  agent  as  its  cause.  (Guyer,  1997,  p.  196)  
Where  Guyer  finds  the  most  trouble  for  Kant  is  in  this  appearance  of  design,  or  undesigned  
design,   the   appreciation   of   which   in   the   representation   of   the   form   of   an   object   leads   us   to  
pleasure  in  the  beautiful.  
More   promisingly,  Anthony   Savile   understands   “something’s   being   purposiveness  without   a  
purpose  [as]  nothing  other  than  its  being  undesignedly  functional  for  an  end”  (Savile,  1993,  p.  90)  by  
which   he   means   that,   as   with   beauty,   that   the   object’s   contingent   nature   accords   with   our  
faculty  of  judgment  by  chance,  by  “good  fortune”  rather  than  as  some  consciously  chosen  end.    
My  account  is  related  to  this,  but  leans  more  towards  Zuckert  in  that  our  entire  orientation  to  
the  world  and  its  contents  is  premised  on  its  contents  being  such  that  it  and  they  can  be  related  
to  one  another  and  represented  as  such  without  a  prior  notion  or  concept  of  any  end  or  function  
(although  we  will  often  have  such  a  concept).  
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grounded   in  some  form  of  pleasurable  recognition  of  unity   in  an  object  which  
may  then  be  demanded  of  others.    
Thus  we   can   construe   the   characteristically   perceptual   problem   of   binding  
features   to   the   objects  which  possess   them  and   the   characteristically   aesthetic  
question   of   the   appearance   of   such   objects   not   only   as   aspects   of   the   same  
phenomenon,   but   as   subject   to   a   principle   of   purposiveness   or   open-­‐‑ended  
organisation   which   serves   to   provide   us   with   the   object’s   “individual   form”  
which  may  then  be  the  object  of  aesthetic  appreciation.    
3.5  The  Structure  of  Aesthetic  Perception  
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  go  into  more  detail  about  the  distinction  between  
bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception.  What  unifies  them  as  aesthetic  perception  is  
their  foundation  in  the  perceptual  representation  of  an  individual  in  possession  
of   particular   properties,   an   activity   of  mind  which  we   can   understand   as   the  
organisation   of   the   material   of   sense   from   the   buzzing   confusion   of   sensory  
stimuli.  What   distinguishes   them   is   the   complexity   and   determinacy   of   such  
representation   and   the   accessibility   and   reflexivity   of   the   perceptual   and  
cognitive  states  of  which  each  admits.65   In   the  next  chapter   I  will  explain  how  
this  distinction  is  founded  in  differing  relations  to  attention  and  why  it   is  that  
attention   should  not  be   thought  necessary   for   all   aesthetic  perception,   even   if  
the  full,  rich  states  associated  with  a  narrower  approach  to  aesthetic  psychology  
demand  attention.  
3.5.1  Bare  aesthetic  perception  
Bare  aesthetic  perception  is  the  only  kind  of  aesthetic  perception  which  goes  
on   in   the  absence  of  attention  or  at  very   low   levels  of  attention.   It   is  aesthetic  
                                                                                                 
65   By   “reflexivity”   I   mean   the   capacity   to   take   one’s   own   mental   states   as   the   objects   of  
thought:  For  example,  valuing  one’s  own  positive  experience  of  a  state  of  affairs  in  the  manner  
of  Walton  aesthetic  appreciation  or  Iseminger’s  aesthetic  state  of  mind.  
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because  it  is  involved  in  the  purposive  organisation  of  sensory  representations  
such   that   their   contents   comprise   individual   objects   possessing   sensible  
qualities.   That   is,   bare   aesthetic   perception   satisfies   our   criterion   for   aesthetic  
status   because   it   involves   the   representation   of   individual   objects   possessing  
particular   (if   not   highly   determinate)   qualities.   Such   aesthetic   perception   is  
“bare”   because   the   absence   of   attention   limits   the   complexity   of   perceptual  
organisation   and   the   rational   or   cognitive   access   possible   at   this   level;  
something  which  will  become  clearer  when  we  consider  the  interaction  between  
attention,   perception,   and   cognition.   We   might   thus   choose   to   call   this  
“minimal”   aesthetic   perception.   However,   “bare”   highlights   the   contrast  
between   the   richer   form  of   aesthetic   perception   and   serves   to   emphasise   that  
this   form  of   aesthetic  perception   really   is   foundational   in   aesthetic  psychology:  
bare   aesthetic   perception   is   not   intended   to   take   the   place   of   the   rich   and  
cognitively  complex  “aesthetic  perceptions”  identified  by  narrow  theorists.  
3.5.1.1  Aesthetic  perception  and  Kant’s  aesthetic  response  
We   can   illuminate   the   relationship   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception   by   considering   the   two   kinds   of   reflective   judgment   Paul   Guyer  
argues  we  must   recognise   in  Kant’s   theory  of   the   judgement  of   taste.   In  §9  of  
the  Critique   of   the   Power   of   Judgment   Kant   asks   “in   what   way   do   we   become  
conscious   of   a   mutual   subjective   correspondence   of   the   powers   of   cognition  
with   each   other   in   the   judgment   of   taste—aesthetically,   through   mere   inner  
sense   and   sensation,   or   intellectually,   through   the   consciousness   of   our  
intentional  activity  through  which  we  set  them  in  play?”  (5:  218).    
That   is,   if   it   is   the   “mutual   subjective   correspondence   of   the   powers   of  
cognition”—or   the   harmony   of   the   faculties   of   imagination   and  
understanding—in   which   a   judgement   of   taste   is   founded,   what   is   the  
relationship   between   the   pleasure   which,   for   Kant,   arises   from   such   harmony  
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and  our  awareness  of  that  harmony  which  is  taken  to  be  indicative  of  a  judgment  
of   beauty?  Kant   is   asking,   on  Guyer’s   reading,  whether   and   in  what  way  we  
should   distinguish   between   the   sensory   and   the   intellectual   recognition   of  
beauty.  In  other  words,  Kant’s  question  is  about  the  kind  of  awareness  involved  
in   the   judgement   of   beauty:   are  we   aware   of   the   harmony  of   the   faculties   by  
way   of   some   awareness   of   our   own  mental   states,   or   is   it   the   pleasure   which  
arises  from  that  harmony  of  which  we  are  aware?  We  might  construe  this  as  a  
question  about  the  kind  of  access  we  have  to  our  own  inner  states:  Kant  wants  to  
know  if  the  harmony  of  the  faculties  is  something  of  which  we  can  be  aware  by  
anything  other  than  the  pleasure  which  such  harmony  occasions.  
Kant  is  asking  a  question  about  the  nature  of  our  aesthetic  psychology  which  
is  similar  to  ours  to  the  extent  that  he  is  interested  in  the  way  that  we  represent  
and  cognise  the  forms  of  objects  aesthetically.  Think  of  it  this  way:  In  this  thesis  
we  are  interested  in  the  relationship  between  attention  and  aesthetic  perception;  
and   one   way   in   which   we   can   understand   our   concern   is   in   terms   of   the  
relationship   between   aesthetic   perception   and   the   kinds   of   awareness   or  
consciousness   of   bound   perceptual   representations   of   which   we   are   capable.  
One   of   my   key   arguments   will   be   that   attention   changes   the   nature   of   our  
awareness   of   aesthetic   perception   and   this   change   in   the   nature   of   our  
awareness   is   what   I   call   the   transition   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception.    
How   does   this   differing   awareness   of   perceptual   representations   relate   to  
Kant’s  question?  Guyer  makes  a  distinction  which  helps  us  here.  For,  he  argues,  
we  must  distinguish  between  Kant’s  account  of  aesthetic  response—a  theory  of  
mental   states,   processes,   and   their   relations:   an   account   of   aesthetic  
psychology—and  Kant’s  theory  of  aesthetic  judgment,  which  is  “a  theory  of  the  
relations  between   judgments  and   their  grounds”.  Crucially,  Guyer  points  out,  
Kant’s   account   of   the   aesthetic   response   does   not   require   awareness   of   the  
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relations  of   the  mental  states  which  underpin  it.   In  contrast,  Kant’s  account  of  
aesthetic  judgement  plausibly  requires  awareness  of  the  relation  between  reasons  
and  the  judgments  they  ground  (Guyer,  1997,  p.  92).  
Why   might   this   help   us?   Guyer’s   distinction   between   Kant’s   account   of  
aesthetic  response—which  is  about  our  aesthetic  psychology—and  his  account  
of  aesthetic  judgment—which  is  about  reasons  and  their  grounding—highlights  
the  different  relationship  each  might  have  to  awareness  and  the  way  in  which  
the  perceptual  activity  involved  in  aesthetic  response  need  not  be  available  to  the  
subject  in  order  to  be  aesthetic.  In  other  words,  this  kind  of  distinction  helps  us  
think   about   the  difference  between   a   set   of  mental   states,   processes   and   their  
relations,  on  the  one  hand,  and  our  awareness  of  the  relations  between  reasons  
and   the   grounds   of   aesthetic   judgements.  We   can   then   ask   a   question   about  
what   it   is   in   aesthetic   thought  which   requires   a   certain   form   of   awareness   or  
access:   is   it   aesthetic   response   (or   aesthetic   perception)   or   is   it   aesthetic  
judgement  (which  I  call  aesthetic  appreciation).  
This  hopefully  helps  us  begin   to  understand   the   relationship  between  bare  
and  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation.  One  of  my  arguments  
will  be  that  attention  changes  the  relationship  between  aesthetic  perception  and  
aesthetic   appreciation   by   virtue   of   changing   the   nature   of   our   awareness   or  
consciousness   of   perceptual   representations.   In   the   absence   of   attention   we  
perceive   aesthetically   but   we   do   so   only   minimally   and   such   perceptual  
consciousness   is   unavailable   to   cognition   and   thus   unavailable   to   aesthetic  
appreciation.  I  will  argue  that  it  is  only  when  attended  that  we  have  cognitive  
and  rational  access  to  the  objects  of  aesthetic  perception  and  are  thus  able  to  use  
these   representations   in   aesthetic   judgements.   In   other  words,   the   perceptual  
representations   of   bare   aesthetic   perception   are   unavailable   to   function   as  
reasons   in   aesthetic   judgement   because   their   objects   are   unattended.   Rich  
aesthetic  perception,  whilst  still  being  a  form  of  aesthetic  response  rather  than  
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aesthetic   judgement,   requires   attention   and   thus   makes   its   representations  
available   to   cognition,   and   thus   available   for   use   as   reasons   in   aesthetic  
judgements.   I  will   argue   for   this   relationship   between   attention   and  different  
forms  of  consciousness  in  the  next  chapter.66  
Now,   to   explain   Kant’s   account,   Guyer   outlines   two   distinct   acts   of   the  
faculty  of  reflective  judgement  which  underpin  the  declaration  that  an  object  is  
beautiful:  firstly  “the  “unintentional”  reflection  which  produces  the  pleasure  of  
aesthetic   response;”   and,   secondly   “the   other,   that   further   and   quite   possibly  
intentional  exercise  of  reflective  judgment  which  leads  to  an  actual  judgment  of  
taste”   (Guyer,   1997,   p.   97).  My   emphasis   is   necessarily   different   from   Kant’s  
because  I  do  not  focus  on  pleasure  as  the  key  indicator  of  an  aesthetic  response  
or   the  sign  of   the  harmony  of   the   faculties  arising  from  “the  estimation  of   the  
object”  (§9).  My  account  is  affectively  and  evaluatively  neutral,  whereas  Kant’s  
focuses   on   the   pleasure   that   indicates   and   grounds   the   judgment   of   beauty.  
Moreover,   I   have  not   adopted  Kant’s   account   of   the  harmony  of   the   faculties  
occasioned   by   the   representation   of   the   form   of   the   object   as   the   ground   for  
beauty  and  regulative  or  purposive  ideal  of  perception.  
However,   the   distinction   between   unintentional   and   intentional   reflective  
judgement   helps   us   to   understand   the   distinction   between   bare   and   rich  
aesthetic   perception,   particularly   insofar   as   I  will   argue   that   it   is   only   in   rich  
aesthetic   perception   that   we   access   the   reasons   for   aesthetic   verdicts   or  
judgments.  That  relationship  between  aesthetic  response  (aesthetic  perception)  
and   our   cognitive   access   to   and   reflection   on   such   a   response—an   awareness  
and   reflection   which   can   themselves   shape   ongoing   and   future   aesthetic  
responses—is   central   for   this   thesis.   Indeed,   I   will   argue   that   it   only   really  
                                                                                                 
66   My   account   of   rich   aesthetic   perception   must   be   distinguished   from   Kant’s   aesthetic  
judgment   in   that  rich  aesthetic  perception  remains  an  account  of  aesthetic  psychology—of  the  
mental   states,   processes,   and   relationships   between   them   involved   in   aesthetic   perception—
even  as  it  also  addresses  the  accessibility  of  reasons  involved  in  aesthetic  judgements.  
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makes   sense   for   us   to   discuss   verdicts   and   judgments   in   the   presence   of  
attention  and  the  rich  aesthetic  perception  it  supports.  
It  must  be  emphasised,  however,  that  in  discussing  this  distinction  of  Kant’s  
(and   Guyer’s)   between   aesthetic   response   and   aesthetic   judgement   I   do   not  
mean   to   equate   bare   aesthetic   perception   to   the   former   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception  to  the  latter.  Aesthetic  perception  is  an  account  of  aesthetic  response  
or   the   purposive   representational   activity   of  mind   and   not   an   account   of   the  
relations   between   reasons   and   aesthetic   judgements.   The   aim   here   is   to   use  
Kant’s   questions   about   the   forms   of   awareness   of   and   access   to   aesthetic  
response  and  the  relationship  of  that  response  to  the  reasons  which  ground  the  
judgement  of  taste  to  clarify  the  distinction  I  wish  to  make  between  the  mental  
states   and   processes   involved   in   aesthetic   perception   and   the   availability   of  
perceptual   representations   to  aesthetic  appreciation.  Put   simply,   rich  aesthetic  
perception  makes  aesthetic  appreciation  possible,  but  it  does  not  itself  amount  
to  appreciation.  
3.5.1.2  Bare  aesthetic  perception  and  everyday  aesthetics  
Bare   aesthetic   perception   is   the   natural   foundation   both   for   rich   aesthetic  
perception  and  broad  accounts  of  aesthetic  psychology  because  it  constitutes  a  
pervasive  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  with  the  objects  and  environments  we  
encounter  in  daily  life.  Examples  of  bare  aesthetic  perception  might  include  the  
experiences   to  which   Sherri   Irvin   attributed   “aesthetic   texture”.   Recall   Irvin’s  
suggestion  that,  
Being  in  the  room  you  are  in  right  now,  with  its  particular  visual  features  
and  sounds;  sitting  in  the  way  that  you  are  sitting,  perhaps  crookedly  in  
an  uncomfortable  chair;  feeling  the  air  currents  on  your  skin—all  of  these  
things   impart  a   texture   to  your  experience   that…should  be  regarded  as  
aesthetic.  (Irvin,  2008a,  p.  30)  
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If  we  interpret  these  aspects  of  experience  as  unattended  then  they  qualify  as  
instances  of  bare  aesthetic  perception.  Irvin  writes  that  each  “imparts  a  certain  
shape   or   texture   to   a   small   part   of   my   life…”   (Irvin,   2008a,   p.   31)   and   this  
implicates  bare  aesthetic  perception  to  the  extent,  firstly,  that  this  is  an  example  
of  the  relating  and  ordering  of  sensory  representations,  and,  secondly,  that  such  
elements   then  play  a   role   in   the  periphery   rather   than   the  centre  of   conscious  
experience.   (If   they  were   attended,   and   they   often   are,   this  would   amount   to  
rich  aesthetic  perception.)  
Let’s   focus   on   the   visual   aspects   of   Irvin’s   example:   the   unattended,  
peripheral   visual   features   of   a   room   of  which  we   are   barely   conscious.  Note  
immediately   that   Irvin  writes   of   particular   visual   features:   it   seems   important  
that  we  are  discussing  individual,  uniquely  instantiated  features  and  qualities.  
This  accords  with  my  account  of  the  importance  of  perceptual  representation  of  
individual   objects   possessing   appearance   qualities.   I   am   unsure   what   Irvin  
means  by  “texture”  in  this  example,  but  this  should  not  matter  too  much  for  our  
purposes.  
What  visual  features  are  we  discussing?  I  am  surrounded  by  patches  of  light  
and   shade,   differences   in   hue   and   brightness,   associated   with   objects   of  
different  shapes,   sizes,  and   textures,   some  of  which  resolve   into  a  desk,  chair,  
books,  glasses,  mugs,  a  lamp,  a  mouse,  pen,  paper,  parts  of  my  body,  and  so  on.  
To  the  extent  that  these  are  qualities  and  objects  which  belong  to  one  another,  
which  are  bound   together  as   representations  of  multifeatured  objects   they  are  
aesthetic.   And   to   the   extent   that   they   are   so   represented   in   the   absence   of  
attention  this  is  an  example  of  bare  aesthetic  perception.    
These  are  features  of  the  room  the  perceptual  representation  of  which  affect  
my  experience  of   it,  which   is  what   I   think   Irvin  means  by  highlighting   them.  
She  seems  interested  in  their  effect  on  the  shape  or  development  of  experience  
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as   indicative   of   their   aesthetic   status.   My   view   is   slightly   different.   I   am  
interested   in   the   extent   to   which   we   are   capable   of   assembling   or   binding  
experience   in   the   absence   of   attention   and—on   the   basis   of   my   account   of  
aesthetic  perception—on  the  extent  to  which  such  representation  is  aesthetic.    
Such  a  discussion  is  challenging  because  we  are  trying  to  isolate  and  discuss  
an  aspect  of  experience  and  a  form  of  aesthetic  perception  which  is  precisely  to  
be  understood  as  unattended,  as  resistant  to  discussion  and  isolation;  but  which  
is  central  to  our  everyday  approach  to  the  world,  underpinning  the  assembled  
array   of   appearances   which   orientate   us   in   and   to   the   environment.   Our  
preattentive  estimation  of   the  object—our  binding  of   its   features   in   space  and  
time—is  an  ongoing  perceptual  activity  which  runs  through  experience,  adding  
that  texture  of  which  Irvin  writes.    
One  of  the  ways  in  which  we  can  understand  this  continuous  estimation  or  
binding  is  the  manner  in  which  we  are  often  struck  first  by  the  “feeling”  or  first  
impression  of  a  space:  we  feel  comfortable,  uncomfortable,  uneasy,  constrained,  
or   free   to   move   in   a   room   as   a   result   of   its   layout,   decoration,   dimensions,  
lighting,   and   so   on.   Recall   Kevin  Melchionne’s   suggestion   that   “the   aesthetic  
virtues  of  the  home  are  usually  background  qualities  that  affect  our  experience  
of  the  space  without  calling  attention  to  themselves”  (Melchionne,  1998,  p.  199).  
That  our  experience  is  so  affected  is  part  of  the  reason  so  much  time  and  effort  
is  often  invested  in  the  design  and  decoration  of  home,  work,  and  public  spaces.  
Often  such  affective  manifestations  of  bare  aesthetic  perception  will  lead  to  our  
attending   to   their   origins   and   this  will   result   in   a   shift   toward   rich   aesthetic  
perception  and  characteristically  appreciative  practices;  but  the  suggestion  here  
is  that  the  affective  element  of  bare  aesthetic  perception  is  pervasive  in  much  of  
our  experience  of  spaces  and,  indeed,  goes  beyond  that  to  unattended  aesthetic  
perception  of  objects  and  their  features  even  as  we  go  about  other  tasks  in  our  
everyday  lives.  
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3.5.1.3  Limits  on  bare  aesthetic  perception  
It  should  be  stressed  that  bare  aesthetic  perception  is  limited  in  terms  of  the  
complexity   and  determinacy  of   the  qualities   and   relations   it  may   involve;   or,   to  
put   it   in  our   terms,  bare  aesthetic  perception   is   limited   in   the  complexity  and  
determinacy  of  the  qualities  it  can  attribute  to  individual  objects.  Why  this  is  so  
will  become  more  apparent  when  we  look  in  detail  at  the  kind  of  phenomenal  
consciousness   and   cognitive   accessibility   possible   in   the   absence   of   attention.  
Certain   qualities,   I   will   suggest,   are   more   “attentionally   demanding”   than  
others   by   virtue   of   both   the   complexity   of   their   underlying   aesthetic   and  
nonaesthetic  bases  and  the  kinds  of  understanding  that  they  demand  as  objects.    
This   can  be  understood   in  both   the  broad  and  narrow  sense  of  perception:  
that  is,  in  terms  of  the  complexity  and  determinacy  of  representation  of  which  
we  are  capable   in  bare  aesthetic  perception,  and  in  terms  of   the  complexity  of  
understanding   and   knowledge  we   can   bring   to   bear   on   such   representations.  
The   absence   of   attention   limits   the   determinacy   of   the   qualities   we   can  
perceptually   attribute   to   objects,   but   this   need   not   threaten   the   possession   of  
some   less   determinately   represented   quality—“light   coloured”   or   “reddish”  
say—by  an  individual  object  represented.    
In  order  to  understand  attentional  complexity  consider  the  manner  in  which  
our   attribution   of   aesthetic   qualities   to   a   painting  might   be  modified   by   our  
knowledge   of   the   prevailing  methods   of   composition   and   iconography   at   the  
time  of  its  execution.  What  strikes  us  as  an  unremarkable  dynamism  in  a  minor  
Futurist  work  would  have  quite  a  different  effect   in  a  David   tableau   (Walton,  
1970).   Furthermore,   as  we   shall   see,   some   qualities—especially   compositional  
ones—require  sustained  attention  to  discrete  elements  of  a  work,  environment,  
or   object   in   order   that   we   might   relate   them   to   one   another   and   begin   to  
perceive  their  coherence,  unity,  or  grace  of  execution  (or  lack  thereof)  in  a  way  
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that   fleeting   or   inattentive   perception   could   not.   A   similar   point   is   made   by  
Zuckert   about   the   imaginative   activity   involved   in   Kant’s   account   of   the  
representation  of  an  object  as  beautiful:    
“[The]  cognitive  activity  representing  an  object  as  beautiful  comprises  an  
activity   of   imagination,   which   is,   more   specifically,…an   alternation   of  
attention  among  heterogeneous  (particular,  empirical)  properties  of  the  object,  or  
“play””  (Zuckert,  2007,  pp.  292,  my  emphasis).  
That  is,  our  attention  needs  to  move  amongst  discrete  elements  of  a  work  in  
order  to  build  up  a  temporally  extended  and  determinate  representation  of  its  
character.   This   kind   of   activity   is   unavailable   to   bare   aesthetic   perception,  
except  insofar  as  it  may  involve  fairly  indeterminate  qualities  perceivable  in  the  
absence   of   attention   and   such   qualities   are   not   dependent   on   our   bringing   a  
sophisticated   understanding   to   bear   on   our   representation   of   them.   Such  
activity  is  reserved  for  rich  aesthetic  perception.  
3.5.2  Rich  aesthetic  perception  
For   those   unnerved   by   bare   aesthetic   perception,   rich   aesthetic   perception  
should   provide   something   of   a   relief.   Rich   aesthetic   perception,   as   the   term  
implies,   involves  a  richer  and  more  complex  form  of  aesthetic  perception:  one  
which  demands  the  kinds  of  phenomenological  and  cognitive  processes  which  
only  attention  supports.  On  our  terms,  rich  aesthetic  perception  involves  a  more  
complex   and   determinate   representation   of   the   individual   and   the   sensible  
qualities   it   possesses:   which   means   that   it   is   capable   of   supporting   more  
attentionally   demanding   qualities,   some   of   which   require   an   evaluative   and  
analytical   response   on   our   part.   For   example,   the   expressive   qualities   which  
emerge   from   temporally   extended   scrutiny   of   music   or   complex   formal  
qualities  of  painted  canvases.  
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Taking  on  Guyer’s  account  of  the  two  forms  of  reflective  judgment  involved  
in  the  judgment  of  taste,  then,  rich  aesthetic  perception  is  doubly  different  from  
bare   aesthetic   perception,   even   as   it   depends   on   it   for   the   representation   of  
bound  perceptual  experience.  Firstly,   rich  aesthetic  perception   is  “intentional”  
in   the   sense   that   is   necessarily   conscious   and   directed   (if   not   consciously  
directed)   toward  objects   and   their  properties.  When   I   attend   to  a  mug  on  my  
desk  that  might  not  be  a  voluntary  act,  it  might  have  shifted  as  I  knock  a  table  
leg,  or   the   light  might  have  glinted   in   the  corner  of  my  eye:   stimuli   can  catch  
our   attention,   leading   to   a   focusing  on   their  point  of  origin.  Whether  or  not   I  
was  phenomenally  conscious  of   the  mug   in  all   its   richness  and  detail  before   I  
attended   to   it—and   there   are   many   differences   of   opinion   on   this   question  
which   we   will   have   to   address—I   am   aware   of   the   mug   in   a   more  
straightforward  sense  once  I  attend  to  it.    
Secondly,  then,  this  more  determinate  perceptual  representation  brings  with  
it   a   different   relationship   with   the   reasons   for   judgement   which   such   a  
representation  might  provide.  We  will  go  into  this  further  below  and  in  the  next  
chapter,   but   it   is   one   of   my   central   contentions   that   only   rich   aesthetic  
perception,  on  the  basis  of  more  determinate  perceptual  representation  and  the  
cognitive  and  rational  accessibility  attention  brings,  can  furnish  us  with  reasons  
for  aesthetic  judgments  and  verdicts.  
Rich  aesthetic  perception  thus  involves  an  attention  condition  on  the  mental  
states   it   involves  and  shares   this   characteristic  with  narrow  forms  of  aesthetic  
psychology.   By   virtue   of   its  more   determinate   perceptual   representation   and  
cognitive  and  rational  access  to  such  representations  and  our  response  to  them  
rich  aesthetic  perception  should  be  understood   to  support  and  be   involved   in  
aesthetic   appreciation   and   the   activities   and   practices   which   emerge   from   and  
depend   on   such   appreciation,   such   as   criticism,   aesthetic   communication   and  
argument,   artistic   practice   and   design.   Rich   aesthetic   perception   grounds  
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appreciation   by   providing   the   perceptual   and   cognitive   resources   on   which  
appreciation  depends.  
3.5.2.1  Three  senses  of  appreciation  
If   we   recall   the   narrow   accounts   discussed   in   the   previous   chapters   it  
becomes   apparent   that   there   are   three   interrelating   senses   of   appreciation   at  
play:  analytical,  evaluative,  and  affective.    
i.  Analytical  appreciation  
The  analytical  sense  of  appreciation  involves  scrutiny  and  discrimination  and  
is   thus   the  most   closely   connected   to  my   specification  of   the   core  of   aesthetic  
perception.   Beyond   this,   the   analytical   sense   of   appreciation   also   seems   to  
suggest  attentiveness  and  the  cognitive  goals  of  understanding  and  knowledge.  
Paul  Ziff  described  this  sense  of  appreciation  as  “sizing  up”,  separating  it  from  
the  evaluative  sense  of  appreciation  we  will  discuss  below  (Ziff,  1960,  pp.  242-­‐‑
243).  Seeking  to  understand  the  relations  between  elements  of  an  artwork,   the  
webs  of  interrelating  aesthetic  and  nonaesthetic  qualities,  the  manner  in  which  
they   appear   in   experience,   and   so   on   are   examples   of   this   analytical   sense.  
Recall   Levinson’s   suggestion   that   “to   appreciate   something   aesthetically   is   to  
attend   to   its   forms,   qualities,   and  meanings   for   their   own   sakes,   and   to   their  
interrelations,   but   also   to   attend   to   the  way   in  which   all   such   things   emerge  
from  the  particular  set  of  low-­‐‑level  perceptual  features  that  define  the  object  on  
a  nonaesthetic  plane”  (Levinson,  1996b,  p.  6).  Consider  the  following  catalogue  
entry  on  Umberto  Boccioni’s  1910-­‐‑1911  La  città  che  sale  (The  City  Rises):  
The  picture  rejects  the  age-­‐‑old  laws  of  harmony,  it  is  aimed  at  dissonance  
and   expresses   the   simultaneity,   fragmentation   and   contradictory  
character   which   characterises   modern   sensibility.   A   vibrant,   edgy   and  
flickering   brushstroke,   at   times   broad   and   dense,   at   others   unravelled  
and  diaphanous,  becomes  the  vehicle  of   forces,   the  agent  of   the  shift  of  
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energies  from  one  body  to  another,  from  one  form  to  another  and  from  
one  colour  to  its  complementary.  (Zippilli,  2009,  p.  132)  
This  formal  analysis  is  a  characteristic  product  of  the  analytical  aspect  of  rich  
aesthetic   perception:   an   evocative   description   of   the   formal   relationships   that  
arc  across  Boccioni’s  vibrant  canvas,  finding  social  and  artistic  meaning  in  that  
energy   and   its   painterly   representation.   This   is   also   an   example   of   the  
attentionally  demanding  nature  of   such  activity:   these  qualities  and  meanings  
are  what  we  might  call  “attentionally  complex”  and  thus  require  a  certain  level  
of  sustained  and  shifting  attention  to  them  and  their  constituents  in  order  for  us  
to  be  able   to  perceive  and   interpret   them.  This   is   a  key   feature  of   a  view   like  
Levinson’s   and   is   arguably   the   central   aspect   of   Carroll’s   content-­‐‑orientated  
view   wherein   “experience   is   an   aesthetic   experience   in   virtue   of   the   objects  
upon  which   our   attention   is   focused”   (Carroll,   2012).67   It  was   also   evident   in  
both  Sibley  and  Davies  understanding  of   the  cognitive  conditions  on  aesthetic  
interest.  
As  with  most   issues  bound  up  with  perception,   the   transition   from  bare   to  
rich   aesthetic   perception   has   both   phenomenological   and   epistemological  
aspects.  Not   only  does   such   scrutiny   and   attention   alter   our  phenomenology,  
causing  certain  relations  or  qualities  to  come  to  the  fore  of  our  consciousness,  to  
appear  more  striking,  but  such  a  phenomenological  alteration  brings  with   it  a  
sense  in  which  we  are  placed  in  a  stronger  epistemic  position  in  relation  to  the  
object   of   our   attention   and   the   grounds   of   aesthetic   judgement.   This   accords  
with  the  common  sense  concept  of  attention  and  the  manner  in  which  the  items  
on  which  we  focus  are  available  for  scrutiny  and  report.  The  analytical  sense  of  
appreciation  requires  attention  both   in   the  perceptual  sense  of  our  orientating  
                                                                                                 
67   The   analytical   sense   accommodates   both   Carroll’s   direct   and   indirect   or   apperceptive  
forms  of  attention  whereby  one  scrutinises  an  object  either  in  terms  of  the  qualities  it  strikes  one  
as  containing  or  in  virtue  of  the  experience  it  elicits  in  us.  
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sense  organs  appropriately  and  thus  making  the  objects  and  properties  of  one’s  
attention  more  determinate,  but  also   in   the  mental  or   intellectual   sense  of  our  
focusing   on   particular   concerns   or   aspects   of   the   object   in   question.68   The  
analytical   sense   of   appreciation   is   one   way   of   guaranteeing   perceptual  
acquaintance  with  the  object  of  appreciation  such  that  we  have  an  appropriate  
awareness  of  the  objects  and  features  in  question.  
However,   on  my   account   it   is   not   the   epistemic   or   cognitive   aspect  which  
renders  an  episode  of  perception  aesthetic:  that  is,  it  is  not  our  access  to  or  even  
the  availability  of,  the  objects  and  qualities  represented  in  aesthetic  perception  
for   reasoning   which   makes   them   aesthetic.   My   specification   of   the   aesthetic  
character  of  perception  precedes   the  cognitive  and  rational  accessibility  of   the  
representations   delivered   by   such   perception,   and   thus  makes   it   improper   to  
speak   of   “appropriate”   appreciation   at   the   level   of   bare   aesthetic   perception.  
We   will   have   far   more   to   say   about   this   in   the   next   chapter   when   we   will  
consider   the   forms   of   access,   awareness,   and   reference   that   the   presence   and  
absence  of  attention  may  involve.  For  now  I  will  simply  state  that,  although  rich  
aesthetic  perception,  on  my  view,  does   require  attention  and   thus  will   ensure  
that   objects   and   qualities   represented   are   accessible   to   and   apt   for   use   in  
aesthetic   judgements   and   descriptions,   this   is   not   the   case   in   bare   aesthetic  
perception,   which   is   characterised   by   inattention   or   divided   attention.   This  
inaccessibility   does   not   threaten   aesthetic   character   it   only   constrains   its  
development.  
ii.  Evaluative  appreciation    
The  evaluative  sense  of  appreciation  is  usually  coupled  with  the  analytical  in  
                                                                                                 
68   It   is,   I  suggest,   the  analytical  sense  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  coupled  with  the  belief   that  
the   “lower   senses”   are   incapable   of   the   requisite   cognitive   engagement   that   leads   many   to  
suggest   senses   or   sensory   experiences   of   taste,   touch,   and   smell   are   incapable   of   supporting  
appreciative  activity.  See  (Korsmeyer,  1999)  for  an  acceptance  of  the  centrality  of  the  cognitive  
in  aesthetics,  but  a  rejection  of  taste’s  incapacity  for  such  engagement.  
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that  it  is  either  the  discriminating  activity  itself  which  is  valued  or  valuable,  
or,  as  is  more  common,  some  complex  of  the  (usually)  positive  evaluation  of  
the  discriminating  activity  and   its  objects.  We  see   this   in  Levinson,  Walton,  
Stecker,   and   Iseminger   for   each   of   whom   an   evaluative   response   and  
orientation   is   built   into   their   understanding  of   the   aesthetic   in   general   and  
aesthetic  appreciation  in  particular.  This  reflexivity  was  characteristic  of  the  
various   narrow   accounts.   Recall   Iseminger’s   suggestion   that   “Someone   is  
appreciating  a  state  of  affairs  just  in  case  she  or  he  is  valuing  for  its  own  sake  the  
experiencing   of   that   state   of   affairs”   (Iseminger,   2006,   pp.   99,   emphasis   in  
original)   and   Walton’s   argument   that   ““aesthetic”   pleasures   include   the  
pleasure   of   finding   something   valuable,   of   admiring   it.   One   appreciates   the  
work.  One  does  not  merely  enjoy  it;  one  takes  pleasure  or  delight  in  judging  
it   to   be   good”   (Walton,   1993,   p.   504).   Such   reflexivity   need   not   necessarily  
involve   a   thought   or   statement   to   the   effect   that   one   is   appreciating,   but—
and   especially   when   coupled   with   the   analytical   sense—this   evaluative  
relationship  to  the  objects  and  character  of  experience  does  seem  to  suggest  a  
suppression   of   other   concerns   and   ends,   a   narrowing   of   one’s   field   of  
thought  and  action:  a  focusing  of  attention.  
Another   form  of  evaluative  appreciation  might   issue   in  or  be   thought   to  be  
constituted   by   judgements   of   aesthetic   merit:   what   Sibley   calls   “purely  
evaluative   judgements”,   which   comprise   verdicts   on   the   aesthetic   quality   or  
value  of   the  object   in  question   (Sibley,   2001a).  Nick  Zangwill  makes  a   similar  
distinction   between   verdictive   aesthetic   judgements:   judgements   that   things  
have   or   lack   aesthetic   value   or   merit;   and   substantive   aesthetic   judgements:  
judgements  that  things  are  dainty,  dumpy,  graceful,  garish,  delicate,  balanced,  
warm,   passionate,   brooding,   awkward,   and   sad   (Zangwill,   2001a,   p.   9).   In  
simple  terms,  verdictive  aesthetic  judgements  tell  us  that  something  is  valuable,  
substantive  aesthetic  judgements  tell  us  why.    
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Now,  on  my  account  we  need  to  make  a  further  distinction  because  the  kinds  
of   substantive   aesthetic   judgement   Zangwill   mentions   are   not   supported   by  
bare  aesthetic  perception.  Both  substantive  and  verdictive  aesthetic  judgements  
in  this  guise  are  supported  by  rich  aesthetic  perception  because  only  this  form  
will   allow   of   the   determinate   and   temporally   extended   representation   that  
supports   a   complex   judgement   to   the   effect   that   a   dancer   is   graceful:   a  
judgement  that  will  be  supported  by  myriad  discrete  properties  of  the  dancer’s  
body,   movement,   and   relation   to   any   musical   accompaniment,   a   scrutiny  
symptomatic  of  the  analytical  aspect  of  appreciation.    
Bare   aesthetic   perception,   in   contrast,   cannot   support   this   kind   of   scrutiny  
nor  can  it  support  conscious  access  to  such  judgements  as  reasons  in  support  of  
verdictive   judgements.   Bare   aesthetic   perception   precedes   and   supports  
substantive   aesthetic   judgement   in   providing   bound   representations   of  
individuals   in   possession   of   sensible   qualities   located   in   time   and   space.  
Judging  or  perceiving  a  dancer  to  be  graceful,  a  painting  passionate,  a  sculpture  
awkward,  requires  a  response  beyond  the  assembling  of  experience.  These  are  
characteristically   aesthetic   judgements   involving   characteristically   aesthetic  
terms,   but   it   is   important   to   see   that   they   are   constituted   or   supported   by  
myriad   discrete   unifying   or   binding   representations   which   give   structure   to  
experience  and  constitute  the  minimal  aesthetic  response  that  I  have  called  bare  
aesthetic  perception.  
Nonetheless,  if  these  “minimal”  aesthetic  judgements  (with  judgement  in  this  
instance  meaning   representation)   support   substantive  aesthetic   and  verdictive  
aesthetic   judgements,   they   do   not   constitute   an   engagement   with   aesthetic  
value  or  form  of  aesthetic  valuing.  It  makes  little  sense  to  speak  of  judgements  
of   aesthetic  merit   or   value   such   as   “beauty”   or   “ugliness”   in   relation   to   bare  
aesthetic   perception.   Such   judgements   demand   a   greater   and   more   complex  
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response  to  the  qualities  of  an  object  than  unattended  aesthetic  perception  can  
supply.    
However,   as   Jerrold   Levinson   highlights,   many   aesthetic   terms   and  
attributions   include   a   substantial   descriptive   element   understood   as   “a  
perceptually  manifest   effect   one   can   register   independently   of   any   evaluative  
assessment   of   or   attitudinal   reaction   to   that   effect”   (Levinson,   2006a,   p.   317).  
Levinson  would  not  recognise  bare  aesthetic  perception  as  an   instance  of   this,  
because—as   we   have   seen—he   demands   a   level   of   awareness   beyond   bare  
aesthetic  perception.    
Yet,  if  we  understand  “descriptive”  not  as  a  term  relating  to  an  activity  but  as  
a   substantive   contrast   to   “evaluative”   (this   is   necessary   because   I   argue   that  
bare  aesthetic  perception  does  not  allow  of  the  kinds  of  description  involved  in  
aesthetic  judgement  and  its  justification:  that  is,  the  activity  of  description);  and  
if  we  restrict  ourselves  to  discussing  the  formal  estimation  of  the  object  and  its  
properties   involved   in   bare   aesthetic   perception   (the   possession   of   colour,  
shape,  size,  texture,  outline  and  silhouette,  by  an  object  and  our  perspective  on  
it);  then  we  can  speak  in  terms  of  the  perceptually  manifest  effect  of  our  binding  
of  the  features  of  an  object  into  an  individual  in  a  minimal  aesthetic  judgement  
which  provides  the  foundation  for  more  developed  analytical,  evaluative,  and  
affective  evaluation.69    
iii.  Affective  appreciation  
The   affective   or   emotional   sense   of   appreciation   requires   that   one   take  
pleasure   in  or  be  affected  by   the  objects  of  experience  or   the  experience   itself.  
                                                                                                 
69   This   doesn’t   quite   match   Levinson’s   specification   of   higher-­‐‑order   perceptual   ways   of  
appearing   as   the   way   to   understand   aesthetic   properties   and   their   effects,   so   we   should,  
perhaps,   speak   of   more   modest   perceptual   ways   of   appearing   in   bare   aesthetic   perception,  
reserving   higher-­‐‑order   ways   of   appearing   and   evaluative   terms   for   the   products   of   rich  
aesthetic  perception.  See  (Levinson,  2006c).  
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This   might   involve   a   feeling   of   sadness   or   despair   when   viewing   a   Greek  
tragedy;   elation   or   joy   in   the   beauties   of   nature;   or   a   simple   pleasure   in   the  
delicate  treatment  of  a  still  life.  We  will  focus  on  pleasure  for  the  moment.  
The  affective  sense  stands  in  a  complex  relationship  with  the  analytical  and  
evaluative  senses  of  appreciation.  On   the  one  hand,   it   seems,   in  order   for  our  
pleasure   in   an  object   to  be   epistemically   appropriate   and   thus   an  appropriate  
ground   for   aesthetic   judgement,   that   pleasure   must   be   grounded   in   the  
analytical  or  discriminating  aspect  of  appreciation;  yet,  on  the  other,  for  many  
this   relationship   also   means   that   our   pleasure—in   order   to   be   aesthetic  
pleasure—must   arise   from   the   right   evaluative   stance,   be   that   some   form   of  
disinterest  or  “for  its  own  sake”-­‐‑type  condition.    
This  is  further  complicated  by  the  manner  in  which,  for  some,  aesthetic  value  
is   indicated   by   appropriately   grounded   pleasure.   Thus,   we   can   ask   if   an  
experience  is  pleasing  because  it   is  valuable  or  valuable  because  it   is  pleasing.  
Can   affectively   neutral   experiences   be   aesthetically   valuable?   What   of  
unpleasant  or  negative  responses  to  works  or  features  which  nonetheless  strike  
us  as  valuable?70  We  need  not  worry  about  such  questions  here.  It  is  hopefully  
clear   by   now   that   my   account   of   aesthetic   character   does   not   hinge   on   the  
positive   or   negative   valence   of   perceived   qualities   or   evaluative   responses   to  
experiences   on   the   part   of   the   subject,   but   on   the   nature   of   the   perceptual  
representation  of  an  object  and  its  qualities.71  
                                                                                                 
70  The  relationship  between  aesthetic  value,  artistic  value,  pleasure  and  aesthetic  experience  
more  broadly  is,  unsurprisingly,  disputed.  See,  for  example,  (Graham,  2006),  (D.  Davies,  2006),  
(Goldman,  1995,  2006).  (Shelley,  2010b)  has  a  good  overview.  
71  We  mentioned  above  that  one  of  the  significant  manifestations  of  bare  aesthetic  perception  
is   affective.   The   form   of   continuous   perceptual   discrimination   characteristic   of   bare   aesthetic  
perception  manifests,  I  argue,  as  much  in  bodily  feeling  and  mood  as  it  does  in  more  traditional  
visual  and  auditory  perceptual  experiences.  It  seems  plausible  that  one  way  in  which  the  shift  
from   bare   aesthetic   perception   to   rich   aesthetic   perception   may   be   characterised   is   as   the  
voluntary   or   involuntary   shifting   of   attention   to   that   affective   experience   as   well   as   the  
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It   is   important,   however,   to   distinguish   the   affective  manifestation   of   bare  
aesthetic  perception,  which  might  also  be  understood  as  a  form  of  more  or  less  
sophisticated   mood,   from   the   affect   and   emotion   involved   in   rich   aesthetic  
perception.   For   this  purpose   I   follow  Peter  Goldie   in  distinguishing   emotions  
and  moods  with   reference   to   the  degree  of   specificity  of   their  objects   (Goldie,  
2000).  Such  a  distinction  is  necessarily  not  clear-­‐‑cut  in  actual  experience,  but  the  
contrast  between   the  emotion  of   anger  and   the  mood  of   irritability,  or   that  of  
fear   and  of   anxiety,   serves   to   illustrate   the   broad  difference   between   emotion  
and  mood.  In  the  case  of  the  emotion,  we  might  be  able  to  specify  a  particular  
person  as   the  object  of  our  anger  or   fear,  whereas   irritability  or  anxiety  might  
lack   any   clear   object   beyond   “everything”   or   “nothing   in   particular”   (Goldie,  
2000,  p.  143).  
In  the  clearest  case,  emotional  appreciation  has  as  its  object  an  artwork  (and  
its  parts)  and,  perhaps,  our  response  to  it:  thus  we  stand  before  El  Greco’s  The  
Burial   of   the   Count   of   Orgaz,   struck   by   the   transition   between   interment   and  
apotheosis:  a  luminous  but  grief-­‐‑stricken  realism  of  ashen  flesh  transforms  into  
the  pliant  radiance  of   the  divine  as  the  picture  stretches  upward.  That  tension  
between  flesh  and  heaven,  tinged  with  something  like  the  sublime  in  the  face  of  
so  large  a  canvas,  elicits  a  response  of  awe,  a  near  sensual  luxuriance  in  the  rich  
vestments  of  St  Stephen  and  St  Augustine  lowering  the  Count’s  armoured  body  
into  his  grave,  which  frisson  is  heightened  by  the  unity  of  the  composition  as  it  
ascends,  both  as  the  figures  form  a  triangle  and  as  the  colour  of  their  clothing—
red,   gold,   white—holds   the   height   of   the   work   together.   Alternatively,   of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
beginnings  of  an  analytical  and  evaluative  engagement  with   their   causes  and  character.   If  we  
recall  our  experience  of  spaces,  we  can  shift  from  our  daily  occupation  of  such  a  space  and  its  
attendant   affective   characteristics   toward   a   more   focused,   discriminating   attention   to   its  
architecture,  decoration,  and  the  origins  our  responses.  This  kind  of  activity  is  characteristic  of  
house-­‐‑hunting  or   the   sudden  shift  of  perspective   that  arranging  a   room  for  visitors   can  elicit.  
We   are   able,   in   such   situations,   to   perceive,   appreciate,   and   discuss   more   attentionally  
demanding  qualities  such  as  balance  or  disorder  as  a  result.  
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course,   we   might   feel   perplexed,   frustrated   even,   and   made   irritable   by   an  
artwork  we  neither  understand  nor  value.    
That   is,   the   expressive   qualities   of   the  work   and   our   affective   response   to  
them  might   form   the  basis  of   the  emotional   response  and  constitute   its  object  
even  though  the  ultimate  object  of  the  emotion  is  the  artwork.  (This  is  similar  to  
Carroll’s  apperceptive  form  of  attention  whereby  we  are  struck  by  the  qualities  
of   an   artwork   in   virtue   of   the   experience   it   elicits   in   us.)   Goldie   writes   of  
“feeling   towards   an   object”  which   “is   a   feeling   towards   that   thing   as   being   a  
particular  way  or  as  having  certain  properties  or  features”  (Goldie,  2000,  p.  58).  
This   seems   to   describe   the   affective   or   emotional   mode   of   appreciation   very  
well:  “Feeling  towards  is  thinking  of  with  feeling”  (Goldie,  2000,  p.  58),  Goldie  
writes,   and   the  way   in  which  we   are   guided   toward   particular   qualities   of   a  
work,   a   room,   a   natural   scene—qualities   which   can   support   more   complex  
compositional   or   expressive   features—seems   often   to   be   a   movement   from  
feeling   associated  with   appearances   toward   an   understanding   of   the   origin   of  
that  feeling  in  our  perception  of  a  feature  or  set  of  features.    
In  the  case  of  bare  aesthetic  perception,  however,  our  access  to  the  source  of  
our  mood   is   restricted  by  our   inattention.  Moods  affected  or   induced  by  bare  
aesthetic  perception—discomfort  and  anxiety  in  small,  overcrowded  spaces,  for  
example—have   as   their   objects   the   individuals  we  have  bound   and  placed   in  
assembled  representations,  but  we  have  neither  cognitive  nor  rational  access  to  
them.  
Yet  this  does  not  mean  that  such  a  mood  may  not  affect  reasoning  and  action.  
As   Goldie   points   out,   moods   and   our   less   intentional   emotions   express  
themselves   in   and   shape   action   and   in   this   way   tend   toward   specificity,   by  
virtue   of,   amongst   other   things,   disposing   us   toward   or   away   from   certain  
courses   of   action   (Goldie,   2000   passim).   If   we   understand   bare   aesthetic  
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perception  as   the  unattended  organisational   activity  of   the  perceiving   subject,  
and  the  upshot  of  such  representation  is  an  effect  on  experience  and  thought  in  
the   shape   of   mood   and   feeling,   then   it   becomes   easier   to   see—at   least  
schematically—how  the  continuous  activity  of  aesthetic  perception  must  impact  
on   everyday  decisions   and   actions,   even   if   they   are   not   a   determining   factor.  
This  is  one  way  of  interpreting  Yuriko  Saito’s  incorporation  of  the  aesthetic  into  
everyday   life  and  allows  us   to  begin   to  understand  the  manner   in  which  bare  
aesthetic  perception  might  “propel  us  toward  everyday  decisions  and  actions”  
in  the  absence  of  attention  and  contemplation.    
The   three   senses   of   aesthetic   appreciation   are   supported   by   rich   aesthetic  
perception.  This  discussion   should  highlight   the   complex  ways   in  which   they  
might   interact   phenomenologically,   epistemologically,   and   in   relation   to  
attention.  They  also  capture  the  central  elements  of  most  narrow  approaches  to  
aesthetic   psychology.   This   is   a   richer   form   of   aesthetic   perception   than   bare  
aesthetic   perception   because   it   admits   of   a   more   complex   discriminating  
engagement  with  the  objects  of  our  response,  a  greater  absorption  in  both  their  
character   and   our   experience   of   it,   as   well   as   facilitating   a  wealth   of   critical,  
social,   and   institutional   practices.   It   is   attention  which   supports   this   richness  
and  is  thus  necessary  for  it;  and  it  is  the  analytical  sense  of  appreciation  which  
is  the  most  fundamental.  Our  next  task  is  to  see  precisely  how  this  is  the  case,  
for  our  broad  account  of  aesthetic  perception  will  be  incomplete  unless  we  can  
explain   in   greater   detail   how   the   presence   and   absence   of   attention   interacts  
with  our  key  concepts  of  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception.  To  that  end,  in  the  
next  chapter  we  will  engage  with  contemporary  work  in  empirical  psychology  
and   the   philosophy   of   mind   on   the   relationship   between   attention   and  
consciousness.  
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3.6  Conclusion  
A  brief  word  now  on  aesthetic  experience,  the  concept  of  which  seems  to  find  
no  place  in  the  scheme  of  aesthetic  perception  outlined  above.  As  we  have  seen,  
the   scope   of   the   term   “aesthetic   experience”   is   very   broad  when   used—as   it  
often   is—as   a   marker   of   any   and   all   commerce   with   the   aesthetic.   This  
“somewhat   nebulous   idea   of   aesthetic   experience,”   as   Malcom   Budd   calls   it  
(Budd,  2008,  p.  31),  can  seem  too  cumbersome  a  tool,  ambiguous  as  it  so  often  is  
between   perceptual   engagement   with   aesthetic   qualities   and   objects,   on   one  
hand,  and  constraints  on  the  specific  phenomenological  characteristics  of  such  
engagement,   on   the   other.   It   is   my   contention   that   we   are   unlikely   to   make  
much   headway   in   understanding   aesthetic   psychology   if   we   seek   to   do   so  
whilst  speaking  of  “aesthetic  experience”.  This  is  partly  because  the  experiential  
element   of   the   concept   is   often   presumed   to   qualify   the   aesthetic   aspect,  
whereas   we   have   seen   that   this   relationship   is   far   from   clear.   The   extent   to  
which  there  is  an  experience  which  we  can  qualify  as  aesthetic  in  virtue  of  some  
prevailing   phenomenological   quality   or   structural   characteristic   of   that  
experience   is   questionable   and   has   been   attacked   in   both   its   Deweyan   and  
Beardsleyan  manifestations.72    
We  were  on  more  promising  ground  with  Carroll’s  suggestion  that  aesthetic  
experience  should  be  characterised  disjunctively  in  terms  of  its  content,  because  
that  allowed  us  to  focus,  not  on  the  possible  affective  and  evaluative  forms  of  
engagement   with   such   content,   but   on   the   process   of   aesthetic   perception.  
However,  once  again  we  found  fault  with  Carroll’s  view  because   it  presumed  
attention  necessary  for  aesthetic  perception.  It  also  struck  us  as  at  the  very  least  
questionable   whether   Carroll’s   account   justified   us   speaking   in   terms   of   an  
aesthetic  experience  rather  than  an  experience  involving  aesthetic  content:  to  this  
                                                                                                 
72   For   the   long-­‐‑running   debate   between   Monroe   Beardsley   and   George   Dickie   see,   for  
example,  (Beardsley,  1981,  1982b)  and  (Dickie,  1964)  (Dickie,  1965).  
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extent   Levinson’s   criticism   of  what   he   called   a   “minimal   account   of   aesthetic  
experience”  was  justified.  
This   all   reflects   the   fact   that   we   are   not   entirely   sure   what   we   mean   by  
“experience”  in  this  context:  is  an  experience  characterised  by  its  content,  by  its  
attendant  phenomenology,  by  our  attention,  by  some  complex  of  these  and  any  
stance   we   have   adopted?   Does   qualifying   an   experience   as   aesthetic   exclude  
other   potential   qualifiers?   For   some   it   does,   for   others   it   does   not.  What   this  
ambiguity   indicates,   I   suggest,   is   that   we   should   avoid   using   the   term   and  
concept   of   “aesthetic   experience”—or,   at   the   very   least,   avoid   relying   on   it—
except   to   indicate   that  we  are  dealing  with   some   conscious,   attended   form  of  
experience   in  which   the   aesthetic   is   involved   in   some   as   yet   unspecified   but  
likely  significant  manner.  This  is  vague  but  not  necessarily  the  worse  for  that.  It  
covers  anything  from  Irvin’s  and  Saito’s  examples  to  those  of  Levinson,  Carroll,  
and   Iseminger.   It   says   nothing   about   what   qualifies   those   experiences   as  
aesthetic  and  nor  need  it.  The  term  is,  to  that  extent,  a  quantifier  rather  than  a  
qualifier.   We   need   some   other   justification   of   the   aesthetic   aspect   of   the  
experience,   at   which   point   we   will   be   more   specific   about   the   particular  
elements  of  our  aesthetic  psychology  which  are  in  play  and  why:  if  we  care  to  
be.  It’s  likely  that  we  won’t  need  to  be  in  day-­‐‑to  day-­‐‑life.  
In   this   thesis   we   have   increasingly   come   to   associate   the   aesthetic,   and  
aesthetic   perception   in   particular,   with   discrimination:   with   the   relating,  
ordering,   and   organisational   capacity   of   the  mind   as   it   is   brought   to   bear   on  
sensory  perception  and  its  products  and  relatives.  This  became  more  concrete  in  
this  chapter  as  I  presented  an  account  which  identifies  the  aesthetic  character  of  
perception  with   the  purposive  perceptual   representation   of   individual   objects  
possessing  particular  sensible  properties.    
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We  have   also   seen   that   attention  plays   an   important   role   in   the   scope   and  
manner   of   this   aesthetic   activity,   especially   when   coupled   with   particular  
accounts   of   the   kind   of   perceptual   discrimination   and   response   which   is  
distinctive  or  characteristic  of  aesthetic  engagement.  This  led  to  the  formulation  
of  various  construals  of  an  attention  condition  on  both  aesthetic  character  and  
particular   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement,   many   of   which   were   marked   by  
demands   for   reflexivity,   awareness   of   relations   between   properties,   a   certain  
form  or  forms  of  content,  particular  evaluative  stances,  or  some  complex  of  all  
of   these.   These   demands   underlined   particular   and   interwoven  
phenomenological,   epistemological,   and   evaluative   demands   on   aesthetic  
experience,  aesthetic  perception,  aesthetic  attention,  and  aesthetic  appreciation.    
Yet   we   found   that   the   clash   between   broad   and   narrow   approaches   to  
aesthetic  psychology   turned  on  divergent   intuitions   and   accounts   about  what  
such   demands   are   thought   to   secure.   It   also   turned   out   that   many   of   the  
phenomenological,   epistemological,   and   evaluative   demands   made   by  
narrower  approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology  have  a  very  strong  relation  to  the  
absence   or   presence   of   attention.   In   seeking   to   accommodate   the   plausible  
elements   of   both   approaches   I   have   outlined   a   broad   account   of   aesthetic  
perception,  comprising  bare  aesthetic  perception  and  rich  aesthetic  perception,  
which   operates   in   both   the   presence   and   the   absence   of   attention,   and  which  
places  no  general  attention  condition  of  aesthetic  perception.  
However,  we  have   reached  a  point  where  our   “common   sense”   concept  of  
attention  must  give  way  to  a  more  sophisticated  contemporary  understanding  
of   the   complex   and   resistant   field   of   attention   research.   Now   that   we   have  
understood   the   divisions   between   the   broad   and   narrow   approaches   to  
aesthetic  psychology  and  the  implicit  and  explicit  roles  of  attention  in  examples  
of   each   approach;   and   now   that   we   have   the   outline   of   a   broad   account   of  
aesthetic  perception,  we  are  in  a  position  to  assess  the  role  of  attention  in  such  a  
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model.  We  need  an  understanding  of  attention  which  matches  the  progress  we  
have   made   in   grasping   the   complexity   and   pervasiveness   of   aesthetic  
perception.  
In  the  next  chapter,  therefore,  we  will  get  to  grips  with  contemporary  work  
on  attention  as  its  bears  on  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  the  behaviour  
and  practices  they  support.  By  the  end  of  that  chapter  we  should  have  refined  
our   understanding   of   both   aesthetic   perception   and   attention.   Indeed,   I   will  
argue  that  it  is  the  interaction  of  this  broad  concept  of  aesthetic  perception  with  
attention—in  concert  with  other  values,  goals,  and  cognitive  influences—which  
serves  to  individuate  our  aesthetic  psychology.  
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Chapter  Four  
Attention  and  Aesthetic  Perception  
Such   are   the   noons   here.   In   the   morning   this   light   breasts   your  
windowpane  and,  having  pried  your  eye  open  like  a  shell,  runs  ahead  of  
you,   strumming   its   lengthy   rays—like   a   hot-­‐‑footed   schoolboy   running  
his   stick   along   the   iron   grate   of   a   park   or   garden—along   arcades,  
colonnades,   red-­‐‑brick   chimneys,   saints,   and   lions.   “Depict!   Depict”   it  
cries   to   you,   either  mistaking   you   for   some   Canaletto   or   Carpaccio   or  
Guardi,  or  because  it  doesn’t   trust  your  retina’s  ability  to  retain  what   it  
makes   available,   not   to   mention   your   brain’s   capacity   to   absorb   it.  
Perhaps   the   latter   explains   the   former.   Perhaps   they   are   synonymous.  
Perhaps   art   is   simply   an   organism’s   reaction   against   its   retentive  
limitations.  
Watermark:  An  Essay  on  Venice  
Joseph  Brodsky73    
4.1.  Introduction  
What  is  the  relationship  between  attention  and  aesthetic  perception?  In  order  
to   answer   this   question   we   need   to   address   contemporary   empirical   and  
philosophical   work   on   attention   and   its   complex   relationship   to   perceptual  
organisation,   phenomenal   consciousness,   and   cognitive   and   rational  
accessibility.  Each  of  these  is  a  crowded  and  contested  field  of  research  whose  
aims  and  preoccupations  differ  from  the  aesthetician’s  except  insofar  as  all  seek  
to  understand  the  processes  and  mental  states  involved  in  perception,  attention,  
and  consciousness.  The  sheer  complexity  of  contemporary  work  on  attention  is  
daunting,   but   careful   engagement  with   its  material   offers  us   the   chance   to  be  
                                                                                                 
73  (Brodsky,  1992,  p.  79).  
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much  more  precise  about  the  nature  of  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  
the  relationship  between  them.74    
4.2  Beyond  common  sense  
Thus   far   we   have   tended   to   discuss   attention   as   if   it   were   a   unified   or  
coherent   concept   amenable   to   concomitantly   unified   explanation.  We  pointed  
toward  perceptual   and   cognitive   selectivity   (and   their   reciprocal   relationship)  
as  the  heart  of  a  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention  which  shaped  our  aesthetic  
phenomenology,   epistemology,  and  evaluation  and,   consequently,  our  picture  
of   aesthetic   psychology.   The   common-­‐‑sense   concept   of   attention   was   useful  
because   it   allowed   us   to   analyse   the   role   of   attention   in   broad   and   narrow  
accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   and   appreciation.   However,   there   are  
drawbacks   to   the  common-­‐‑sense  concept  when   it  comes  to   thinking  about   the  
specific  processes  and  mental  states  involved  in  aesthetic  perception.      
4.2.1  A  common-­‐‑sense  concept  of  attention?  
The   extent   to  which   there   is   a   consistent   common-­‐‑sense   or   folk   concept   of  
attention   is   debated;   as   is   the   extent   to  which   such   a   common   sense   concept  
could   or   should   guide   research   on   attention.   William   James   remarks   that  
“Everyone  knows  what  attention  is.  It  is  the  taking  possession  by  the  mind,  in  
clear  and  vivid  form,  of  one  out  of  what  seem  several  simultaneously  possible  
trains   of   thought”.   This   is   arguably   an   appeal   to   such   common-­‐‑sense  
                                                                                                 
74  In  this  chapter  we  will  focus  on  vision,  not  because  vision  should  be  privileged  in  aesthetic  
psychology   (although   it  has  been),   but  because   the  vast  majority  of   research  on  attention  has  
been  on  visual  sensory  and  perceptual  experience.    
We   will   draw   on   attention   research   in   empirical   psychology,   cognitive   science,   and   the  
philosophy   of   mind.   For   overviews   of   the   psychological   and   philosophical   issues   in   such  
research   see   (Mole,   2009)   or   (Watzl,   2011b,   2011c).   (Wu,   2014)   is   an   excellent   introduction   to  
many  of  the  issues  we  will  touch  on  in  this  chapter.  (Mole  et  al.,  2011a)  is  a  collection  of  essays  
spanning  neuroscientific,  psychological,  and  philosophical  approaches  to  attention.    
For   a   more   technical   introduction   to   attention   see   (Palmer,   1999)   particularly   chapter   11,  
section  2.    
See  (Carrasco,  2011)  and  (Driver,  2001)  for  reviews  of  empirical  work  on  visual  and  selective  
attention.  
   163  
understandings   of   attention.  Whether   researchers   should   try   to   accommodate  
common,  pretheoretical  patterns  of  usage  or  forge  ahead  and  attempt  to  shape  
or  critique  such  patterns  is  a   live  question;  one  which  finds  a  focus  in  debates  
surrounding   the   relationship   between   attention   and   consciousness.   For  
example,  Christopher  Mole  argues  that  we  can  empirically  determine  common-­‐‑
sense  usages   of   the   concepts   of   attention   and   consciousness   and   arrive   at   the  
view   that   “one   is   conscious   of   everything   that   one  pays   attention   to,   but   one  
does  not  pay  attention  to  all  the  things  that  one  is  conscious  of”  (Mole,  2008,  p.  
86).  Others,  such  as  Felipe  De  Brigard,  reject  the  claim  that  there  is  a  consistent  
common-­‐‑sense  view  of   attention,   consciousness,   or   their   relationship;   arguing  
instead   that   common   usage   is   varied   and   context-­‐‑dependent   (De   Brigard,  
2010).75  
Indeed,  one  of   the  undoubted  drawbacks  of  making  use  of   the  resources  of  
attention   research   is   the   extensive   and   seemingly   intractable   disagreement  
about   the  nature  and  role  of  attention   in  consciousness  and  vice  versa.  As  we  
will   see,   definitions   of   and   approaches   to   consciousness  diverge   significantly,  
leading  many  to  talk  past  one  another  and  adopt  very  different  criteria  for  the  
various   forms  of   consciousness  proposed.  Likewise,  what  attention   is,  what   it  
does,  why  and  how  it  does  it,  and  whether  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  a  unified  
phenomenon   of   attention   at   all,   are   questions   that   admit   of   a   great   many  
answers  and  methodological  approaches  across  a  range  of  disciplines.  We  will  
have   to   acknowledge   such   disagreement   if   we   are   not   to   give   a   simplistic  
impression  of  the  ways  in  which  such  research  is  of  use  to  the  aesthetician.    
Yet,   despite   the   remarkable   complexity   and   diversity   of   opinion   in  
contemporary   attention   research,   if   we   can   navigate   our   way   through   the  
disagreements  we  will  benefit   from  a  greater  grasp  of   issues  such  as  attended  
                                                                                                 
75  See  also  (De  Brigard  &  Prinz,  2010)  and  (Watzl,  2011b).  
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and   unattended   perceptual   experience,   the   phenomenal   and   cognitive  
accessibility   of   perceptual   representations,   and   the   attentional   demands   of  
rational  and  demonstrative  thought.  With  such  an  understanding  we  will  be  in  
a  position  to  grasp  the  continuum  of  aesthetic  perception  as   it   runs   from  bare  
aesthetic  perception  to  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation.  This  
will   help   us   make   sense   of   the   relationship   between   the   broad   and   narrow  
approaches  to  aesthetic  psychology  and  begin  to  reconcile  the  two  approaches  
through  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  role  of  attention  in  aesthetic  perception.  
4.2.2  Definitions  and  explanatory  strategies  
The   rejection   of   a   unified   or   consistent   common-­‐‑sense   concept   of   attention  
need   not   lead   to   a   rejection   of   the   possibility   of   a   unifying   philosophical   or  
psychological  account.  On  the  contrary,  researchers  may  reject  folk  usage  whilst  
presenting  an  account  of  attention  as,   for  example,  “a  natural-­‐‑kind   term,  with  
an   empirically   discovered   essence”   (De   Brigard   &   Prinz,   2010,   p.   52).   Call  
accounts   which   look   to   specify   some   unified   phenomenon   of   attention  
“essentialist”   (Taylor,   forthcoming).   Essentialist   accounts   identify   particular  
conditions   or   properties   which   serve   to   identify   the   entities   which   satisfy   or  
possess  them  as  instances  of  attention.76  
For   example,   Jesse   Prinz   identifies   a   particular   brain   process,   Christopher  
Mole  a  particular  way  of  unifying  cognitive  processes,  and  Sebastian  Watzl  an  
organisational  feature  of  experience  as  constituting  attention.77  These  “process”,  
“adverbial”,   and   “phenomenological”   approaches   differ   in   many   ways,   but  
what  they  have  in  common  is  their  argument  that  a  certain  set  of  properties  or  
conditions   are   necessary   and   sufficient   for   an   instance   of   attention.   Each   of  
                                                                                                 
76   It   is  not   the  rejection  of   folk  usage  which  makes  a  definition  of  attention  essentialist,  but  
the  attempt  to  specify  some  unified  concept  of  attention.  
77  For  Prinz’s  account  see,  for  example,  (De  Brigard  &  Prinz,  2010),  (Prinz,  2010,  2011b).  For  
Mole,  see  (Mole,  2011a,  2011b).  For  Watzl,  see  (Watzl,  2011a).  
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these  essentialist  accounts  includes  and  excludes  different  examples  of  apparent  
attention   and   inattention,   and   involve   different   approaches   to   the   role   of  
attention   in  perception  and   cognition.   In  particular,   they   can   lead   to  different  
views  of  the  relationship  of  necessity  and/or  sufficiency  between  attention  and  
consciousness:   a  debate  which   is   as  hostage   to  definitions  of   (the  varieties  of)  
consciousness   as   it   is   to   those   of   attention.   These   relationships   include   the  
following:  
• Attention  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  consciousness.  
• Attention  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  consciousness.  
• Attention  is  sufficient  but  not  necessary  for  consciousness.  
• Attention  is  not  sufficient  for  consciousness.  
• Attention  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for  consciousness.  
   List  adapted  from  (Taylor,  2013).  
For  example,  Felipe  De  Brigard  and  Prinz  write  “We  claim  that  attention   is  
necessary   and   sufficient   for   perceptual   representations   to   become   conscious”  
(De  Brigard  &  Prinz,  2010,  p.  51).  For  them,  the  function  of  attention  is  to  bring  
a  perceptual  representation  to  consciousness,  by  which  they  mean  that,  in  order  
“for   there   to   be   something   that   it   is   like   to   experience   a   representational  
perceptual  state”,  it  must  be  attended  (De  Brigard  &  Prinz,  2010,  p.  51).    
In  contrast,  Robert  Kentridge  argues  on  the  basis  of  experimental  work  on  a  
subject   suffering   from   “blindsight”   that   (spatial)   attention   is   possible   in   the  
absence  of  consciousness,  which  would  mean  that  attention  is  not  sufficient  for  
consciousness,   although   it   might   still   be   necessary   (Kentridge,   2011).   In  
blindsight   subjects   are   “capable   of   accurately   detecting   visual   stimuli   and   of  
making   simple   discriminations   about   their   properties,   despite   reporting   that  
[they]   are   subjectively   blind   to   these   stimuli”   (Kentridge,   2011,   pp.   239,   my  
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emphasis).  Such  a  position  dissociates  attention  and  the  “what-­‐‑it-­‐‑is-­‐‑likeness”  of  
experience:   attention   occurs   in   the   absence   of   phenomenal   consciousness,  
something  which  makes  no  sense  on  De  Brigard  and  Prinz’s  view.  This  should  
give  us  some  inkling  of   the  various  functions  and  forms  of  attention  to  which  
different  accounts  appeal.  
Indeed,   Kentridge’s   is   an   example   of   an   alternative   to   the   essentialist  
approach.   Some,   most   notably   those   in   empirical   and   cognitive   psychology,  
adopt  a  plural  approach  because  they  are  interested  in  the  diverse  functions  of  
attention  and  the  myriad  processes  which  instantiate  these  selective  functions.  
Experimental  paradigms  can  be  developed  to  focus  on  these  processes  and  their  
perceptual   effects,   and   in   this  way  various  models   are  produced   to  deal  with  
particular  forms  of  attentional  phenomena.  These  approaches  tend  to  construe  
attentional   processes   as   the   subject’s   response   to   its   limited   capacity   to   deal  
with  the  overwhelming  amount  of  information  available  to  us.  (E.g.  (Carrasco,  
2011).)  On  this  approach  the  route  from  initial  stimulation  of  the  cones  and  rods  
of  the  retina  to  subjective  experience  of  the  view  from  our  window  is  a  story  of  
selective   or   competitive   processing,   prioritisation,   and   interpretation.  Discrete  
yet   reciprocal  processes  are   implicated  at  each  stage  and   in  different  contexts,  
leading  many  to  resist  a  unified  or  essentialist  account  of  attention,  preferring  to  
use  “attention”  as  an  umbrella  or  family-­‐‑resemblance  term.  As  Ronald  Rensink  
writes,   “attention   is  more  of   an  adjective   than  a  noun”   (Rensink,   2013,  p.   98).  
That   is,   various   processes   operate   selectively   and   are   thus   attentional,   rather  
than  falling  under  a  particular  natural  kind  term,  metaphysical  explanation,  or  
connection  to  consciousness  which  captures  the  essence  of  attention.  
Another   of   the   key   distinctions   between   approaches   to   attention   is   that  
between  sub-­‐‑personal  and  personal  accounts.  Prinz’s  view  is  an  example  of  an  
essentialist,   reductionist  view  which   identifies  attention  with  a  particular  sub-­‐‑
personal   computational   process:   “attention   is   a   process   by  which   information  
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becomes   available   to   working   memory”   (Prinz,   2011b,   p.   199).   In   contrast,  
personal  approaches,  whilst  valuing  the  empirical  study  of  such  processes  and  
mechanisms,  consider   the  best  account  of  attention  to  be   located  at  a  personal  
level.   Personal   approaches   resist   reduction   to   subpersonal   processes   and   the  
loss   of   the   role   of   the   subject.   Declan   Smithies,   for   example,   argues   that  
“attention   is   essentially   a   phenomenon   of   consciousness”   which   performs   a  
particular  functional  role  (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  247).  We  will  look  more  closely  at  
Prinz’s,  Smithies’s,  and  other  accounts  below.    
We  must  tread  carefully  in  the  light  of  such  ongoing  disagreement  about  the  
terms   and   concepts  we   deploy,   and   about   the   level   at  which   explanations   of  
attention   should   be   targeted.   I   will   avoid   general   definitions,   preferring   to  
engage  in  a  plural  manner  with  the  functional  role  attention  plausibly  plays  in  
many  mental  states  and  cognitive  processes.  To  the  extent  that  the  conclusions  I  
draw  depend   on   the   outcome   of   these  wider   debates   they  will   be   hostage   to  
developments  in  the  field,  but  not,  I  hope,  vulnerable  in  the  broad  direction  of  
my  argument  as  much  as  in  its  particular  technical  expression.  
4.2.3  Varieties  of  attention  
One  of  the  reasons  to  be  open  to  a  plural  account  is  the  sheer  variety  of  forms  
of   attention   and   attentional   process   with   which   we   are   faced.   A   far   from  
exhaustive  list  might  include  the  following:  firstly,  the  distinction  between  overt  
attention  in  which  (in  vision)  we  move  our  eyes  towards  a  location,  and  covert  
attention   in  which  we   attend   to   an   area  without   shifting   our   gaze.   That   is,   in  
covert  attention  we  mentally  focus  on  an  area  or  feature  without  fixating  on  it.  
Secondly,   the  distinction  between  voluntary   (or   endogenous)   attention   in  which  
shifts   in   attention   are   directed   by   the   will   of   the   subject;   and   involuntary   (or  
exogenous)   attention   in   which   our   attention   is   captured   or   automatically  
orientated  to  the  location  of  a  sudden  stimulus  like  a  flashing  light  or  moving  
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object   (Carrasco,   2010,   p.   75).   Thirdly,  we   can   think   about   visual   attention   as  
focused  on  a  single  object  or  feature;  spread  over  several  objects;  or  as  distributed  
over  an  entire  scene  (sometimes  called  global  attention)  (Treisman,  2006,  p.  411).  
These   differences   reflect   the   fact   that  we   sometimes   attend   to   a  whole   scene,  
sometimes  to  a  single  object  or  set  of  objects,  and  sometimes  we  attend  locally  
to  a  particular  feature  or  property  (Palmer,  1999,  pp.  351-­‐‑352).  Fourthly,  we  can  
distinguish  between  three  main  types  of  visual  attention:  spatial,  feature-­‐‑based,  
and  object-­‐‑based.    
Spatial  visual  attention—the  variety  discussed  by  Kentridge  above—involves  
attention   to   a   particular   location   or   region   of   space,   either   via   an   overt  
movement  of   the  eyes  or  a   covert   shift  without  accompanying  eye  movement  
(Carrasco,   2011,   p.   1486;   Shomstein,   2010).   Feature-­‐‑based   attention   “can   be  
deployed  covertly  to  specific  aspects  (e.g.  color,  orientation  or  motion  direction)  
of   objects   in   the   environment,   regardless  of   their   location”   (Carrasco,   2011,  p.  
1486).   Object-­‐‑based   attention   involves   the   guiding   of   attention   by   object  
structure:  “The  primary  signature  associated  with  object-­‐‑based  attention  is  the  
enhanced   processing   of   information   belonging   to   or   appearing   within   the  
confines   of   one   object   that   is   selectively   attended”   (Behrmann   &   Shomstein,  
2010,  p.  94).  
Each   of   these   forms   of   attention   captures   a  way   in  which  we   aesthetically  
engage  with  artworks  and  environments:  sometimes  standing  back  to  take  in  a  
view,  a  canvas,  or  a  building;  at  other   times  attending   to   the  distribution  of  a  
particular   colour   and   its   effect   on   the   compositional   structure   of   an   artwork;  
sometimes   focusing   on   a   particular   patch   of   canvas,   a   rose,   an   architrave,   a  
vase;  often  choosing  where  to  attend,  but  at  other  times  having  one’s  attention  
caught  and  held  by  a  dramatic  movement,  a  flash  of  light.  
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This  variety  of  forms  and  mechanisms  of  attention  is  a  key  motivation  for  the  
plural   approach   of   the   empirical   sciences.   It   seems   unlikely,   though   not  
impossible,   that  an  essentialist  or  unified  account  at  a  subpersonal   level  could  
account   for   every   form   of   attention.   (Of   course,   it   might   not   aim   to.)   This  
diversity   of   subpersonal   processes   involved   in   attention   led   Alan   Allport   to  
argue  that,  
[Even]  a  brief  survey  of  the  heterogeneity  and  functional  separability  of  
different   components   of   spatial   and   nonspatial   attentional   controls  
prompts  the  conclusion  that,  qua  causal  mechanism,  there  can  be  no  such  
thing   as   attention.   There   is   no   one   uniform   computational   function,   or  
mental  operation  (in  general,  no  one  causal  mechanism),  to  which  all  so-­‐‑
called  attentional  phenomena  can  be  attributed.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  
a   rich   diversity   of   neuropsychological   control   mechanisms   of   many  
different  kinds   (and  no  doubt  many  yet   to  be  discovered),   from  whose  
cooperative   and   competitive   interactions   emerge   the   behavioral  
manifestations  of  attention.  (Allport,  1993,  p.  203)  
Sebastian  Watzl  (Watzl,  2011b)  summarises  this  challenge  for  an  essentialist  
subpersonal  account  of  attention  in  terms  of  two  problems:  the  overgeneralisation  
problem  and  the  disunity  problem.  Firstly,  as  Allport  points  out,  mechanisms  and  
processes   implicated   in   attention   in   some   instances   seem   to   operate   in   other  
contexts   in   the  absence  of  attention.  Any  account  which  attempted   to   identify  
attention   with   one   of   these   mechanisms   would   thus   seem   to   predict   the  
presence   of   attention   where   it   appears   absent.   This   is   the   overgeneralisation  
problem.  
Secondly,   there   appears   to   be   very   little   in   common   between   the   diverse  
mechanisms   associated   with   attention.   “While,   for   example,   in   some   cases  
attention  seems  be  the  mechanism  that  binds  features  together,  in  other  cases  it  
seems   to   be   the  mechanism   by  which   information   gets   broadcast   to  working  
memory”   (Watzl,   2011b).   This   is   the   disunity   problem.   This   resistance   to  
reduction  is  what  leads  many  empirical  psychologists  to  write,  as  Rensink  does,  
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of  attentional  processes—processes  which  operate  selectively—rather  than  any  
unified  phenomenon  of  attention.  
Yet,   just   because   we   cannot   identify   a   unified   subpersonal   account   of  
attention  need  not  mean  that  a  personal  level  account  could  not  capture  the  core  
of  attention,  although  such  accounts  face  similar  problems  of  overgeneralisation  
and   disunity,   which   stem   from   the   great   variety   of   contexts   in   which  
“attention”  is  used  in  daily  life.    
Hopefully,   the   sheer   heterogeneity   of   attentional   processes,   substrates,   and  
perceptual  effects  has  become  clear  amidst  the  definitional  and  methodological  
disputes  described  above:  this  complexity  and  resistance  to  reduction  should  be  
kept  in  mind  throughout  the  discussions  which  follow.  Our  question—what  is  
possible  in  the  presence  and  absence  of  attention—is  misguided  if  we  think  the  
issue   of   the   presence   or   absence   of   attention   is   something  which   admits   of   a  
straightforward  resolution.  
Our   answer   will   depend   on   the   role   and   nature   of   attention   in   three  
interwoven   fields:   perceptual   organisation,   consciousness,   and   cognition.  We  
have   already   encountered   one   of   the   issues—that   of   feature   binding   and   the  
assembling   of   visual   experience—and   will   address   that   when   we   consider  
whether  such  binding  is  possible  in  the  absence  of  attention;  and  thus  whether  
bare   aesthetic   perception   is   a   plausible   element   of   aesthetic   perception.   First,  
however,  we  will  have  to  address  the  problems  we  have  already  hinted  at:  the  
relationship  between  attention,  consciousness,  and  cognition.  
4.3  Attention  and  consciousness  
We  have   already   encountered   the   permeable   divide   between  philosophical  
and  empirical  methodologies,   between   subpersonal   and  personal   explanation,  
and  essentialist  and  plural  accounts  of  attention.  Of  course,  each  approach  may  
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draw   on   the   others.   Philosophers   with   an   interest   in   unifying   explanations  
benefit  from  an  engagement  with  the  diversity  of  empirical  attention  research,  
whilst  experimental  psychologists  and  their  colleagues  may  avail  themselves  of  
substantial  philosophical  work  on   the  nature  of   consciousness   in  particular:   a  
concept   which   is   used   in   so   many   contexts   and   with   so   many   divergent  
meanings  as  to  resist  any  attempt  to  render  them  commensurable.  
4.3.1  Concepts  of  consciousness    
The   concept  of   consciousness   is   a  hybrid,  or  better,   a  mongrel   concept:  
the  word  “consciousness”  connotes  a  number  of  different  concepts  and  
denotes   a   number   of   different   phenomena.   We   reason   about  
“consciousness”   under   some   premises   that   apply   to   one   of   the  
phenomena  that  fall  under  “consciousness,”  other  premises  that  apply  to  
other  “consciousnesses,”  and  we  end  up  with  trouble.  (N.  Block,  1995,  p.  
227)      
Consciousness   is   a   notoriously   disputed   concept.   Indeed,   as   Ned   Block  
makes  clear,  there  is  no  single  concept  of  consciousness.  There  are  a  great  many  
“problems”   of   consciousness  which   range,   in  David   Chalmers’s   presentation,  
from   the   easy   to   the   hard.   Chalmers   outlines   the   following   “easy   problems”,  
which  are  supposedly  susceptible  to  study  by  cognitive  science  and  explanation  
in  terms  of  computational  or  neural  mechanisms:  
• The   ability   to   discriminate,   categorize,   and   react   to   environmental  
stimuli;  
• The  integration  of  information  by  a  cognitive  system;  
• The  reportability  of  mental  states;  
• The  ability  of  a  system  to  access  its  own  internal  states;  
• The  focus  of  attention;  
• The  deliberate  control  of  behaviour;  
• The  difference  between  wakefulness  and  sleep.  
   (Chalmers,  2004a)  
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As  Chalmers  points  out,  “one  sometimes  says  that  a  mental  state  is  conscious  
when  it   is  verbally  reportable,  or  when  it   is   internally  accessible.  Sometimes  a  
system   is   said   to   be   conscious   of   some   information  when   it   has   the   ability   to  
react  on  the  basis  of  that  information,  or,  more  strongly,  when  it  attends  to  that  
information,   or   when   it   can   integrate   that   information   and   exploit   it   in   the  
sophisticated   control   of   behaviour”   (Chalmers,   2004a,   p.   618).   Attention   has  
been   studied   as   somehow   supporting   or   constituting   each   of   these.   For  
example,   for   some   the   reportability   of   a   mental   state   is   a   criterion   of  
consciousness.  On  such  a  view,   if  attention  plays  a   role   in   the   reportability  of  
mental  states,  then  it  plays  a  crucial  role  in  consciousness.78  
It  is  easy  to  see  how  one’s  concept  of  consciousness  can  affect  what  one  takes  
to  be  evidence   for   its  presence.  What  one   takes  consciousness   to  be  and  what  
one  counts  as   (experimental)   evidence   for   consciousness   is  as  disputed  as  any  
definition  of  or  methodological  approach  to  attention.  This  clearly  complicates  
matters   for   the   aesthetician   seeking   to   understand   the   relationship   between  
attention,   aesthetic   perception,   and   consciousness.   Recall   our   question   in   the  
previous  chapter—introduced  via  Kant—about  the  nature  of  our  consciousness  
of  aesthetic  perception  (or  aesthetic  response).  Unless  we  know  what  we  mean  
by   “consciousness”  when  we   are   asking   about   its   role   in   aesthetic   perception  
and  aesthetic   judgement  we  cannot  get  a  handle  on  the  question.  What  do  we  
mean,   for   example,   by   consciousness   of   perceptual   representations?   Do   we  
mean  that  they  are  reportable,  available  for  use  in  in  aesthetic  judgements  in  the  
way  David  Davies   (via  Sibley)   requires   (D.  Davies,   forthcoming)?  Would   that  
mean   that   aesthetic   perception   requires   attention,   as   a   consequence   of   its  
requiring  consciousness  understood  as  availability  for  report?    
                                                                                                 
78   We   need   not   necessarily   accept   Chalmer’s   suggestion   that   these   are   easy   problems   of  
consciousness;   or   that   the   distinction   between   easy   problems   amenable   to   empirical  
investigation  and  a  hard  problem  that  is  more  resistant  is  tenable.  For  a  challenge  to  Chalmer’s  
approach   see   (Lowe,  1995).  At   this  point  our  aim   is   to  emphasise   the  diversity  of   concepts  of  
consciousness  rather  than  to  assess  their  merit.  
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Put   simply:   does   the   purposive   representational   activity   of   mind   which   I  
have  called  aesthetic  perception  require  consciousness  of  the  representations  of  
bound   multifeatured   objects   which   are   its   product?   If   so,   does   such  
consciousness   require   attention?   Why?   These   questions   are   impossible   to  
answer  at   this  stage  and  will   remain  so  unless  we  can  be  clearer  about  which  
concept  of  consciousness  and  which  definition  of  attention  we  are  using.  
We   have   yet   to   address   the   so-­‐‑called   “hard”   problem:   the   problem   of  
experience   itself.   There   is   something   it   is   like,   a   subjective   character,   to  
experience  (Nagel,  1974).  This  subjective  character  does  not  seem  to  be  captured  
by  the  list  of  the  easy  problems  of  consciousness.  In  this  sense  of  consciousness,  
something  “has  conscious  states  if  and  only  if  there  is  something  that  it  is  like  to  
be   that  organism—something   it   is   like   for   the  organism”   (Nagel,   1974,  p.   436).  
There   is   a   felt   quality   to   experience   that   accompanies   visual   sensation:   the  
quality  of  redness,  depth  of  field,  the  sound  of  a  clarinet,  the  smell  of  mothballs,  
and  so  on  (Chalmers,  2004a,  p.  619).  Call  this  phenomenal  consciousness.  
This   concept   of   phenomenal   consciousness   is,   I   suggest,   a   key   one   for  
aesthetic  psychology.   In  order   to  perceive,  appreciate,  scrutinise,  and  evaluate  
aesthetically   there   must   be   something   it   is   like   to   be   a   subject   of   aesthetic  
states—to   feel   pleasure,   to   see   colour,   shade,   and   line,   to  hear  a   note,   a   voice,  
harmony,  and  to  reflect  upon  those  feelings  and  experiences.  If  there  is  nothing  
it  is  like  to  perceive  aesthetically,  then  we  are  not  discussing  aesthetic  matters  at  
all.  As  we  have  seen,  for  a  narrow  account,  not  only  must  there  be  something  it  
like   to   experience   aesthetically—some   phenomenology—but   we   are   also  
required   to   value   the   experience   and   its   objects,   to   scrutinise   the   perceptual  
manifold,  to  deploy  the  products  of  that  scrutiny  in  descriptions  which  ground  
aesthetic  judgements,  and  so  on.  
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These  aesthetic  activities   require   the  supposed   targets  of   the  easy  problems  
of  consciousness:  reportability,  discrimination,  introspective  access,  integration  
by   the   cognitive   system,   and   so   forth;   but   they   also   seem   to   require   the  
experiential,   subjective   element   as   well.   Narrow   accounts,   in   other   words,  
require  phenomenal  consciousness  and  something  more:  a  particular  response  
to   or   scrutiny   of   experience.   In   contrast,   some—although   not   all—broad  
accounts   require   something   less.   Yuriko   Saito,   we   saw,   does   not   emphasise  
reportability   in  everyday  aesthetic  experience.   Instead,  she  discusses  the  effect  
on  thought  and  action  of  aesthetic  qualities  and  experiences  in  daily  life.  This  is  
neither  attended  to,  nor,  perhaps,  even  accessible.  It  is  certainly  not  deliberate.  
On   some   criteria   of   consciousness,   then,   those   are   not   conscious   phenomena,  
although   it   might   be   assumed   that   they   are   part   of   some   broader   subjective  
experience.   It   is  an  open  question  whether   for  Saito  and  other  broad   theorists  
such   unattended   everyday   experiences   are   unreportable   in   principle—whilst  
remaining  aesthetic—or  whether  we  merely  happen  not  to  report  them  in  day-­‐‑
to-­‐‑day  life.  
Our   question   now   has   to   be   that   of   the   relationship   between   phenomenal  
consciousness  and   that  “something  more”  which   is   so  often   taken   to  be   some  
kind   of   scrutiny   of   or   evaluative   stance   toward   the   contents   and   objects   of  
perceptual  experience.  Indeed,  one  of  the  central  elements  of  this  thesis  can  be  
understood  as   a  question   about   the   relationship  between   the   “something   it   is  
like”   of   experience   and   the   “something   more”   of   cognitive   and   rational  
engagement  with   that   felt   quality   of   experience   insofar   as   it   characterises   the  
relationship   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   On   my  
account  this  “something  more”  is  a  requirement  for  aesthetic  appreciation,  but  it  
is   the   “something   it   is   like”—the   phenomenal   character   of   perceptual  
experience—on  which  the  aesthetic  character  of  experience  depends.  
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4.3.2  Consciousness  and  accessibility  
What  is  the  relationship  between  phenomenal  consciousness—understood  as  
the   subjective   felt   quality   of   experience—and   the   cognitive   and   rational  
accessibility   of   perceptual   representations?   Might   it   be   possible   to   have  
conscious  phenomenology  which  “overflows”  cognitive  access?  That  is,  might  it  
be  possible  for  there  to  be  something  it   is   like  for  a  subject  to  have  perceptual  
experience  without   the  perceptual   representations   involved   in   this   experience  
being  accessed  in  cognitive  processing  and  thus  reportable?  In  other  words,  can  
we   dissociate   phenomenal   consciousness   and   what   Ned   Block   calls   “access-­‐‑
consciousness”?79  
A  state  is  access-­‐‑conscious  (A-­‐‑conscious)  if,  in  virtue  of  one’s  having  the  
state,   a   representation   of   its   content   is   (1)   inferentially   promiscuous  
(Stich  1978),  that  is,  poised  for  use  as  a  premise  in  reasoning,  (2)  poised  
for   rational   control   of   action,   and   (3)   poised   for   rational   control   of  
speech….These   three   conditions   are   together   sufficient,   but   not   at   all  
necessary…I   see   A-­‐‑consciousness   as   a   cluster   concept,   in   which   (3)  —  
roughly,   reportability  —   is   the   element  of   the   cluster  with   the   smallest  
weight,  although  (3)  is  often  the  best  practical  guide  to  A-­‐‑consciousness.  
(N.  Block,  1995,  p.  231)  
For  Block,  access-­‐‑consciousness   is  a   functional   concept:  “what  makes  a  state  
A-­‐‑conscious  is  what  a  representation  of  its  content  does  in  a  system”  (N.  Block,  
1995,   p.   232).   Access-­‐‑conscious   content   is   paradigmatically   involved   in  
reasoning,   whereas   phenomenally   conscious   content   is   paradigmatically   a  
matter  of  experiential  properties:  “it  is  in  virtue  of  its  phenomenal  content…that  
a   state   is   P-­‐‑conscious,   whereas   it   is   in   virtue   of   its   representational  
content…that   a   state   is  A-­‐‑conscious”   (N.   Block,   1995,   p.   232).  As   a   functional  
concept  what  makes  a  state  access-­‐‑conscious  is  what  (Block  calls)  the  Executive  
                                                                                                 
79   (N.  Block,  1995).  He  develops   the  argument   that  phenomenal  consciousness  “overflows”  
cognitive  access  in  (N.  Block,  2007;  N.    Block,  2008;  N.  Block,  2011).  
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System  (“the  system  in  charge  of  rational  control  of  action  and  speech”)  does  or  
is  disposed  to  do  with  that  representation  (N.  Block,  1995,  p.  232).80    
What   this   means   is   that   we   can   conceive,   firstly,   of   access   consciousness  
without   phenomenal   consciousness,   and,   secondly,   of   phenomenal  
consciousness  without   access   consciousness.   (Although  Block  doubts   that   any  
cases   of   the   former   actually   exist.)   Let’s   focus   on   the   latter:   phenomenal  
consciousness  without  access  consciousness.  Block  writes,  
Suppose   you   are   engaged   in   intense   conversation   when   suddenly   at  
noon   you   realise   that   right   outside   your   window   there   is—and   has  
been—a   deafening   pneumatic   drill   digging   up   the   street.   You   were  
aware  of  the  noise  all  along,  but  only  at  noon  are  you  consciously  aware  
of  it.  That  is,  you  were  P-­‐‑conscious  of  the  noise  all  along,  but  at  noon  you  
are  both  P-­‐‑conscious  and  A-­‐‑conscious  of  it.  (N.  Block,  1995,  p.  234)  
This   is   the   idea   that   phenomenal   or   perceptual   consciousness   overflows  
access-­‐‑consciousness.   You   were   always   aware   of   the   noise,   conscious   of   its  
phenomenal  content,  but  the  representational  content  of  the  state  played  no  role  
in  the  Executive  System  until  noon;  at  which  point  “the  belief  that  is  acquired  at  
noon  is  that  there  is  and  has  been  a  noise”  (N.  Block,  1995,  p.  234).  
The   initial   motivation   for   the   development   of   the   distinction   between  
phenomenal   and  access   consciousness  was   the  phenomenon  of   blindsight.  As  
we  have  seen,  in  blindsight  subjects  are  “capable  of  accurately  detecting  visual  
stimuli   and   of   making   simple   discriminations   about   their   properties,   despite  
                                                                                                 
80  Block  continues,  “The  paradigm  P-­‐‑conscious  states  are  sensations,  whereas  the  paradigm  
A-­‐‑conscious   states   are   “propositional   attitude”   states   such   as   thoughts,   beliefs,   and   desires,  
states   with   representational   content   expressed   by   “that”   clauses…[However,]   thoughts   are  
often   P-­‐‑conscious   and   perceptual   experiences   often   have   representational   content”   (N.   Block,  
1995,  p.  232).  
That   is,   although   it   is   in   virtue   of   its   phenomenal   content   that   a   state   is   phenomenally  
conscious   it  may   still   have   representational   content   as,   for   example,   a   perceptual   experience  
may  possess  the  representational  content  “that  there  is  a  red  square  in  front  of  me”  (N.  Block,  
1995,  p.  232).  
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reporting  that  [they]  are  subjectively  blind  to  these  stimuli”  (Kentridge,  2011,  p.  
239).  That  is,  patients  with  “blind”  areas  in  their  visual  field  will  nonetheless  be  
able   to  guess  reliably  about  certain   features  of  a  stimulus   flashed   in   that  area.  
This  includes  the  discrimination  of  simple  forms,  shaping  their  hands  in  a  way  
appropriate   to   grasping   an   object,   and,   possibly,   colour   discrimination   (N.  
Block,  1995,  p.  227).  On  Block’s  terms  blindsight  patients  claim  to  have  neither  
phenomenal   nor   access   consciousness.   However,   it   is   not   straightforwardly  
because  phenomenal  consciousness  is  missing  that  access  is  missing  as  well.  This  
is  the  key  issue  for  Block.    
The  confusion  that  Block  is  keen  to  avoid  is  the  jump  from  the  premise  that  
“consciousness”  is  missing  to  the  conclusion  that  phenomenal  consciousness  has  
a   certain   function.   That   is,   he  wants   to   prevent   the  move   from   “the   fact   that  
consciousness   in   some   sense   or   other   is  missing   simultaneously  with  missing  
creativity  or  voluntary  action   to   the  conclusion   that  P-­‐‑consciousness   functions  
to  promote   the  missing  qualities   in  normal  people”   (N.  Block,  1995,  p.  245).   It  
may   be   that   phenomenal   and   access   consciousness   are   intimately   linked—
indeed,  they  normally  are—but  we  can  still  distinguish  between  them  and  thus  
conceptually  distinguish  two  concepts  of  consciousness.  
4.3.3  Consciousness  and  aesthetic  psychology  
Let’s   take   stock   for   a   moment.   I   have   distinguished   several   concepts   of  
consciousness,  many  of  which   interrelate:   the  deliberate   control   of   behaviour,  
the  ability  to  access  and  report  one’s  inner  states,  the  felt  quality  of  experience,  
and   the   functional   notion   of   the   role   and   accessibility   of   representational  
content   in   cognitive   processing.   The   relationship   between   phenomenal,  
cognitive,  rational,  and  behavioural  concepts  of  consciousness  is  complex.  The  
possibility   presents   itself   that   a   perceptual   state   might   have   phenomenal  
content  without  straightforwardly  playing  a  role  in  the  cognitive  machinery  of  a  
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subject.  That   is,  phenomenal   consciousness  might  not  unproblematically  equate  
to   cognitive,   rational,   and   behavioural   consciousness.   In   other   words,   there  
might  be  “something  it  is  like”  to  experience  without  that  “something  it  is  like”  
being  accessed  for  cognitive  and  rational  use  or  the  control  of  behaviour.  
Why  is  this  significant  for  us?  One  of  our  central  questions  in  this  thesis  is  the  
extent  of  aesthetic  states  or  states  with  aesthetic  content:  that  is,  of  the  extent  of  
our   aesthetic   psychology.   I   have   suggested   that   both   broad   and   narrow  
accounts   involve   attention   implicitly   or   explicitly   in   their   explanations   of   the  
extent  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  This  is  because  of  their  (often  common-­‐‑sense  
or   folk-­‐‑psychological)   view   of   what   attention   does   for   us   such   that   it   either  
supports  and  deepens  aesthetic  perception  and  appreciation  or   is  unnecessary  
for  recognisably  aesthetic  states  or  effects.  On  several  narrow  accounts  a  kind  of  
higher-­‐‑order  awareness  of  the  objects  and  phenomenal  character  of  perception  
is   required:   an   awareness   cashed   out   in   terms   of   the   discrimination   of   and  
consequent   availability   for   reasoning   and   report   of   the   relations   between  
qualities;   and   the   reflexive   valuing   of   those   properties   and   our   experience   of  
them.  Positions  which  demand  higher-­‐‑order  forms  of  thought  and  the  cognitive  
processes   which   support   them   are,   it   seems,   predicated   on   the   thought   that  
attention  is  what  supports  them.  This  may  well  be  true  and  we  will  address  that  
in  a  moment.  
However,   we   have   just   seen   that   it   is   possible   to   distinguish   between  
phenomenal   consciousness   and   access   or   cognitive   consciousness,   at   least   in  
theory.  My  suggestion  is  that  narrow  accounts  of  aesthetic  psychology  tend  to  
conflate   phenomenal   and   access   consciousness   such   that   they   assume,   firstly,  
that   the   latter   depends   on   the   former;   and,   secondly,   that   phenomenal  
consciousness   is   indicated   by   reportability   and   rational   control   of   behaviour,  
which  may  actually  be  evidence  of  access  consciousness.  I  suggest  that  it  is  not  
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access  or  cognitive  and  rational  scrutiny  but  phenomenal  consciousness  on  which  
the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  depends.  
In  combination  with  my  account  of  aesthetic  perception  this  suggests  that  we  
perceive  aesthetically—in  the  sense  that  we  bind  features  to  individual  objects  
such   that  we  have  phenomenal   consciousness  of   them—without  needing   to  be  
cognitively  conscious  of  their  representational  content  or  able  to  use  this  visual  
information  in  rational  deliberation  in  the  way  that  narrow  accounts  of  aesthetic  
psychology   require.   (We   will   examine   some   evidence   for   this   idea   that  
phenomenal  consciousness  might  overflow  access  in  a  moment.)  The  next  step  in  
developing  such  an  account  of  aesthetic  perception  is  to  understand  the  role  of  
attention  in  phenomenal  and  access  consciousness.  Roughly,  my  argument  will  
be   that   phenomenal   consciousness   of   a   rich   enough   sort   for   bare   aesthetic  
perception   exists   in   the   absence   of   attention   (and   thus   access),   whereas  
cognitive   access   and   rich   aesthetic   perception   require   attention.   In   order   to  
understand  this  we  will  have  to  consider  the  kinds  of  inattentional  phenomena  
adduced   in  support  of   the  suggestion  that  we  do  not  possess  rich  phenomenal  
consciousness  in  the  absence  of  attention.  
4.3.4  Inattentional  phenomena  and  failures  of  attention  
How   much   of   what   we   look   at   do   we   see   when   our   attention   is   engaged  
elsewhere?   Perhaps   much   less   that   we   might   think.   For   it   seems   that   when  
occupied   with   other   tasks   there   is   a   tendency   for   people   to   miss   intuitively  
striking  stimuli  even  when  they  are  presented  directly  at  fixation.  Arien  Mack  
and  Irvin  Rock  called  this  failure  to  report  and  thus,  they  assumed,  to  see  bright,  
salient   objects   with   well-­‐‑defined   contours   “inattentional   blindness”   (Mack   &  
Rock,   1998).   Indeed,   objects   and   events   as   intuitively   striking   as   a   man   in   a  
gorilla   suit  walking   across   the   screen  whilst   the   subject   is   asked   to   count   the  
passes   between   a   group   of   basketball   players   go   unnoticed   by   a   surprising  
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number   (Simons   &   Chabris,   1999).   (Although   not,   it   must   be   noted,   by   the  
majority   of   subjects.)   This   leads   to   the   claim   “that,   without   attention,   visual  
features  of  our  environment  are  not  perceived   at   all   (or  at   least  not   consciously  
perceived)—observers  may  fail  not  just  at  change  detection,  but  at  perception  as  
well”   (Simons   &   Chabris,   1999,   pp.   1060,   my   emphasis).   That   is,   in   cases   of  
inattentional   blindness   one   neither   accesses   nor   possesses   phenomenal  
consciousness  of  such  features.  
This  is  a  stronger  claim  than  that  arising  from  so-­‐‑called  “change  blindness”:  
“the  striking  failure   to  see   large  [and  salient]  changes   that  would  normally  be  
noticed   easily”   (Simons   &   Rensink,   2005,   p.   16)   when   those   changes   occur  
across  film  cuts,  eye  movements,  and  points  of  view.  Change  blindness  studies  
are  used  to  motivate  and  ground  the  claim  that  attention  is  required  in  order  to  
see   change   because   it   is   only   with   attention   that   “features   can   be   encoded  
(abstractly  or  otherwise)  and  retained  in  memory.  That  is,  all  of  the  information  
in  the  visual  environment  is  potentially  available  for  attentive  processing.  Yet,  
without   attention,   not   much   of   this   information   is   retained   across   views”  
(Simons  &  Chabris,  1999,  p.  1060).  
In   contrast   to   many   attentional   and   inattentional   phenomena,   change  
blindness   is   not   a   mere   artefact   of   experimental   disruption,   but   “a   general  
failure  to  retain  and/or  compare  information  from  moment  to  moment”  (Simons  
&   Rensink,   2005,   p.   17)   even   in   the   face   of   widespread   insistence   that   such  
changes   would   be   noticed.   (Simons   and   Rensink   call   this   “change   blindness  
blindness”.)81  
                                                                                                 
81  The  magician  Derren  Brown  exploits  change  blindness  when  he  performs  a  routine  which  
involves  his  asking  a  member  of   the  public   for  directions  and,  when  a  pair  of  men  carrying  a  
large   screen   pass   between   Brown   and   the   unsuspecting   subject,   swapping   places   with   a  
confederate  of  a  different  age,  gender,  build,  and  ethnic  background  with,  it  seems,  no  sign  that  
the  subject  has  noticed.  
   181  
The   key   question,   of   course,   is   what   this   inattentional   “failure”   actually  
amounts  to.  Jeremy  Wolfe  asks  whether  this  is  a  failure  of  perception  in  the  sense  
that  we  fail  to  see  unattended  information,  or  a  failure  of  memory  and  thus  not  
inattentional  blindness  but  inattentional  amnesia.  On  this  view,  inattentive  visual  
perception   is   conscious   but   “vision   has   no   memory   and…attention   is   the  
gateway   to   other   mental   representations”   and   so   “unattended   visual   stimuli  
may  be  seen,  but  will  be  instantly  forgotten”  (Wolfe,  1999,  p.  75ff).    
The  question  is  not  whether  unattended  visual  information  is  processed,  for  
it   seems   that   unconscious   or   “implicit”   perception   of   events   and   stimuli  may  
direct  behaviour  and  be,  to  that  extent,  causally  if  not  phenomenally  efficacious  
(Mack,   2003).   There   are   significant   priming   effects   in   inattentional   blindness  
experiments  as  well  as  evidence—mentioned  earlier—that  “visual   information  
undergoes  substantial  processing  prior  to  the  engagement  of  attention”  (Mack,  
2003,  p.  181).  The  pertinent  question  for  us  is  whether  such  priming  is  the  result  
of  unconscious  or  conscious  perception.  
The   question,   of   course,   is   not   insubstantially   linked   to  what  we  mean   by  
consciousness  and  attention  in  the  first  place.  This  has  been  a  problem  all  along.  
We   have   probed   the   relationship   between   consciousness   and   our   ability   to  
report   stimuli   outside   of   attention:   Why   should   simultaneous   or   subsequent  
failure   to   report   imply   a   lack   of   phenomenal   consciousness   or   a   failure   of  
perception?  What   counts   as   a   demonstration   of   consciousness?   For   many,   as  
Block   points   out,   “Whatever   it   is   about   a   state   that   makes   it   unreportable,  
would  also  preclude  its  being  phenomenally  conscious”  (N.  Block,  2007,  p.  483).  
But  the  truth  of  that  is  far  from  clear  and  “whether  the  machinery  of  cognitive  
accessibility  is  a  constitutive  part  of  the  nature  of  phenomenal  consciousness”  is  
precisely  the  point  at  issue  (N.  Block,  2007,  p.  483).  
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Yet,   reportability   is   frequently   the   criterion   by   which   phenomenal  
consciousness  is  thought  to  be  indicated  and  its  nature  inferred.  The  question  of  
what  inattentional  phenomena  actually  establish  about  the  nature  of  perception  
and   perceptual   consciousness   remains.   Is   a   failure   to   report   indicative   of   a  
failure   to   experience  or  a   failure   to  access?  Linked   to   this   is   the  question  of   the  
richness  or  sparseness  of  perceptual  consciousness.  
4.3.5  Is  perceptual  consciousness  rich  or  sparse?  
Eric   Schwitzgebel   writes   that   “We   might   think   of   consciousness   as   like   a  
soup.   Is   it   a   rich   soup,   full   of   experience   in   a   wide   variety   of   modalities  
simultaneously—visual,   auditory,   tactile,   olfactory,   imagistic,   proprioceptive,  
emotional—or   is   it   a   thin   soup,   limited   to   one   or   a   few   things   at   a   time?”  
(Schwitzgebel,   2007,   p.   6).   If   phenomenal   consciousness   is   rich   then   we   can  
begin   to   wonder   about   the   relationship   between   this   rich,   full   consciousness  
and   the   kinds   of   cognitive   and   rational   access   we   might   have   to   it   in   the  
presence   and   absence   of   attention.   When   Block   asks   “whether   phenomenal  
consciousness   could   be   so   divorced   from   cognitive   access   that   a   subject   can  
have  an  experience  that  he  does  not  and  cannot  think  about”  (N.    Block,  2008,  p.  
289)  he   is  wondering  whether  we  have   rich  phenomenal   consciousness   in   the  
absence  of  attention  and  the  cognitive  access  it  supports.  
Now,  do   inattentional  blindness  and  associated  phenomena  undermine   the  
rich   view   of   visual   representation   and   experience?   Is   consciousness   a   rich   or  
thin  soup?  This  matters  for  us  because,  as  Schwitzgebel  emphasises,  
The  phenomenological  difference  between  the  rich  and  the  thin  views  is  
vast.   On   the   first   view,   our   stream   of   conscious   experience   is   aswarm  
with  detail  in  many  modalities  at  once,  both  inside  and  outside  the  field  
of  attention;  on  the  second,  the  stream  of  experience  is  limited  to  one  or  a  
few  attention-­‐‑occupying  activities  or  perceptions  at   a   time.  On   the   first  
view,  unconscious  perception  exists  only  on  the  margins  if  it  exists  at  all;  
on   the   second,  most   of   our   perception   is   unconscious.  On   the   first,  we  
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always  have  a  complex  flow  of  visual  experience;  on  the  second  we  may  
quite  often  have  not  visual  experience  at  all.  (Schwitzgebel,  2007,  p.  31)  
On   the   sparse   view,   very   little   of   a   scene   is   consciously   processed   at   any  
given   time:   the   illusion   of   seeing   outside   of   the   focus   of   attention  may   arise  
because  viewers  know  that  they  can,  at  will,  orient  attention  to  any  location  and  
obtain   conscious   information   from   it.   This   is   known   as   the   “refrigerator   light  
illusion”,  wherein  “subjects  mistake   the   easy  accessibility  of   all   sorts  of  detail  
for  actually  seeing  that  detail”  (Block  2008:  297).  On  the  rich  view  quite  a  lot  of  a  
scene   in  our  visual   field   is   consciously  experienced  and,  at   least,   available   for  
cognitive  access  even  if  it  is  not  actually  accessed  or  remembered.    
The   significance   of   this   question   for   the   dispute   between   the   broad   and  
narrow  accounts  of  aesthetic  psychology  should  be  apparent.  If  our  perceptual  
or   phenomenal   consciousness   is   rich   then   the   kinds   of   everyday   experiences  
described   by   Saito,   Irvin,   and   others,   seem   possible,   at   least   in   principle.  
Multimodality   aside,   the   complexity   of   visual   experience   on   the   rich   view—
attended  or  otherwise—seems  to  admit  of  the  kind  of  perceptual  representation  
of   individuals   in   possession   of   appearance   properties   which   constitutes   bare  
aesthetic   perception.   The   sparse   view,   however,   effectively   limits   perceptual  
experience   to   a   few   attended   objects   and   events   and   thus   restricts   aesthetic  
perception  as  well.82  
The   inattentional   phenomena  mentioned   above   are   cited   as   evidence   for   a  
sparse   perceptual   consciousness.  We   see,   it   is   suggested,   much   less   than   we  
realise  or  wish   to  believe.   It   is   the   refrigerator   light   illusion  which   leads  us   to  
think  otherwise.   Inattentional  blindness   in   the  gorilla  basketball   case   suggests  
we   are   conscious   of   little   beyond   the   focus   of   our   attention.   The   question   of  
                                                                                                 
82   Of   course,   a   narrow   theorist   might   hold   that   we   have   a   rich   perceptual   consciousness  
whilst  still  arguing  that  aesthetic  states  of  mind  require  more  than  this.  
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what   counts   as   consciousness   rears   its   head   once   again   and   is   made   more  
complex  by   the  question  of   the   richness  or   sparseness  of   consciousness   in   the  
presence  and  absence  of  attention.  
Yet,  as  was  suggested  by  Wolfe’s  inattentional  amnesia,  we  come  up  against  
the  issue  of  reportability  and  accessibility  here  as  well.  As  Schwitzgebel  points  
out,  “mere  behavioural  responsiveness…or  above-­‐‑chance  responding  on  forced  
choice  questions  about  the  presence  of  stimuli”  (Schwitzgebel,  2007,  p.  32)  will  
not   convince   an   advocate   of   the   thin   or   sparse   view   that   stimuli   outside   of  
attention   were   consciously   experienced.   Yet,   nor   will   mere   failure   to   report  
convince  an  advocate  of  the  rich  view  that  stimuli  outside  of  attention  were  not  
consciously   experienced.   This   can   be   seen   in   Block,   who   rejects   inattentional  
blindness  in  favour  of  inattentional  inaccessibility:  “subjects  may  see  the  features  
that   change,   but   fail   to   notice   the   difference,   because   although   much   of   the  
detail   in  each  picture   is  phenomenally   registered,   it   is  not   conceptualised  at  a  
level  that  allows  cognitive  access  to  the  difference”  (N.    Block,  2008,  p.  296).  But  
what   evidence   is   there   for   the   view   that   we   have   a   rich   phenomenal   or  
perceptual  consciousness  which  overflows  attention  and  cognitive  access?    
4.3.6  The  overflow  argument  
The   overflow   argument   turns   on   a   distinction   between   the   conscious  
perceptual   system   and   the   cognitive   system   which   accesses   it.   This   rich  
conscious  perceptual  system,  it  is  argued,  has  a  greater  capacity  than  the  sparse  
system  which  accesses  it  (N.  Block,  2011,  p.  567).  Block  argues  that  the  working  
memory   system  which   underlies   cognitive   access   has   a   smaller   capacity   than  
the   perceptual   consciousness   system,   which   means   that   necessarily   only   a  
portion  of  the  rich  perceptual  representations  possessed  by  a  subject  is  accessed.  
(All   representations  are   in  principle  accessible,  but,  necessarily,  only  some  are  
accessed.)  For  Block,  “This  difference  in  capacity  shows  that  consciousness  and  
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cognitive   access   are   to   some   extent   based   in   different   systems  with   different  
properties”  (N.    Block,  2008,  p.  297).  The  evidence  for  this  view  is  complex  and  
contested.  We   cannot   possibly   address   every   issue.  We  will   focus   here   on   an  
oft-­‐‑cited   paper   by   Victor   Lamme   who,   drawing   on   (Landman,   2003),   argues  
that,  “we  are   ‘conscious’  of  many  inputs  but,  without  attention,  this  conscious  
experience   cannot   be   reported   and   is   quickly   erased   and   forgotten”   (Lamme,  
2003,  p.  13).  
The   figure   below   (fig.   1)  describes   a  psychophysical   experiment   on   change  
blindness   which   supports   this   conclusion.   In   all   three   cases   a   stimulus   is  
presented,   followed  by   a  grey   inter-­‐‑stimulus   interval   (ISI),   and   then   a   second  
stimulus  in  which  the  orientation  of  one  of  the  items  in  the  scene  has  changed.  
In  the  first  version  of  the  experiment  (1a),  the  altered  stimulus  is  cued  after  the  
ISI.   Subjects   asked   whether   this   item   has   altered   orientation   perform   poorly  
(60%  correct).  Unsurprisingly,  cueing  the   item  that  might  change  (1b)  protects  
from  change  blindness,  leading  to  near  100%  correct  performance  in  identifying  
the  alteration.  The   interesting  result   is   the   third   form  of   the  experiment.   In  1c  
the   item  which  might   change   is   cued   after   the   first   stimulus   has   disappeared  
and   before   the   second   appears.   This   also   protects   from   change   blindness.  
Subject   success   in  detecting   change   in   this   case   is   nearly   that   of   the  pre-­‐‑cued  
alteration.   This   suggests   that   a   complete   representation   of   the  display,   firstly,  
exists  in  the  absence  of  attention,  and,  secondly,  endures  after  the  stimulus  has  
disappeared.  
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Figure  1.  
  
Change   blindness   in   an   abstract   scene,   and   the   role   of   attention.   In   these   change  
blindness   trials   (a–c),   a   scene   containing   multiple   items   is   presented   (Stimulus   1),  
followed   by   a   gray   screen   inter-­‐‑stimulus   interval   (ISI),   after   which   the   same   scene  
(Stimulus  2)  is  shown  again.  The  subject  is  then  asked  whether  the  cued  item  (indicated  
by   the   orange   line)   has   changed   or   not.   In   (a)   it   has   changed   orientation.   Subjects  
perform   poorly   at   this   task,   (60%   correct,   lower   left   histogram).   Performance   can   be  
converted  into  a  ‘capacity’  measure  (lower  right  histogram)  indicating  how  many  items  
the   subject   had   available   (in   working   memory)   for   change   detection,   in   this   case,  
approximately  four  items.  When  the  to  be  changed  item  is  cued  in  advance  (b),  subjects  
perform   almost   100%   correct   (resulting   in   a   virtual   capacity   of   all   eight   objects).  
However,  when  subjects  are  cued  after  the  disappearance  of  Stimulus  1  but  before  the  
onset  of  Stimulus  2  (c),  they  perform  almost  as  well  and  seem  to  have  stored  almost  all  
objects.    
(Lamme,  2003,  p.  13).  Reproduced  with  permission.  
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Lamme  uses  this  result  to  argue  that  attention  is  responsible,  not  for  bringing  
stimuli  to  perceptual  consciousness,  but  for  making  it  possible  that  stimuli  may  
be   consciously   reported.   Attention   is   responsible   for   the   storage   of   items   in  
working   memory   to   allow   for   subsequent   report   and   comparison.   As   with  
Block,   on   this   view   change   and   inattentional   blindness   are   construed   not   as  
failures  of  perceptual  consciousness  but  of  access.  Lamme  writes,  
Apparently,   after   the   first   display   has   disappeared,   a   neural  
representation  of  almost  the  whole  scene  is  still  present  and  attention  can  
select   from   this   representation   to   store   the   relevant   item   in   working  
memory.  After  the  onset  of  stimulus  2,  this  representation  has  vanished,  
as  cueing  at  that  time  does  not  help  (Fig.  1a).    
The  model  thus  argues  for  the  existence  of  a  short-­‐‑lived,  vulnerable  and  
not   easily   reportable   form  of   visual   experience,  which   contrasts  with   a  
more  stable,  reportable  form  of  awareness.  (Lamme,  2003,  pp.  13-­‐‑14)  
This  view  is  represented  in  the  figure  below  (fig.  2)  in  (d):  We  are  conscious  
of  more  than  we  attend,  but  the  capacity  to  report  depends  on  attention.  Prinz’s  
view  that  attention  is  responsible  for  the  availability  of  information  for  encoding  
in  working  memory  and  thus  its  reaching  consciousness  equates  to  (b)  because  
he   believes   that,   despite   the   necessity   and   sufficiency   of   attention   for  
consciousness,  our  phenomenal  consciousness  still  overflows  what  we  actually  
access.   The   classic   inference   from   inattentional   blindness   paradigms   is  
represented  by  (a):  only  what  is  attended  is  conscious  and  available  for  report.  
Recall  that  for  advocates  of  inattentional  inaccessibility  it  is  an  error  to  speak  of  
inattentional  and  change  blindness  because,  for  them,  “one  normally  consciously  
sees   the   item   that   constitutes   the   difference   but   fails   to   categorise   or  
conceptualise  it  in  a  way  that  allows  for  comparison”  (N.  Block,  2011,  p.  567)83.  
                                                                                                 
83   In   addition   to  Lamme  and  Landman,  Block   cites   the   experimental  paradigm  devised  by  
George  Sperling   in   1960.   (Sperling,   1960)   In   this   experiment   subjects  were   shown  an   array  of  
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Figure  2.  
  
(Lamme,  2003,  p.  13).  Reproduced  with  permission.       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
letters   for  a  brief  period.  Subjects   reported  being  able   to   see  most  or  all  of  an  array  of   twelve  
letters  in  three  rows  of  four.  However,  they  could  only  report  three  to  four  of  the  letters  from  the  
whole  array.  Yet,  significantly  Block  argues,  subjects  could  report  three  to  four  items  from  any  
row  cued  after  stimulus  offset.  This,  Block  writes,  suggests  “that  subjects  did  have  a  persisting  
image  of  almost  all  the  letters”  (N.  Block,  2011,  p.  567).    
The   overflow   argument   explains   this   as   the   conscious   representation   of   all   or   almost   all  
twelve  letters  in  sufficient  detail  to  distinguish  them  from  the  rest  of  the  alphabet.  Yet,  “only  3-­‐‑4  
of   these   items   can   be   cognitively   accessed,   indicating   a   larger   capacity   in   conscious  
phenomenology  that  in  conscious  access”  (N.  Block,  2011,  p.  567).  
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As   I   suggested   above,   the   possibility   that   phenomenal   consciousness  
overflows  cognitive  consciousness,  combined  with  the  thought  that  it  is  on  the  
former   which   the   aesthetic   character   of   experience   depends,   leads   to   the  
suggestion  that  what  I  have  called  aesthetic  perception  goes  on  in  the  absence  of  
cognitive   consciousness   and   thus   that   attention   may   not   be   required   for  
experiences   possessing   aesthetic   character.  However,  we   are   not   quite   at   this  
stage   yet,   for   we   still   need   to   understand   the   development   of   aesthetic  
perception   when   we   do   attend   and   access   our   broader   phenomenal  
consciousness.  
4.3.7  Attention,  determinacy,  and  visual  consciousness  
From  this  point   I   shall  be  assuming   this  model  of   the   relationship  between  
attention,   phenomenal   consciousness,   and   cognitive   accessibility.   That   is,   the  
model   represented   by   (d)   and   Block’s   overflow   argument.   This   is   not  
uncontroversial   and   challenges   to   the   overflow   argument   and   the   distinction  
between   phenomenal   and   access   consciousness   continue.   For   example,   James  
Stazicker   argues   that   Block   underestimates   the   indeterminacy   of   visual  
consciousness  and  that  cueing  doesn’t  prompt  access  to  conscious  information,  
but   that   “the   effect   [is]   to   alter…conscious   experience   such   that   some  
information  became  more  determinate  in  it”  (Stazicker,  2011,  p.  169).  Thus,  for  
Stazicker,   unattended   visual   consciousness   is   not   rich   and   “specific”   (in   the  
sense  that   it  contains  detailed   information  about  size,  shape,  and  so  on)  when  
unattended,  but  rather  involves  visual  consciousness  of  determinable  properties  
which   is  made  more   determinate   by   attention.84   As  we   saw   earlier,   a   similar  
idea   is   outlined   in   (Nanay,   2009)   in   terms   of   the  perceptual   representation   of  
determinate  and  determinable  properties  and  the  role  of  attention  in  making  an  
attended  property  more  determinate.  
                                                                                                 
84  There   is  much  more   to   the  debate  between  Block  and  Stazicker   than   this,   but   the  above  
suggests  the  kinds  of  disagreement  in  this  area.  See  also  (Tye,  2010).  
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Now,   it   is  worth  conceding   that  overt  perceptual  attention—the  orientating  
of  one’s  visual   sense  organs—does   render  visual   conscious  more  determinate.  
The   distinction   we   must   make   is   between   the   determinacy   of   visual  
consciousness  that  is  causally  linked  to  the  physiology  of  our  visual  organs  and  
the  limitations  in  determinacy  imposed  on  parafoveal  vision,  on  the  one  hand,  
and  the  determinacy  of  visual  consciousness  that  arises  from  restrictions  higher  
in   the   visual   processing   system,   on   the   other.   A   further   distinction   and  
dissociation   must   also   be   made   between   those   physiological   and   processing  
limitations  and  the  cognitive  accessibility  of  perceptual  representations.  
For  it  seems  plausible  that  attention  and  attentional  processes  are  involved  in  
each  of   these.  Overt  attention—involving   the  orientating  of  one’s  gaze   (foveal  
vision)—renders   vision   more   determinate   as   a   consequence   of   the   superior  
resolution   of   the   fovea.   However,   overt   and   covert   attention   also   increase  
determinacy   because   particular   representations   are   selected   from—or  
successfully  compete  with—the  mass  of  potential  stimuli  with  which  the  visual  
system   is   faced.85   This   distinction   is   illustrated   by   the   difference   between  
focusing   one’s   gaze   on   a   red   mug   and   thus   rendering   its   previously  
determinable   property   “red”   determinately   “scarlet”,   and   keeping   one’s   gaze  
focused  on  the  computer  screen  whilst  focusing  one’s  attention  covertly  on  the  
mug.  In  the  latter  case,  the  colour  property  is  arguably  less  determinate  than  the  
former,   whilst   being   more   determinate   than   it   would   be   when   completely  
unattended.   Both   cases   involve   differences   in   determinacy,   with   different—
although  related—causes.    
Thus,   the   determinacy   of   perceptual   experience   is   not   unproblematically  
related   to   the   accessibility   of   its   content,   understood   in   Block’s   terms   as   the  
functional   role   its   representational   content   plays   in   the   cognitive   system.   The  
                                                                                                 
85  See  (Carrasco,  Ling,  &  Read,  2004)  for  the  effect  of  covert  attention  on  contrast  sensitivity  
and  contrast  resolution.  
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determinacy  of  our  visual   consciousness  and   its  accessibility  are  anything  but  
straightforwardly   related   and   we   can   sit   somewhere   between   Block’s   and  
Stazicker’s   arguments.   This   is   significant   for   the   question   of   the   nature   of  
perceptual   or   phenomenal   consciousness   in   bare   aesthetic   perception.   Bare  
aesthetic   perception   involves   more   determinable   representations   than   rich,  
attended  aesthetic  perception  because  it  is  neither  overtly  nor  covertly  attended,  
and  is  thus  unaccessed  and  unreported.  But,  as  long  as  bare  aesthetic  perception  
involves   bound   perceptual   representations   this   does   not   threaten   its   aesthetic  
character.    
However,   this  kind  of  unattended  and  unaccessed  perceptual   experience   is  
certainly  not  what  most  of  us  think  of  as  paradigmatically  aesthetic  experience.  
Nor  does  it  permit  the  kinds  of  complex  scrutiny,  reflection  and  communication  
we   tend   to   associate   with   such   experiences.   The   overflow   of   perceptual  
consciousness  might  help  us  to  understand  the  breadth  of  aesthetic  perception,  
but  we  need  to  go  further  if  we  are  to  understand  why  and  how  rich  aesthetic  
perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation   depend   on   attention   for   their  
development.   This   is   crucial   for   a   comprehensive   account   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology:   one  which   doesn’t   just   seek   to   broaden  what   counts   as   aesthetic  
perception,  but  which  can  account  for  and  support  the  rich  forms  of  perception  
and   appreciation   privileged   by   narrow   approaches.   This   requires  
understanding  the  relationship  between  attention  and  cognition.  
4.4  Attention  and  cognition  
In   chapter   two   we   saw   that   narrow   approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology  
emphasise  what  we   called   epistemic   conditions   on   aesthetic   experience.   They  
are  concerned  with  knowing  the  world  aesthetically  and  this  is  reflected  in  their  
accounts   of   the   aesthetic   character   of   experience   and   judgement.   Davies’s  
reading   of   Sibleyan   discrimination   was   couched   explicitly   in   such   terms:   a  
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discriminating  approach  to  the  perceptual  manifold  such  that  one  is  furnished  
with  descriptions  apt  for  use  in  aesthetic  judgements.  Levinson’s  demand  for  an  
awareness  of  the  interrelations  between  aesthetic  properties  and  the  manner  in  
which  they  emerge  from  their  nonaesthetic  bases  seems  to  require  this  cognitive  
capacity;  as  does  the  ability  to  think  about  and  value  one’s  aesthetic  experience  
and  its  objects  in  the  way  Walton  and  Iseminger  describe.  
Similarly,   rich   aesthetic   perception—understood,   firstly,   as   involving  more  
determinate   and   accessible   perceptual   representations   than   bare   aesthetic  
perception,   and,   secondly,   as   supporting   and   partially   constituted   by   our  
response   to   such   representations—involves   cognitive   access   to   perceptual  
experience;  and  aesthetic  appreciation  (in  its  analytical,  evaluative,  and  affective  
senses)   requires  both  rich  aesthetic  perception  and   the  capacity   to   interrogate,  
respond  and  refer  to  the  objects  and  contents  of  experience.  If  attention,  or  one  
plausible  approach  to  a  plural  concept  of  attention,  is  implicated  in  our  capacity  
to  know  the  world,  to  reason  about,  refer  to,  or  discuss  it  aesthetically,  then  we  
need  to  understand  how  and  why  this  might  be  so.  
Accounts   of   the   relationship   between   attention   and   cognition   are   closely  
linked  to  those  concerned  with  the  relationship  of  attention  and  consciousness.  
For   Prinz,   for   example,   attention   functions   to  make   information   accessible   to  
working   memory   and   thus   for   use   in   cognition.   For   him,   attention   is   what  
brings  information  to  consciousness  (Prinz,  2011b).  This  clearly  makes  attention  
crucial   for   cognition   by  way   of   being   crucial   for   consciousness.   However,   as  
Mole,  Smithies,  and  Wu  point  out,  on  a  different  approach  “attention  does  not  
explain  our  conscious  experience  of  the  world  but,  rather,  our  conceptual  capacity  
for  thinking  about  it  or  our  epistemic  capacity  for  knowing  it”  (Mole,  Smithies,  &  
Wu,   2011b,   p.   xvii).  We  will   focus   on   the   role   of   attention   in   rationality   and  
demonstrative  thought.  
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4.4.1  Attention  and  rationality  
Views   about   the   relationship   between   attention   and   rationality   are  
characteristically  targeted  at  the  personal  level  perspective  rather  than,  as  with  
Prinz  and  Block,  at  the  subpersonal  level  of  information  processing  (Mole  et  al.,  
2011b,  p.  xvii).  For  example,  Declan  Smithies  writes  that,    
…attention  is  essentially  a  phenomenon  of  consciousness.  If  attention  is  
understood  in  terms  of  its  distinctive  phenomenology,  then  it  is  built  into  
the  concept  of  attention  that  there  is  a  phenomenal  contrast  to  be  drawn  
between  attentive  and  inattentive  modes  of  consciousness.  On  this  view,  
attention   is   a   distinctive   mode   of   consciousness,   so   there   is   consciousness  
without   attention,   but   there   is   not   attention   without   consciousness.  
(Smithies,  2011a,  pp.  247,  my  emphasis)  
Smithies  argues  that  the  functional  role  of  attention  is  to  make  “information  
accessible   for   use   in   the   rational   control   of   thought   and   action”,   and   what  
makes   information  so  accessible   is  a  distinctive  mode  of  consciousness,  which  
means  that  attention  is  a  distinctive  mode  of  consciousness  (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  
248).   Smithies   thus   links   the   phenomenology   of   attention—the   distinction   for  
the   subject   between,   on   the   one   hand,   perceiving,   acting,   and   thinking  
attentively,   and,   on   the   other   hand,   doing   so   inattentively—to   its   functional  
role.  Attention  modifies  the  stream  of  consciousness  and,  in  doing  so,  helps  us  
understand  the  selectivity  of  attention:  “not  every  experience  within  the  stream  
of  consciousness  can  occupy  the  attended  foreground  at  once,  since  attention  is  
essentially   a   contrastive   notion:   there   is   always   a   phenomenal   contrast   to   be  
drawn   between   the   foreground   and   the   background   of   consciousness”  
(Smithies,   2011a,   p.   250).   Smithies   is   thus   comparable   to   Block   in   that  
consciousness  overflows  attention,  but  distinctive  in  that  inattention  precludes  
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rational   access   at   a   personal   level   rather   than   cognitive   accessibility   at   the  
subpersonal.86    
Smithies’s   response   to   inattentional   blindness   illustrates   this   view.   “If  
attention   is  necessary   for   information   to  be  accessible   for  use   in   the  control  of  
action,   reasoning,   and   verbal   report,   then   this   is   sufficient   to   explain   why  
subjects   fail   to   react   to   unattended   objects”   (Smithies,   2011a,   p.   256).   Yet,  we  
saw   above   that   priming   effects   on   performance   occur   outside   of   attention.  
Smithies   responds   to   this   unattended   effect   by  making   a   distinction   between  
causal   and   rational   notions   of   accessibility,   arguing   that   attention   is   only  
necessary   for   rational   access,   leaving   the  way   open   for   “nonrational   forms   of  
causal   influence,   including   priming   effects,   on   action,   reasoning,   and   verbal  
report”  in  the  absence  of  attention  (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  257).  He  goes  on:  
The  crucial  claim  is  that  although  unconscious  information  is  sometimes  
accessible  for  spontaneous  use  in  the  control  of  action,  it  is  not  rationally  
accessible  in  the  sense  that  it  is  accessible  to  the  subject  as  a  reason  that  
justifies  the  subject  in  forming  a  belief  or  performing  an  action.  (Smithies,  
2011a,  p.  262)87  
That   is,   Smithies  holds   that   beliefs   and  actions   cannot  be   justified  or  made  
rational   on   the   basis   of   information   to   which   one   has   no   access.  We   require  
introspective  access   to   information  for   the  purposes  of  critical  reflection  about  
what   we   believe   and   do.   Unconscious   visual   information   “plays   only   a  
nonrational  causal  role”  (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  263).  
                                                                                                 
86   See   (Watzl,   2011a)   for   another   account  which   construes   attention   as   a   structuring  of   the  
stream  of  consciousness.  
87  Thus,  for  Smithies,  in  blindsight  visual  information  is  causally  accessible  because  it  primes  
performance,  but  not  rationally  accessible.  Hence  the  appearance  of  guesswork  rather  than  the  
formation  of  beliefs  in  the  experimental  responses  of  blindsighted  subjects   (Smithies,  2011a,  p.  
262).  
It  is  his  argument  that  there  is  a  conceptual  relationship  between  consciousness  and  rational  
accessibility,   and  his   functional  definition  of   attention   in   terms  of   rational   accessibility  which  
leads  Smithies  to  conclude  that  consciousness  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  attention.  
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This  accounts  bears  comparison   to  Block’s  distinction  between  phenomenal  
and   access-­‐‑consciousness,   but   is   distinct   because   Smithies   rejects   Block’s  
location  of  the  functional  role  of  attention  at  the  subpersonal  level  of  cognitive  
accessibility   whereby   attention   facilitates   the   encoding   of   perceptual  
representations   in  working  memory,   thus   allowing   them   to  play   a   role   in   the  
executive   system.   For   Smithies,   this   “purely   causal”   notion   of   accessible  
information  neither  constitutes  consciousness  nor  does  justice  to  the  connection  
between   the  phenomenology  of  attention  and   its   epistemic   (rather   than  causal)  
role  in  making  information  rationally  accessible.(Smithies,  2011a,  pp.  267-­‐‑268).  
We   need   not   adjudicate   this   debate.   We   are   interested   in   both   Block’s  
subpersonal  access-­‐‑consciousness  and  Smithies’s  personal   level   rational-­‐‑access  
consciousness,   because   both   address   the   way   in   which   phenomenal  
consciousness   (and   thus,   on  my   account,   aesthetic   perception)  may   overflow  
report   and   access.   Both   consider   phenomenal   consciousness   to   overflow  
attention,  but  they  diverge  in  their  notions  of  accessibility:  Block’s  accessibility  
is  causal,  whereas  Smithies’s  is  normative—it  has  a  role  in  rational  justification.    
Crucially,  neither  rules  out  the  aesthetic  character  of  unattended  experience  
as   I   have   specified   it   in   bare   aesthetic   perception.  What   Smithies’s   approach  
highlights   is   the   epistemic   and   rational   significance   of   attention;   and   this   is  
crucial   for   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   If   we   hold   a  
narrow   account   of   our   aesthetic   psychology,   however,   then   rational-­‐‑access  
consciousness  will  be  required  for  any  aesthetic  mental  state,  because  the  kind  
of   perceptual   acquaintance   and   critical   and   evaluative   reflection   involved   in  
such  accounts  requires  such  access.88  
                                                                                                 
88   A   similar   epistemic   account   of   the   role   of   attention   can   be   found   in   (Roessler,   2011).  
Roessler   is   interested   in   “perspicuous”   perceptual   knowledge:  we   know   how   we   know,  with  
immediate   understanding.  His   account   differs   from   Smithies’s   in   that   attention,   for   Roessler,  
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4.4.2  Aesthetics  and  demonstrative  thought  
Closely   related   to   attention’s   role   in   rationality   is   its   relationship   to  
demonstrative   thought.   If   I   perceive   something   and   my   thought   can   be  
understood  as,  for  example,  “That  mug  is  red”  or  “That  is  a  square”  then  I  am  
thinking  a  demonstrative  thought.  As  Gareth  Evan’s  writes,    
[The]   general   idea   is   that   thinking   about   an   object   demonstratively   is  
thinking   about   an   object   in   a   way   which   crucially   depends   upon   the  
subject’s   currently  perceiving   that  object.  Thus  one  simply  will  not  have  
understood  a  normal  use  of   the   sentence   ‘That   cup   is  F’,   unless   (i)   one  
can  perceive  the  cup,  and  (ii)  one  thinks,  in  a  way  that  depends  on  that  
perception,   ‘That   cup   is  F,   that’s  what   the   speaker   is   saying’…   (Evans,  
1982,  p.  72)  
This   notion   of   perceptual   demonstrative   thought   (some   demonstrative  
thought  might  be  based  on  memory  or   testimony)   requires   current  perceptual  
contact  with  objects  and  their  properties.  This  is  not  thinking  about  an  object  by  
description—even   as   the   object   one   is   currently   perceiving—but,   as   Smithies  
emphasises,   “the   crucial   difference   is…that   one   cannot   think   about   an   object  
demonstratively  unless  one  currently  perceives  it”  (Smithies,  2011b,  p.  8).  
I  suggest  that  much  aesthetic  thought—appreciation,  judgement,  evaluation,  
and   communication—involves   a   significant   demonstrative   component.   Recall  
the   different   kinds   of   aesthetic   attribution   or   judgement   we   can   make:  
substantive   judgements   are   judgements   that   something   is   dainty,   dumpy,  
graceful,  garish,  delicate,  and  so  on.  Verdictive  judgements  are  judgements  that  
things  have  or  lack  aesthetic  value  or  merit.  Now,  I  don’t  wish  to  discuss  here  
whether  or  not  a  verdictive  judgement  of  an  object  one  is  currently  perceiving  
constitutes   demonstrative   thought   because   of   the   muddy   waters   swirling  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
supports  knowledge  about  objects  because  one  knows  how  one  knows:  the  relationship  is  a  top-­‐‑
down  one  of  perspicuous  knowledge  providing  perceptual  justification.  
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around  whether  one  attributes  a  property   to  something  one  calls  “beautiful”  or  
some   similar   evaluative   term.  One  might   be   thinking   demonstratively   in   this  
case,  but  I  don’t  want  to  make  anything  turn  on  it.  
However,   we   are   certainly   thinking   demonstratively   when   we   make  
substantive   judgements   on   the   basis   of   our   perception   of   an   object.   “That  
dancer  is  graceful,”  “This  vase  is  garish,”  “This  brushwork  is  delicate,”  and  so  
on  are,  if  based  on  current  perception,  demonstrative  thoughts.  As  well  as  being  
sentences  which   express   thoughts,   these   examples   also   capture   a   (simplified)  
form  of   critical   communication.   If,   standing  before  a   canvas,  we  are  urged  by  
our   companion   to   note   the   violence   of   Boccioni’s   brushwork,   perhaps   with  
reference   to   its   texture,   orientation,   and   visibility,   then   we   are   engaged   in  
seeking  to  understand  the  reference  of  their  demonstrative  utterance.  
This   pointing   toward   objects   and   features   is   at   the   heart   of   aesthetic  
communication.  As  Sibley  points  out  “Prominent…among  [the  activities  of  the  
critic]   is  drawing  attention   to   the   features   that  are  notably   responsible   for   the  
effect  the  critic  wants  his  audience  to  see”  (Sibley,  2001a,  p.  38).89  Isolating  and  
pointing  out  both  aesthetic  effects  and  the  properties  or  qualities  which  support  
them  is  plausibly  an  example  of  demonstrative  thought  and  reference.   It   is  an  
interesting   and   open   question  whether   a   thought   expressible   in   the   sentence  
“That  painting  is  the  cause  of  my  (aesthetic)  response”  is  also  demonstrative;  or  
whether  one  can  demonstratively  refer  to  one’s  own  thoughts  in  a  form  such  as  
“That  aesthetic  response  is  pleasurable”  or  “That  pleasure  is  valuable”.  (That  is,  
whether   one’s   taking   as   the   content   of   one’s  mental   states   other  mental   states  
can   constitute   demonstrative   thought.)   If   this   is   the   case,   then   the   evaluative  
and   emotional   senses   of   appreciation   might   be   even   more   closely   tied   to  
                                                                                                 
89  There  is,  as  Sibley  points  out  in  the  rest  of  the  passage,  rather  more  to  the  critic’s  activity  
than  this  isolation  of  features;  but  demonstrative  thought  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  project.  
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demonstrative   thought   and   the   role   of   attention   and   consciousness   in  
supporting  such  thought  than  I  argue  here.  
There  is  thus  an  interesting  parallel  between  the  enduring  view  that  aesthetic  
perception,  experience,  or  judgment  requires  direct,  noninferential  perception  of  
objects  and  phenomena,  and   the   role  of  demonstrative   thought   in  aesthetics.90  
For   example,   although   Kant   held   that   the   judgement   of   taste   possesses  
universal  validity,  he  nonetheless  also  believed  it  to  be  singular  (§33  5:  285).  That  
is,   aesthetic   judgement   “asserts   of   a   given   object,   and   that   object   only,   that   it  
may  be  expected  to  occasion  pleasure  in  every  subject  responding  to  it”  (Guyer,  
1997,  p.  133).  Thus  Kant  writes:  
If   someone  does  not   find  a  building,   a  view,  or   a  poem  beautiful,   then  
first,  he  does  not  allow  approval  to  be  internally  imposed  upon  him  by  a  
hundred  voices  who  all  praise  it  highly.  He  may  of  course  behave  as  if  it  
pleased   him   as   well…But   what   he   does   see   clearly   is   this:   that   the  
approval  of  others  provides  no  valid  proof  for  the  judging  of  beauty,  that  
others  may  perhaps  see  and  observe  for  him,  and  that  what  many  have  
seen   in  one  way  he  believes  himself   to  have  seen  otherwise,  may  serve  
him   as   a   sufficient   ground   of   proof   for   a   theoretical,   hence   a   logical  
judgment,  but  that  what  has  pleased  others  can  never  serve  as  a  ground  
of  an  aesthetic  judgment.  (§33,  5:  284)  
Singular   judgements   of   the   form   “This   F   is   G”   are   not   a   form   of  
demonstrative   thought,  but  Kant’s   insistence   that  aesthetic   testimony  may  not  
ground   aesthetic   judgement—because   aesthetic   judgement   is   grounded   in   a  
subjective   feeling   arising   from  our   representation  of   the   object—suggests   that  
underlying  the  demand  for  perceptual  acquaintance  in  aesthetic  judgement  is  a  
requirement  for  a  perceptual  demonstrative  thought  the  subject  of  which  is  the  
object   to  which   beauty   is   imputed.   This  means   that   rich   aesthetic   perception  
                                                                                                 
90   The   scepticism   of   aesthetic   testimony   can   be   seen   in   Sibley’s   insistence   that   aesthetic  
judgement   requires  direct  perception   in   (Sibley,   2001a,   2001b)   as  well   as   the  narrow  accounts  
we   have   discussed   throughout.   For   a   positive   discussion   of   aesthetic   testimony   see   (Meskin,  
2004).  
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and   aesthetic   appreciation   require   the   capacity   to   frame   and   understand   the  
reference  of  demonstrative  thoughts.  It  is  to  the  relationship  between  attention  
and  demonstrative  thought  —and  thus  the  relationship  between  attention,  rich  
aesthetic  perception,  and  aesthetic  appreciation—that  we  now  turn.  
4.4.3  Attention  and  demonstrative  thought  
I  don’t  intend  to  go  very  far  into  the  analysis  of  demonstrative  thought—that  
would  divert  us  significantly   from  the  aims  of   this   thesis—but   it   is  significant  
for   us   that   attention   is   thought   by  many   to   be   crucial   to   such   thought.91   The  
question   is   generally   framed   as   one   of   whether   perception   must   be  
phenomenally   conscious   and   attentive   in   order   to   support   demonstrative  
thought   (Smithies,   2011b,   p.   7).   This   question   can   be   focused   by   considering  
whether   a   blindsight  patient   is   capable   of  using   the  visual   information   in   the  
blind   half   of   his   visual   field   in   order   to   understand   a   visual   demonstrative.  
Recall  that  such  a  patient  can  reliably  guess  about  the  orientation  and  direction  
of  an  object  in  this  blind  field.  There  is,  apparently,  nothing  it  is  like  for  such  a  
patient   to   perceive   the   object   and   only   the   forced-­‐‑choice   conditions   of   the  
experiment   cause   this   information   to   manifest   itself.   That   is,   the   visual  
information   is   not   spontaneously   accessible   by   the   subject,   but   requires,   for  
example,  the  questioning  of  an  experimenter  in  order  for  the  subject  to  infer  the  
existence  of   some  object   in  his  blind   field.  As  Smithies  points  out,   the   subject  
would   therefore   be   thinking   about   such   stimuli   by   description   rather   than  
demonstratively  (Smithies,  2011b,  p.  6).  
4.4.3.1  Experiential  highlighting  
For  John  Campbell,  knowledge  of  the  reference  of  a  demonstrative  concept  is  
provided   by   conscious   perceptual   attention   to   its   object.   “It   is   attention   as   a  
                                                                                                 
91   See   (Evans,   1982)   chapter   six   for   his   account   of   demonstrative   thought.  An  overview  of  
Evans’s  account  framed  in  terms  of  our  concerns  with  consciousness  and  attention  can  be  found  
in  (Smithies,  2011b).  
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phenomenon  of  consciousness  that  matters  for  knowledge  of  reference.  If  I  am  
to  understand  a  demonstrative   referring   to   an  object,   it   is   not   enough  merely  
that   the   object   be   there   somewhere   in  my  visual   field;   I   have   to   attend   to   it”  
(Campbell,  2002,  p.  2).  That,  for  Campbell,  one  can  only  have  knowledge  of  the  
reference  of  a  demonstrative  in  the  case  of  conscious  perceptual  attention  to  its  
object  is  made  clearer  by  imagining  a  blindsight  subject  who  can  reliably  guess  
the  properties  of   the  object   in  his  blind  field,  can  act  appropriately  towards  it,  
and   construct   descriptions   which   interpret   a   demonstrative   referring   to   the  
object.  Yet  this  “blindseer”  cannot  understand  the  reference  of  a  demonstrative  
because,  despite  appropriate  and  reliable  report  and  action,  the  subject  doesn’t  
know  what  is  being  referred  to.  Consider  Campbell’s  “sea  of  faces”  case:    
[You]  and   I   are   sitting  at  a  dinner   table  with  a   large  number  of  people  
around  and  you  make  a  remark  to  me  about   ‘that  woman’.  There  are  a  
lot  of  people  around;  I  can’t  yet  visually  single  out  which  one  you  mean.  
So  on  anyone’s  account,  I  do  not  yet  know  which  woman  you  are  talking  
about.  Suppose  now  that  we  add  to   the  example.  My  visual  experience  
remains   as   before:   a   sea   of   faces.   I   cannot   consciously   single   out   the  
person  you  mean.  All  I  get  consciously  is  a  sea  of  faces.  But  now  we  add  
some  of  what  the  blindseer  has.  You  refuse  to  give  me  any  further  clues  
as  to  which  person  you  mean,  but  you  say,  ‘Try  to  point  to  the  woman  I  
mean.’   At   first   I   protest   that   I   can’t   do   that,   since   I   don’t   know   who  
you’re   talking  about,  but   I  do   try   to  point,   and   to  my  surprise  you  say  
I’m   pointing   right   at   the   person   you   mean.   Suppose   now   that   my  
conscious  experience  remains  a  sea  of  faces,  but  we  extend  the  reach  of  
my  reliable  guessing  so  that  it  encompasses  everything  the  blind  seer  can  
do.   So   I   can   make   reliable   guesses   about   what   the   person   is   eating,  
wearing,  and  so  on,  as  well  as  reaching  and  pointing  appropriately.  But  
so   long   as  my   conscious   experience   remains   a   sea   of   faces   there   is   an  
ordinary  sense  in  which  I  do  not  know  who  you  mean.  (Campbell,  2002,  
pp.  8-­‐‑9)  
Campbell’s  aim  in  having  us  consider  the  sea  of  faces  case  is  that  we  should  
find   it   compelling   that   the   blindseer   does   not,   despite   having   a   reliable  
mechanism   for   detecting   and   responding   to   his   environment,   actually   know  
which  objects  are  being   indicated.  The  blindseer   lacks  conscious  awareness  of  
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the  object  in  question  and  thus,  Campbell’s  case  is  meant  to  suggest,  he  has  no  
knowledge  of   the   reference   of   a  demonstrative   of  which   those   objects   are   the  
subject.  
So  what   is   it  about  conscious  perceptual  attention  that  means  we  know  the  
reference   of   a   demonstrative?   As   Campbell   points   out,   it   is   not   simply   that  
foveating  the  object  provides  greater  information  about  the  object  in  question—
although  that  is  an  upshot  of  overt  attention—because  covert  attention  likewise  
singles   out   an   object   or   person   such   that   one   can   know   the   object   to   which  
another  is  referring;  and  anyway,  the  issue  is  not  simply  one  of  information  but  
experience  (Campbell,  2002,  p.  9ff).  
Campbell’s   argument   is   complex.   He   construes   conscious   attention   as   the  
highlighting  of  an  object  in  experience,  which  highlighting  affects  the  functional  
role   of   experience   and   serves   to   place   us   in   a   position   to   deliberately   track,  
answer   questions   about,   and   to   act   on   the   object.   “[It]   is   because   of   your  
experience   of   the   object   that   you   are   able   to   verify   propositions   about   the  
object”  (Campbell,  2004,  pp.  267-­‐‑268).  Conscious  attention  plays  a  target-­‐‑setting  
or   selectional   role   at   a   computational   level,   even   though   “the   targets   of   the  
information-­‐‑processing   selected   are   set   at   the   level   of   conscious   attention”  
(Campbell,  2004,  pp.  270,  my  emphasis).  It  is  conscious  attention  to  the  location  
of  the  object  in  question  which  serves  to  facilitate  information  processing  of  the  
features  and  object  at  that  location.  
Thus,   although   Campbell’s   concept   of   attention   as   “experiential  
highlighting”  is  a  phenomenal  one,  it  serves  a  functional  role  via  the  functional  
role  of   conscious   experience  by   identifying   the   location  of   the   target  object   of  
the  information  processing  which  underlies  our  use  of  demonstrative  concepts.  
Attention  aids  in  the  selection  and  processing  of  information  and  it  is  only  thus  
that  we  can  know  which  object  is  being  pointed  out  using  a  demonstrative  and  
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so  understand   the   reference   of   the  demonstrative   in   question.  On  Campbell’s  
view,   then,   a   blindsight   subject   cannot   understand   the   reference   of   a  
demonstrative   because   he   cannot   know   the   object   in   question   by   virtue   of   a  
highlighted   experience   of   that   object:   and   it   is   conscious,   attentive   experience  
that  provides  the  requisite  knowledge  of  that  object  such  that  it  can  serve  as  the  
reference  of  a  demonstrative  term.  The  blindsight  subject  does  not  understand  
his   success   in   guessing   the   characteristics   of   an   object   in   their   blind   field,   he  
only  knows  that  he  is  successful.92  
So,   if   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation   involve   a  
significant   demonstrative   component,   and   if   conscious   visual   attention   is  
required   in  order   that  we  understand   the  reference  of  a  visual  demonstrative,  
then   there   is   a   strong   suggestion   of   a   conscious   visual   attention   condition   on  
rich   aesthetic   perception   and   the   appreciative   aesthetic   experiences  
characteristic  of  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetics.  
4.4.3.2  Forming  immediately  justified  beliefs    
We  can  contrast  Campbell’s  experiential  highlighting  account  with  Smithies  
view.  Smithies  rejects  Campbell’s  target-­‐‑setting  account  of  attention  in  favour  of  
an  account  which  locates  the  significance  of  consciousness  at  an  epistemic  level.  
For  Smithies,  consciousness  plays  an  epistemic  role  because  “it  enables  subjects  
to   use   demonstrative   concepts   in   forming   immediately   justified   beliefs   about  
objects   in   the   world   around   them”   (Smithies,   2011b,   p.   19).   On   this   account,  
blindsight   subjects   cannot   think   demonstrative   thoughts   because   they   fail   to  
satisfy  certain  epistemic  constraints  on  their  possession.  
For  Smithies,  we  only  possess  a  demonstrative  concept  of  a  particular  object  o  
if   we   have   “information   about   o   which   provides   immediate,   defeasible  
                                                                                                 
92   I   am  not   concerned   to   critique  Campbell’s  view  here.   See   (Kelly,   2004),   (Matthen,   2006),  
and  references  to  Smithies  above  for  some  concerns  about  Campbell’s  account.  
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justification  to   form  beliefs  about  o”  (Smithies,  2011b,  p.  21).  This   justification,  
he  argues,  requires  conscious  perceptual  experience  of  o.    
So,  on  this  view,  it  is  our  conscious  perceptual  experience  of  an  object  which  
causes   and   provides   the   justification   for   forming   beliefs   about   it.   That   is,   the  
phenomenology   of   conscious   experience   plays   an   epistemic   role.   This   role   is  
missing  in  the  blindsight  case  because,  as  we  saw  earlier,   it  makes  little  sense,  
for   Smithies,   to   speak  of   beliefs   as   rationally   justified   if  we  have  no   access   to  
their   grounds.  On   the   rational-­‐‑access  model   of   attention,   our   beliefs   about   an  
object   are   only   immediately   justified   if   we   have   access   to   that   object   and   its  
properties,   and   it   is   attention  which  makes   information   fully  accessible   in   the  
rational   control   of   thought   and   action.   This   precludes   the   possession   of   a  
demonstrative  concept  of  an  object  in  blindsight  cases.    
Again,   without   adjudicating   between   Campbell’s   and   Smithies’s   accounts,  
we   can   see   that   conscious   attention   is   plausibly   crucial   for   rich   aesthetic  
perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation.   (As  well  as  for  the  experiences  targeted  
by   narrow   aesthetic   psychology.)   Although   it   is   not   the   capacity   for  
demonstrative   thought   which   renders   perception   aesthetic,   rich   aesthetic  
perception  nonetheless   requires   that  we  possess  demonstrative   concepts.  That  
is,   in   rich   aesthetic   perception   we   need   to   be   able   to   sustain   perceptual   and  
rational   engagement   with   the   objects   of   experience,   and   this   requires  
demonstrative   thoughts   about   those   objects.   This   perceptual   and   cognitive  
capacity   supports   the   kinds   of   thought   and   communication   involved   in  
aesthetic  appreciation.  
It   is   thus  only  at   this   level   that  discussion  of   the  appropriateness  of  aesthetic  
perception  becomes  apt,  because  it  is  only  once  attended  that  information  about  
an   object   can   be   used   to   form   immediately   justified   beliefs   about   that   object.  
This   is   not   only   because   differences   in   attention   lead   to   differences   in  
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represented  detail—and  one  might   think  a  certain   level  of  detailed  perceptual  
scrutiny  required  before  we  are  warranted  in  making  an  aesthetic  judgement—
but  also  because   conscious  attention   is   required   in  order   that  we  may  use   the  
justification  derived  from  our  experience  to  form  beliefs  about  an  object.  
Consider   an   account   of   appreciation   like   Iseminger’s:   “Someone   is  
appreciating  a  state  of  affairs   just   in  case  she  or  he  is  valuing  for   its  own  sake  the  
experiencing  of  that  state  of  affairs”  (Iseminger,  2006,  pp.  99,  emphasis  in  original).  
It  is  very  difficult  to  imagine  valuing  a  state  of  affairs  and  one’s  experience  of  it  
without   consciously   attending   to   it.   Iseminger’s   terms   invite   framing   such  
appreciation  in  terms  of  a  focusing  of  attention  on  both  one’s  experience  and  its  
objects;   and   it   is   difficult   to   understand   the   experience   of   that   object  without  
using   demonstrative   terms.   Certainly   if   we   were   to   ask   what   it   is   about   an  
object  which  invites  appreciation  of  it  we  would  expect,  if  we  were  to  share  that  
appreciation  and  understand  its  grounds,  to  be  provided  with  a  demonstrative  
characterisation   like   “that   painting   is   harmonious”,   which   characterisation  
might   itself   be   unpacked   in   demonstrative   terms   such   as   “the   composition   is  
symmetrical,”  “that  line  is  unbroken,”  “those  colours  complement  one  another”  
and  so  on.    
Furthermore,   if   we   are   to   use   such   aesthetic   descriptions   to   aid   our  
appreciation,  then  the  commonly  held  view  of  the  need  for  direct  experience  of  
aesthetic  objects  in  order  for  us  to  have  warranted  aesthetic  judgements  of  them  
seems  to  require  that  we  stand  in  direct  perceptual  contact  with  the  artwork  (or  
any  other  object  of  aesthetic  appreciation)  such  that  our  judgement  can  be  of  the  
singular   form   “that   painting   is   harmonious”.   Following   Smithies,   without  
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conscious   attention   to   the   painting   we   cannot   use   our   immediate   perceptual  
justification  to  form  beliefs  about  the  object  which  are  immediately  justified.93  
4.4.4  Taking  stock  
Let’s   take   stock   once   again.   We   have   covered   a   lot   of   philosophical   and  
psychological   ground,   considering   attention,   consciousness,   cognition,  
rationality,   and   demonstrative   thought.   I   have   tried   to   show   that   these  
discussions   contain   the   resources   the   aesthetician   needs   to   understand   and  
ground   broad   aesthetic   psychology.   These   debates   are   far   from   resolved   and  
look  set  to  run  and  run.  The  aim  here  was  to  outline  some  of  the  material  that  
provides   fodder   for   debates   about   the   relationship   between   attention   and  
cognition  and  to  understand  how  and  why  it  is  that  views  on  that  relationship  
can  differ  so  sharply.  Our  broader  aim  is  to  use  this  to  understand  the  forms  of  
consciousness   (phenomenal,   cognitive,   rational-­‐‑access,   and   so   on)   involved   in  
our   perceptual   representation   of   the   world   around   us   and,   in   particular,   the  
different  ways   in  which  we   are   aware   of   that   part   of   our   perceptual   activity  
which  is  aesthetic.    
Now,   one   of   the   key   differences   in   these   debates   concerns   the   use   and  
extension   of   the   term   “attention”   itself.   We   have   encountered   talk   of  
subpersonal   attentional   processes   and   personal,   conscious   attention.   Both  
strategies  are  useful  for  us  as  long  as  we  proceed  with  their  differing  aims  and  
frameworks   in  mind.  What   a   cognitive   scientist  working  with   a   subpersonal,  
plural   understanding   of   attention   as   various   selective   and   competitive  
computational   processes   construes   as   pre-­‐‑   and   post-­‐‑attentional   differs   from   a  
philosopher   with   an   understanding   of   attention   as   a   personal,   unified,   and  
                                                                                                 
93   Even   if   we   are   unhappy   with   the   thought   of   “that   painting   is   harmonious”   as  
demonstrative,   we   can   nonetheless   still   argue   that   the   more   descriptive   statements   which  
underpin   that   thought  are  demonstrative,  as  we  saw  above.  So  we  need  not  pin   too  much  on  
more  evaluatively  weighted  substantive  statements  being  demonstrative  ones.  It  is  enough  that  
the  more  descriptive  substantive  statements  are  demonstrative  ones.  
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phenomenally   or   rationally   distinguished   phenomenon.   In   short,   asking  
whether  aesthetic  perception  occurs  pre-­‐‑  or  inattentionally  is  to  invite  questions  
about   the   definition   of   attention   we   adopt;   as   well   as   questions   about   our  
understanding   of   the   relationship   between   attention,   consciousness,   and  
cognition.  
This   brings   us   to   a   question   we   have   yet   to   answer:   whether   feature  
binding—and   thus   bare   aesthetic   perception—goes   on   in   the   absence   of  
attention.   I   have   resisted   presenting   the   evidence   for   this   position   until   now  
because,  whilst  it  is  a  question  which  arises  prior  to  those  surrounding  attention  
and  cognition,  some  of  the  key  distinctions  we  will  draw  between  attended  and  
unattended   feature  binding  make  use  of   the  discussions  of   consciousness  and  
rational  thought  above.  Briefly,  the  argument  will  be  that  the  problem  of  feature  
binding   can   be   solved   at   several   levels—those   of   computational   information  
processing,  perceptual  experience,  and  conceptual  thought—and  that  attention  
is   involved  in  each  of   these   in  different  ways.  The  problem  of   feature  binding  
with  which  we  are  concerned  in  bare  aesthetic  perception  is  that  at  the  level  of  
perceptual   experience   or   consciousness   rather   than   conceptual   thought.  
However,   before  we   can   reach   this   conclusion  we  need   to  understand  why   it  
might   be   thought   that   attention   is   required   for   bound   perceptual   experience  
and  thus  for  bare  aesthetic  perception.  
4.5  Bare  aesthetic  perception  and  binding  
Let’s  remind  ourselves  of  the  account  of  bare  aesthetic  perception  I  presented  
in   the   last   chapter.   I   argued   that   the   core   of   aesthetic   perception   is   the  
perceptual  representation  of  an  individual  object  or  phenomenon  in  possession  
of   particular   qualities   of   appearance.   This   reflects   the   distinctively   aesthetic  
concern   with   our   discrimination   of   and   engagement   with   appearances.   I  
suggested   that   this   understanding   of   the   aesthetic   as   bound   up   with   the  
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organisation  and  production  of  appearances,  of  objects  and  events   in  a  spatio-­‐‑
temporal   framework,   is   productively   understood   in   terms   of   what   Anne  
Treisman   calls   “the   binding   problem”:   the   problem   of   how   we   assemble   or  
“bind”   discrete   features   or   properties   into   coherent   and   enduring   visual  
representations   of   multifeatured   objects   with   locations.   Once   we   solve   the  
binding   problem  we   perceive   aesthetically.   Once   the   coffee  mug   before   us   is  
bound   temporally   and   spatially,   possessing   colour,   shape,   size,   and   other  
sensible   qualities—once   its   features   are   integrated—we   have   perceptually  
represented   it  as  an   individual   in  possession  of  particular  sensible  qualities  of  
appearance.   (Although  we  need  not  have   represented   it  as   a   coffee  mug.)  We  
are  perceiving  aesthetically.  
The   representation   of   bound   objects   I   called   bare   aesthetic   perception,  
distinguishing   it   from   the   attended   and   potentially   far   more   complex   rich  
aesthetic  perception.  I  suggested  that  bare  aesthetic  perception  is  pervasive  and  
operates   in   the   absence   of   attention  whilst   also   providing   the   foundation   for  
rich  aesthetic  perception  which  requires  overt  or  covert  attention  for  cognitive  
and   rational   access   to   the   products   of   feature   binding   (that   is,   bare   aesthetic  
perception).  We  should  now  understand  why  such  cognitive  and  rational  access  
might  be  limited  to  the  necessarily  attended  rich  aesthetic  perception,  as  well  as  
why   inattention   need   not   mean   a   lack   of   phenomenal   or   perceptual  
consciousness.    
However,  we  still  need  to  establish  whether  feature  binding  can  go  on  in  the  
absence  of  attention;  something  which  might  initially  seem  problematic  because  
the  central  account  of   feature  binding,  Treisman’s  Feature   Integration  Theory,  
can   be   interpreted   as   ruling   out   unattended   binding.   Indeed,   the   initial  
statement  of   the   theory  seems   to  do  precisely   this.  “[Focal]  attention  provides  
the   “glue”   which   integrates   the   initially   separable   features   into   unitary  
objects.…We  claim  that,  without  focused  attention,  features  cannot  be  related  to  
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each  other”   (Treisman  &  Gelade,   1980,  p.   98).  This   appears  quite  devastating.  
Fortunately,  however,  Treisman’s  account  doesn’t  have   the  consequence   these  
apparently  problematic  statements  might  be  thought  to  suggest.  
4.5.1  Feature  Integration  Theory  
As  we   saw,   binding   is   “the   process   of   conjoining   different   properties   into  
visual   objects”   (Palmer,   1999,   p.   557)   and   Feature   Integration   Theory   is   an  
account  of  how  this  binding  comes  about  which  gives  attention  a  key  role.  As  it  
was   initially   developed   in   (Treisman   &   Gelade,   1980)   FIT   suggested   that  
features   such   as   colour,   curvature,   and   orientation   are   detected   early   and  
automatically  in  the  visual  system,  but  that  they  are  registered  separately  and  “in  
parallel”  across  the  visual  field.  Objects  are  only  identified  as  a  result  of  focused  
attention.  
[The]   visual   scene   is   initially   coded   along   a   number   of   separable  
dimensions,   such   as   color,   orientation,   spatial   frequency,   brightness,  
direction   of   movement.   In   order   to   recombine   these   separate  
representations   and   to   ensure   the   correct   synthesis   of   features   for   each  
object  in  a  complex  display,  stimulus  features  are  processed  serially  with  
focal   attention.   Any   features   which   are   present   in   the   same   central  
“fixation”  of   attention  are   combined   to   form  a   single  object.  Thus   focal  
attention   provides   the   “glue”   which   integrates   the   initially   separable  
features   into   unitary   objects.  Once   they   have   been   correctly   registered,  
the   compound   objects   continue   to   be   perceived   and   stored   as   such.  
(Treisman  &  Gelade,  1980,  p.  98)  
Each   feature   is   independently   registered   on   a   “feature   map”.   Thus,   red  
horizontal   lines  in  the  visual  field  cause  activity  in  the  “red”  and  “horizontal”  
feature  maps   (Palmer,   1999,   p.   557).   Yet,   in   order   for   the   subject   to   perceive  
these   stimuli   as   red   horizontal   lines,   more   is   required   than   simultaneous  
registration  in  discrete  feature  maps.  Treisman  argued  that  focused  attention  to  
specific   locations   is   required   in   order   to   correctly   bind   features   together.   This  
“correctly”   is   important.   For   it   is   not   the   case   that   an   absence   of   focused  
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attention  equates  to  an  absence  of  visual  experience  or  an  experience  of  empty  
space.  Rather,  features  can  be  conjoined  prior  to  conscious  perception,  but  they  
are  likely  to  be  formed  randomly.  “These  unattended  couplings  will  give  rise  to  
“illusory   conjunctions””   (Treisman   &   Gelade,   1980,   p.   98).94   That   is,   visual  
experience   may   be   of   a   blue   cross   when   blue,   red,   horizontal,   vertical,   and  
curved   features  are  detected,  whereas   the  stimuli   in  question  are  a  blue  circle  
and  a  red  cross.  
  The  figure  below  (fig.  3)  indicates  the  route  from  the  detection  of  stimuli  to  
bound  features  and  object  recognition  in  preattentional  perception.  Stimuli  are  
detected   as   implicit   conjunctions   of   features   and   individual   feature  maps   are  
formed.   “In   this  preattentive  or   inattentive  phase,   features   activate   any  object  
types  with  which  they  are   individually  consistent,  and  may  inhibit   those  with  
which  they  conflict,  activating  particular  recognition  nodes  to  differing  degrees  
depending  on   the   level  of   feature  support”   (Treisman,  2006,  p.  413).  The  non-­‐‑
selectivity   of   feature   access   means   illusory   conjunctions   as   well   as   correct  
conjunctions  will  be  activated,  and  thus  the  figure  below  shows  “the  nodes  for  a  
red   cross,   and,   through   associative   priming,   for   hospital,   being   activated   by  
what  is  actually  a  yellow  cross  and  a  red  heart”  (Treisman,  2006,  p.  413).  
     
                                                                                                 
94   Top-­‐‑down   processing   also   has   a   significant   influence   on   feature   binding.   Unattended  
features   can   be   combined   correctly   as   a   result   of   past   experience   and   context.   As   Treisman  
writes,  “Even  when  attention  is  directed  elsewhere,  we  are  unlikely  to  see  a  blue  sun  in  a  yellow  
sky”   (Treisman  &  Gelade,   1980,  p.   98).  A  great  deal   of   our  day   to  day   life   is   likely   to  benefit  
from  such  top-­‐‑down  influence.  
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Figure  3.  
  
(Treisman,  2006,  p.  412).  Reproduced  with  permission.     
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This  form  of  binding  is  rudimentary,  unreliable  and  subject  to  correction  by  
focused   “serial”   attention:   that   is,   focused   attention   to   each   location   in   turn  
serves   to   “weed   out”   illusory   conjunctions   of   features   as   well   as   facilitating  
discrimination.   In   order   to   perceive   multiple   objects   in   the   visual   field   the  
subject   must   move   a   variable   “window”   of   focused   attention   sequentially  
between  locations  and  thus  build  up  the  complex  and  multifeatured  objects  we  
experience.  (“Variable”  because  we  can  vary  the  focus  of  attention  from  a  single  
feature,   to   an  object,   to   an   entire   scene.)  Thus,   serial   focused   spatial   attention  
solves   the   binding   problem   by   eliminating   illusory   conjunctions   and   binding  
features  into  a  representation  of  unitary  multifeatured  objects.  
As  we  have   seen,   Treisman’s   view   is   that  we   solve   the   binding  problem—
that   is,   achieve   correctly   bound   representations—by   moving   a   variable  
“window   of   attention”   between   locations   in   the   scene   before   us.   The   figure  
below   (fig.   4)   shows   the   attention   window   focused   on   a   particular   object  
location  which  serves  to  suppress  features  outside  of  that  location.  Thus,  on  the  
principle   that  only  one  visible  object  can  occupy  a  space  at  any  one   time,  and  
combined  with  serial  attention  to  the  contents  of  different  locations,  the  binding  
problem  is  solved  by  binding  all  the  features  at  one  location  as  one  object.  An  
“object   file”   is   formed   to   represent   this   bound   object.   “These   “object   files”  
“encode   information   from   particular   objects   in   their   particular   current  
instantiation,   specifying   the   spatial   relations   and   conjunctions   of   features”  
(Treisman,   2006,   p.   415).   Because   the   window   of   attention   is   variable,   it   can  
“encompass   anything   from   a   finely   localized   object   to   a   global   view   of   the  
surrounding  scene”  (Treisman,  2006,  p.  414).  An  object  file  may  thus  represent  
“the  scene  as  a  whole  (e.g.,  an  ocean  beach),  a  pair  of  objects  within  the  scene  
(e.g.,   a  woman  walking  her  dog),  or  even  a   single  part  of  one  object   (e.g.,   the  
handle  of   a   cup).   In   combination,   these   samples  at  differing   scales  build  up  a  
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representation   both   of   a   background   setting   and   some   objects   within   it”  




(Treisman,  2006,  p.  414).  Reproduced  with  permission.     
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Is   this   sufficient   for   bare   aesthetic   perception?   Perhaps.   Whilst   individual  
feature  detection,  does  not  qualify  as  bare  aesthetic  perception,  Treisman  allows  
that   conjunctions—albeit  often   illusory  ones—may  occur  preattentionally.  The  
main  problem  here  is  one  of  location.  Objects  are  not  integrated  and  bound  until  
conjunctions  are  spatially  localised.  And,  for  Treisman,  this  localisation  requires  
focused   attention.   This   could   be   a   problem   for   bare   aesthetic   perception,  
because,  as  I  have  presented  it,  aesthetic  perception  requires  the  representation  
of   bound   objects   in   particular   locations.   Aesthetic   perception   is   perception   of  
objects   in   space   and   time,   and   without   attention   it   seems   we   cannot   bind  
features  in  the  same  location  into  a  single  object  in  that  location.  That  does  seem  
to  preclude  aesthetic  perception.95    
4.5.2  FIT,  attention,  and  consciousness  
We  have  said  all  along  that  it  is  vitally  important  to  be  clear  about  what  we  
mean  by  “attention”.  Feature  Integration  Theory  seems  to  suggest  that  attention  
is  required  for  binding  features  into  objects  with  locations.  However,  it  is  vital  
to   understand   that,   in   FIT,   “attention”   is   not   visual   attention   of   the   sort   we  
discussed   in   relation   to   either   the   overflow   argument   or   Smithies’s   and  
Campbell’s  conscious  visual  attention.  Indeed,  Treisman  points  out  that  “spatial  
selection   and   serial   scanning…can   and   often   do   occur   without   awareness”  
(Treisman,  2003,  pp.  109,  my  emphasis).  That  should  give  us  our  first  indication  
that   Treisman   might   not   be   ruling   out   what   we   had   feared.   Treisman’s  
attentional   processes   are   subpersonal   and   unconscious,   even   though   such  
processes   can   certainly  be   consciously  directed.  Thus,   she   is   not   suggesting   that  
conscious   visual   attention   is   required   for   feature   binding.   Indeed,   Treisman   has  
                                                                                                 
95   It  also  seems  to  preclude  demonstrative   thought  which   is  vital   for  aesthetic  appreciation  
and  judgement.  This  is  because,  as  Smithies  highlights,  in  addition  to  requiring  attention  for  the  
formation  of  “beliefs  about  the  identity  of  a  particular  object  unless  one  attends  to  the  object  in  
question…”   (Smithies,   2011b,   p.   30),   we   also   need   to   be   able   to   perceive   and   “believe   that  
properties  are  bound  to  a  single  object  and  to  make  inferences  that  trade  on  the  identity  of  the  
object”  (Smithies,  2011b,  pp.  32-­‐‑33).  
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written   of   the   necessity   of   binding   for   consciousness,   by   which   she   means  
something  like  cognitive  accessibility:  “Conscious  access  in  perception  is  always  
to   bound   objects   and   events.   Experienced   objects   have   colors,   locations,  
orientations”  (Treisman,  2003,  p.  97).  It  would  thus  make  little  sense  to  suggest  
that  conscious  attention  was  required  for  binding.  She  goes  on:  
Why   should   binding   be   necessary   for   conscious   experience?   Perhaps  
because  the  properties  by  which  we  characterize  an  object  do  share  their  
source   in   the   physical   world.   This   makes   it   useful   to   represent   the  
bindings   and   the   structural   relations   for   quick   and   explicit   access   in  
conscious   awareness.   Binding   is   also   a  way   of   compacting   the   sensory  
information   to   fit   into   the   single   representation   to  which  consciousness  
seems  to  be  restricted.  (Treisman,  2003,  p.  109)  
We  noted  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  we  might  find  it  a  challenge  to  
account   for   the   different   concepts   of   attention   and   consciousness   at   play   in  
empirical   and   philosophical   discussions   of   each   phenomenon.   The   apparent  
necessity  of  attention   for  perceptual  consciousness,  access,  or   rational   thought  
on   one   account   might   not   straightforwardly   conflict   with   another   account’s  
suggestion   that  one  or  all   of   these  might  not   require  attention.  The  difference  
between   Treisman’s   subpersonal   and   unconscious   construal   of   one   kind   of  
visual  attention  as  spatial  selection  and  serial  scanning  which  supports  binding  
and   access   and   Smithies’s   account   of   conscious   visual   attention   and   rational  
access  consciousness  is  one  example  of  this.    
The   solution   to   this   problem   of   the   proliferation   of   attentions   lies   in   two  
linked  approaches.  Firstly,  we  should  commit  to  a  plural  construal  of  attention  
which   includes   the   subpersonal   processes   psychologists   investigate   and   the  
kinds  of  personal   level  explanation  of  attention  which   focus  on  cognition  and  
reason.  It  is  important  to  note,  as  writers  like  Smithies,  Campbell,  and  Sebastian  
Watzl  do,  that  attention  plays  an  important  role  at  a  personal  level  and  may  be  
apt   for   partial   explanation   at   such   a   level.   Conscious   visual   attention,   for  
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example,   highlights   and   structures   phenomenal   experience  whilst   playing   an  
important   role   in  cognition.  We  can  hold  on   to   that   function  and  approach   to  
attention   (whilst   acknowledging   that   each   account   differs)   whilst   also   taking  
approaches  like  Block’s  and  Treisman’s  (and  many  others)  seriously.    
This  plural  approach  involves  the  rejection  of  an  essentialist  or  natural  kind  
account   of   attention   whilst   acknowledging   that   such   accounts   might   still  
capture   one   aspect   of   the   wide   array   of   attentional   phenomena   we   have  
discussed.   Thus   the   attentional   processes   involved   in   Feature   Integration  
Theory   capture   an   important   aspect   of   the   assembling   of   bound,   integrated,  
multifeatured  objects,  but  certainly  do  not  exhaust  what  we  mean  by  attention  
and   should   not   be   confused  with   other   concepts   of   attention   which   perform  
different  functions.  
When  it  comes  to  the  relationship  between  attention  and  aesthetic  perception  
the  benefits   of   this  plural   form  of   thinking   are   substantial.   It   is,   I   think,  most  
likely  that  the  concept  of  attention  with  which  most  aestheticians  are  working  is  
akin   to   conscious   visual   attention   of   the   variety   discussed   by   Campbell   and  
Smithies.  That  is,  narrow  theorists  are  unlikely  to  hold  that  attention  is  required  
for  perceptual  or  phenomenal  consciousness  per  se,  but  they  do  seem  to  believe  
that  the  kind  of  visual  consciousness   involved  in  aesthetic  perception  requires  
attention   because   they   are   demanding   about   the   kinds   of   discrimination   and  
reflection   required   for   aesthetic   states   of   mind.   Hence   the   implicit   attention  
condition  on  any  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  in  narrow  accounts.    
4.5.3  Aesthetic  perception  and  two  kinds  of  binding  
The   second,   and   related,   approach   to   adopt   is   to   distinguish   between  
different  forms  of  the  binding  problem  with  different  relationships  to  attention  
(and  to  different  construals  of  attention).  Smithies  points  out  that  talking  of  the  
binding  problem  can  be  misleading,  “since  there  are  multiple  binding  problems  
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which  arise  at  multiple  levels  of  psychological  reality”  (Smithies,  2011b,  p.  31).  
He   highlights   three   levels:   computational   information   processing,   perceptual  
experience,   and   conceptual   thought.   Let’s   focus   on   the   second   and   third.  The  
question  is  whether  attention  is  required  for  binding  at  the  level  of  perceptual  
experience  or  conceptual  thought.    
This  does  not  admit  of  a  reliable  answer  if  we  fail  to  be  clear  about  what  we  
mean   by   attention.   Treisman’s   binding   problem   is   posed   at   the   level   of   the  
prerequisites  for  coherent,  integrated  perceptual  experience.  Smithies’s  binding  
problem  is  a  question  of   the  prerequisites   for  conceptual   thought:   specifically,  
whether   or   not   attention   is   necessary   “for   using   one’s   justification   to   believe  
that  properties  are  bound  to  a  single  object  and  to  make  inferences  that  trade  on  
the   identity   of   the   object”   (Smithies,   2011b,   pp.   31-­‐‑32).   Each   operates   with   a  
different,  though  not  mutually  exclusive  concept  of  attention.  
As  we  have   seen,   Treisman’s   attention   involves   spatial   selection   and   serial  
scanning   in   the   form   of   a   “window”   of   attention  moving   between   locations.  
This  can  and  does  occur  unconsciously.  It  is  the  product  of  such  activity  which  
comes   to   consciousness.   The   concept   of   attention   as   a   form   or   mode   of  
phenomenal  consciousness,  however,  clearly  means  something  quite  different.  
The   functional   role   of   conscious   attention   is,   on   this   view,   an   upshot   of   the  
phenomenal  contrast  between  attention  and  inattention  (which  also  means  that  
consciousness   exists   in   the   absence   of   such   attention).   For   both   Smithies   and  
Campbell  it  is  conscious  attention  as  a  modification  of  experience  which  makes  
conceptual  thought  possible.  
Putting  the  perceptual  and  conceptual  forms  of  the  binding  problem  together  
with  the  differing  construals  of  attention  (and  its  relation  to  consciousness)  we  
arrive  at  the  following  suggestion.  The  binding  problem  at  the  level  of  perceptual  
experience  requires  attention  in  Treisman’s  sense,  but  does  not  require  attention  
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understood   as   a   form   of   phenomenal   modification   of   the   stream   of  
consciousness   which   makes   information   rationally   accessible.   The   binding  
problem  at  the  level  of  conceptual  thought  likewise  requires  Treisman’s  sense  of  
attention   because   bound   perceptual   experience   is   a   prerequisite   for  
consciousness;   however,   it   is   at   this   level   of   psychological   explanation   that  
conscious  visual  attention  is  required,  because  one  of  the  roles  of  attention  is  to  
place  us   in  a  position   to  answer  questions  about  and  be   rationally   justified   in  
using  our  bound  perceptual  experience.      
What  does  this  mean  for  bare  aesthetic  perception?  Well,  we  can  understand  
the  different  ways  of   thinking  about   the  binding  problem  as  analogous   to   the  
distinction   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception.   I   have   identified   bare  
aesthetic  perception  as  bound  perceptual  experience,  which  locates  the  question  
of   the   aesthetic   character   of   perception   at   the   level   of   Treisman’s   form  of   the  
binding  problem.  This,  we  have  seen,  requires  certain  attentional  processes,  but  
not,   I   suggest,   either   the   kind   of   attention   narrow   theorists   of   aesthetic  
psychology   have   in   mind,   or,   we   can   be   fairly   sure,   the   conscious   visual  
attention   those   interested   in   conceptual   thought   seek   to   deploy.   Put   simply,  
bare   aesthetic   perception   requires   perceptual   binding   for   phenomenal  
consciousness,   but   does   not   require   conceptual   binding   and   thus   does   not  
require  conscious  visual  attention.  
In   contrast,   the   criteria   for   aesthetic   perception   and   appreciation   on  which  
narrow  theorists  insist  are  plausibly  located  at  the  level  of  conceptual  thought.  
For   example,   David   Davies’s   insistence   on   discriminating   attention   to   the  
perceptual  manifold   such   that  we   have   available   rich   descriptions   involved   in  
aesthetic   judgements   seems   to   be   precisely   a   demand   for   conscious   visual  
attention   to   the   objects   of   perceptual   experience   in   order   that  we   are   able   to  
access   this   experience   and   possess   demonstrative   thoughts,   understand  
demonstrative   reference,   and   be   justified   in   using   our   experiences   in   rational  
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thought.  Much  the  same  can  be  said  for  narrow  accounts  demanding  awareness  
of   the   relations   between   properties   as   well   as   our   awareness   of   them;   or   for  
those   accounts   which   require   scrutiny   and   appropriate   evaluation   both   of   the  
objects   of   scrutiny   and   our   response   to   them.   In   other   words,   rich   aesthetic  
perception   requires   perceptual   and   conceptual   binding   and   thus   requires  
conscious  visual  attention.96  
4.6  The  structure  of  aesthetic  perception  revisited  
We  are  now   in  a  position   to   return   to  our  model  of   aesthetic  perception   in  
light   of   the   conclusions   of   this   chapter.   The   aim   of   this   thesis   is   to   use   a  
sophisticated  understanding  of  attention  to  develop  an  account  of  our  aesthetic  
psychology   and   reconcile   the   motivations   behind   the   broad   and   narrow  
approaches.   I   suggested   in   the   previous   chapter   that   we   can   usefully  
understand   the   senses   of   perception   in   which   we   are   interested   in   terms   of  
discrimination:   firstly,   as   the   detection   and   organisation   of   features   into  
perceptual   representations   of   an   ordered   world;   and,   secondly,   as   the  
interrogation  of  and  reflection  on  those  representations.  These  reciprocal  senses  
of   discrimination   become   clearer   when   we   consider   the   way   in   which  
perceptual  and  conceptual  binding  underpin  our  representation  of  and  capacity  
to  think  about  the  world.  Likewise,  the  way  in  which  attention  (and  its  diverse  
                                                                                                 
96  Whilst   I   have   appealed   to   a  distinction  between  perceptual   and   conceptual   binding,  we  
need   not   and   should   hold   this   distinction   between   perceptual   experience   and   conceptual  
thought   to   be   a   rigid   or   exclusive   one:   how   could   we,   given   our   ability   to   think   about   our  
experience,  to  take  perceptual  states  as  objects  of  belief  and  desire,  and  to  use  them  as  reasons?  
We   can   hold,   with   E.J.   Lowe   (and   Kant),   that   “our   capacity   for   conceptual   thought  
is…inextricably  bound  up  with  our  capacity  for  phenomenal  consciousness”  (Lowe,  1995,  p.  73)  
and   consider   the   relationship   between   perception   and   demonstrative   thought   to   be   one  
example  of  this.  Locating  the  root  of  aesthetic  perception  in  the  assembling  of  experience—the  
foundation   of   perceptual   consciousness—is   not   to   exclude   it   from   a   significant   role   in  
conceptual   thought.   That   would   be   to   radically   impoverish   our   aesthetic   psychology   and,  
indeed,   our   lives.   That   we   can   enrich   perceptual   experience   through   our   aesthetic  
understanding   should   convince   us   of   this.   Artworks   and   spaces   and   phenomena   whose  
qualities   and   values   we   once   failed   to   grasp   can   be   made   accessible   through   shifts   in  
understanding,   in   perception   in   its   widest   sense.   This   is   what,   if   anything,   “an   aesthetic  
education”  amounts  to.  
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denotations)   mediates   and   constrains   discrimination   and   binding   leads   to   a  
continuum  of  aesthetic  perception  running  from  the  perceptual  representation  
of  bound  objects   to   complex   reflective  engagement  with   such   representations.  
On  this  account,  despite  its  characteristic  development  at  the  level  of  conceptual  
thought,  practice,  and  communication,  the  core  of  the  aesthetic  is  to  be  found  at  
the  perceptual  level.    
4.6.1  Bare  aesthetic  perception  
We   can   now   say   that   bare   aesthetic   perception   is,   in   many   respects,   the  
product   of   the   solving   of   the   binding   problem   at   the   level   of   perceptual  
experience.  The  perceptual   representation  of   individual  bound  and   integrated  
multifeatured  objects  with  locations  is  a  necessary  condition  of  our  experience  
of   an   assembled   world   of   appearances:   particular   appearances   possessed   by  
particular  objects.  This  perceptual  representation  forms  a  part  of  (or  constitutes)  
our  perceptual  or  phenomenal  consciousness  whether  or  not  we  attend  to  and  
cognitively  or  rationally  access  it.  Bare  aesthetic  perception  is  thus  pervasive  in  
perceptual  experience  and  forms  a  foundation  for  richer,  more  determinate  and  
accessed   perception.   Recall   that   in   chapter   two   we   discussed   the   forms   an  
attention  condition  on  aesthetic  perception  might  take.  
The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception1  
It   is   necessary,   although   not   sufficient,   for   an   episode   of   perception   to   be  
distinctively   or   characteristically   aesthetic,   that   we   attend   to   the   object(s),  
properties,  qualities,  or  features  perceived.  
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The  attention  condition  for  aesthetic  perception2  
It  is  necessary,  although  not  sufficient,  for  a  form  of  aesthetic  engagement  to  
be  an  episode  of  aesthetic  perception,  that  we  attend  to  the  object(s),  properties,  
qualities,  or  features  perceived.  
The   first   form   of   the   attention   condition   for   aesthetic   perception   makes  
attention   necessary   for   perception   to   be   aesthetic.   The   second   form   makes  
attention  necessary   for   the  perceptual  element  of  aesthetic  perception.  We  can  
rule  out  both  of   these   conditions.   I  have  argued   that   attention   in   the   sense  of  
conscious  visual  attention—the  sense  most  akin   to   the  common  sense  concept  
utilised   in   theories   of   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   experience—is  
unnecessary   for   the  aesthetic   character  of  perception.  This   is   the   result  of   two  
linked  arguments:  that  the  key  criterion  for  aesthetic  character  is  the  perceptual  
representation   of   individual   bound   and   integrated  multifeatured   objects;   and  
that  feature  binding  occurs  in  the  absence  of  conscious  visual  attention.  There  is  
thus   no   conscious   visual   attention   condition   on   either   the   aesthetic   or   the  
perceptual  elements  of  aesthetic  perception.  
However,   we   need   to   be   clear   about   the   different   senses   of   attention.  We  
endorsed   a   plural   concept   of   attention   which   encompasses   the   kinds   of  
processes   of   selection   and   competition   resolution   involved   in   perceptual  
organisation  and  feature  binding  as  well  as  the  kinds  of  phenomena  involved  in  
modifying   and   structuring   phenomenal   consciousness.   If   we   consider   the  
spatial   selection   and   serial   scanning   involved   in   feature   integration   to   be  
attentional   processes,   then   there   is   an   attention   condition   on   bare   aesthetic  
perception.   Yet,   these   processes   are   conditions   of   perceptual   consciousness  
itself;   and   I   have   never   suggested   that   aesthetic   perception   goes   on   in   the  
absence  of  perceptual  consciousness.  
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Moreover,   it   is  not   the  necessity  of   spatial   selection  and  serial   scanning   for  
aesthetic   perception   which   distinguishes   narrow   accounts   of   aesthetic  
psychology.  They  are  understandably  silent  on  such  processes  given  the  level  of  
explanation   at  which   they   seek   to   operate.   Perceptual   experience   is   taken   for  
granted   in  such  accounts  even  as   they  discuss  discriminating  attention   to  and  
evaluation  of  the  contents  of  such  experience.  My  argument  is  not  that  a  great  
many  forms  of  aesthetic  engagement  with  our  environment  and  its  contents  do  
not  require  attention,  but  that  we  must  not  presume  that  all  forms  do.    
Nor   was   my   argument   about   the   ontology   of   aesthetic   qualities.   Were   it  
simply   that   we   should   admit   the   discrimination   of   a   range   of   so-­‐‑called  
“everyday  aesthetic  qualities”   (Leddy,   1995)   into   the   aesthetic   club  we  would  
not  have  sought   to  understand   the  nature  and   limits  of   that  discrimination.   It  
may  well  be  that  we  should  admit  such  qualities  into  the  discourse  of  aesthetic  
appreciation,   but   the   aim   here   is   to   ask   a   question   prior   to   this:   where   does  
aesthetic   perception   begin?  My   answer   is   that   it   begins  with   the   products   of  
feature  binding  at  the  level  of  perceptual  experience—which  I  call  bare  aesthetic  
perception—and  does  not  require  conscious  visual  attention.  
In   answering   this   question   of   the   reach   of   aesthetic   perception   I   have  
provided   the   psychological   framework   missing   from   accounts   of   everyday  
aesthetic   experience   and   the   broad   aesthetic   psychology   they   often   presume.  
Moreover,  by  developing  an  empirically  grounded  account  of  the  continuum  of  
bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception   through   a   discussion   of   perceptual  
organisation,   consciousness,   and   cognition   I   have   placed   the   experiences   of  
both   broad   and   narrow   aesthetic   psychology   within   a   naturalistic   aesthetic  
framework.  This  approach  allows  us  to  understand  both  the  penetration  of  the  
aesthetic  into  everyday  life  and  the  significance  and  psychological  prerequisites  
of   rich,   contemplative   aesthetic   experiences   characteristic   of   mainstream  
aesthetics.  
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4.6.1.2  Limits  on  bare  aesthetic  perception  
For  all  that  aesthetic  perception  occurs  in  conditions  of  inattention  there  are  
limits  on  the  complexity,  determinacy,  and  access  involved.  As  we  saw  above,  
our   perceptual   consciousness   plausibly   lacks   the   capacity   to   represent  
properties   determinately   in   the   absence   of   conscious   visual   attention.   Covert  
attention   facilitates   the   processing   of   stimuli   and   affects   the   appearance   and  
accessibility  of   its   objects,   but   it   is   overt   attention  which  provides   the  highest  
resolution.   As   a   result,   the   perceptual   representations   of   bare   aesthetic  
perception  remain  determinable  rather  than  determinate.  
This  is  complicated  slightly  by  the  capacity  for  prior  knowledge,  expectation,  
and  contextual  information  to  affect  preattentional  feature  binding.  If  we  know  
that   there   is   a  mug,   a   sculpture,   a   cat   on   the   table   then  we   are   likely   to   bind  
their   features   in   a   way   which   reflects   this.   Such   top-­‐‑down   influences   on  
perceptual   organisation   make   it   likely   that   a   great   deal   of   bare   aesthetic  
perception  involves  perceptual  representations  of  objects  and  phenomena  with  
which   we   are   already   acquainted.   We   will   briefly   discuss   the   effect   of  
familiarity  and  unfamiliarity  further  in  chapter  five.  
We  have   also   seen   that   unattended  perceptual   representations   are   fleeting.  
They  persist  for  only  slightly  longer  than  the  stimuli  which  prompted  them.  As  
a   result   there   will   be   limits   on   the   perception   of   phenomena   involving  
succession  or  contrast  over  longer  periods  of  time.  I  argued  in  the  last  chapter  
that   attention   is   needed   to   build   up   a   temporally   extended   and   determinate  
representation  of   the  character  of  objects.  Thus,   it   is  unlikely  that   the  complex  
temporal  structures  involved  in  music,  dance,  or,  perhaps,  architecture  could  be  
perceived  or  appreciated  in  bare  aesthetic  perception  beyond  a  kind  of  window  
in  which   they   are   perceived   but   unaccessed.   This   limit   on   the   complexity   of  
bare  aesthetic  perception  is  a  central  feature  of  our  aesthetic  psychology.  
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4.6.2  Rich  aesthetic  perception  
On   the   foundation   of   bare   aesthetic   perception   is   laid   the   structure   of   rich  
aesthetic  perception.  Rich  aesthetic  perception   is  characterised  by   the  capacity  
for   complex   and   determinate   perceptual   representations   of   objects   and  
phenomena.   This   capacity   is   provided   by   conscious   visual   attention   to   its  
objects.  As  we  have  seen,  we  can  attend  to  particular  features,  objects,  or  entire  
scenes.   Indeed,   our   attention   is   likely   to   flit   amongst   these  different   “modes”  
fairly  frequently.  We  step  back  to  view  a  whole  room,  its  layout,  colour  scheme,  
dimensions,   lighting;  we   then   focus   on   the   sofa   and   its   qualities;   perhaps  we  
focus   on   the   prominence   of   red   in   the   room.   The   same   can   be   said   for   the  
scrutiny  of  an  artwork,  a  building,  a  garden.  Our  attention  moves  around  and  
builds   up   a   picture   of   its   objects.   This   representation   is   more   determinate  
because   it   involves   the   higher   resolution   foveal   vision   secures,   as  well   as   the  
greater   determinacy   selection   and   preferential   processing   of   stimuli   brings.  
Without  attention  the  texture  of  a  cushion  might  not  be  perceived,  but  when  we  
take  a  closer  look  we  see  its  cross-­‐‑hatched  pattern.    
Because   rich   aesthetic   perception   is   constituted   by   the   determinate  
perceptual   representation   provided   by   conscious   visual   attention,   such  
attention  is  a  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  it.    
The  conscious  attention  condition  for  rich  aesthetic  perception  
It  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  rich  aesthetic  perception,  that  we  consciously  
attend  to  the  object(s)  perceived.  
It   is   important   to   appreciate   that   the   distinction   between   bare   and   rich  
aesthetic   perception   is   primarily   a   perceptual   one   despite   its   cognitive   and  
rational   consequences.   The   distinction   is   between   the   determinacy   and  
complexity   of   perceptual   representations   of   bound   and   integrated  
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multifeatured   objects.   That   binding   occurs   in   the   absence   of   conscious   visual  
attention,  but   is  developed  only  in  the  presence  of  such  attention.  This   is  why  
rich   aesthetic   perception   is   a   ground   for,   rather   than   identical   with   aesthetic  
appreciation.  
4.6.3  Rich  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation  
It  is  at  the  level  of  rich  aesthetic  perception  that  the  fuller  sense  of  perception  
comes   to   the   fore.   As   we   have   seen,   the   other   upshot   of   conscious   visual  
attention  is  the  capacity  to  demonstratively  perceive  objects  and  their  properties  
and  to  use  this  identification  and  the  visual  information  represented  in  critical  
reflection.   Rich   aesthetic   perception   grounds   appreciation   by   providing   the  
perceptual   and   cognitive   resources   on   which   appreciation   depends.   Rich  
aesthetic   perception   is   thus   in   a   reciprocal   relationship   with   aesthetic  
appreciation.   It   makes   appreciation   possible   yet   it   can   also   be   enriched   and  
guided  by   appreciation.   There   is   thus   also   a   conscious   attention   condition   on  
aesthetic  appreciation  because  of  its  dependence  on  rich  aesthetic  perception.    
The   three   senses   of   appreciation—analytical,   evaluative,   and   emotional—
depend   on   rich   aesthetic   perception   in   slightly   different   ways.   We   might  
analyse,   value,   or   have   emotional   responses   toward   objects   without   visually  
attending   to   them.   It   is   not   that   these   practices   or   states   depend   on   visual  
attention  that  makes  them  dependent  on  rich  aesthetic  perception.  (It  seems  that  
some  kind  of  attention  is  required  for  each,  but  such  attention  might  be  purely  
to  one’s  own  inner  states  or  memories.)  In  the  case  of  visual  artworks,  objects,  
and   phenomena,   however,   conscious   visual   attention   is   necessary   in   order,  
firstly,  that  we  richly  aesthetically  perceive  them  and,  secondly,  that  we  are  able  
to   access   this   information   such   that   it   can   form   the   object   of   a  more   complex  
thought  or  belief  in  aesthetic  appreciation  
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The   analytical   sense   of   appreciation   is   the   most   closely   connected   to   the  
determinate  perceptual  representation  that  conscious  visual  attention  provides.  
Such  attention  can   range  over  an  object,  building  up  a  picture  of   its  qualities,  
relating   them   to   one   another.   Complex   qualities   of   composition   such   as  
harmony,   balance,   and   dissonance   likely   require   this   determinate  
representation   in   order   to   be   perceived   because   they   often   require   that   our  
attention  moves  amongst  discrete  elements  in  order  to  construct  a  picture  of  the  
whole.   It   is  also  attention  which  enables  us   to   reflect  on  such  representations;  
which   reflection   can   feed   back   into   our   perception   of   the   object.   That   is,  
aesthetic  appreciation  feeds  back  into  rich  aesthetic  perception  because  it  has  a  
role  in  setting  the  targets  for  attention  as  well  as  involving  the  kind  of  historical,  
artistic,   and  social  understanding  which  can   lead  us   to   see   features  which  we  
might  otherwise  miss.    
The   analytical   sense   of   appreciation   also   provides   grounds   for   evaluative  
appreciation.  Evaluative  appreciation  might  be  understood  as  the  valuing  of  an  
object,  experience,  or  as  some  complex  of  the  evaluation  of  the  activity  and  its  
objects.   This   complex   activity   requires   the   determinate   representation   of   rich  
aesthetic  perception  as  well  as  the  accessibility  of  and  capacity  to  reflect  on  its  
products  and  the  activity  itself.  This  requires  conscious  visual  attention.  As  do  
judgements   of   aesthetic   merit.   We   have   seen   that   attention   supports  
demonstrative   thought,  which   I   argued  was   plausibly   necessary   for   aesthetic  
judgement,   because  we   require   a   direct   perceptual   experience   of   an   object   in  
order  to  judge  its  appearance.  
The  affective  or   emotional   sense  of   appreciation  depends  on   the  analytical,  
because   analytical   appreciation   provides   the   ground   which   makes   our  
emotional   response  appropriate   to   its  object(s).  However,   it  might  well  be   the  
case   that   an   affective   response   to   an   object   is   what   leads   us   to   focus   our  
attention  on  it  with  an  aesthetic  motive.  That  is,  although  I  have  argued  that  it  is  
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not   anything   about   our   intentions   or   evaluative   stance   which   constitutes  
aesthetic   character,   we   might   still   approach   an   object   with   the   intention   of  
scrutinising  its  appearance  in  order  to  understand  why  its  qualities  might  cause  
us  to  emotionally  respond  to  it  in  a  certain  way.  That  kind  of  experience  seems  
common  and  we  should  not  rule  it  out.  It  remains  the  case,  however,  that  any  
judgement  of  the  object  would  rely  on  some  specification  of  its  qualities  which  
requires   conscious   visual   attention   as   the   provider   of   both   determinate  
representations  of  the  object  and  the  capacity  to  access  and  reflect  upon  it.  
In   any  given   case   it   is   likely   that   these   three   senses  of   appreciation  will   be  
related   in  quite   complex   and   shifting  ways.  Each   sense  of   appreciation  might  
guide  our  attention  and  lead  to  our  scrutinising  particular  features,  collections  
of   objects,   or   the   entire   scene;   which   might   lead   to   an   alteration   in   our  
evaluation  of  the  objects;  which  might  affect  or  be  constituted  by  our  emotional  
response.   At   some   point  we  might  wish   to   discuss   or   be   guided   by   another,  
which   requires   that   we   frame   and   share   demonstrative   thoughts,   produce  
reasons   for   our   judgements,   or   act   towards   the   object   of   the   discussion   in  
certain  ways:  waving   our   hands,   standing   back,   changing   our   viewing   angle,  
walking  around  it,  and  so  on.  All  of   this  depends  on  rich  aesthetic  perception  
and  conscious  visual  attention.  
For  all   that   I  have  sought   to  distinguish  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception,  
they   are   intimately   related   and   occur   simultaneously.   We   might   richly  
aesthetically  perceive  one  object   by   attending   to   it,   but   that  doesn’t  mean   the  
rest  of  our  consciousness  is  not  involved  in  bare  aesthetic  perception.  We  shift  
our  attention  between  objects  constantly.  Simply  navigating  a  room  is  likely  to  
involve   numerous   shifts   of   attention   between   furniture,   ornaments,   pets,  
windows,  and  doors.  Likewise,  a   task   like  preparing   food   involves   constantly  
shifting   our   attention   between   knives   (and   fingers!),   chopping   boards,  
individual  vegetables,  collections  of  ingredients,  a  recipe  book,  a  glass  of  wine,  
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another  person,  and  so  on.  Each  of  these  involves  a  different  sized  window  of  
attention,  focused  on  different  features,  and  none  of  which  need  require  that  we  
stand  back   and   seek   to   judge   aesthetically.  We  might  well   so   judge   if  we   are  
choosing   different   colours   of   raw   ingredient   or   seeking   to   present   uniformly  
sized   cuts   of   meat,   say.   Again,   it   is   likely   that   plating   a  meal  might   involve  
more  attention  to  composition;  but  we  need  not  aesthetically  appreciate  a  meal  
in  order  for  it  to  involve  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  nor  need  we  attend  to  it  
in  order  for  it  to  involve  bare  aesthetic  perception.  
4.7  Conclusion  
The   aim   of   this   chapter   was   to   provide   the   complex   understanding   of  
attention,  consciousness,  and  cognition  required  in  order  to  develop  the  model  
of   aesthetic   perception   I   outlined   in   chapter   three.   We   distinguished   the  
different  approaches  we  might  take  to  attention,  choosing  to  tread  a  plural  path  
between   different   approaches   to   its   definition   and   function.   We   also  
distinguished   between   different   concepts   of   consciousness,   focusing   on  
phenomenological,   cognitive,   and   rational   concepts   and   the   different   way   in  
which  each  is  related  to  attention.  We  took  care  to  keep  in  mind  the  concepts  of  
attention  and  consciousness  that  different  accounts  deploy.  This  allowed  us  to  
reach   a   point   where   we   could   argue   that   the   kind   of   perception   which  
constitutes   a   minimal   or   bare   kind   of   aesthetic   perception   goes   on   in   the  
absence  of  conscious  visual  attention;  although  the  absence  of  conscious  visual  
attention   precludes   rich   aesthetic   perception   and   thus   aesthetic   appreciation,  
because   only   such   attention   enables   cognitive,   demonstrative,   and   rational  
access   to  perceptual   representation.  There   is   thus   a   conscious  visual   attention  
condition  on   rich  aesthetic  perception   (and  aesthetic  appreciation),  but  not  on  
bare  aesthetic  perception.  Each   form  of  aesthetic  perception   interacts  with   the  
other  in  a  complex  and  endless  fashion  in  everyday  life  and  in  the  art  gallery.    
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Chapter  Five  
Outstanding  Issues  
I  shrugged  “I  know  it’s  untidy…”  
“It  is  not  just  the  room,”  Oscar  said.  “A  room  is  not  just  a  room.  A  room  
is  a  manifestation  of  a  state  of  mind,  the  product  of  an  intelligence.  Either  
conscious”—and   he   dropped   dramatically   back   into   his   armchair,  
sending   up   a   plume   of   dust   and   cigarette   ash—“or   unconscious.   We  
make  our  rooms,  and  then  our  rooms  make  us.”  
Care  of  Wooden  Floors  
Will  Wiles  
5.1  Introduction  
The   central  motivation   for   this   thesis  was   the   thought   that  both  broad  and  
narrow   approaches   to   aesthetic   psychology   capture   important   aspects   of   the  
mind’s  aesthetic   engagement  with   the  world;  and   that   the   impasse   that  arises  
from  the  opposition  of  each  might  be  resolved  through  an  analysis  of  the  role  of  
attention   and   its   relation   to   awareness   and   discrimination   in   accounts   of  
aesthetic   experience,   aesthetic   appreciation,   and   aesthetic   judgement.   I   have  
endeavoured   to   undertake   this   analysis   as   well   as   to   begin   the   work   of  
developing  an  account  of  aesthetic  perception  which  reconciles   the  broad  and  
narrow  approaches  through  a  greater  understanding  of  attention  and  the  forms  
of   perceptual   representation   and   appreciation   of   which   we   are   capable   in  
different  contexts.  
In  this  chapter  we  will  consider  some  of  the  most  significant  challenges  my  
account   faces   as   well   as   the   advantages   and   wider   implications   of   thinking  
about   attention   and   aesthetic   perception   in   the   ways   I   have   presented.   In  
responding   to   these   challenges  we  will   consider   the   advantages  which   come  
with   separating   certain   questions   about   aesthetic   perception   from   questions  
about   aesthetic   value,   as   well   as   the   benefits   of   my   account   for   the  
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understanding  of  the  role  and  significance  of  the  aesthetic  in  art  and  everyday  
life.   In   several   cases   I  will   suggest   that   the   apparent   challenge  or  objection   in  
question   should   be   thought   of   as   an   opportunity   for   a   realignment   or  
reconstrual  of  the  concerns  underlying  the  discussion.  This  will  be  the  case  with  
objections   focusing   on   the   aestheticisation   of   perception   and   the   apparent  
demotion  of  aesthetic  value,  both  of  which  are  considerations  we  might  adduce  
against  a  broad  account  of  aesthetic  psychology  and  in  favour  of  a  narrow  one.    
5.2  The  aesthetic  activity  of  mind  
I  turn  first  to  the  pinpointing  of  the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  and  the  
distinction  between  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception.  Here,  the  main  challenge  
will   be   to   emphasise   that  my  proposal   captures   the   philosophical   core   of   the  
aesthetic   whilst   neither   rendering   the   aesthetic   too   inclusive,   nor   setting   up  
distinctions  where  none  are  needed.  After  that  I  will  consider  some  potentially  
problematic   implications   of   my   account   of   aesthetic   perception   which   arise  
from  the  aestheticisation  of  perception  and  the  perceived  demotion  of  aesthetic  
value.   Here   I   will   focus   on   the   supposed   loss   of   the   normative   core   of   the  
aesthetic  in  my  account,  and  the  worry  that  interest  in  aesthetic  value  becomes  
epiphenomenal.  
5.2.1  From  nonaesthetic  to  bare  aesthetic  perception  
One   of   the   key   tasks   in   the   attempt   to   map   the   limits   of   our   aesthetic  
psychology  is  to  locate  that  moment,  so  to  speak,  when  the  aesthetic  enters  into  
or   begins   to  play   a   role   in   experience.  We  may   then  develop   a   framework   in  
which  differing  forms  of  engagement  with  the  aesthetic  are  explored—aesthetic  
perception,  aesthetic  judgement,  aesthetic  appreciation,  and  so  on—but  without  
a  clear  central  concept  of  the  aesthetic  this  framework  will  remain  fuzzy  and  the  
grounds   of   our   aesthetic   psychology   unclear.   On   my   account   this   central  
concept  is  a  perceptual  activity  which  purposively  orders  the  material  of  sense  
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into   bound   representations.   Other   strategies   for   locating   this   “aesthetic  
moment”   include   the   scrutiny   of   some   characteristic   of   the   objects   of  
perception,  perhaps   its  possession  of  aesthetic  and  expressive  properties.  This  
scrutiny   might   itself   possess   some   appropriate   and   aesthetic-­‐‑making  
characteristic   of   the   kind   we   have   examined:   appropriate   attention,  
disinterested   contemplation,   or   the   viewing   and   valuing   of   the   object   and   its  
properties   for   its  own  sake.  One  of   the  central  arguments  of   this   thesis   is   that  
these   strategies   come   with   oft-­‐‑unacknowledged   commitments   or   conceptual  
lacunae   in   relation   to   attention   and   awareness:   which   lacunae   are   partly  
responsible  for  the  narrowing  of  aesthetic  psychology  and  the  ease  with  which  
evaluative   and   appreciative   concepts   of   the   aesthetic   take   centre   stage   in  
aesthetic  frameworks.  
Still,   it   is   worth   returning   to   this   question   of   the   aesthetic   moment.  
Throughout   I   have   focused   on   the   representational   activity   of   the   perceiving  
mind  as  being  the  foundational  concept  of  a  broad  aesthetic  psychology,  rather  
than,   say,   some  aesthetic  property  of   the  object   of  perception  which   forms   the  
aesthetic   content   of   (appropriately   specified)  mental   states.  As  we   have   seen,  
the   appropriate   scrutiny   or   valuing   of   aesthetic   properties   (however   one  
considers  such  properties   to  be  realised)   forces  on  us  a  post-­‐‑attentional  model  
of  aesthetic  psychology  if  it  is  considered  the  mark  of  the  aesthetic.  By  moving  
the  aesthetic  moment   into  a  more  fundamental  activity  of  mind  I  have  shifted  
this  attention  condition  into  a  position  whereby  it  applies  to  only  rich  aesthetic  
perception  and  the  mental  states  and  practices  of  aesthetic  appreciation.    
  That  aesthetic  perception  is  a  pervasive  activity  of  mind  makes  it  difficult  to  
locate  its  tipping  point:  that  moment  when  we  move  from  nonaesthetic  to  bare  
aesthetic   perception.   There   is   no   “clean   break”   in   experience,   no   Deweyan  
“pervasive   quality”   to   our   phenomenology   which   marks   the   move   from  
nonaesthetic  to  aesthetic  perception.  Rather,  and  as  we  saw  in  our  discussion  of  
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Kant  and  purposiveness,  the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  is  constituted  by  
the   representation   of   the   heterogeneous   qualities   of   objects   in   the   external  
world:  hence  our  focus  on  feature  integration  and  the  binding  problem.  It  is  this  
stage  where  discrete  features  are  related  to  one  another  that  the  aesthetic  character  
of  perception  lies.97    
Of   course,   a   great   deal   of   perceptual   organisation   and   processing   goes   on  
prior  to  binding.  We  discussed  some  of  these  processes   in  chapter  three.  They  
included  grouping  and  part-­‐‑whole  relationships  (determining  which  regions  of  an  
image   go   with   others   to   form   unitary   objects)   and   perceptual   coupling  
(determining  the  appropriate  relationship  between  two  linked  dimensions  in  an  
image).   These   are   the   nonaesthetic   organisational   relationships   which   are  
bound  together  to  form  representations  of  multifeatured  objects  with  locations.  
Prior  to  binding,  perception  is  nonaesthetic  because  it  still  involves,  as  it  were,  
unassigned  features  rather  than  qualities  of  particular,  individual  objects  in  an  
ordered   world.   It   is   in   the   assembly   and   the   assembling   that   the   aesthetic  
character  of  perception  lies.  Thus,  in  Anthony  Savile’s  characterisation  of  Kant’s  
“aesthetic”  in  the  first  Critique,  the  heart  of  aesthetic  perception  lies  in  “what  the  
mind  makes   of   its  manifold   of   sensation”   (Savile,   2005,   p.   67).   To   this   extent,  
aesthetic  perception  is  one  way  of  understanding  our  perceptual  approach  and  
orientation  to  the  world  and  its  contents:  as  an  ongoing  mental  activity  whose  
minimal   aesthetic   activity   is   the   assembling   of   a   representation   of   our  
environment  and   its  qualities,   rather   than  a  discrete  episode  of  contemplation  
or  appreciation.  
                                                                                                 
97  Binding  need  not  have  some  single  mechanism  or  locus  whereby  the  “aesthetic”  somehow  
pops  into  existence.  Would  that  things  were  so  simple.  However,  if  we  step  back  for  a  moment  
and  consider  that  what  we  are  looking  for  in  our  consideration  of  aesthetic  psychology  is  some  
understanding   of   the   capacities   of   the   mind—which   capacities   are   bound   up   with   their  
empirical  study  much  more  closely  than  many  have  wished  to  acknowledge—then  the  diverse  
processes  involved  in  feature  binding  should  not  trouble  the  aesthetician  unduly.  
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Understood   in   this  way,   it  makes  sense   that  aesthetic  perception  might  run  
from   the   fundamental   form   of   perceptual   discrimination   I’ve   called   bare  
aesthetic   perception   to   the   attended   and   concomitantly   more   complex   rich  
aesthetic  perception.  Our  purposive  and  discriminating  perceptual  approach  to  
the  world  is  fundamental,  but  it  varies  in  its  focus  and  development.  Sometimes  
we  choose  to  attend  to  appearances,  to  deploy  the  full  range  of  our  appreciative  
capacities  on  the  objects  of  perception  and  our  responses  to  them:  this  is  a  form  
of   discrimination   potentially   Levinsonian   in   its   interest   in   the   relationships  
between   qualities   and   their   perceptual   effects,   Carroll-­‐‑like   in   its   attention   to  
apperceptive   experience,  Waltonian   in   its   attention   to   our   taking   pleasure   in  
positive   evaluation   of   appearances.   These   are   the   fullest,   richest   senses   of  
aesthetic   perception   and   appreciation,   subject   to   questions   about   their  
appropriateness,  and  deserve  their  place  at  one  end  of  a  continuum  of  aesthetic  
engagement.   They   are   built,   however,   on   the   foundation   of   our   perceptually  
discriminating,   aesthetic   approach   to   the   ordering   of   the   world:   an   aesthetic  
approach   which,   because   it   is   pervasive   and   fundamental,   is   affected   in   its  
development  by  so  significant  a  mental  (and  bodily)  phenomenon  as  attention.  
5.2.2  Is  bound  perceptual  experience  really  aesthetic?  
The   heart   of   my   account   is   that   bound   perceptual   experience   of  
multifeatured   objects   with   locations   is   the   minimal   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception.  However,  it  might  be  argued  that  bound  perceptual  experience  is  a  
necessary   but   not   a   sufficient   condition   of   aesthetic   perception.   A   narrow  
theorist   will   argue   that   it   is   not   sufficient   for   aesthetic   perception   that   we  
perceptually  represent  objects  as  appearing  in  a  certain  way.  What  is  required  is  
a  form  of  scrutiny  or  the  adoption  of  a  certain  attitude  toward  the  objects  and  
qualities   represented.   Distinctively   aesthetic   perception   takes   perceptual  
experience  and  subjects  it  to  something  more.  In  other  words,  on  this  view,  what  
I   have   called   rich   aesthetic   perception   is   just   aesthetic   perception   and   bare  
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aesthetic  perception   is  a  nonaesthetic   foundation.   (Alternatively,   rich  aesthetic  
perception   is   still   only   a   necessary   condition   for   aesthetic   appreciation   or  
aesthetic  experience.)  
In   this  case   it  would  be  open  to  a  critic   to  accept  my  analysis  of   the  role  of  
attention,   but   to  nonetheless  maintain   that   this  demonstrates  precisely  what   I  
have  denied:   that  aesthetic  perception  or  experience   require  attention  because  
the   right   kind   of   perceptual   scrutiny   and   valuing   for   its   own   sake   are  
impossible  in  its  absence.  In  other  words,  attention  is  required  for  appropriate  
scrutiny   of   and   reflection   on   the   perceptual   manifold,   and   this   is   why   bare  
aesthetic  perception  cannot  be  aesthetic.   In  that  case,   I  should  hope  to  have  at  
the   very   least   performed   a   service   in   the   analysis   of   the   role   of   attention   in  
contemporary   theories   of   aesthetic   experience   and   appreciation,   as   well   as  
demonstrating  the  importance  of  engagement  with  philosophical  and  empirical  
work   on   attention   and   consciousness.   Aestheticians   need   to   be   much   clearer  
about  what  they  mean  when  they  invoke  or  allude  to  either  concept.  Moreover,  
I   challenged   the   narrowness   of   many   theories   of   aesthetic   experience:   in  
particular,  I  have  highlighted  the  problems  with  limiting  aesthetic  experience  to  
cognitively  and  evaluatively  complex  responses.  It  is  not  clear  why  the  aesthetic  
tout   court   rather   than   particular   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement   should   be  
limited  to  such  responses.    
In  my   view,   a   key  way   of   rendering   the   aesthetic   coherent   is   to   resist   the  
trend   towards   the   identification   of   aesthetic   experience   with   some   form   of  
higher-­‐‑order  engagement  with  or  intensification  of  perceptual  experience.  This  
trend  targets  particular  forms  of  engagement  characteristic  of  experiences  of  art  
and  nature,  as  well  as  seeking  to  understand  the  value  of  such  experience.  Yet,  
as   I   argued   in   chapter   one,   such   extra-­‐‑psychological   desiderata   are   not  
sufficient   to   force  on  us   an  otherwise  unconvincing  account  of   the   concept  of  
the  aesthetic  or  aesthetic  perception.  
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In   locating   the   heart   of   the   aesthetic   at   the   level   of   bound   perceptual  
experience  rather  than  in  some  scrutiny,  higher-­‐‑order  thought,  or  evaluation,  I  
have   sought   to   establish   a   unified,   evaluatively   neutral   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception  which  does   justice   to   the  perennial  aesthetic   concern  with  ways  of  
appearing,  whilst  not  becoming  too   inclusive  or  watering  down  the  concept  of  
appreciation.   In  doing   so,   I  have   tried   to  accommodate  both   the   idea   that   the  
aesthetic   is   bound   up   with   ways   of   appearing   and   the   everyday   aesthetics-­‐‑
inspired   thought   that   it   is   not   in   the   appreciation   of   ways   of   appearing   that  
aesthetic  status  lies.  
Indeed,   it   is   a   commitment   to   this   kind   of   narrowing   and   exclusive  
distinction  which  renders  aesthetic  experience  and  the  accounts  which  attempt  
to  analyse  it,  open  to  charges  of  irrelevance,  impracticality,  and  elitism.  As  Saito  
(Saito,   2007)   and   Irvin   (Irvin,   2008a)   point   out,   accounts  which   treat   aesthetic  
experience  as  detached,   isolated   from  everyday   life,  and  occupying  Olympian  
heights,  might  well  capture  one  kind  of  experience;  but  it  is  a  relatively  rare  and  
exclusive   form,   treating   aesthetic   experience   as   a   success   term,   rather   than  
something  more  dynamic   and  pervasive   in   the  way  Dewey  gestured   towards  
(Dewey,  2005).  
Saito   is   pessimistic   about   placing   such   detached   experience   on   a   spectrum  
with  unattended,   everyday   experience.   She   thinks  we  need   separate   accounts  
for   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics,   special   experience-­‐‑based   aesthetics,   and   everyday  
aesthetics   (Saito,   2007).   I   resist   this   splitting   up   of   aesthetic   engagement.   In  
specifying  a  minimal  concept  of  aesthetic  perception  which  nonetheless  satisfies  
the  core  aesthetic   interest   in   the  way   in  which   things  appear   I  have  sought   to  
provide   a   foundation   for   all   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement.   This   creates   the  
possibility   of   a   continuum   of   aesthetic   perception   which   runs   from   bare  
aesthetic   perception   to   rich   and   which   is   capable   of   accommodating   the  
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unattended  everyday  as  well   as   the  paradigmatic   and  detached  experience  of  
art.  
My  account  of  aesthetic  perception  is  not  intended  to  replace  accounts  which  
discuss  scrutiny  and  awareness  of  the  relations  between  aesthetic  qualities,  their  
evaluation  and  the  critical  activities  which  depend  on  them.  Where  I  argue  for  
the  priority  of  my  account  is  in  the  initial  specification  of  the  aesthetic  character  
of  perception  and  its  relation  to  attention.  I  endorse  a  plural  account  of  aesthetic  
thought   in   the   sense   that,   once  we   perceive   aesthetically,   and   once  we   do   so  
richly,   there   are   a   great  many  ways   in  which   our   engagement  with   aesthetic  
perception  and  its  objects  might  proceed.  
5.2.3   Is   there   a   significant   difference   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception?  
With  that  said,  once  we  have  specified  the  aesthetic  character  of  perception,  it  
is   a   further   step   to   make   the   kind   of   distinction   between   forms   of   aesthetic  
perception—bare  and  rich—in  the  way  that  I  have.  The  former  does  not  entail  
the   latter.   Nonetheless,   my   account   depends   on   there   being   a   significant  
difference  between  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception.  I  have  argued  that  they  
are   on   a   continuum   with   one   another   and   that   conscious   (visual)   attention  
mediates  the  move  from  one  to  the  other.  Yet,   if  conscious  visual  attention  (or  
its   absence)   is  what   determines  whether  we  perceive   barely   or   richly,   does   it  
make   sense   to   distinguish   two   forms   of   aesthetic   perception   as   I   have   done?  
Why   not   simply   speak   of   aesthetic   perception   in   the   presence   or   absence   of  
conscious  visual  attention?  Distinguishing  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception  as  
I   have,   it   might   be   argued,   is   unparsimonious   when   we   can   use   our  
understanding  of  the  role  of  attention  to  understand  aesthetic  perception.    
It   is   true   that   I   consider   bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception   less   as   distinct  
species  of  aesthetic  perception  and  more  as  aspects  of   the  same  phenomenon.  
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However,   the   value   in   distinguishing   them   as   I   have   lies   in   in   the   different  
forms  of  thought  and  activity  which  they  are  capable  of  supporting,  which  is  a  
result   of   their   differing   relationship   to   phenomenal   attention,   consciousness,  
and  our  access  to  visual  representation.    
We  can  think  about  it  this  way:  If  one  way  of  individuating  useful  concepts  is  
with   reference   to   their   differing   conditions,   then   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception   are   distinct.   Both   are   aesthetic   in   virtue   of   satisfying   the   same  
criterion:   that  of   the  perceptual   representation  of  bound  multifeatured  objects  
with   locations.   That   is,   they   share   necessary   conditions   insofar   as   they   are  
aesthetic.  It  is  at  this  point,  someone  might  suggest,  that  we  should  stop  making  
distinctions,   because   we   have   our   necessary   and   sufficient   condition   for  
aesthetic  perception.  
However,   as   we   have   seen,   each   form   of   aesthetic   perception   stands   in   a  
different  relationship  to  conscious  visual  attention  and  cognitive  consciousness,  
with  all   the  consequences  for  aesthetic  appreciation  which  this  brings.  We  can  
distinguish  between  bound  perceptual  experience  which  is  and  is  not  accessed,  
and   we   can   do   so   partly   in   virtue   of   whether   or   not   we   are   consciously  
attending.    
Indeed,  consciously  attended  perceptual  experience  is  not  only  accessed,  but  
also   more   determinate,   capable   of   supporting   more   enduring   and   complex  
representations.   There   is   thus   a   conscious   visual   attention   condition   on  
accessible,   enduring,   and   determinate   bound   perceptual   representation  while  
there   is   no   such   condition   on   fleeting   and   determinable   bound   perceptual  
representation.   In  other  words,   there   is   a   conscious  visual   attention   condition  
on  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  no  such  condition  on  bare  aesthetic  perception.    
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Furthermore,  rich  aesthetic  perception  is  a  necessary  (although  not  sufficient)  
condition   for   aesthetic   appreciation   which   further   distinguishes   it   from  
unattended,   bare   aesthetic   perception.   This   difference   in   necessary   conditions  
for  each  form  of  aesthetic  perception  and  in  the  mental  states  and  activities  for  
which   they   are   necessary   conditions   allows   us   to   individuate   two   forms   of  
aesthetic  perception.  
Yet,  for  all  that  we  can  individuate  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception  in  this  
way,  we  must  acknowledge  that  the  transition  between  them  is  more  fluid  than  
a   list   of   necessary   and   sufficient   conditions   might   suggest.   This   is   because  
attention  is  not  a  straightforward  binary  phenomenon.  Attention  can  be  divided  
amongst  tasks,  objects,  and  internal  states.  (See  (Mole,  2011a,  p.  74ff.).)  We  can  
find  ourselves  distracted  whilst  desperately  trying  to  focus  on  a  piece  of  work  
or  a  play.  (Or,  of  course,  we  can  allow  ourselves  to  attend  to  anything  but  our  
task.)  Attention  can  misbehave  despite  our  best  efforts.98  To  the  extent  that  it  is  
not  always  clear  what  we  attend  to,  nor  to  what  extent  we  are  attending  to   it,  
the   line   between   bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception   becomes   blurred.   This   is  
likely  to  be  especially  true  in  everyday  life  as  we  move  between  different  tasks,  
environments,   preoccupations,   and   distractions.   Some   intermediate   point  
between   each   form  of   aesthetic  perception  may  be   typical   of   our   engagement  
with   the   environment,   having   characteristics   of   both   bare   and   rich   aesthetic  
perception,  shifting  the  balance  between  them  constantly.  
5.3  The  aestheticisation  of  perception  
One  of  the  central   implications  of  my  account  is  that  aesthetic  perception  is  
pervasive  in  perceptual  experience.  Bare  aesthetic  perception,  understood  as  the  
perceptual   representation   of   bound  multifeatured   objects  with   locations,   goes  
                                                                                                 
98  Indeed,  as  William  James  pointed  out,  for  some  the  inability  to  attend  consistently  is  never  
overcome:   people   “whose   work,   to   the   end   of   life,   gets   done   in   the   interstices   of   mind-­‐‑
wandering”  (James,  1980,  p.  417).  
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on   all   the   time.   This   “aestheticisation”   of   perception,   it   might   be   argued,  
renders  the  aesthetic  trivial  and  threatens  its  value.  
“Aestheticisation”   is   a   term   used   in   a   number   of   different   ways.   Ossi  
Naukkarinen  defines  it  as  “the  notion  that  more  and  more  things  get  absorbed  
into  the  aesthetic  sphere,  and  that  aesthetic  matters  are  becoming  increasingly  
important   in  our  daily   [lives]”   (Quoted   in  Leddy,  2012a).   In   this  sense,  and  in  
the   sense   implicit   in   Saito’s   and   Sherri   Irvin’s   work   on   everyday   aesthetics,  
aestheticisation  is  either  the  recognition  of  things  as  aesthetic  and  aesthetically  
valuable  which  have  always  been  so,  or  the  process  of  their  somehow  becoming  
aesthetically  significant:  of  the  aesthetic  sphere  expanding,  perhaps  as  attitudes  
towards  everyday  life  change.  These  are  positive  or  neutral  understandings  of  
aestheticisation.  
However,  there  are  more  negative  uses  of  the  term.  As  Thomas  Leddy  points  
out,   one   strand   of   criticism   of   aestheticisation   focuses   on   the   aesthetically  
pleasing   representation   in   advertisements   of   potentially   harmful   products  
(Leddy,   2012a).   In   this   sense,   “aestheticisation”   is   the   process   and   result   of  
making   something   visually   pleasing,   possibly   so   as   to  mislead   or   distract   the  
viewer  from  its  other  qualities.  This  is  not  the  negative  sense  of  aestheticisation  
I  will  be  considering  as  a  challenge  to  my  account.  
I   will   focus   on   an   understanding   of   aestheticisation   which   considers   the  
pervasiveness  of  the  aesthetic  in  perception  to  lead  to  its  trivialisation.  Implicit  
in   this   understanding   of   aestheticisation   is   the   charge   that  we   are   viewing   as  
aesthetic  things  which  are  not  (or  viewing  them  in  a  nonaesthetic  manner);  and  
that   doing   so   is   damaging   both   to   our   understanding   of   the   aesthetic   and   its  
value.  This  trivialisation  can  be  understood  in  a  number  of  linked  ways.  Firstly,  
it   might   be   held   that   the   pervasiveness   of   aesthetic   perception   threatens   the  
coherence   and   the   significance   of   the   category   or   concept   of   the   aesthetic   by  
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including  such  diverse  experiences  and  phenomena  that  no  common  thread  can  
be   found.   I   have   attempted   to   answer   this   aspect   of   the   challenge   of  
aestheticisation   throughout   this   thesis,   by   presenting   a   minimal   concept   of  
aesthetic   perception   which   forms   the   foundation   for   richer   and   potentially  
highly  diverse  forms  of  aesthetic  engagement.  
Secondly,   pervasiveness   might   be   thought   to   threaten   the   value   or  
significance   of   the   aesthetic.   Put   simply,   if  we  want   to   find   in   the   aesthetic   a  
marker   or   a   core   of   value—something   special—then   its   pervasiveness   in  
ordinary   life   renders   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   experience   just   that:  
ordinary.   I   take   it   that   this   concern   is   what   underlies   Christopher   Dowling’s  
worry   “that   in   attempting   to   extend   the   concept   of   the   aesthetic   used   in  
philosophical   discussion   of   the   experience   of   art,  we   do   not   lose   sight   of   the  
core  concept  of  the  aesthetic…[There]  is  a  serious  danger  of  motivating  such  an  
intuition  at  the  cost  of  trivializing  what  counts  as  aesthetic”  (Dowling,  2010,  p.  
226).  The  objection  here  is  not  to  extending  the  aesthetic  sphere  to  cover  at  least  
some   aspects   of   daily   life,   but   to   the   admission   of   forms   of   response   beyond  
those  characteristic  of  the  aesthetic  experience  of  art.99    
Thirdly,  and  relatedly,  aestheticisation  threatens  the  normativity  of  aesthetic  
perception.  This  is  the  Kantian  worry  which  underlies  Dowling’s  criticism:  The  
normative   or   critical   core   of   the   aesthetic   is   lost   when   one   extends   aesthetic  
perception   or   aesthetic   experience   beyond   the   reach   of   aesthetic   judgements  
which  “demand  agreement  from  apparent  dissenters”  (Dowling,  2010,  p.  228).  
For   Dowling,   the   critical   core   of   the   aesthetic—the   focus   on   aesthetic  
                                                                                                 
99  Dowling’s  primary  targets  are  accounts  of  everyday  aesthetic  experience  like  Irvin’s  which  
recognise   a   wider   array   of   felt   experience   as   aesthetic.   My   account   is   not   vulnerable   to   his  
criticism   of   such   accounts   on   the   basis   that   the   extension   of   the   aesthetic   to   the   everyday  
trivialises  the  aesthetic  by  confusing  the  agreeable  with  the  beautiful.  This  is  because  I  have  not  
outlined  a  criterion  of  aesthetic  perception  which  identifies  some  sensuous  or  “private  feeling”  
which   gratifies   the   subject.   The   distinction   between   the   agreeable   and   the   beautiful   does   not  
map  on  to  my  account  because  I  do  not  give  pleasure  an  “aesthetic  making”  role  in  perception.  
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judgements   which   make   normative   claims   on   others,   and   which   are  
characteristic  of   the  aesthetic   experience  of   art—must  be   retained   in  order   for  
the   coherence   and  value  of   the   concept   to   remain.   It   is   only   “those   responses  
that  legitimately  engage  critical  attention  and  interest”  (Dowling,  2010,  p.  229),  
in  part  because  they  are  common  and  communicable,  that  should  be  admitted  
as  aesthetic:  the  a-­‐‑critical,   the  response  which  admits  of  no  sense  in  which  it   is  
correct   or   appropriate,   should   not   be   allowed   through   the   “aesthetics   door”,  
because   that   way   lie   the   idiosyncratic   and   merely   agreeable   responses   that  
threaten  the  coherence  and  significance  of  the  concept.  We  saw  in  chapter  one  
that  this  Kantian  strategy  leads  to  the  narrowing  of  aesthetic  psychology.  
At   the   heart   of   my   response   to   these   challenges   will   be   the   separation   of  
questions   about   aesthetic   perception   from   questions   about   aesthetic   value,  
along  with  the  insistence  that  separating  these  questions  need  not  threaten  the  
value  of  the  aesthetic.  We’ll  begin  by  discussing  the  challenge  from  normativity.  
5.3.1  Aestheticisation  and  normativity  
Let’s   spell   out   the   challenge   of   aestheticisation   and   normativity   for   my  
account   in   more   detail.   If   aesthetic   perception   is   pervasive   in   perceptual  
experience  in  the  way  that  I  have  argued,  then  it  goes  on  pre-­‐‑attentively.  In  that  
case,   firstly,   our   perceptual   experience   is   aestheticised   because   bare   aesthetic  
perception  is  involved  in  the  assembling  of  such  experience  prior  to  conscious  
visual   attention;   and,   secondly,   aesthetic   perception   goes   on   before   talk   of  
appropriateness   or   normativity   becomes   applicable.   This   is   because   the  
epistemic   and   rational   inaccessibility   of   bare   aesthetic   perception   mean   that  
aesthetic   judgements   in   the  sense  of   critical  and  communicable  attributions  of  
aesthetic   qualities   or   aesthetic   value   have   no   place   at   this   level.   Despite  
involving   the   perceptual   representation   of   bound   multifeatured   objects   with  
locations—which  I  argued  should  be  the  core  of  the  concept  of  the  aesthetic—
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this   pervasive   aesthetic   perception   does   not   admit   of   anything   like   the  
normative  aesthetic  experience  Dowling  outlines  or   the  critical  scrutiny  David  
Davies   insists   upon   (D.   Davies,   forthcoming).   I   have   argued   that   it   is   this  
minimal  conception  of  aesthetic  perception  which  underpins  all  other  forms  of  
aesthetic  engagement.  It  is  only  once  attended  and  richly  aesthetically  perceived  
that  talk  of  appropriateness,  aesthetic  appreciation,  and  critical  communication  
becomes  apt.  
Dowling’s   worry   can   be   understood   as   an   appeal   to   place   aesthetic  
judgement  at  the  heart  of  our  aesthetic  framework,  and  to  understand  aesthetic  
experience  and  aesthetic  value  with  reference  to  that  normative  concern.  Hence  
his   resistance   to   responses   which   don’t   admit   of   an   assessment   of  
appropriateness,  and  which  make  no  critical   claims  on  others.  This  normative  
concern,   despite   variations,   is   characteristic   of   many   narrow   approaches   to  
aesthetic   psychology.   Throughout   this   thesis   we   have   seen   that,   for   many,  
aesthetic  experience  must  somehow  admit  of  appropriate  judgements:  of  value,  
of   particular   qualities,   of   our  pleasure   in   them,   and   so   on.   In  many   cases   the  
content  of  such  judgements,  as  well  as  their  appropriateness  are  provided  and  
partly  guaranteed  by  conscious  attention   to   their  objects  and  our  responses   to  
them.  On  some  views   it   is  appropriately  grounded  pleasure  which  constitutes  
or  informs  judgement,  on  others  it  is  attention  to  certain  forms  and  qualities  of  
objects   “for   their   own   sakes”,   and,   on   still   others,   it   is   attention   to   our   own  
experience   of   a   state   of   affairs.   The  normative   concern  has   certain   benefits   as  
well   as   attendant   problems.   One   benefit   lies   in   doing   justice   to   our   sense,  
identified   by   Hume,   Kant,   and   many   others,   that   our   aesthetic   judgements  
possess   something   more   than   merely   personal   significance.100   We   feel   that   a  
                                                                                                 
100   The   normative   concern   runs   through   most   of   modern   aesthetics,   from   Hume’s  Of   the  
Standard   of   Taste   (Hume,   2008)   and   Kant’s   third   Critique   (Kant,   1998)   to   more   modern  
manifestations  in  (Scruton,  1979),  (Levinson,  1996b),  and  (Zangwill,  2001a).  
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judgement   of   beauty,   grace,   ugliness,   has   a   claim   on   others.   Without   this  
normative  core,  we  risk  triviality.101  
If   one   of   the   key   implications   of   my   account   is   that   aesthetic   perception  
extends   beyond   this   normative   core,   becoming   supposedly   “a-­‐‑critical”,   then  
that   might   be   thought   to   provide   prima   facie   grounds   for   rejecting   it.   The  
aesthetic  framework  has  become  warped,  tending  towards  an  a-­‐‑critical  aesthetic  
perception   and   too   far   from   aesthetic   judgement.   (Moreover,   it   might   be  
argued,  this  aestheticising  extension  results  in  the  triviality  of  the  concept  of  the  
aesthetic.  If  all  perception  is  somehow  aesthetic,  then  the  concept  doesn’t  really  
demarcate  anything  useful  over  and  above  perceptual  experience,  and  certainly  
can’t  be  used   to  discuss  or   identify  a  kind  of  value.)  This   is  a  challenge  which  
must  be  taken  seriously.  One  concern  of  this  thesis  is  the  relationship  between  
several   key   concepts   in   aesthetics.   How   aesthetic   value,   aesthetic   perception,  
aesthetic   experience,   aesthetic   pleasure,   aesthetic   judgement,   and   aesthetic  
appreciation  are  interrelated  and  interdefined  is  what  tends  to  make  any  given  
account  distinctive.  Shift  one  concept  or  define   it   in   terms  of  another  and  you  
alter  the  framework.  
5.3.2  Aesthetic  response  and  aesthetic  judgement  
It  must  be  conceded  that  a  commitment  to  this  normative  core  as  a  sine  qua  
non   of   aesthetics  will   result   in   the   rejection   of  my   account.   It   is   not   a   critical  
                                                                                                 
101  However,  such  a  project  comes  with   its  own  problems.  One   is  how  to  cash  out   the   idea  
that  subjective  responses  can  be  assessed  for  appropriateness  when  it  is  often  the  case  that  the  
qualities   to  which  we  are  responding  are   thought   to  be  partially  constituted  by  that  response.  
One  attempted  solution  to  this  has  been  the  suggestion  that  we  attend  to  or  value  the  objects  of  
our   response   “for   their   own   sake”,   so   as   to   protect   against   instrumental   or  merely   personal  
evaluation.   Another,   has   been   to   argue   that   in   experiencing   or   perceiving   aesthetically   we  
apprehend  real  features  of  objects,  thus  seeking  to  secure  the  appropriateness  of  our  responses  
and  judgements  with  reference  to  the  world  rather  than  ourselves.  This  form  of  realism  about  
aesthetic   properties   is   accompanied   by   familiar   metaphysical   concerns   about   response-­‐‑
dependence  and  the  status  of  secondary  qualities,  which  I  don’t  intend  to  discuss  here.  
On   this  perennial  debate,  a   representative  sample  might   include   (Bender,  1996,  2001,  2003;  
Goldman,  1993,  1995;  Levinson,  2006a,  2006c).  
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approach   to   appearances   which   demarcates   the   aesthetic   on   my   account   of  
aesthetic  perception.  Nor,  however,  is  the  identification  of  a  form  of  pleasure  or  
evaluation  the  criterion  by  which  the  aesthetic  is  identified.  This  should  help  us  
begin  to  see  why  the  normative  critique  might  not  be  fatal  for  my  approach.  If  
part  of   the   reason   for   the  emphasis  on  appropriateness  and  critical   interest   in  
aesthetics   is   the   frequent   understanding   of   aesthetic   judgement,   aesthetic  
perception,   and   aesthetic   experience   as   grounded   in   the   felt   response   of   the  
subject   to   features   of   the   external  world,   then   the  worry   that   such   responses  
may   be   inappropriate   or   a-­‐‑critical   can   be   understood   as   the   upshot   of   a  
particular   approach   to   the   nature   of   aesthetic   response   and   its   relation   to  
aesthetic  judgement,  rather  than  characteristic  of  the  aesthetic  in  general.    
In   other  words,   if   one’s   account   of   aesthetic   response   involves,   on   the   one  
hand,   a   subjective   response   such   as   pleasure,   and,   on   the   other   hand,   a  
condition   that   attempts   to   secure   intersubjective   legitimacy   for   judgements  
grounded  in  that  pleasure,   then  that  demonstrates  why  one  would  need  to  be  
committed   to   a   normative   core.   As   Dowling   highlights,   such   accounts   don’t  
want  to  arrive  at  a  point  where  “merely”  pleasurable  or  agreeable  experiences  
qualify   as   aesthetic.   So   they   need   a   way   to   isolate   distinctively   aesthetic  
pleasures  which   are   then  used   to  ground   judgements  with   a   claim  on  others:  
that   is,   with   a   claim   to   describe   something   about   the   world   as   well   as   an  
individual’s  response  to  it.  
But   that,   I   suggest,   is   the   result   of   an   account   (or   family   of   accounts)   of  
aesthetic  response  we  need  not  accept,  and  a  view  of  the  relationship  between  
aesthetic   response   and   aesthetic   judgement   which   should   not   be   taken   to  
characterise   the   aesthetic   tout   court.   Because   I   haven’t   identified   aesthetic  
response  with  a  form  of  pleasure  my  account  of  aesthetic  perception  need  not  
be   concerned   with   the   demarcation   of   distinctively   aesthetic   pleasure   from  
pleasure  in  general.  (At  least,  not  urgently.)  As  a  result,  the  normative  demand  
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on   aesthetic   response   drops   away,   because   my   characterisation   of   aesthetic  
perception  as  the  perceptual  representation  of  bound  multifeatured  objects  with  
locations  is  not  vulnerable  to  the  kind  of  epistemic  or  causal  worry  that  underlies  
attempts   to   ensure   that   aesthetic   judgements   grounded   on   pleasure   are  
appropriate  and  have  some  claim  on  others.  
Another  form  of  this  worry  is  that  bare  aesthetic  perception  does  not  admit  
of   the   comparative   judgement   and   relevance  of   expertise   involved   in   judging  
artworks  and  aesthetic  merit.  This  is  another  manifestation  of  the  objection  that  
bare  aesthetic  perception  does  not  admit  of  the  right  kind  of  discrimination.  The  
idea   is   that   certain   reasons   cannot   play   a   justificatory   role   in   aesthetic  
judgement,   because   justification  doesn’t   enter   into  my   framework  of   aesthetic  
perception   until   attention   is   involved:   then   the   relationship   between   reasons  
and   aesthetic   judgement   becomes   similar   to   mainstream   accounts.   Yet   the  
aesthetic   ends   up   sitting   uncomfortably,   it   might   be   suggested,   between   the  
rational  and  the  a-­‐‑rational;  and  thus  the  concept  of  the  aesthetic  and  its  role  in  
our  lives  becomes  fractured.  
The  response  to  this  challenge  focuses  on  the  difference  we  discussed  in  the  
previous   chapter   between   perceptual   justification   and   the   use   of   perceptual  
justification.   Now,   it   is   true   that   attended   and   unattended   perceptual  
experiences  differ  in  terms  of  the  complexity  and  determinacy  of  representation  
of  which  they  are  capable,  but  that  doesn’t  affect  this  issue,  because  it’s  not  the  
case   that   in   bare   aesthetic   perception   we   make   aesthetic   judgements   which  
cannot   be   justified  until  we   attend.  Rather,   by  virtue   of   our   representation  of  
bound   multifeatured   objects   with   locations   we   already   possess   perceptual  
justification.   We   certainly   require   more   than   the   possession   of   perceptual  
justification   for   aesthetic   appreciation:   we   require   the   capacity   to   use   that  
justification  in  statements  and  inferences  about  the  objects  of  our  experience.  It  
is   conscious   visual   attention   which   enables   us   to   use   the   justification   that  
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perceptual  experience  provides.   In   this  sense,  bare  aesthetic  perception   is  pre-­‐‑
critical   rather   than   a-­‐‑critical.   My   account   retains   the   critical   thought   and  
practise   involved   in   aesthetic   appreciation,   supported   by   rich   aesthetic  
perception.  However,  I  argue  that  aesthetic  perception  is  the  core  concept  of  our  
aesthetic  psychology.  
5.3.3  A  challenge  from  appearance    
Now,  it   is  open  to  someone  to  say  of  the  above,  “Look,  that’s  a  response  to  
one   kind   of   account   of   aesthetic   response   and   aesthetic   judgement,   but   my  
concern  is  not  with  those  accounts  but  with  the  aesthetic  interest  in  appearances  
for   themselves.   By   aestheticising   perception,   you   prevent   this   interest   in  
appearances  for  their  own  sake  being  paradigmatic  of  the  aesthetic  approach  to  
the  world.”  The  challenges  are  related  in  that  they  share  the  concern  to  isolate  
an   interest   in   appearances,   either   as   grounds   for   appropriate   judgements   of  
aesthetic  qualities  and  aesthetic  merit,  or  as  straightforwardly  characteristic  of  
aesthetic  matters.  Both  challenge  the  sense  in  which  I  aestheticise  perception  by  
making   bare   aesthetic   perception   pervasive   in   (although   not   exhaustive   of)  
perception.    
The  emphasis  of  this  second  objection  is  slightly  different  from  the  normative  
challenge.  The  normative   challenge   is  motivated  by  a   concern   to  preserve   the  
critical  core  of  aesthetic  judgement,  whereas  this  new  challenge,  despite  having  
a  normative  concern  as  a  potential  consequence,   is   focused  on   the   isolation  of  
appearances   from,   say,   function,   idiosyncratic   preference,   or   sensory  
gratification.  What  matters  is  how  a  mug  appears,  not  how  well  it  performs  its  
function   of   containing   hot   liquids   in   an   easily   handled   form.   Of   course,  
elements  of   the  mug’s  appearance  will  be  determined  by   the   choices  made   in  
fulfilling   functional   goals;   but,   goes   a   characteristic   argument,   the   aesthetic  
interest—whilst   operating   alongside   function   in   the   design   process—is  
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something   over   and   above  mere   function,   something   experienced   for   its   own  
sake.  
It  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  my  account  necessarily  threatens  such  a  
view.  We  are  constitutionally  involved  with  appearances  in  the  broadest  sense  
for  as  long  as  we  perceive.  We  can  respond  to  the  challenge  from  appearance  by  
arguing   that   bare   aesthetic   perception   does   not   threaten   this   interest   in  
appearances  for  their  own  sake.    
I   suggest   that   the  pre-­‐‑attentional   nature   of   bare   aesthetic   perception  might  
actually   foster   the   perception   of   appearances   for   their   own   sake.   This   might  
seem  counter-­‐‑intuitive  to  the  challenger  who  holds  that  perceiving  appearances  
for   their  own  sake   require   certain   forms  of  attitude  or  epistemic   self-­‐‑checking  
such  that  the  individual  can  guarantee  they  are  not  allowing  considerations  of  
function   or   personal   interest   to   impinge.   Yet   the   key   point   here   is   that,   once  
attended   such   an   attitude   or   form   of   epistemic   self-­‐‑checking   might   well   be  
required  to  ensure  appearances  are  perceived  or  scrutinised  for  their  own  sake,  
precisely  because  it  is  attention  which  enables  considerations  of  function,  interest,  and  
value  to  affect  judgement  and  appreciation.  In  other  words,  if  the  concern  of  the  “for  
its   own   sake”   challenge   is   to   safeguard   the   isolation   of   aesthetic   perception  
from   supposedly   extra-­‐‑aesthetic   concerns,   then   bare   aesthetic   perception  
satisfies  this  demand  by  taking  place  before  the  deployment  of  conscious  visual  
attention   and   the   accessibility   of   such   visual   information   to   nonaesthetic  
influences.  Of  course,  this  is  not  attention  for  its  own  sake;  and  we  must  concede  
that   an   insistence   of   an   attention   condition   for   aesthetic   perception   remains  
incompatible   with   my   account.   Nor,   I   think,   is   this   a   very   happy  
characterisation   of   aesthetic   perception:   my   account   is   committed   to   the  
aesthetic  character  of  experience  prior  to  interest  in  appearance  for  its  own  sake.  
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5.4  A  broad  foundation  for  plural  aesthetic  psychology  
Let’s   take  a  step  back  for  a  moment.  Despite  my  response  to   the  normative  
challenge,   it   remains   the   case   that   we   want   aesthetic   perception   to  
accommodate  the  communication  of  something  like  verdictive  and  substantive  
aesthetic   judgements.   The   sense   that   we   appreciate   features   of   the   external  
world—even   if   partially   constituted   by   our   response   to   them—and   that   our  
attribution  of   qualities   and  aesthetic  merit   to   those   features  has   some  kind  of  
claim   on   the   assent   of   others   should   not   be   brushed   aside.  My   claim   is   that  
aptness  for  critical  communication  in  aesthetic  judgement  does  not  exhaust  the  
aesthetic   or   aesthetic   perception.   It   is   not   the   concept   or   practice   in   terms   of  
which   all   other   elements   of   our   aesthetic   framework   should   be   defined   and  
understood.  On  my  account,   that   central  position   is   occupied  by   the  minimal  
concept  of  aesthetic  perception.  
Part   of   my   aim   in   developing   this   account   has   been   to   create   space   for   a  
variety  of  approaches  to  the  nature  of  aesthetic  appreciation  and  judgement  to  
be  built  on  this  broad  foundation  of  aesthetic  perception.  There  is  no  guarantee  
that   the   objects,   individuals,   and   systems   we   might   appreciate   aesthetically  
have  anything  in  common  besides  their  appearing  to  us;  and  there  is  no  reason  
why  anything  beyond  our  representation  of  their  appearances  need  be  held  in  
common  in  order  for  our  perception  and  subsequent  appreciation  of  them  to  be  
aesthetic.  The  sheer  variety  of  potential  objects  of  aesthetic  appreciation  means  
that  a  number  of  accounts  of   such  appreciation  might  plausibly  be  developed  
and  coexist  happily.  Taking  up  something  like  an  aesthetic  attitude  toward  an  
artwork  is  not,  on  my  account,   illegitimate  as  a  form  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  
Aesthetic   perception   is   pervasive   and   it   thus   pervades   each   form   of  
appreciation  that  might  occur.  
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What  the  distinction  between  bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception  allows  is  for  
the  aesthetic  to  be  given  a  crucial  role  in  our  perception  of  and  orientation  to  the  
world,   whilst   not   detracting   from   the   critical   and   appreciative   practices  
considered  paradigmatic  of  aesthetic  engagement  by  narrow  accounts.  Far  from  
trivialising  aesthetic  judgement,  this  account  preserves  the  critical  intuition  that  
motivates   normative   approaches   to   aesthetic   experience,   whilst   making  
aesthetic  perception  pervasive  and  significant  in  everyday  life.  
Indeed,   one   of   the   interesting   results   of   placing   aesthetic   perception   at   the  
heart   of   our   engagement   with   the   world   is   the   way   in   which   it   makes   our  
aesthetic   choices   significant.   Williams   James   wrote   that   “each   of   us   literally  
chooses,  by  his  ways  of  attending  to  things,  what  sort  of  universe  he  shall  appear  
to   himself   to   inhabit”   (James,   1980,   p.   424).   From   the   great   range   of   possible  
objects  and  contexts  of  appreciation,  what  we  actually  aesthetically  appreciate  is  
limited:  by  time,  inclination,  and  day  to  day  concerns.  If  the  aesthetic  pervades  
experience,   then  what  we   choose   to   view  with   a   specifically   aesthetic   interest  
speaks  volumes  about  our  stylistic,  artistic,  and  more  broadly  cultural  concerns.  
Our   choices   of   aesthetic   object   and   aesthetic   experience   become   one   way   in  
which  we   assert   both   our   individuality   and   our  membership   of   groups  with  
similar  aesthetic  interests.    
For   example,   the   Japanese   aesthetic   tradition   focuses   on   and   appreciates  
particular   qualities,   objects,   and   practices:  most   distinctively,  what   Saito   calls  
“the  Japanese  aesthetics  of  imperfection  and  insufficiency”  celebrates  “the  aged,  
the   obscured,   the   impoverished   and   defective”   (Saito,   1997,   p.   377).   In   this  
tradition,  Saito  argues,  the  role  of  time,  environment  and  human  agency  in  the  
ageing  and  wearing  process  are  part  of  a  narrative  that  underlies  appreciation  
of  the  sensory  qualities  of  a  chipped  vase,  the  fallen  cherry  blossom,  the  cracked  
tea  cup.  (See  also  (Tanizaki,  2001).)  
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Indeed,  the  tea  ceremony  is  one  of  the  clearest  examples  of  aesthetic  choices  
as  a  manifestation  and  shaper  of  Japanese  culture.  As  Kakuzo  Okakura  writes  
in  The  Book  of  Tea:    
The   Philosophy   of   Tea   is   not   mere   aestheticism   in   the   ordinary  
acceptance  of  the  term,  for  it  expresses  conjointly  with  ethics  and  religion  
our  whole  point  of  view  about  man  and  nature…Our  home  and  habits,  
costume  and  cuisine,  porcelain,  lacquer,  painting,—our  very  literature,—
all  have  been  subject   to   its   influence….It  has  permeated  the  elegance  of  
noble  boudoirs,  and  entered  the  abode  of  the  humble.  Our  peasants  have  
learned  to  arrange  flowers,  our  meanest  labourer  to  offer  his  salutation  to  
the  rocks  and  waters.  (Okakura,  1964,  pp.  1-­‐‑2)  
Of   course,   neither   Japanese   nor   any   other   culture   is   monolithic,   and   this  
gives   an   impression   of   only   a   small   part   of   the   atmosphere   of   design   and  
appreciation.  Indeed,  one  of  the  challenges  in  any  given  period  is  frequently  the  
dispute  over  which  aesthetic  choices  are  the  most  valuable  or  representative  of  
a  set  of  values.102  We  will  discuss  this  more  below,  but  before  that  I  want  to  turn  
to  the  relationship  between  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  value.    
5.5  The  demotion  of  aesthetic  value?  
It   is   common   to   find   discussions   of   aesthetic   experience   or   aesthetic  
appreciation  motivated  with  reference  to  our  interest  in  and  pursuit  of  aesthetic  
value.   Thus   Robert   Stecker   writes   that   “The   reason   we   are   interested   in   the  
aesthetic  is  that  we  believe  there  is  a  distinctive  kind  of  value:  aesthetic  value.  
Of  all   the  aesthetic  concepts,   this   is   the  one  we  ultimately  need  to  make  sense  
of.   Those   who   care   about   such   things   as   aesthetic   experience   or   aesthetic  
properties  do  so  because  of   the  belief   that   they  are  providers  of   something  of  
great  value  to  human  beings”  (Stecker,  2006a,  pp.  1-­‐‑2).  On  one  influential  view,  
“aesthetic   empiricism”,   we   are   to   understand   aesthetic   value   as   a   form   of  
                                                                                                 
102  See  (Saito,  2007)  for  more  on  this.  One  example  might  be  the  Nineteenth  Century  dispute  
between  Neo-­‐‑Classical  and  Gothic  Revivalist  architecture.  
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instrumental  value,  such  that  the  aesthetic  value  of  an  object  is  a  question  of  the  
value  of  the  experience  the  object  is  disposed  to  bring  about  in  an  appropriate  
audience.  Thus  the  concepts  of  aesthetic  experience  and  aesthetic  properties  are  
marshalled   in   service   of   the   explanation   of   aesthetic   value   and  why   it   is   we  
might  pursue  such  an  experience  and  the  objects  which  elicit  it.103  
All   this   is   by   way   of   emphasising   the   centrality   of   aesthetic   value   in  
explanations   of   aesthetic   concepts   and   aesthetic   practice.   In   contrast,   I   have  
outlined   a   framework   in   which   an   evaluatively   neutral   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception   takes   centre   stage.   Concepts   such   as   aesthetic   experience   and  
aesthetic   appreciation   are   understood   with   reference   to   aesthetic   perception,  
rather  than  aesthetic  value,  which  is  thus  demoted  from  its  position  at  the  head  
of  our  aesthetic  framework.  Or  so  it  might  be  argued.    
This   kind   of   objection   is   related   to   the   problem   of   pervasiveness   and  
triviality.  It  can  be  understood  in  several  ways.  Firstly,  as  the  familiar  problem  
that   the   pervasiveness   of   the   aesthetic   leaves   us   struggling   to   understand   its  
distinctiveness  or  value:  if  aesthetic  perception  goes  on  all  the  time,  how  could  
aesthetic   experience   be   in   any  way  more   valuable   than   ordinary   experience?  
This   is   another   form   of   Dowling’s   concern.   Secondly,   and   relatedly,   the  
objection   from   aesthetic   value   can   be   understood   as   the  worry   that   aesthetic  
value  simply  drops  out  of  the  picture  on  my  account,  or  becomes  explanatorily  
inconsequential   or   epiphenomenal.   This   supposed   inconsequentiality   of  
                                                                                                 
103  Aesthetic  empiricism  is  far  more  complex  an  issue  than  this,  involving  significant  disputes  
over  the  nature  and  relationship  between  artistic  and  aesthetic  properties,  and  our  experience  of  
them.   Matters   are   further   complicated   by   frequent   discussions   of   artistic   value   rather   than  
aesthetic  value,   the  waters  becoming  increasingly  muddied  by  disputes  about  whether  artistic  
value  should  be  separated  from  aesthetic  value.  The  question  of  whether  artistic  merits  can  be  
judged   in   the   absence   of   facts   external   to   the   experience   of   a   work   is   plausibly—but   not  
decisively—a   separate   question   from   the   judgement   of   its   aesthetic   merits.  My   discussion   is  
simply   aimed   at   highlighting   the   centrality   of   aesthetic   value   to   discussions   of   aesthetic  
experience,  aesthetic  appreciation,  and  the  concept  of  the  aesthetic  itself.  
For  overviews  of  such  debates  see  (D.  Davies,  2006;  Graham,  2006).  See  (Shelley,  2010a)  for  a  
recent  argument  against  value  empiricism.  
   251  
aesthetic   value   is   deeply   counterintuitive   from   such   a   point   of   view.   For,   as  
John  McDowell  puts   it,  “aesthetic  experience  presents   itself  as  a  confrontation  
with   value:   an   awareness   of   value   as   something   residing   in   an   object   and  
available  to  be  encountered”  (McDowell,  1983,  p.  1).  It  is  with  reference  to  such  
a  confrontation  with  value  that  we  should  try  and  understand  the  nature  of  our  
aesthetic  engagement  with  the  world  and  its  features.    
Indeed,  thirdly,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  centrality  of  aesthetic  value  is  what  
explains  the  apparent  normativity  of  aesthetic   judgement:  as  James  Shelley  and  
Michael  Watkins  write,  “if  a  painting  is  beautiful,  then  you  ought  to  see  that  it  
is   beautiful   if   you   look   at   it   and   you   ought   to   look   at   it….[An]   object’s   having  
aesthetic   value   is   a   reason   to   perceive   it   and   to   perceive   it   as   having   the  
aesthetic   value   it   has”   (Watkins   &   Shelley,   2012,   p.   349).   From   this   point   of  
view,  the  centrality  of  aesthetic  value  provides  protection  against  idiosyncrasy,  
as  well  as  a  framework  for  understanding  the  force  of   judgements  of  aesthetic  
merit.  
Underlying  each  of   these   forms  of   the  challenge   from  aesthetic  value   is   the  
thought  that  aesthetic  engagement  is  special  and  that  to  widen  the  reach  of  the  
aesthetic   is   to   risk   adulterating   its   value   and   the   loss   of   the   ability   to   explain  
why  we  want  to  engage  in  such  experience.  Moreover,  to  broaden  the  reach  of  
the  aesthetic  by  shifting  aesthetic  value  from  its  central  position  in  our  aesthetic  
framework   is   to   undermine—once   again—the   normativity   of   aesthetic  
judgements  and  aesthetic  merit.  From  this  point  of  view,  if  my  account  were  to  
trivialise   aesthetic   value   or   to   render   it   explanatorily   insignificant,   then   that  
would  cast  significant  doubt  on  its  plausibility.  
5.5.1  Two  separate  questions:  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  value  
It   is   undoubtedly   the   case   that   we   are   interested   in   valuable   aesthetic  
experiences   and   in   understanding   the   value   of   objects   and   the   kinds   of  
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disagreements  we   can   have  with   others   about   this   value.   It  would   not   do   to  
deny  McDowell’s  emphasis  on  the  confrontation  with  and  awareness  of  value  
arising  from  objects  and  our  experience  of  them;  nor  would  it  seem  sensible  to  
disagree   that   an   object’s   aesthetic   value   provides   prima   facie   reason   to  
experience   it—at   least   if  we  are   interested   in  valuable  aesthetic   experience.   In  
the   light   of   such   acknowledgements   it   might   seem   sensible   to   agree   with  
Stecker  when   he   claims   that  we   are   interested   in   the   aesthetic   because  we   are  
interested  in  aesthetic  value;  or,  perhaps  go  further,  and  suggest  that  we  should  
understand  the  aesthetic  as  essentially  evaluative  and  develop  our  accounts  of  
aesthetic  qualities,  aesthetic  perception,  and  aesthetic  experience  with  reference  
to  aesthetic  value.    
We  can  acknowledge  the  significance  of  aesthetic  value  in  our  lives.  We  can  
even  concede  the  plausibility  of  the  suggestion  that  aesthetic  value  leads  us  to  
try   to   understand   other   aesthetic   issues.   However,   that   the   significance   of  
aesthetic  value  prompts   investigation   into  other  aesthetic   concepts   should  not  
lead   us   to   think   that   this   prompting   implies   its   occupation   of   the   central  
position  in  our  aesthetic  framework.  In  particular,  we  should  avoid  the  pitfall  of  
narrowing  our  concepts  of  the  aesthetic  and  aesthetic  perception  in  an  effort  to  
cash  them  out  in  terms  of  aesthetic  value.  
On  my  account  the  question  of  the  aesthetic  character  of  perception  is  prior  
to  that  of  the  aesthetic  value  of  the  objects  of  perception  and  our  experience  of  
them.   The   recognition   or   appreciation   of   aesthetic   value   depends   on   (rich)  
aesthetic   perception,   but   the   mark   of   the   aesthetic   is   not   evaluative:   it   is  
perceptual.  Of  course,  aesthetic  perception  must  be  compatible  with  an  account  
of   aesthetic   value   and   our   appreciation   of   it   and   the   objects   and   experiences  
which   possess   it.   I   have   insisted   throughout   that   the   kinds   of   discriminating  
approach  to  appearances  “for  their  own  sake”  outlined  by  narrow  accounts  of  
aesthetic   psychology   are   not   illegitimate   as   analyses   of   forms   of   engagement  
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with   aesthetic   perception   and   its   objects;   nor   are   their   discussions   of   the  
relationship  between  appropriately  grounded  pleasure  and  aesthetic  judgement  
ruled  out  on  my  account.  Rather,   I  have  taken  a  step  back  and  away  from  the  
grounding   of   aesthetic   character   in   an   evaluative   orientation   toward   the  
character   of   experience   and   its   objects   whilst   maintaining   a   focus   on  
appearances  and  their  constitution.  
This  certainly  means  that  the  unity  of  the  concept  of  the  aesthetic  cannot  be  
secured   with   reference   to   a   kind   of   evaluative   interest   in   appearances   or   a  
concern   with   a   certain   kind   of   value.   That   much   I   concede   and   insist   upon.  
However,   this   does   not   necessarily   mean—because   the   account   does   not  
pronounce   upon   it—that   we   cannot   look   to   secure   the   normativity   of   such  
judgements  with  reference  to  an  account  of  aesthetic  value  and  what  it  means  to  
appropriately  experience  the  bearers  of  such  value.  It  means  that  such  a  project  
must   be   understood   as   subsequent   to,   though   intimately   connected  with,   the  
wider  project  of  understanding  the  nature  of  the  aesthetic  itself.  
So,  aesthetic  value  does  not  become  superfluous  on  my  account  of  aesthetic  
perception,  but  it  is  shifted  to  a  separate  set  of  questions,  one  which  a  complete  
theory   of   aesthetic   appreciation   and   aesthetic   judgement   would   have   to  
address.  This  is  not  the  demotion  of  aesthetic  value  or  its   implied  explanatory  
inconsequence  but  a   clear   separation  of  questions  about  value   from  questions  
about  aesthetic  perception.  This  likewise  suggests  the  limitations  of  my  account.  
I  earlier  emphasised  that  I  made  no  attempt  to  give  an  account  of  judgements  of  
beauty   or   aesthetic   merit   beyond   outlining   the   perceptual   and   cognitive  
conditions  for  such  an  account.  Nor  have  I  attempted  to  analyse  the  connection  
between  pleasure  in  appearance  and  aesthetic  value  in  the  way  that  accounts  of  
the   response-­‐‑dependence  of  aesthetic  value  do.   (E.g.   (Goldman,  2006).)  To   the  
extent   that   aesthetic   perception   is   pervasive   on   my   account   the   attempt   to  
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isolate  aesthetic  pleasure  will  require  some  further  condition  beyond  its  arising  
from  assembled  experience.  
5.5.2  Connecting  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  value  
Despite  arguing  that  questions  about  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  value  
are   separate,   it  would  be   odd  were  we   to   insist   that   no   connections   could  be  
made  between   them.  Such  a  proposal  would  have   the  strange  consequence  of  
attempting  to  secure  the  unity  and  coherence  of  the  concept  of  the  aesthetic  by  
excluding   questions   about   aesthetic   value;   which   exclusion   rather   militates  
against  the  unifying  aim.  Aesthetic  perception  is  a  valuable  mental  activity  not  
least  because  it  plays  a  central  role  in  our  orientation  to  our  environment.  Such  
an  activity  has  cognitive,   social,   therapeutic,  and  ethical  value,  some  of  which  
we  will   discuss   below.   Let’s   focus   first,   however,   on   the   connection   between  
one   form   of   aesthetic   value—that   of   aesthetic   qualities   and   the   objects  which  
possess   them—and   the   activity   of   aesthetic   perception.   I’ll   do   this   with   the  
assistance   of   a   passage   from   Frank   Sibley’s   “Aesthetics   and   the   Looks   of  
Things”  (Sibley,  2001c).  
5.5.3  Sibley  and  values  in  human  life  
When   wondering   why   we   value   certain   qualities   “for   themselves”   Sibley  
makes  the  following  suggestion,  
Is   it   perhaps,   that   the   qualities   and   appearances   that   can   be   admired  
aesthetically   for   themselves   must   be   ones   which   somehow,   putting  
aesthetic   questions   aside,   are   vitally   involved   in   human   experience?  
Awareness  of  and  concern  with  warmth,  light,  brilliance,  clarity,  purity,  
regularity,   cleanness,   richness,   softness,   smoothness,   and   simplicity   go  
deep   into   human   life   and   interests.   There   is   nothing   artificial   or  
accidental   or   superficial   about   them.  They   are   as   basic   as   the  passions.  
(Sibley,  2001c,  p.  31)  
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He  goes  on:  
we   cannot   survive   without   warmth,   peace,   energy;   we   cannot   avoid  
danger,   violence,   fear;   and   we   concern   ourselves   deeply   over   purity,  
clarity,   and   simplicity.   These   are   qualities   we   may   value   for  
themselves…[Qualities]   like   serrated,   or   hygienic,   or   sanitary   are  more  
specialized   or   peripheral,   of   interest   less   for   themselves   than   for   their  
instrumental   value   (contrast  with   them   ‘sharp’   and   ‘biting’,   ‘pure’   and  
‘clean’).  When  we  do  praise   something   for   being,   e.g.,   fast-­‐‑looking,  we  
notice  that  ‘fast’  is  not  confined,  like  ‘hygienic’,  to  its  instrumental  value;  
it  suggests  dash,  bravado,  a  way  of  life  valued  for  itself.  (Sibley,  2001c,  p.  
31)  
Sibley  suggests  that  those  qualities  in  which  we  can  take  an  aesthetic  interest  
for  themselves,  without  reference  to  other  explanations  of  suitability  to  context  
and   so   on,   are   those   which   reflect   fundamental   human   concerns.   In   a   slight  
contrast   to   his   phrasing,   Sibley’s   aesthetic   “for   itself”   derives   from   a   broader  
human   instrumentality,   linking   certain   appearances   with   foundational   needs  
and   desires.   The   implication   seems   to   be   that,   although   these   are   aesthetic  
qualities  we  value  for  themselves,  they  are  instrumental  and  anthropocentric  in  
the  sense  that  they  signify  human  value.  They  become  “for  itself”-­‐‑type  values  (or  
qualities  we   value   “for   themselves”)   for   us   because  we   are   human   and   have  
certain  vital  interests.  Roger  Scruton  has  pointed  out  that  humans  seem  to  have  
inherent  need  to  interpret:  when  the  object  of  our  attention  is  an  appearance,  we  
will   interpret   it   as   something   intrinsically  meaningful   (Scruton,   2007,   p.   244).  
Aspects   of   our   environment’s   appearance   such   as   light,   brilliance,   clarity,  
purity,   regularity,   cleanness,   richness,   softness,   smoothness   are   perceived   as  
valuable  for  their  own  sake  as  a  consequence  of  their  signifying  safety,  warmth,  
peace,  energy,  and  so  on.  
There  is  a  Deweyan  undercurrent  to  Sibley’s  suggestion.  Dewey  thought  “the  
contemplative  character  of  the  esthetic”  overemphasised  “without  much  regard  
to   capacity   for   esthetic   perception   in   the   concrete”.   For   Dewey,   aesthetic  
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perception  “deeply  affects  the  practice  of  living”  and  this  overemphasis  of  the  
contemplation   of   art   results   in   “drawing   away   esthetic   perceptions   that   are  
necessary   ingredients   of   happiness,   or   reducing   them   to   the   level   of  
compensating   transient   pleasurable   excitations”   (Dewey,   2005,   pp.   8-­‐‑9).   We  
have  seen  how  this  is  the  case  in  contemporary  narrow  accounts  and  Dowling-­‐‑
like  objections  to  everyday  aesthetics.  Similarly,  Sibley  was  of  the  view  that  we  
should  not  neglect  those  aesthetic  aspects  of  life  which  don’t  result  in  standout  
experiences,  although  each  writer  differs  in  many  other  respects  (Sibley,  2001d).  
For   Dewey,   as   for   Sibley,   aesthetic   value   can   be   connected   to   fundamental  
human  needs  and  our  ever  changing  relation  to  the  environment.  
The   career   and   destiny   of   a   living   being   are   bound   up   with   its  
interchanges   with   its   environment,   not   externally   but   in   the   most  
intimate  way…Life  consists  of  phases  in  which  the  organism  falls  out  of  
step   with   the   march   of   surrounding   things   and   then   recovers   unison  
with   it…In   a   world   likes   ours,   every   living   creature   that   attains  
sensibility   welcomes   order   with   a   response   of   harmonious   feeling  
whenever  it  finds  a  congruous  order  about  it.  (Dewey,  2005,  pp.  12-­‐‑13)    
  Our   perception   of   the   congruity   between   appearances   and   these   needs   is  
valuable  and  experienced  as  valuable,  both  aesthetically  and  as  fulfilling  these  
needs.   This   congruity,   as   Sibley   highlights,   allows   us   to   explain   why   certain  
qualities  might  be  aesthetically  valuable  in  only  some  situations.  “[To]  make  a  
quality   like   angularity   aesthetically   acceptable,  we   link   it  with   some   of   these  
deeper  concerns,  with  what   touches  home;  we  say   it   is  violent  or  energetic  or  
menacing”  (Sibley,  2001c,  pp.  31-­‐‑32).  What  I  want  to  suggest,  then,  in  response  
to  the  challenge  of  aesthetic  value’s  separation  from  aesthetic  perception  is  that  
we   begin   to   understand   the   role   of   value   in   the   way   Sibley   hints.   Far   from  
banishing   aesthetic   value   to   the   sidelines,   this   understanding   places   it   at   the  
very  centre  of  our  lives.  
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How   should   we   understand   the   connection   between   my   account   and   the  
Sibleian  approach  to  (some  kinds  of)  aesthetic  value?  These  qualities,  the  objects  
which  possess  them,  and  the  collections  of  such  objects  in  the  environment  are  
at   the   heart   of   aesthetic   perception.   They   inform   and   inflect   perceptual  
experience   at   the   level   of   both   bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception.  Although   I  
have   outlined   an   evaluatively   neutral   criterion   for   aesthetic   perception,   it  
remains   the   case   that   the   objects   and   qualities   represented   may   possess   this  
connection   to   valuable   qualities   of   the   environment,   and   do   so,   in   part   as   a  
consequence  of  how  they  appear  even  when  unattended.    
The  qualities  which  Sibley  identifies  are  at  the  heart  of  this:  they  are  qualities  
we   confront   every   day   even   if   we   do   not   attend   to   them.   In   the   absence   of  
attention   we   are   unable   to   respond   appropriately   to   them   in   the   way   many  
accounts   of   aesthetic   value   demand   (unless   we   have   done   so   previously,   in  
which   case   contextual   and   memory-­‐‑based   top-­‐‑down   influences   on   our  
representation   of   them   might   amount   to   something   like   an   appropriate  
response).  However,  we  nonetheless  represent  them  and  they  are  connected  to  
the   deep   human   interests   Sibley   discusses.   Bare   aesthetic   perception   thus  
involves   a   confrontation   with   aesthetic   value,   the   possessors   of   which   are  
aesthetic   qualities   which   connect   to   human   interests   in   such   a   way   as   to   be  
valuable  for  their  own  sake.  
Of   course,   aesthetic   appreciation   remains   the   locus   of   engagement   with  
aesthetic  value  and  the  phenomena  which  possess  it.  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  only  
attentive,  appreciative  experience  which  provides  the  perceptual  and  cognitive  
tools   to   respond   appropriately   to   objects   and   their   qualities.   Thus,   it   is   only  
such   experience   which   can   be   involved   in   the   kinds   of   critical   practice  
privileged  by  Dowling-­‐‑like  challenges  to  broad  aesthetic  psychology.  As  long  as  
we  don’t  make  such  practice  criterial  of   the  aesthetic   in  general,  we  can  allow  
that   aesthetic   appreciation—supported   by   rich   aesthetic   perception—is   the  
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origin   of   aesthetic   judgements   with   a   claim   on   others,   which   possess   (or  
purport  to  possess)  normative  force  in  their  attribution  of  aesthetic  qualities  and  
aesthetic   value,   whilst   arguing   that   the   role   of   aesthetic   perception   in  
representing  an  integrated  external  world  implicates  it  in  the  confrontation  with  
value.  
5.6   Aesthetic   perception,   art,   and   everyday   aesthetics:   advantages   and  
implications  
Perhaps  the  greatest  advantage  of  my  account  is  that  its  outline  of  aesthetic  
psychology   allows   us   to   begin   to   reconcile   the   role   of   the   aesthetic   in   the  
experience   of   art,   nature,   and   the   home.   To   put   it   another   way,   the  
reconciliation   of   the   broad   and   narrow   accounts   of   aesthetic   psychology  
through   a   greater   understanding   of   the   nature   and   role   of   attention   and  
aesthetic  perception  provides  a  foundation  for  everyday  and  standout  forms  of  
aesthetic   engagement.   It   allows   us   to   say   this   is   where   the   aesthetic   is   in  
everyday  life  and  show  the  continuum  of   that  concept  with  experiences  of  art  
(and  nature).  
5.6.1  Aesthetic  perception  and  everyday  aesthetics  
One  of  the  motivations  for  this  thesis  was  the  conviction  that  whilst  everyday  
aesthetics  has  raised  important  questions  about  the  nature,  extent,  and  value  of  
aesthetic  experience   in  everyday  life,   it  has  not  done  a  good   job  of  addressing  
the   psychological   foundations   of   such   experience   or   the   ways   in   which  
everyday   aesthetic   psychology   differs   from   mainstream   theories   of   aesthetic  
experience   and  aesthetic   value.  This  made   it   fairly   straightforward   for  what   I  
called  the  narrow  approach  to  aesthetic  psychology  to  exclude  those  everyday  
aesthetic   experiences   which   do   not   satisfy   their   theories   of   attentive   and  
appreciative   experience.   Everyday   aesthetics   has   not   provided   an   aesthetic  
psychology   to   support   the   extension   of   aesthetic   experience.   I   have  
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endeavoured  to  remedy  that  and,  in  doing  so,  to  provide  the  kinds  of  analytical  
tools  which  both  mainstream  and  everyday  aestheticians  can  use  to  understand  
the  nature  and  variety  of  aesthetic  experience.  Thus,  if  the  narrow  theorist  still  
wishes   to   reject   everyday   aesthetic   experience,   they   now   have   a   concept   of  
aesthetic   perception,   aesthetic   psychology,   and   attention   against   which   to  
argue.  
One  of  the  key  ways  in  which  I  have  attempted  to  substantiate  the  extension  
of   the   aesthetic   to   everyday   experience   is   by  providing   a   concept   of   aesthetic  
perception  which  is  neither  “merely  sensory”  nor  simply  an  approach  adapted  
from  so-­‐‑called  “art-­‐‑centred”  aesthetics.  The  former  approach  will  never  satisfy  
those  who  wish  to  see  a  more  significant  role  for  the  aesthetic  than  its  involving  
sensory   experience;   and   the   latter   threatens   to   retain   the   focus   on   the  
contemplative   experiences   characteristic   of   theories   of   the   appropriate  
experience   of   art,   which,   as   we   have   seen,   either   begs   the   question   against  
unattended   aesthetic   experience   or   includes   such   experience   without   saying  
why   it   qualifies   as   aesthetic.   The   concept   of   aesthetic   perception   as   the  
perceptual   representation   of   bound   objects   with   locations   avoids   the  
weaknesses  of  both  approaches  and  can  be  used  to  understand  the  significance  
of  the  aesthetic  in  daily  life  as  well  as  the  attentive  experiences  philosophers  of  
art  describe.  
Of   course,   attention   to   appearances   isn’t   restricted   to   the   art   gallery.   We  
attend  to  appearances  every  day,  perhaps  never  more  frequently  and  with  such  
personal  significance  as  when  we  are  at  home.  Much  of  the  everyday  aesthetics  
literature   is   dedicated   to   an   analysis   and   urging   of   the   aesthetic   status   of  
domestic   experience,   practice,   qualities,   and   values.104   For   example,   Thomas  
Leddy’s   “everyday   surface   aesthetic   qualities”   are   characteristically   domestic:  
                                                                                                 
104   See,   for   example,   (Lee,   2010),   (Melchionne,   1998),   (Naukkarinen,   2013),   (Rautio,   2009),  
(Saito,  2007).  
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“Neat,”   “clean,”   “messy”,   “dirty”,   “sloppy”,   “carelessness”,   “shoddy”,  
“slipshod”,  “precise/imprecise”,  “meticulous”.  He  writes,  
Rooms   become   messy,   cluttered.   They   must   be   cleaned,   cleared,   set  
straight,   tidied   up.   Kitchens   and   bathrooms   can   be   unclean   or   ‘filthy.’  
Floors   must   be   washed   when   dirty   and   unattractive.   Shelves   may   be  
ordered   or   disordered.   Desks   can   be   cluttered.   Schedules   and  
organizational  plans  can  be  messy.  Products  can  be  presented  neatly  and  
attractively  or  not.  Clothes  run  from  messy  and  dirty  to  neat  and  clean.  
People  too  can  be  messy  or  neat,  clean  or  unclean.  They  are  considered  
messy  and  unclean   if   their   clothes,  grooming,  possessions,  products,  or  
workstations  have  these  qualities.’  (Leddy,  1995,  p.  261)    
Leddy  argues  that  such  qualities  deserve  a  place  in  the  ontology  of  aesthetic  
qualities.   It   is   worth   highlighting   the   way   in   which   we   might   connect   such  
qualities  with  Sibley’s   suggestion   that   some  qualities   represent  or   touch  upon  
vital  human  interests.  We  can  and  frequently  do  attend  to  such  qualities,  both  
from  the  point  of  view  of  appearance  and  function.  Ideally,  of  course,  we  want  
a  home   that   both   appears   and   functions   in   a  manner   conducive   to   our   living  
well   in   it.   As   Scruton   writes,   “[The]   attempt   to   match   our   surroundings   to  
ourselves   and   ourselves   to   our   surroundings   is   arguably   a   human  universal”  
(Scruton,   2009,  p.   82).   In   a   similar  vein,   the   critic  Rowan  Moore  describes   the  
building  of  a  home  as  the  attempt  “to  rearrange  the  bewildering  world,  so  as  to  
find   your   place   and   way   in   it”   (Moore,   2012,   p.   55).   We   can   place   aesthetic  
perception  at  the  heart  of  this  project,  both  in  the  matching  and  the  living.  Our  
attention  to  and  assembly  of  our  surroundings  is  informed  by  the  qualities  we  
value   and   which   signify   for   us   both   fundamental   human   concerns   and  
individual   preoccupations.   Habits   of   attention   and   inattention—as   James  
suspected—translate   into   different   experiences,   different   ways   of   occupying  
spaces;  and  this  variety  of  attention—as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter—has  a  major  
effect   on   the   kinds   of   aesthetic   thought   and   communication   of  which  we   are  
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capable   by   virtue   of   the   perceptual   representations   accessed   and   available   to  
cognition  and  discussion.    
Moore   quotes   the   architect   Lina   Bo   Bardi   speaking   of   her   approach   to  
building   her   own   house:   “[the]   idea  was   to   have   a   house   that   gave   physical  
protection   from   the   wind   and   rain,   but   shared   this   with   poetry   and   ethics,  
things   that   can   be   found   even   in   a   storm”   (Moore,   2012,   p.   32).   By   poetry,  
Moore  writes,  Bo  Bardi  meant  “such  things  as  the  ability  of  the  house  to  seem  
airborne   and   grounded   at   once,   or   the   rapport   she   created   between   artefacts  
and  vegetation”  (Moore,  2012,  p.  32).  These  are  aesthetic  effects  conducive  to  a  
certain   way   of   occupying   the   home   and   representative   of   Sibleian   valuable  
qualities   such   as   light,   regularity,   simplicity,   clarity.   As   a   particular   architect  
and  individual  Bo  Bardi  connected  to  and  privileged  particular  values  and  their  
manifestations  in  the  appearance  of  her  home.105  
Particular  habits  of  linking  such  qualities  to  these  deeper  concerns  amount  to  
a   style,  a  particular  way  of  establishing  a  home  and  displaying   the  values  we  
adopt.  That  these  values  are  multiply  realisable  is  evident  from  the  great  variety  
of  ways  we  go  about  representing  and  satisfying  them.  For  example,  Junichirō  
Tanizaki’s  In  Praise  of  Shadows  highlights  the  distinctively  Japanese  approach  to  
food,   light,   shade,   and   space,   as  well   as   the  way   in  which   such   a   distinctive  
tradition   of   architecture   and   dwelling   satisfies   similar   fundamental   human  
needs   as   Western   traditions   (Tanizaki,   2001).   Thus,   to   a   great   degree   the  
creation   and   ordering   of   a   home   is   the   choosing   of   our   experience   and   the  
experience  of  those  who  visit.  We  can  do  this  to  differing  degrees.  Some  seem  
oblivious  to  the  environment  in  which  they  live  and  others  exquisitely  sensitive,  
as   in  Will  Wiles’s   novel  Care   of  Wooden   Floors   in   which   an   inveterate   slob   is  
entrusted  with  the  immaculate  apartment  of  modernist  composer  Oskar.  This  is  
                                                                                                 
105  See  also  (Ballantyne,  2011).  
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a  question  of  character  and  aesthetic  preferences  will  have  a  part  to  play.  After  
all,   we   might   judge   an   artwork   extraordinary   yet   prefer   a   serene   minor  
impressionist   landscape   on   the   wall   of   the   sitting   room   to   a   blood-­‐‑spurting  
Caravaggio.  (Should  any  of  us  be  so  fortunate.)  
Of   course,   on   my   account   of   aesthetic   perception—and   on   several   broad  
accounts  of  aesthetic  psychology—it   is  not  only  when  attended   that  everyday  
life  is  aesthetic.  As  Ossi  Naukkarinen  writes  “The  everyday  attitude  is  colored  
with   routines,   familiarity,   continuity,   normalcy,   habits,   the   slow   process   of  
acclimatization,   even   superficiality   and   a   sort   of   half-­‐‑consciousness   and   not  
with   creative   experiments,   exceptions,   constant   questioning   and   change,  
analyses,   and   deep   reflections”   (Naukkarinen,   2013).   A   central   project   of  
everyday   aesthetics   is   the   recognition   and   theorisation   of   the   objects   and  
experiences   of   everyday   life   as   aesthetic   and   aesthetically   valuable.   I   have  
contributed   to   this  project  by  developing  a   framework   in  which  perception   is  
aestheticised   but   not   trivialised.   Bare   and   rich   aesthetic   perception   operate  
reciprocally  as  we  live  and  move  and  work  at  home.  
Bare  aesthetic  perception  as  I  have  developed  it  is  fleeting,  persisting  for  only  
slightly   longer   than  the  stimuli  which  prompt   it.   If   this  were  all   there  were  to  
unattended   experience,   daily   life   would   be   impoverished.   However,   bare  
aesthetic  perception  is  enriched  by  its   interplay  with  rich  aesthetic  perception.  
As   we   saw   in   the   previous   chapter,   prior   knowledge,   evaluation,   and  
experience   affect   unattended   perceptual   representation,   which   means   that  
much  of  our  daily  bare  aesthetic  perception  will  be  informed  by  prior  episodes  
of   rich   aesthetic   perception.   This   is   especially   true   in   the   home,   where   our  
intimacy   with   its   spaces   and   contents   will   inform   and   render   determinate  
perceptual  representations  which  would  otherwise  remain  determinable.  Such  
familiarity  makes   it   likely   that  deviations   from  our  domestic  expectations  will  
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draw  attention.  We  notice  when  our  living  room  is  disarranged:  many  visitors  
would  not.  
This   familiarity  has  a  strange  consequence,  which   is   that  we   tend   to  attend  
less   in   the  home   than  we  do   in  unfamiliar   or   strange  places.  As  Naukkarinen  
pointed  out,  our  everyday  operation  is  often  one  of  “half-­‐‑consciousness”  in  the  
sense   that  we  do  not  attend   to   the   intimate  and   familiar:   it’s  not  new,   it’s  not  
exciting,   it’s  background.  Part  of  what  art  does   is   force  us  to  attend,  both  as  a  
result   of   the   cultural   context   of   its   production   and   reception,   and   by  
representing  the  familiar  in  strange  and  striking  ways.  This  is  part  of  the  impact  
of   the   avant-­‐‑garde   in   any   particular   period:   new   stylistic  movements   present  
new  ways  of  assembling  experience,  urge  differing  habits  of  attention  on  us.  In  
the   home,   however,  we   are   used   to   seeing,   hearing,   and   touching   the   objects  
and  events  we  encounter.  Our  attention  is  not  drawn  to  the  familiar  in  the  way  
that  it  is  to  the  strange  (Haapala,  2005).  I  walk  home  distracted,  barely  noticing  
the   path,   the   trees,   the   sky,   the   road;   but   when   I   visit   a   new   country,   city,  
church,  or  museum,  I  am  unfamiliar  and  excited.   I  attend  and  am  open  in  the  
way   that   narrow   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   privilege.   That   shifting  
relationship  between   the  attended  and  the  unattended,  between  bare  and  rich  
aesthetic   perception   is   testament   to   the   significance   and   breadth   of   aesthetic  
psychology.   It   is   a   strength   of   the   account   presented   in   this   thesis   that   it   can  
accommodate  the  variety  of  our  aesthetic  engagement  with  the  world.  
5.6.2  Everyday  and  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetics  
As  I  mentioned  above,  by  resisting  the  tendency  to  fix  the  meaning  and  value  
of  aesthetic  experience  with  reference  to  paradigmatic  experiences  of  art  I  have  
undercut  approaches  which  seek  to  understand  the  role  of  the  aesthetic  in  daily  
life   by   extending   art-­‐‑centred   accounts.   This   kind   of   art-­‐‑centred   approach   is  
exemplified  by  Christopher  Dowling’s  distinction  between  two  different  ways  
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of  accommodating  the  “Aesthetics  of  Daily  Life  Intuition”.  The  intuition  that  we  
should  extend  the  aesthetic  to  aspects  of  daily  life  can  be  understood  either  as  
the   suggested   application   of   art-­‐‑centred   accounts   of   aesthetic   experience   and  
value   to   everyday   life   or   as   the   view   that   experiences   of   daily   life   supply  
paradigmatic  instances  of  aesthetic  experience  and  value  without  any  reference  
to  frameworks  derived  from  the  philosophy  of  art.  Dowling  opts  for  the  weaker  
art-­‐‑centred   approach,   Yuriko   Saito,   he   suggests,   for   the   stronger   (Dowling,  
2010).  
In  choosing  the  weaker  form  of  the  intuition  Dowling  resists  Saito’s  division  
of  the  aesthetic  domain  into  art-­‐‑centred  and  everyday  aesthetics.  He  retains  the  
unity  of   the  concept  of   the  aesthetic  by  arguing  that   its  critical  and  evaluative  
core   is   exemplified   by   experiences   of   art;   and  he  does   so   by   arguing   that   the  
stronger  form  of  the  intuition  (exemplified  by  Irvin  and  Saito)  has  unwelcome  
consequences  for  aesthetics:  namely  the  trivialisation  of  aesthetic  value  and  the  
fragmentation   of   the   concept   of   the   aesthetic.   His   tone   in   endorsing   the   art-­‐‑
extending  intuition  is  one  of  rescuing  aesthetics  from  the  excesses  of  those  who  
would   accord   the   everyday   equal   status   with   art.   He   writes   that   the   strong  
intuition   involves   experiences   “not   bound  by   the   limitations   and   conventions  
that   temper  discussions  of  aesthetic  value   in   the  philosophy  of  art”   (Dowling,  
2010,  p.  241).  
My   account   undercuts   this   distinction.   By   framing   a   minimal   account   of  
aesthetic   perception   as   bound   perceptual   representation   we   can   avoid   both  
Saito’s  division  of  the  aesthetic  domain  and  Dowling’s  (and  others’)  attempt  to  
retain  its  unity  by  insisting  on  the  priority  of  art.  The  aesthetic  becomes  broader  
and   its   value   need   not   be   thought   diluted   by   its   pervasiveness.  We   need   not  
seek   to   understand   our   concepts   of   aesthetic   experience   and   aesthetic   value  
with  reference  to  a  prioritisation  of  art  or  everyday  life.  The  interesting  question  
becomes   one   focused   on   how   aesthetic   perception   varies   in   everyday   and   art  
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contexts.   I  have   reorientated   the  debate   surrounding   the   relationship  between  
art   and   the   everyday   away   from   questions   of   priority   or   accommodation   by  
developing  a  concept  of  aesthetic  perception  and  a  psychological  framework  in  
which  both  are  equal  partners  on  a  continuum  of  aesthetic  engagement  running  
from  bare   aesthetic   perception   to   the   rich   and   appreciative.  Moreover,   I   have  
done   so   in   such   a   way   that   we   can   understand   why   unattended   everyday  
experience  and  attended  aesthetic  experience  should  differ  in  their  relationship  
to  aesthetic   appreciation,   aesthetic   judgement,   and  critical   communication.  As  
we   have   seen,   this   has   been   a   focus   for   disagreement   between   broad   and  
narrow,  everyday  and  art-­‐‑centred  approaches.  On  my  account  we  need  give  up  
neither  inattentive  and  unreported  aesthetic  perception  nor  attentive,  extended  
and  critical  contemplation.      
5.6.3  Art  and  aesthetic  perception  
What   are   the   implications  of  my  account   for   art   and   the   experience  of   art?  
Much  of  what  I  have  had  to  say  in  this  thesis  has  been  about  experiences  very  
different   from   those  associated  with  art.  Yet   it  would  be  odd   if   an  account  of  
aesthetic   perception   were   inapplicable   to   the   reception   and   creation   of  
artworks.  I’ll  focus  here  on  some  interwoven  implications  of  my  account  for  the  
experience,  creation,  and  appreciation  of  art,  as  well  the  role  of  the  critic.  
I  have  already  pointed  out  that  aesthetic  perception  overflows  the  experience  
of   art   and   I   suggested   in   chapter  one   that  my  account  of   aesthetic  perception  
has  consequences  for  aesthetic  theories  of  art.  In  thinking  about  the  relationship  
between   my   account   and   aesthetic   theories   I   will   focus   on   Nick   Zangwill’s  
Aesthetic  Creation  Theory  (Zangwill,  2007).  This  is  Zangwill’s  “bare  statement”  
of  the  theory:  
Something   is   a  work  of   art   because   and  only   because   someone  had   an  
insight   that   certain   aesthetic   properties   would   depend   on   certain  
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nonaesthetic  properties;  and  because  of  this,  the  thing  was  intentionally  
endowed   with   some   of   those   aesthetic   properties   in   virtue   of   the  
nonaesthetic  properties,   as   envisaged   in   the   insight.   (Zangwill,   2007,  p.  
36)  
This   is   an   aesthetic   theory   of   art:   Zangwill   takes   the   familiar   line   of  
identifying   an   intention   to   create   an   artefact  with   aesthetic   character   and,   by  
extension,  aesthetic  value.  This  aesthetic  character  is  understood  in  terms  of  an  
insight  about  the  dependence  of  aesthetic  properties  on  nonaesthetic  properties:  
an  insight  about  the  aesthetic  effect  “realized  by  an  object  or  event  with  certain  
nonaesthetic   properties—for   example,   marks   on   a   canvas,   sounds   or   words”  
(Zangwill,   2007,   p.   39).   Artistic   activity,   for   Zangwill,   involves   the   insight,  
intention  and  belief   that   the   creation  of   an  object  with  particular  nonaesthetic  
properties  will  produce   the   aesthetic  properties  which  depend  on   them.   “The  
existence  of   such  an   intention  or   set  of   intentions,”  he  maintains,   “is   essential  
for   something   to   be   a   work   of   art”   (Zangwill,   2007,   p.   40).   It   follows   that  
aesthetic   appreciation   involves   the   perception   and   evaluation   of   this  
dependency  and  the  intentions  which  produced  it.106  
What  would   a   reconstrual   of  Aesthetic  Creation   Theory   in   the   light   of  my  
account  of  aesthetic  perception  look  like?  It  must  be  noted  that  I  have  resisted  
property   talk   in   this   thesis,   whereas   Aesthetic   Creation   Theory   is   couched  
specifically   in   terms  of   the  dependence  of  aesthetic  properties  on  nonaesthetic  
properties.   However,   nothing   I   have   argued   in   this   thesis   militates   against  
property  talk,  especially  when  we  come  to  discuss  and  attribute  properties—or,  
as   I   prefer,   qualities—to   objects,   events,   and   individuals   as   a   result   of  
perceiving   them   aesthetically.   Indeed,   I   have   endeavoured   to   steer   clear   of  
explicit   metaphysical   commitments   beyond   those   which   accompany   the  
naturalism  implicit  in  the  use  of  empirical  psychology.  
                                                                                                 
106   It   is   a   further,   and   specifically   artistic   issue,   for   Zangwill,   whether   or   not   the   artist’s  
insight  was  original  (Zangwill,  2007,  p.  44).  
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A  more  natural  reading  of  Aesthetic  Creation  Theory  from  the  point  of  view  
of  aesthetic  perception—and  one  which  avoids  property  talk  where  possible—
would  be  in  terms  of  the  insight  of  the  artist  into  the  way  in  which  both  she  and  
others  will  assemble  the  qualities  with  which  they  may  intentionally  endow  the  
object  or  event.  In  other  words,  the  artist  has  an  insight  about  the  nature  of  the  
potential   perceptual   experience   their   work   may   engender.   The   aesthetic  
appreciation  of  the  resulting  artwork  will  consequently  focus  on  the  success  of  
the  artist’s  intention  and  the  nature  of  the  experience.  So,  an  aesthetic  theory  of  
art  may  well  be  compatible  with  my  account,  in  part  due  to  the  emphasis  on  the  
intentions  of  the  artist  to  engender  particular  perceptual  experiences.    
It  is  particularly  interesting  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relationship  of  art-­‐‑
centred   and   everyday   aesthetics   that   Zangwill   is   keen   to   include   everyday  
creative   activities   “such   as   industrial   design,   advertising,  weaving,  whistling,  
cake-­‐‑decorating,   arranging   and   decorating   rooms,   religious   rituals   and  
fireworks  displays”  in  his  theory  of  art  (Zangwill,  2007,  p.  78).  In  this  his  view  is  
similar   to   Melchionne’s   suggestion   that   “Everyday   domestic   practice   can   be  
interpreted  as  a  response  to  the  status  of  ordinary  domestic  space  as  a  work  of  
art”  (Melchionne,  1998,  p.  194).  Elsewhere  Zangwill  writes  that,  
…some  grooming  activities  are  aesthetically  motivated  and  their  upshot  
may  count  as   little  works  of  art–or   I  see  no  harm  in  saying  so.   In  cases  
where  we  groom  ourselves  to  enhance  our  beauty,  I  would  shift  the  onus  
of  proof,  and  ask,  giving  the  extent  of  the  aesthetics  of  everyday  life,  why  
such   activities   are   not   at   least   on   a   continuum   with   artworld   art  
activities?  Hairdressing,  after  all,  is  an  art  in  a  broad  sense,  and  in  many  
countries  the  art  even  goes  under  the  name  “aesthetic”.  (Zangwill,  2009b,  
p.  25)  
We  can  understand  all  of  these  activities  as  involving  the  manipulation  of  the  
qualities  of  objects  and  events  to  create  a  perceptual  effect:  a  particular  way  of  
assembling   perceptual   experience.   The   breadth   of   Zangwill’s   concept   of  
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creativity   sits   happily   with   the   idea   that   the   kinds   of   thought   and   attention  
involved  in  art  and  the  everyday  are  deeply  connected.  As  he  writes,  “Artwork  
activities  fall  into  a  more  general  class  of  aesthetic  activities”  (Zangwill,  2009b,  
p.  26).  Indeed,  we  might  add  that  artwork  activities  fall  into  the  class  of  attended  
aesthetic   activities:   those   which   are   attended   and   thus   richly   aesthetically  
perceived,  which  allows  for  cognitive  and  rational  engagement  with  perceptual  
experience  and  its  objects.  As  I  suggested  above,  in  daily  life  we  move  between  
bare  and  rich  aesthetic  perception,  unattended  and  attended:  when  we  attend,  
we  can  engage  and  act  creatively,  if  only  for  a  moment.    
Of  course,  I  have  taken  the  further  step  of  suggesting  that  the  aesthetic  starts  
earlier   in  perception   than  Zangwill  would  accept—for  he   insists   that  many  of  
the   features   I   identify   as   involved   in   bare   aesthetic   perception   are  
nonaesthetic—but  the  idea  that  aesthetic   insight   is  based  on  an  understanding  
of   the  ways   in  which  we   assemble   experience   is   attractive   from   the   point   of  
view  of  my  account  of  aesthetic  perception.  
Reading  Aesthetic  Creation  Theory   in   terms  of  my  account  also  helps  us   to  
think  about  the  nature  and  role  of  aesthetic  appreciation  and  criticism.  The  core  
of   aesthetic   appreciation   is   perceptual:   It   is   about   seeing,   hearing,   touching,  
tasting,   smelling,   and   so   on   in   a   certain   way.   In   the   case   of   the   aesthetic  
appreciation  of  art,  we  are  concerned  with  the  perceptual  experience(s)  offered  
by  the  work.  I  have  argued  that  perception’s  being  aesthetic  need  not  involve  a  
particular   stance,   detachment,   disinterest   toward   experience   or   its   objects,   or  
even   attention;   however,   it   may   still   be   the   case   that   specifically   aesthetic  
appreciation   of   an   object   or   event   requires   not   only   attention   but   a   form   of  
orientation  or  epistemic  self-­‐‑checking  so  as  to  ensure  that—insofar  as  our  aim  is  
to  understand  and,  perhaps,  evaluate  the  appearance  of  the  object  in  question—
we   are   not   influenced  by   colour  preferences,  mood,   commercial   value,   or   the  
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pleasures   of   familiarity.107   But   this   is   an   aspect   of   the   special   activity   of  
appreciating  appearances  rather  than  the  aesthetic  per  se.    
Now,   this   does   not   mean   that   aesthetic   appreciation   exhausts   the  
appreciation   of   art   as   art.  Nonetheless,   understanding   an   artist’s   achievement  
frequently  requires  perceiving  the  work  and  its  qualities  and  the  nature  of  the  
aesthetic  insight  which  led  to  the  work  engendering  the  perceptual  experience  
which  the  artist  intended  (if  they  have  been  successful).  
One   of   the   roles   of   the   critic   is   also,   therefore,   to   bring   their   audience   to   a  
particular   way   of   perceiving   the   artwork.108   The   critic   guides   attention   to  
particular  marks,   relationships,   textures,  notes,  or  movements  so   that  we  may  
perceive  the  artwork  as  they  believe  it  should  be  perceived.  Indeed,  attention  is  
required  in  order  to  understand  the  kinds  of  statement  the  critic  makes  and  to  
bring   that  understanding   to  our  experience  of   the  work   in  question.  We  must  
also   attend   so   as   to   connect   that   experience   with   the   evaluation   a   critic   (or  
anyone)  makes  of  the  work  and  the  reasons  they  may  produce  in  favour  of  it.  
Of  course,   the  critic’s  overall  goal  may  exceed  their  aesthetic  one,  and  their  
evaluation  of   the  work  as  art  will  overflow  their  assessment  of   the  perceptual  
experience   offered   by   the   work.   The   place   of   the   artwork   in   a   tradition,   its  
context   of   production,   and   our   understanding   of   the   artist’s  wider   intentions  
are,   of   course,   relevant   and   attention   is   required   in   order   to   appreciate   such  
artistic   concerns.   Such  knowledge  may   affect   they  way  we  perceive   the  work  
and,   to   the   extent   that   this   occurs,   such   knowledge   is   relevant   to   aesthetic  
perception.   Artistic   and   aesthetic   experience   are   not   straightforwardly  
disentangled:  one  opportunity  for  development  of  the  work  in  this  thesis  is  the  
question   of   the   relationship   between   knowledge   and   understanding   of   the  
                                                                                                 
107  See  (Kieran,  2011)  for  discussion  of  these  kinds  of  effects  on  aesthetic  judgement.  
108  See  (Grant,  2013)  for  a  recent  discussion  of  the  aims  and  nature  of  criticism.  
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origins  of  artworks  on  the  perceptual  experience  of  them.  That  is,  how  are  we  to  
understand  the  idea  that  an  artwork’s  “relational  properties”—for  example,  its  
relation   to  other  works  and   the  art-­‐‑historical   category   in  which   it   belongs—is  
aesthetically  relevant  rather  than  simply  artistically  so?109  Another  is  the  question  
of  the  role  of  rational  argument  in  criticism  as  it  relates  to  the  perception  of  the  
qualities  of  artworks.110  
The   above   is   one   speculative   development   of   the   relationship   between  
aesthetic   perception   and   art.   The   continuum   of   aesthetic   perception   I   have  
presented   allows   for   other   accounts   of   appreciative   scrutiny  which   can  make  
sense   of   the   experience   of   art.   What   we   must   resist   is   the   suggestion   that  
conscious  visual  attention  to  appearances  is  characteristic  of  the  aesthetic  in  the  
sense   of   fixing   its   extension.   It   strikes   me   as   being   far   richer   to   place   such  
absorbed  attention   to  appearances   (and   the  variety  of   forms  of  appreciation   it  
allows)  on  a  continuum  with  everyday  aesthetic  perception.  In  some  ways  this  
serves  to  heighten  the  value  and  significance  of  attended  aesthetic  experience.  In  
a  world  shot  through  with  aesthetic  significance,  how  valuable  that  we  can  step  
back  and   look  at   it,  and  understand  that  as   the   intensification  of  a  relationship  
that   shifts   and   endures   throughout   our   lives.   Art   is   one   element   of   that  
relationship,  but  is  far  from  exhausting  it.  
5.7  Conclusion  
On  my  account  aesthetic  psychology  is  both  broad  and  deep.  Its  breadth  is  in  
the  wide   variety   of   forms   our   engagement  with   aesthetic   perception   and   the  
                                                                                                 
109  The  classic  paper  is,  of  course,  (Walton,  1970).  For  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  
the   value   of   artworks,   the   perceptual   experiences   they   afford,   and   the   relevance   of   non-­‐‑
perceptual  properties  see  (D.  Davies,  2006)  and  (Graham,  2006).  
See   also   (Hopkins,   2005).   See   (Zangwill,   2001b,   2001c)   for   a   discussion   in   relation   to  
formalism.  
110  See  (Hopkins,  2006)  on  the  relationship  between  critical  reasoning  and  critical  perception.  
See  (Sibley,  2001a,  2001b)  for  an  example  of  the  argument  that  critical  activity  aims  at  bringing  
about  perceptual  experience.  
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objects  and  qualities  it  represents  may  take.  Its  depth  is  in  the  continuum  from  
unattended   bound   perceptual   experience   to   attended,   complex,   reflexive,  
evaluative  and  affective  responses  engaged  in  and  undergone  by  subjects  who  
have   sought   to   detach   themselves   from   questions   of   function   or   personal  
interest   in   order   to   focus   purely   on   appearances.   This   plurality   of   legitimate  
aesthetic   responses   and   forms  of   aesthetic   appreciation   and   the   continuum  of  
aesthetic  perception   situates  us   in   a   richly  varied   aesthetic  domain;   a  domain  
which  is  indivisible  from  foundational  human  interests  as  well  as  our  drive  to  
understand  the  world  as  ordered,  purposive  and  conducive  to  such  interests.  
I  have  argued  that  attention  plays  a  significant  role  in  determining  the  kinds  
of   aesthetic   engagement   of   which   we   are   capable   in   any   given   situation.  
Conscious  visual  attention  allows  us  the  full  use  of  our  cognitive  faculties  in  the  
scrutiny  of  its  objects.  Finding  out  about  the  world  and  our  place  in  it  by  way  of  
our   affective,   conative,   and   evaluative   responses   to   it   and   relating   those  
responses   to  aspects  of   the  world’s  appearance   in  causal  and  rational   terms   is  
plausibly  the  central  role  for  aesthetic  perception  and  appreciation.  Engaging  in  
description  of  and  debate  about  these  appearances,  their  interpretation,  and  the  
appropriateness   of   our   responses   to   them   likewise   depends   on   the   forms   of  
perceptual  and  cognitive  scrutiny  that  attention  makes  possible.  These  aesthetic  
responses  and  critical  practices  may  then  affect  how  we  represent  or  respond  to  
appearances  in  an  ongoing  reciprocal  relationship.  
Other  challenges  remain.   I  have  not  discussed  the  role  of  aesthetic  pleasure  
(or   affect   more   generally)   at   any   great   length   in   the   aesthetic   framework  
presented.  Nor  have  I  discussed  the  related  issue  of  aesthetic  preference.  How,  
we   might   ask,   should   we   understand   the   role   and   nature   of   aesthetic  
preferences   in   a   framework   which   is   not   premised   on   appropriate   pleasure?  
Likewise,  the  nature  of  aesthetic  knowledge  and  rationality  is  important  given  
the  emphasis  I  have  placed  on  the  accessibility  of  perceptual  representations  to  
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cognition  and  reason  in  the  presence  and  absence  of  conscious  visual  attention.  
The  relationship  between  aesthetic   judgements  and  the  reasons  we  possess  for  
them   and   have   available   for   critical   debate—including   the   thorny   issue   of  
aesthetic  testimony  and  acquaintance—will  affect  the  precise  development  of  a  
full   theory   of   the   interplay   between   attention,   aesthetic   perception,   and  
aesthetic  appreciation.    
In  this  chapter  I  have  endeavoured  to  respond  to  some  central  challenges  to  
my  account  of  aesthetic  perception  and  attention.  I  have  focused  on  what  strike  
me   as   the   most   significant   challenges   from   the   point   of   view   of   a   narrow  
approach   to   aesthetic   psychology.   These   were   focused   on   aestheticisation,  
aesthetic   value,   and   normativity.   This   discussion   has   neither   exhausted   the  
objections  which  might  be  raised  against  my  account,  nor  has  every  theoretical  
lacuna  been  filled.  In  some  cases  I  have  not  provided  full-­‐‑blown  argument,  but  
rather  suggested  the  kind  of  approach  I  should  like  to  take  in  dealing  with  each  
problem.  The  problems  of  pervasiveness  and  triviality  are  serious  challenges  for  
an   account   like   mine,   and   I   don’t   deceive   myself   that   the   responses   in   this  
chapter   will   fully   convince   an   interlocutor   who   is   otherwise   unmoved   by   it.  
Nonetheless,   I   have   attempted   to   show   that   these   are   not   insurmountable  
challenges.  I  have  also  indicated  some  of  the  ways  in  which  my  account  affects  
wider   questions   in   philosophical   aesthetics,   specifically   the   relationship  
between  aesthetic  perception  and  the  theory  of  art,  between  everyday  aesthetics  
and   art-­‐‑centred   aesthetics,   and   between   aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic  
value.  
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Conclusion  
So   while   the   examination   of   tastes   and   smells   may   be   in   itself   an  
insignificant   matter,   there   can   hardly   be   any   enterprise   in   aesthetics  
more   central,   or   more   in   need   of   clarification,   than   the   concept,   the  
boundaries,  the  criteria  of  the  Aesthetic  itself.  
Tastes,  Smells,  and  Aesthetics  
Frank  Sibley111  
This   thesis   asked   a   question   about   aesthetic   psychology:   How   does   the  
relationship  between  the  nature  of  the  aesthetic  and  the  capacities  of  the  mind  
serve  to  support  or  constrain  the  contexts  in  which  the  aesthetic  plays  a  role  in  
experience?   I   have   argued   for   a   broad   aesthetic   psychology   founded   in   a  
concept   of   aesthetic   perception   as   the   perceptual   representation   of   bound  
multifeatured   objects,   the   bare   form   of   which   goes   on   in   the   absence   of  
conscious   visual   attention   and   is   thus   pervasive   in   experience.   The   main  
strengths  of  this  account  are,  firstly,  that  it  retains  the  unity  of  the  aesthetic  by  
creating  a  continuum  of  aesthetic  engagement  which  runs  from  the  fleeting  and  
unattended   experiences   of   broad   aesthetic   psychology   to   the   complex   and  
appreciative  experiences  of  narrow  aesthetic  psychology  without  compromising  
what   is   distinctive   about   each   approach;   and,   secondly,   that   it   does   so   by  
beginning   to   remedy   the   under-­‐‑theorisation   of   attention   in   aesthetic  
psychology.  
I  began  chapter  one  by  showing  how  questions  about  the  nature  and  extent  
of  aesthetic  experience  in  daily  life  and  the  relationship  of  such  experiences  to  
mainstream   accounts   lead   us   to   consider   the   psychological   foundations   of  
aesthetic   experience.   I   suggested   that   a   good   way   to   think   about   aesthetic  
psychology   and   aesthetic   experience   is   in   terms   of   broad   and   narrow  
                                                                                                 
111  (Sibley,  2001d,  p.  253).  
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approaches,  each  of  which  can  result   in  or  be  implied  by  different  accounts  of  
aesthetic   experience   and   assumptions   about   the   psychological   capacities  
required   for   experiences   with   aesthetic   character.   I   argued   that   much   of  
contemporary  philosophical  aesthetics  has  inherited  the  narrowing  interest  in  a  
particular  kind  of  discrimination,  appreciation,  or  judgement,  whilst  the  broad  
approach  remains  interested  in  everyday  and  unattended  forms  of  experience.  I  
located   the   heart   of   this   conflict   in   a   disagreement   about   the   form(s)   of  
awareness   required   for   aesthetic   character   and   the   level   of   attention   which  
supplies  it.  I  argued  that  neither  approach  has  adequately  theorised  the  kinds  of  
attention   and   awareness   required   for   the   forms   of   aesthetic   engagement   they  
propose.  
If  our  aesthetic  psychology  has  been  under-­‐‑theorised  despite  its  significance  
for  the  forms  of  aesthetic  experience  of  which  we  are  capable,  then  our  next  step  
had  to  be  to  excavate  the  psychological  assumptions  operative  in  contemporary  
aesthetics.   To   this   end,   in   chapter   two   I   introduced   the   attention   condition   in  
order   to   analyse   the   role   attention   plays   in   different   accounts   of   aesthetic  
experience.   Alongside   a   “common-­‐‑sense”   concept   of   attention,   I   argued   that  
narrow  approaches   to   aesthetic  psychology   require   attention   in  order   that  we  
are   aware   of   the   right   kind   of   content   in   the   right   kind   of   way   for  
characteristically  appreciative  activities.  However,  I  also  argued  that  there  was  
no   reason   to   think   that   aesthetic   character   requires   attention   and   the   forms   of  
awareness  it  supports  unless  we  consider  aesthetic  appreciation  (or  something  
similar)  exhaustive  of  aesthetic  engagement.    
In  chapter  three  I  proposed  a  broad  account  of  aesthetic  psychology  founded  
in   aesthetic   perception.   My   aim   was   to   develop   a   model   which   can  
accommodate  both  the  unattended  and  fleeting  everyday  experiences  of  broad  
aesthetic  psychology  as  well  as  the  complex  and  appreciative  experiences  of  the  
narrow   approach.   I   argued   that   the   concept   of   aesthetic   perception   as   the  
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perceptual   representation   of   individual   bound   objects   possessing   sensible  
qualities   lies   at   the   heart   of   the   perennial   aesthetic   concern   with   “the   ways  
things   present   themselves”.   I   called   this   “bare   aesthetic   perception”   and  
suggested   that   it  might   go  on   in   the   absence   of   attention.   In   contrast,   and  by  
virtue   of   its   requiring   attention,   “rich   aesthetic   perception”   involves   a   more  
determinate   form   of   perceptual   representation   and   supports   the   forms   of  
awareness   distinctive   of   aesthetic   appreciation   and   narrow   aesthetic  
psychology:  something  bare  aesthetic  perception  cannot  do.    
At  this  point  we  needed  to  understand  in  greater  depth  how  and  why  bare  
aesthetic   perception   might   go   on   in   the   absence   of   attention,   whilst   rich  
aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation  require   its  presence.  In  chapter  
four   I   turned   to   contemporary   philosophical   and   psychological   work   on  
attention,   consciousness,  and  cognition.   I  argued   that  attention   is   required   for  
cognitive   access   to   phenomenal   consciousness,   but   that   it   might   not   be  
necessary   for   phenomenal   consciousness   itself.   Phenomenal   or   “perceptual  
consciousness”   may   overflow   cognitive   consciousness.   Our   question   then  
became  which  kind  of   consciousness   is   required   for   bare   aesthetic   perception  
and  which  for  rich  aesthetic  perception.    
Narrow  aesthetic  psychology,   I   suggested,   requires   cognitive  consciousness  
for  aesthetic  character.  In  contrast,  I  argued  that  it  is  the  activity  of  perceptually  
binding   features   into  objects   rather   than  our  accessing   these   representations  on  
which  the  aesthetic  character  of  experience  depends.  Rich  aesthetic  perception  
and   appreciation   require   both   perceptual   consciousness   and   cognitive   and  
rational   access   to   perceptual   representations   in   order   to   support   and   involve  
characteristically   narrow   forms   of   reasoning,   judgement,   and   communication.  
Bare   aesthetic   perception,   however,   requires   only   that   we   possess   bound  
perceptual   representations   of   objects   with   locations:   this,   I   argued,   does   not  
require   attention.   There   is   a   thus   an   attention   condition   on   rich   aesthetic  
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perception,  but  no  such  condition  on  bare  aesthetic  perception.  This  established  
a  broad  aesthetic  psychology  running  from  bare  to  rich  aesthetic  perception  and  
the  pervasiveness  of  the  aesthetic  in  everyday  experience.  
In  chapter   five   I  considered  opportunities   for  development  as  well  as  some  
challenges  which  arise  from  my  argument.  The  first  challenge  was  to  emphasise  
the   foundational  nature  of  bare  aesthetic  perception.   I  argued  that   this  minimal  
concept   of   aesthetic   perception   as   the   perceptual   representation   of   bound  
multifeatured   objects   with   locations   renders   the   aesthetic   pervasive   in  
experience,   but   that   this   neither   trivialises   the   aesthetic   as   a   concept   nor  
threatens  it  value.  Rather,  by  locating  the  foundational  concept  of  the  aesthetic  
at   the   level   of   bound  perceptual   experience   instead   of   some   scrutiny,   higher-­‐‑
order   thought,   or   evaluation   I   have   retained   the   unity   of   the   aesthetic   and  
resisted  the  exclusive  conception  of  the  narrow  approach  as  well  as  the  division  
of  the  aesthetic  domain  into  everyday  and  art-­‐‑centred  aesthetics.    
In  response  to  the  worry  that  the  normative  core  of  the  aesthetic  is  lost  on  my  
approach,   I   argued   that   this   normative   concern  properly   extends   only   to   rich  
aesthetic   perception   and   aesthetic   appreciation.   Bare   aesthetic   perception   is   a  
pre-­‐‑critical   element   of   our   aesthetic   psychology:   questions   of   aesthetic   value  
and  the  appropriateness  of  aesthetic  judgement  enter  only  once  we  attend  and  
richly   aesthetically   perceive.   This   threatens   to   lead   to   a   worry   about   the  
supposed  demotion  of  aesthetic  value  on  my  account.  
I   emphasised   that   the   question   of   aesthetic   character   is   prior   to   that   of  
aesthetic  value  does  not  mean  that  aesthetic  value  is  inconsequential,  but  it  does  
shift   it   from   the   central   position   that   many   wish   it   to   occupy.   Nor   does   the  
separation   of   questions   about   aesthetic   perception   from   those   about   aesthetic  
value  mean   that   the   two   are  unconnected.  Aesthetic  perception   situates  us   in  
the  world  by  virtue  of  its  involvement  in  the  purposive  assembly  of  experience,  
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and   in  doing  so  connects  us   to  qualities  which  are,   in  Sibley’s  words,  “vitally  
involved   in   human   experience”   and  which   suggest   “a  way   of   life   valued   for  
itself”.    
The  breadth  and  depth  of  my  account  of  aesthetic  psychology  allows  us   to  
reconcile   the   role   of   the   aesthetic   in  diverse   experiences   of   art   and   the  home,  
placing   them   on   a   continuum   which   testifies   to   the   richness   of   aesthetic  
engagement   and   the   variety   of   ways   in   which   the   aesthetic   activity   of   mind  
manifests   in   everyday   and   traditional,   standout   experience.  With   reference   to  
Nick   Zangwill’s   Aesthetic   Creation   Theory   (Zangwill,   2007),   I   suggested   that  
my  account  may  allow  us  to  understand  aesthetic  theories  of  art  in  terms  of  the  
intention  to  create  a  work  with  the  capacity  to  engender  a  particular  perceptual  
experience.  We  might   thus  understand   the  aesthetic  appreciation  of  art  as   the  
grasping   of   this   experience   and   the   qualities   of   the   work   which   give   it   this  
capacity.  This,  I  suggested,  means  that  we  can  understand  of  role  of  the  critic  to  
be   bringing   their   audience   to   the   perceptual   experience(s)   of   the   work   they  
consider  appropriate.  We  can  understand   this  as  a  guiding  of  attention   to   the  
qualities  of  the  work  and  the  experiences  they  support  and  form  a  part  of;  and  
also   in   terms   of   the   necessity   of   attention   for   our   capacity   to   understand   the  
reference   of   the   critic’s   statements,   the   relationship   between   the   reasons   they  
offer  in  favour  of  their  analysis  or  evaluation,  and  the  experience  offered  by  the  
work.  
I   wrote   in   the   Introduction   that   this   thesis   aimed   to   present   both   a  
clarificatory   and   a   revisionary   argument.   Through   an   examination   of   the  
psychological  assumptions  involved  in  contemporary  aesthetics  and  an  account  
of   aesthetic   perception   and   its   relationship   to   attention,   consciousness,   and  
cognition,   I   have   argued   for   a   revised   understanding   of   the   limits   of   our  
aesthetic   psychology   and   the   capacities   required   to   support   aesthetic  
experience.  We  might  build  on  this  foundation  for  a  broad  aesthetic  psychology  
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in  a  number  of  ways.  I  have  focused  throughout  on  vision,  but  always  with  the  
proviso  that  the  aesthetic  should  not  be  limited  to  the  so-­‐‑called  “higher”  senses  
of  vision  and  hearing.  A  complete  account  of  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  
psychology   should   extend   to   all   of   the   sensory  modalities   for   which  we   can  
develop  plausible  aesthetic  theories.  
Such  a  project  involves  a  number  of  challenges,  not  least  of  which  is  the  fear  
that  the  extension  of  the  aesthetic  senses  to  so-­‐‑called  “bodily  pleasures”  results  
in  a  “flight  into  sensuality”:  towards  the  body  and  away  from  the  legitimately  
aesthetic  (Parsons  &  Carlson,  2008).  Glenn  Parsons  and  Allen  Carlson  base  their  
argument  against  the  so-­‐‑called  “lower  senses”  on  a  discussion  of  aesthetic  and  
bodily  pleasures.  There  are  a  number  of  problems  with  their  argument,  not  least  
of  which  is  a  problematic  account  of  the  individuation  and  phenomenology  of  
the  senses  and  a  perennial  interest  in  contemplation,  but—as  I  argued  in  the  last  
chapter  in  my  discussion  of  Dowling’s  challenge—my  account  need  not  concern  
itself  with  arguments  which  distinguish  the  aesthetic  from  the  non-­‐‑aesthetic  (or  
agreeable)   on   the   basis   of   pleasures.   This   is   because  my   account   of   aesthetic  
perception   is   not   grounded   in   a   distinction   between   pleasures   but   between  
bound   and   unbound   perceptual   representations   of   objects   (or   collections   of  
objects).   Instead,   the   question   we   need   to   ask   of   the   non-­‐‑visual   and   non-­‐‑
auditory  senses  is  not  whether  they  deliver  the  “right  kind  of  pleasure”  or  are  
apt   for   contemplative   experience,   but   whether   they   admit   of   the   activity   of  
binding  features  to  objects  with  locations.  
In  the  case  of  taste  and  smell—the  interaction  and  individuation  of  which  are  
complex   questions112—the   work   of   Frank   Sibley   (Sibley,   2001d),   Emily   Brady  
(Brady,   2005),   and   Carolyn   Korsmeyer   (Korsmeyer,   1999)   suggests   that  
gustatory  and  olfactory  modalities  admit  of  a  form  of  binding  and  localisation,  
                                                                                                 
112  See  (Macpherson,  2011).  
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the   representation  of  which   serves   to  orientate  us   in  and   to  our  environment.  
Brady  writes   that  “We  can   identify,   individuate,   select,  and  revisit   smells  and  
tastes;  they  can  be  localized  and  specified,  even  if  they  are  not  as  sustained  as  
other  aesthetic  objects”   (Brady,  2005,  p.  184).  This   seems   to   satisfy  my  criteria  
for  bare  aesthetic  perception  as  well  as  suiting  the  forms  of  attentive  perception  
and  appreciation  characteristic  of  narrow  aesthetic  psychology.    
Touch  is  also  subject  to  questions  about  how  it  should  be  individuated  from  
other   forms   of   bodily   feeling.113   As   Matthew   Ratcliffe   writes,   “one   cannot  
perceive  the  world  tactually  without  perceiving  oneself”  (Ratcliffe,  2013,  p.  131),  
and  this  involvement  of  the  subject’s  body  has  led  to  the  exclusion  of  tactual  or  
“bodily”  experience  from  aesthetic  experience.114  Yet,  if  we  are  serious  about  the  
role  of  the  aesthetic  and  aesthetic  perception  in  orientating  us  to  or  situating  us  
in  a  world  of  objects  and  qualities,  then  we  must  take  touch  seriously;  for,  it  has  
been   suggested,   touch   is   vital   in   what   Ratcliffe   calls   our   “sense   of   reality”  
(Ratcliffe,  2013).115  There  is  much  work  to  be  done  on  the  variety  of  senses  and  
sensory  experience  in  aesthetics.  This  thesis  provides  one  foundation  on  which  
such  work  can  be  built.  
My   account   can   be   understood   to   retain   the   subjectivity   of   the   aesthetic,  
whilst  rejecting  the  necessity  for  a  particular  form  of  feeling  or  representation  via  
a   feeling   for  aesthetic  experience.  Nonetheless,   the   role  of   feeling,  emotion,  or  
pleasure  in  aesthetic  perception  and  aesthetic  appreciation  is  significant  despite  
my   separation   of   it   from   the   question   of   aesthetic   character.   A   pleasurable  
feeling  or  some  emotional  response   is  often  the  first   indication  of   the  value  of  
objects  and  experiences:  such  responses  are  also  frequently  the  terms  in  which  
                                                                                                 
113  See  (Ratcliffe,  2012).  
114  See  Parsons  and  Carlson,  and  (Scruton,  1979,  p.  74).  
115  Korsmeyer  has  suggested  that  this  aspect  of  touch  helps  us  to  understand  the  significance  
of  physical  contact  in  our  aesthetic  experience  of  the  genuine  (Korsmeyer,  2012).  
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we  communicate  to  others  the  value  of  artworks,  landscapes,  architecture,  and  
design.    
Whether   or   not   we   think   that   affective   or   emotional   responses   are   what  
aesthetic  value  consists  in,  they  remain  central  and  we  ignore  them  at  our  peril.  
Aesthetic   life   is   rarely   affectively   or   emotionally   “cold”   even   if   we   are   often  
unsure  quite  how  our  emotions  and  feelings  relate  to  the  aesthetic  character  of  
our   experiences   or   the   qualities   of   their   objects.   It   frequently   seems   to   be   the  
case  that  a  feeling  or  emotion  draws  our  attention  to  the  qualities  of  the  objects  
or  phenomena  which  seem  to  elicit   them:  be   that   the  supposed  sadness  of   the  
“Marcia  funebre”  of  Beethoven’s  third  symphony  or  the  calm,  cool  rationality  of  
Brunelleschi’s  Pazzi  Chapel.  That   is,  phenomenologically,  we  seem  to  feel   first  
and  then  turn  our  attention  to  features  which  might  explain  that  response.  
Indeed,  the  architectural  example  brings  together  our  sensory  and  emotional  
concerns,  for  the  experience  of  architecture  is  plausibly  multisensory  and  bound  
up  with  bodily   feeling.  As   Jenefer  Robinson  writes,  “good  architecture   invites  
or  compels  multisensory  experiences  and  ways  of  moving  and  acting  that  can  
be  felt  in  a  bodily  way  by  the  appreciator”  (Robinson,  2012,  p.  342).  If,  as  I  have  
argued,   aesthetic   perception   situates   us   in   the  world,   then   our  multisensory,  
attentive   and   inattentive,   affective   and   emotional   responses   to   the   built   (and  
natural)  environment  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  aesthetic  in  daily  life.  The  challenge  
is  to  connect  the  perceptual  representation  of  bound  objects  to  such  experience.  
This   thesis   asked   a   question   about   the   nature   and   extent   of   the   aesthetic  
activity   of   mind.   In   answering   this   question   I   have   revised   the   limits   of   our  
aesthetic   psychology   and   argued   for   a   pervasive   form  of   aesthetic   perception  
shaped   by   attention.   This   broad   foundation   allows   for   a   plural   conception   of  
aesthetic   life  and  the   involvement  of   the  aesthetic   in  a  wide  range  of  valuable  
forms   of   thought,   action,   and   communication.   The   breadth   and   depth   of   this  
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account   of   aesthetic   psychology—running   as   it   does   from   fleeting   and  
unattended  everyday  experience  to  full,  rich,  and  contemplative  appreciation—
reveals   the   indispensability   of   aesthetic   perception   in   human   life.   In   the  
perceptual   representation   of   an   ordered,   purposive   world;   and   in   our  
occupation  and  expectation  of   such  a  world   lies   the   confluence  of  perception,  
appreciation,  and  value  that  underpins  daily  life  and  its  fluid  relationship  with  
the  production  and  consumption  of  art.  
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